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Chapter I. Nature as Inner Principle of Change
The concept of "nature as inner principle of change" is fundamental
to Aristotle's theory of the physical world; it is the object of the
present thesis to substantiate this claim by tracing the effects of
this idea in Aristotle's rejection of materialism, in his doctrine of
"natural places", in his definition of change and process in general,
and (via the latter) in his notion of agency in general and the supreme
Unmoved Mover in particular ((1)). Aristotle elucidates "natural" by .
contrast with "artificial" ((2) - (3)), holding that natural substances
not merely collectively ((4) - (5)) but as individuals each possess an
'innate impulse of change'. But this must be explained so as to allow
for the fact that no change is entirely independent of external
conditions ((6) - (7)). If, however, change were totally dependent
on external conditions, its occurrence would be inexplicable ((8) -
(9)), and the very concept of "change" would be incoherent. This
latter conclusion emerges from an examination of the ancient paradox
of becoming and Aristotle's treatment of it ((10) - (33)). The paradox
is expounded ((11) -(14)). Aristotle answers it by showing that
language assumes a continuing subject of change ((15) - (21)). But
this assumption meets the problem only if the metaphysical category
of substance is also assumed, and along with it some distinction
between substance-constitutive and non-substance-constitutive charac¬
teristics ((22) - (27)). The former mark off their subject as a thing
of a certain causal type; thus change, in presupposing a substantial
subject (see also Appendix to Chapter 1), presupposes one that makes
some causal contribution to its own changes ((28) - (33)). But
Aristotle means more than this by 'nature as inner principle'. He
holds a natural substance to be (like a craftsman) the autonomous
determinant of certain changes; these therefore (by contrast with
changes not so determined) are "natural", as manifesting the substan¬
tial nature ((34) - (36)). This problematic notion is taken for
granted by Aristotle in the Vhys-ics ((37) - (39)), but can be seen to
rest on his metaphysic of substance. It is a consequence of this that
the natural change of a given substance be of one kind and display a
(i)
unitary pattern reflecting the unity of the substance ((40)). This
view cripples scientific method as we understand it ((41)), but
Aristotle's idea of substance anyway cuts him off from the approaches
successfully operated in later mechanics and chemistry ((42) - (45)).
A summary of the ground so far covered ((46)) introduces a further
sense in which Aristotle's natures are "inner" principles of change:
the subject of change is not (as in artifice) external to the being
which is the source of change ((47) - (54)).
Chapter II. What Things Have Natures?
Aristotle begins Physics II 1 with a list of organic and inorganic
things 'manifestly' possessing "natures" in the sense explained. But
our explanation has left open the question of the extension of this
concept, and supplies as yet no theoretical justification for his
choice of items on the list ((1)). Aristotle's inclusion of complex
objects such as organisms raises a problem. Whatever has a "nature"
is a substance, and a substance is a per se unity; but how can some¬
thing complex and composed (as are organisms) of simpler substances
be such a unity ((2) - (7))? Aristotle is entitled to count organic
creatures as substances (and for him they are so par excellence) only
if, as against the "materialists", he can show them to be more than
mere arrangements of components ((8) - (9)). In Physics II 1 he
presents (without distinguishing) two materialist positions: one
(i) identifies an object's "nature" with its proximate matter; the
other (ii) asserts the simple bodies to be 'the whole of substance'
((10) - (11)). In II 1 he argues against (i) alone, with varying
success ((12) - (20)). But it is (ii) that poses the graver threat
to his view of organisms as per se unities ((21)). This view, which
Aristotle at no point abandons, connects closely with his doctrine of
necessity and his teleology ((22) - (25)). But has it any firmer
ground than a presumed analogy between nature and artifice ((26) -
(27))? Aristotle's reasoned defence comes in Physics II 8, where he
argues against Empedocles' version of the second materialist position
as applied to organic structure and development ((28)). Aristotle's
argument has apparent flaws ((29) - (33)), but is effective in the
context of the view that the simple bodies are substances that
express their natures through locomotion in diverse directions ((34) -
(41)). On this premiss, neither mechanical ((35) -(36)) nor chemical
(ii)
((37) - (39)) combination could account for organic phenomena. Hence
Aristotle has a rational basis (a) for regarding organisms as per se
unities endowed with substantial "natures", and (b) for his teleology
((41)). Despite their close connection, (a) and (b) are not to be
equated ((42)). Aristotle's theory of organic substance is (pace
A. Gotthelf) fundamentally metaphysical ((43)).
Chapter III. The Definition of Change
In ~Ph.ysi.cs III 1 ff. Aristotle undertakes to elucidate 'change'
('yetapoxp') and 'process' ('xlvtiols ') . Although the terms are not
synonymous he treats them here as interchangeable, i.e. as if all
change were process. This tacit restriction of the meaning of 'change'
is due (it is argued in this chapter) to his preoccupation with
"natural" change, although "nature" (as he himself makes clear) is
only one type of source of change ((1) - (3)). Under the general
concept "change" we may distinguish (a) that of the "emergence" of
some new property and (b) that of "process", which includes conditions
leading up to an "emergence" ((4)). The concept here sketched of
"process" leaves open the question of mathematical continuity; it
also allows a subject to be regarded as 'in process' on account of
imminent causal activity in some other subject. This entails that
there is no contradiction in predicating (as Aristotle occasionally
does) the term 'process' of a subject which passes all at once from
an old to a new state ((5) - (6)). Many phenomena can be described
either as emergences or as processes, although locomotion has to be
regarded as process ((7)). But in Physios III Aristotle assumes that
all change-phenomena are to be approached via the concept of "process".
This is because he cannot otherwise preserve the metaphysical con¬
nection between "change" and "natural substance" ((8) - (9)). This is
easily shown for organisms ((10) - (11)). The simple inanimate bodies
can be accommodated to his scheme by supposing an absolute difference
between "upwards" and "downwards" {i.e. the doctrine of "natural
places") ((12) - (14)). Change, on this view, is necessarily directed
to a terminus', thus it may be regarded as "incomplete", which for
Aristotle is what fundamentally distinguishes it from conditions of
non-change ((15)). This "self-terminating" character of Aristotelian
change is what makes it especially puzzling, more so than Plato's
"becoming" ((16) - (17)). We now consider in detail the account of
(iii)
Ill 1 ((18) ff.) Since change or xtvriGLS expresses substance, it too
must be real and actual; hence not only must every characteristic
changed from and to fall into some definite category, but so must
change itself. Aristotle puts it into the category of "Relation"
for want of a better, thereby committing himself to the view that all
change involves an agent-patient relationship ((19) -(20)). Although
obscure, the formal definition of HLvriaus in III 1 is not circular;
this is clear once its reference to 'potentiality' is correctly
interpreted ((21) -(24)). It permits adequate distinctions between
actual change, the actual subject, and the actual condition in which
a change terminates ((25) -(26)). It entails a fundamental type-
difference between change and non-change ((27) - (28)), and shows why
earlier thinkers were so mystified by this topic ((29)). Aristotle's
own doctrine of substance and the Categories turns out to depend on
his conception of change as self-terminating ((30) - (32)). The III 1
definition can be interpreted in two ways; according to one of these
the subject need not undergo perceptible transition ((33) - (35)).
But this definition covers only natural and purposed change or
MLvncrus ((36) - (38)). However, in Physics VI Aristotle attempts
another account (not that he ever appears to renounce that of Physics
III); the metaphysic of nature and substance is now in abeyance and
the central concept is the inclusion, by any one change, of infinitely
many temporally (and in some cases spatially) smaller changes ((39) -
(42)). Change is now distinguished from non-change in a way requiring
the former to be temporally intermediate between its termini (which
was not necessary on the account of Book III) ((43)). But qualitative
change is made to fit this scheme only by a bad argument, whose force
Aristotle himself refuses to acknowledge in another context ((44) -
(50)). Still worse problems are generated by his continuing assumption
that change is directed to a terminus ((51) - (52)). The attempt to
combine this with the analysis in terms of mathematical continuity
produces paradoxes ((53) - (55)), as Aristotle realised when he came
to work out the cosmology of Physics VIII. Thus in VIII 8 he argues
against the Book VI view that a change consists of infinitely many
shorter changes, and there he also abandons the associated view that
change necessarily occupies a period of time between its termini
((56) - (59)) .
(iv)
Chapter IV. Agent and Patient
In the Physios the notion of "agent"/"patient" (xtvouv/xLvouyevov,
"changer"/"changed") is more closely linked than any other to the
concept of change. In III 3 Aristotle reformulates his definition of
the latter in terms of agent and patient. His grounds are obscure,
like much else in his treatment of agency ((1) - (3)). But clearly he
holds that (i) for every change (xdvnots) there is a changer (xtvoOv);
(ii) the changer is distinct from the changed (or subject of change);
(iii) to act as a changer is not to change (intransitive) ((4)).
The first position may have seemed plausible because 'xtveCv' has
to be put in the grammatical passive to express intransitive change.
Thus rules of grammar prescribe that for every xlvpols there is a
xuvouyevov; but this alone does not validate an inference from
'xtvriOLs' to 'xlvouv' ((5) -(6)). In III, Aristotle identifies the
"changer" as that which confers the form typifying the change. But
in natural change the substance whose nature dictates the form is also
the subject of change. Aristotle can only preserve position (ii)
above while continuing to hold (i) universally by shifting the meaning
of 'changer' so that it no longer implies 'that which confers the
form'. This he does in VIII 4, where the "changers" responsible for
the natural motions of the simple bodies are now identified with the
generators of those substances and with whatever releases them from
hindrance ((6) - (11)). Here Aristotle shows that he takes xtvqats as
such to be a form of "suffering", not on account of its dependence on
external circumstances (this holds too for non-passive conditions)
but simply because it is xtvriats ((12)). After a summary of the
positions that have so far emerged ((13)), we consider the difference
between "real" and relational change. This may seem to support Aris¬
totle's principle that all change has an agent, for "real" change
must be referred to a cause standing in a particular relation to the
subject ((14) - (17)). But the same is true of "real" (as opposed to
relational) non-change properties ((18)). Attention now shifts to
Aristotle's positirdh (iii) above, and centres on paradigmatic agent-
patient cases where one distinct individual substance acts upon
another ((19)). In considering these we have to bear in mind the
question (inevitable since Hume) whether the language of 'agent'/
'patient' ought not to be altogether discarded, as misleadingly
suggesting some occult process of "acting upon" ((20) - (21)).
Meanwhile we follow Aristotle's argument for (iii) in Physics III 3,
where he principally relies on the insight that in any given case
agency and patiency are one concrete event ((22) - (25)). This
argument falls short of demonstrating (iii) ((26)), but the latter
proposition can be further supported by means of the evepyeta/Kovriaus
distinction of Metaphysics 0 6. From one point of view the exercise
of transitive agency is evepyeua as opposed to xuvpots ((27) -(33)).
Is it some occult "extra" transaction ((34))? Aristotle's treatment
of cases such as heating shows this idea to be as alien to him as to
Hume, although for Aristotle, unlike Hume, this implies no paradox
((35) - (36)). But not all cases are so simple, and transitive agency
sometimes involves changes in the agent ((37) -(39)). But these are
not distinct and conceptually self-sufficient; they are "parts" of
one change, whose subject is the patient ((40) - (42)) . The upshot is
that although for Aristotle agency is no kind of extra occult trans¬
action, the language of agency performs an indispensable function
((43)). However, problems about the status of agency disappear on
one interpretation of Aristotle's insight that acting and being
acted upon are the same concrete event. Theoretically this could
be taken to imply that there is no actual agent and patient. But
this view (which goes beyond any of Aristotle's) allows no purchase
for the notion of executing an intention ((44) - (46)).
Chapter V. Self-Change and the Eternal Cause
The notion of something's changing (transitive) itself is baffling
but vital to the cosmology of Physics VIII ((1)). "Self-change" is
a species of "natural change", applying (in the sublunary world) only
to organisms ((2) -(3)). It is not independent of external condi¬
tions; its special feature is a logically complex subject comprising
a distinct agent and patient ((4) - (5)). In this Aristotle's concept
of "self-change" differs from Plato's ((6)). But does Aristotle's
make sense? He offers no explicit justification and ignores the
metaphysical problems ((7) - (9)). He lists the criteria for "self-
change", apparently identifying the agent-element with soul, the
patient with body ((10)). But what is the point of introducing the
concept anyway ((11))? Sometimes a live creature as an organic whole
acts contrariwise to the natural tendency of some physical part:
'self-change' is an appropriate term for this situation, but Aristotle,
(vi)
puzzlingly, also applies it even when no subordinate tendency is
overridden ((12) - (13)). His failure in Physics VII to discuss the
difficulties of "self-change" is due (it is suggested) to the fact
that he employs it only as a step in a wider discussion, now to be
examined, concerning the eternity of change ((14)). Is change eternal?
On this depends the validity of the concept of natural substance
developed in Book II ((15) - (17)). In considering objections to
his own affirmative answer ((18) - (19)), Aristotle acknowledges a
difficulty in reconciling it with the fact that some changes begin
and cease ((20) - (21)). For the eternity of change presupposes an
absolutely changeless cause, whose effect must resemble it in endless¬
ness ((22)- (23)). Temporally finite changes cannot therefore be
immediate effects of the ultimate changeless cause. Hence Aristotle
postulates an intermediary consisting in an eternal change, which is
suitable (because eternal) to be the effect of the changeless, and
(because a change) to be the cause of transient change. The eternal
change has an eternal body for its subject. Thus for Aristotle, (a)
the fact of temporally finite change, and (b) the doctrine that change
as such is eternal, jointly entail that there exists something absol¬
utely changeless and something else always changing ((24)). The
weakness of this position lies not (pace F. Solmsen) in any clash
between the doctrine of an ultimate cause and the concept of nature
as inner principle of change ((25) -(26)); but rather in the absence
of proof that the subject of eternal change might not itself be the
change's ultimate source ((27) -(28)). But cover for this logical
gap is tacitly provided by the concept of "self-change", introduced
to uphold a distinction between subject and agent of eternal change
((29); see also Appendix to Chapter V). However Aristotle fails
to prove this concept applicable in the eternal realm ((30) - (33)) .
"Self-change" can be explained so as to make sense in connection with
sublunary organisms, but in ways that do not touch the eternal case
((34) -(37)). Nonetheless, Aristotle tries to demonstrate a univer¬
sally applicable distinction between agent and patient in self-change
by means of the Law of Non-Contradiction; this involves modelling
"change" on "acquiring", a move which lends colour to the charge that
he indulges in "occult causes" ((38) - (41)). Why need he separate
the ultimate source from the subject of eternal change. The reasons
are not only theological ((42)), but also derive from the concept of
(vii)
change and xLupous as "incomplete actuality". His only ground (it is
argued) for regarding eternal change as "incomplete" is its passive
status, i.e. its dependence on an agent distinct from the subject.
Thus in maintaining this distinctness in Physics VIII, Aristotle
ensures conformity of eternal change to the Physics III definition




Nature as Inner Principle of Change
(1) 'The physical doctrines of Aristotle are a
disappointing chapter in the history of science ...
The science of the Renaissance period was obliged
to shake off the fetters of Aristotle's authority
before it could return to the paths of fruitful
and progressive research.'
These remarks of Theodor Gomperz"^ voice a common verdict on
Aristotle's philosophy of nature. It is not my purpose here to endorse
this verdict, nor to challenge it, but to show how the characteristic¬
ally Aristotelian doctrines on which it has been passed stem from one
fundamental idea. This is the conception of a natural substance as
characterised above all by an "inner principle of change and stasis".
This notion of "the nature of a thing" links Aristotle's metaphysic of
substance to his physical system, and it determines almost every one
of that system's distinctive doctrines. It will be the object of the
present work to support and illustrate this claim in detail. It will
be shown, for instance, how Aristotle's concept of natural substance
issues in a theory of living things as irreducibly organic unities,
and hence in the rejection of materialism in favour of teleology.
The same concept will be seen to generate his doctrine of the simple
bodies' "natural movements" and "natural places". Not only Aristotle's
cosmology but his chemistry too can be traced back to this principle,
and on a more general level it shapes his entire conception of change
and process. This in turn dictates Aristotle's denial of change to
agents of change; and from the same source, finally, come the
culminating doctrines of eternal motion and an eternal unmoved mover.
1. The Greek Thinkers, vol. IV, p. 108.
'The least initial deviation from the truth is
multiplied later a thousandfold ... The reason is
that a principle is great in power rather than extent;
hence that which was small at the start turns out a
giant at the end.' (De Caelo I 5, 271b8ff.)
The words with which Aristotle prefaces his own attack on the notion
of infinite body could be aptly quoted back at him by critics such
as Gomperz, with reference, this time, to the Aristotelian concept of
natural substance. But whether or not that concept is an 'initial
deviation from the truth', I hope here to show that for good or ill
in Aristotle's system it 'turns out a giant at the end'.
(2) Let us then turn to the passage where Aristotle introduces
this concept, at the beginning of Physios II 1:
'Of things that exist, some exist by nature and
some through other causes. By nature there exist
animals and their parts and plants and the simple
bodies such as earth, fire, air and water. For these
and similar things we say exist by nature. All these
things manifestly differ from those not constituted
by nature. For each of them has within itself a
principle of change and stasis, some in respect of
place, some in respect of growth and decline, some in
respect of alteration. But a bed and a cloak and any
similar kind of thing, so far as such a description
holds of it, and to the extent that it exists through
artifice, possesses no innate impulse of change. But
so far as they happen to be made of stone or earth or
mixtures of these, they possess such an impulse, and
just to that extent. This suggests that nature is a
principle and cause of change and stasis in the thing
in which it primarily subsists, being in this thing of
itself and not per accidens.x (192b8 - 23)
Now, apart from "nature", Aristotle recognises two other types of
2
"cause": artifice, and "the spontaneous" (or coincidence). The
latter, which we might well hesitate to count as a cause at all (for
2. On this triple division of causes and its Platonic antecedents,
see A. Mansion, Introduction a la Physique Aristotelicienne
pp. 94 - 97.
3
reasons of which Aristotle was aware), receives no attention in this
opening passage. The reason is simple: whether or not "the
spontaneous" is rightly called a "cause", it is a secondary concept,
defined in terms of the concurrence of causally independent factors,
which factors have their causes either in human intention or in the
nature of a natural substance. Assuming that in the present passage
Aristotle is loosely using 'artifice' to cover all the cases in which
a new state of affairs comes about as the intended result of human
intervention in the natural course of events, we can say that he is
here making an exhaustive dichotomy of the primary types of cause.
However, the products of "artifice" in this wide sense that here most
focus his attention, are artifacts in the ordinary sense, -i.e. objects
produced by skill. Although skill produces not only physical objects,
such as beds and clothes, but conditions, such as the health of a
sick person or the domestication of an animal, and activities such as
dancing, Aristotle here fastens on artificial objects as providing
him with the contrast he needs in order to explain his concept of
"nature".
(3) That the products of "nature" and "artifice" form mutually
exclusive classes, is a datum of common sense which Aristotle does
not question. He does not for instance speculate here on possible
reasons for regarding natural beings as the artifacts of some super¬
natural agent like Plato's Demiurgus. This accords with Aristotle's
general insistence, evident in the Physics as elsewhere, that every
type of enquiry be conducted in terms of concepts and methods
appropriate to its subject matter, and confine itself to the questions
that fall within its scope. Even if nature could be looked upon as an
4
artifact or system of artifacts (which Aristotle has good reason to
3
hold that it cannot) , such a point of view would lie outside the
province of natural science. For the super-artificer himself, his
purpose, and the "materials" he may be supposed to have used, are
all, ex hypothesi, factors outwith the world of nature. It is not
therefore to be expected that either the scientist or the philosopher
seeking to clarify the concepts essential to science, should do
otherwise than take it for granted that water and earth, animals and
plants, are not artifacts; it not being their business to question
this on theological grounds, any more than it is their business to
discuss the Eleatic Theory 'that Being is one and motionless' (Physios
I 2, 184b26 - 185a3).
(4) Leaving aside, then, the metaphysical possibility that human
artificers are themselves (divine) artifacts and therefore similar or
at least analogous to the artifacts which they themselves construct,
we can say that the artifacts of ordinary experience differ radically
from natural objects as regards both their causes and their power to
cause other things. For artifacts are made by the skill of beings not
artifacts like themselves, whereas natural beings come into existence
only from other natural beings. Artifacts moreover are not in turn
artificers, and nor do they need to be for further artifacts to be
produced, whereas natural beings generated by other natural beings
must in turn possess the power to generate others, since apart from
natural beings themselves there is no source from which further
3. Cf. Metccphysics A 9, 991a20 - 23. Also V.i. Chapter II, paragraphs
(4) and (27), and footnote 22.
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natural beings could continue to come into existence. And if the
production of natural beings depends not on the activity of an agent
or agents outside the order of nature, but only on other natural
beings, the same must be true of the changes necessarily involved in
production. A new substance comes into existence through processes
of change in substances already existing, and unless these changes
can be accounted for from within the world of nature, the new sub¬
stance itself cannot be so accounted for either. Thus the world of
nature, unlike the "world" of artifacts, is self-contained as regards
production and the changes necessary for production.
(5) It is plain then that natural substances collectively speaking
contain within themselves a principle or principles of change. This
follows from the self-sufficiency of the natural order to keep and
have kept itself going. The concept of principles that are "inner"
in this collective sense is quite uncontroversial, at least for any
believer in the very possibility of science, i.e. in the possibility
of explaining (in some sense of 'explain') natural phenomena in terms
of natural phenomena. However, Aristotle's inner principles are also
supposed by him to be "inner" in the stronger and by no means so
obviously acceptable sense of "intrinsic to each individual substance"
The notion of the self-sufficiency of nature as a whole appears to be
quite compatible with the view that any change in any object results
from the action of external factors happening to stand to that object
in the appropriate spatial and temporal relations. On this view, the
cause of change, in any given case, is as much external to the object
changed as the artificer to the artifact. It is precisely this that
Aristotle is denying when he speaks of an 'innate impulse' (dppn)
6
of change; for if the impulse is innate, i.e. present in the object
from its inception, then it is not imparted by anything external.
(6) We now have to consider in detail what sense can be given to
the notion of an "innate impulse" of change. Aristotle apparently
regards the phrase as requiring no special justification or analysis.
On the common-sense level we no doubt often distinguish between
changes in which the changing object seems to change "of itself" and
those where the changing object appears inert and passive, itself
contributing nothing to what happens to it. But this distinction
remains unproblematic only so long as we ignore the fact that every
change in nature depends to some extent on external conditions, even
if only on the absence of what might obstruct the change. If every
change is externally conditioned, then in what sense can any change
be said to come specially "from within" the object?
(7) In attempting an account of Aristotle's concept of change from
an inner principle, we shall find it useful to consider two limiting
notions, namely (a) that of change entirely uninfluenced by conditions
external to the object itself which changes; and (b) that of change
entirely dependent on such conditions. I call these 'limiting' since
each represents a conceptual extreme not coherently applicable to any
change having place in a system of natural phenomena. A change fit¬
ting the first description would need to be either such as could occur
under any external conditions whatever, or else caused by something
which, as well as causing the change in question, also had absolute
control of the external conditions so as to ensure that they are al¬
ways disposed so as to make the change possible. On either alternative,
7
the change could be neither interrupted nor deflected. In other
words, the cause of the change would be, in effect, omnipotent so far
as this change is concerned. But this could be the case only if the
change is not part of the system of natural events. For either there
are no external conditions having any causal relevance to it (which
would be true only if it is itself identical with the sum of events
in nature, or alternatively forms an entirely separate system on its
own); or else the change is caused by some being with supreme power
to prevent any natural object from obstructing it.
(8) Suppose on the other hand an object whose changes were entirely
shaped by external conditions. This implies that the object has no
character or "nature" of its own either to determine or to limit what
changes take place in it: indeed, the object is no more than a "place"
of change, resembling the space of e.g. the Timaeus (and for that
matter of Newtonian mechanics) in its total indifference as regards
what can happen in it. (For Aristotle, not even space, or place,
itself is like this, let alone substances.) If change were possible
at all in a universe of such objects, then everything would change in
the same way under the same conditions, since only the conditions
determine change. But why should there be any change at all in such
a universe? The objects as we have described them are of infinite
potentiality. For there can be no property that any of them by its
nature is excluded from possessing, since this would imply a limit¬
ation on the changes that they could undergo. In such a universe,
then, an object can have any property logically compatible with its
other properties at the time. Thus if a change occurs when certain
conditions arise, it cannot be said to have occurred because, under
8
these new conditions, the object could not remain in the state it was
in before, as for instance we say that wax cannot stay hard if heated
beyond a certain point. It is logically true that if wax when heated
softens then heated wax cannot stay hard; but there is no logical
necessity (nor, in such a world, necessity of any other kind) for
heated wax to soften. So why should it not remain hard? Moreover,
objects lacking any character to determine their reactions to other
beings can hardly be supposed to possess a character to determine the
reactions of other objects to them. Therefore in such a universe
nothing determines any specific change to happen that does happen,
and there is nothing to explain why it should have happened.
(9) Aristotle proclaims his rejection of any such view of the
actual world in Physics I 5:
'We must first lay it down that no existent thing
is such that any chance thing can act on or be acted
on by any chance thing, nor does any chance thing come
to be from any chance thing, unless one describes the
situation in accidental terms.'
By 'any chance thing' Aristotle means a thing such that its role in a
given change situation might just as well have been filled by anything
else. This is precisely what would be true of everything if nothing
had any intrinsic character determining the changes it undergoes or
produces. A given agent or patient can of course be described in terms
denoting properties that are irrelevant ('accidental'), but there would
not be an agent and patient acting and being acted upon unless they
were also truly describable in terms of characteristics in which the
causal relationship is grounded. Aristotle continues:
'For how could what is white come from what is
cultured, except in the sense that being cultured might
be accidentally conjoined with being not-white or black?
Instead, what is white comes from what is not white,
9
and not from anything not white but from what is
black or of an intermediate colour, and what is
cultured comes from what is not cultured, but not
from anything not cultured, but from the uncultured
or some intermediate state.' (188a31-b2)
At first sight Aristotle seems to be making a purely logical point,
namely that the coming into being of X presupposes the prior absence
or non-being of X. Thus it is incorrect (although not strictly
speaking always false) to say that white comes into being from
cultured, for being cultured does not mean or entail being non-white.
If we are told that up to a certain moment something was cultured,
and that after that moment it was white, we cannot infer that there
was a change, since the statement is consistent with the presence of
whiteness before the moment in question. However Aristotle is not
only saying that the coming to be of white should be described in a
way that makes it clear that the whiteness replaces its own prior
absence. For white does not come from 'anything not white, but from
what is black or of an intermediate colour'. Not everything of which
'not-white' holds true can give place to white: a geometrical point
is not white but cannot come to be white. Thus the not-white from
which white comes to be must be such that white can come to be from
it; it must be an opposite or intermediate in the same range. And
the range, we have seen, has a narrower field of application than the
field within which 'not-white' could apply. Thus the patient or
subject of the change to white is already more than a mere locus of
change: it is such as to admit the range black -white: it has to
this extent a character that marks off its kind from just everything
else; and this differentiating characteristic is not the result of
change, but its precondition.
10
(10) In paragraph (8) above it was argued that the concept of an
object whose changes are in no way determined by a character of its
own makes nonsense of any attempt to explain why any given change
should occur. But it can also be shown that for Aristotle this con¬
cept would make nonsense of change itself, not only the explanation
of change. Some of his predecessors had found change to be so
paradoxical that they preferred to turn away from the study of nature
(which, he implies, they would otherwise have pursued) rather than
accept the paradox. Aristotle remarks on the lack of sophistication
that led them into the difficulty, but he in no way suggests that
having once been gripped by it, they were wrong to take it so seriously.
From this we may assume that he regards it as a problem requiring to
be solved before the concept of change can be accepted as sound and
coherent. I shall now argue that his own solution depends on the very
same conception of objects in nature as led him to say in the passage
already quoted that not any chance thing acts on or is acted on by any
chance thing.
(11) 'The first investigators into the truth and
nature of things were so to say diverted on to a
different path, being forced back through their
naivete (uto duetptas). They say that nothing
that exists either comes into being or passes
away, because it is necessary that what comes into
being comes into being either out of being or out
of not being, and yet from either of these it is
impossible that it should do so. For that which
is does not come into being, since it already is,
and nothing could come into being from not being,
since there must be some underlying subject.'
(I 8, 191a24 - 31)4
The last phrase, 'there must be some underlying subject', is rather
4. Cf. Physics I 4, 187a26 - 29, 32 - 35; I 8, 191b31 - 33.
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misleading. These words do not describe the difficulty as it
presented itself to the earlier thinkers. The expression 'under¬
lying subject' is Aristotle's own, not theirs, and the clause in
which it occurs does not, as might first appear, pose one side
of the ancient dilemma; on the contrary, it carries Aristotle's
own solution."1 Yet the phrase is not entirely out of place in
this brief account of the paradox, because it reflects a conceptual
requirement to which the earlier thinkers were no less sensitive
than Aristotle himself, although unlike him they could not see
how it was to be reconciled with the fact of change. In expounding
the problem we must begin by recasting the requirement that there
be 'some underlying subject' in imprecise terms that will capture
some of the original puzzlement. It was a nebulous thought that
generated the difficulty, and once its vague bearings are dis¬
tinguished and accurately articulated, the logical mystery of
change vanishes, or so Aristotle believes. On the one hand, let
us then say, if X comes into being, X could not have existed
before, since X would then be nothing new in the world, and would
not have come to be. But on the other hand it is impossible to
accept that the X which comes into being was not somehow rooted
in what went before: but in what? If we say: in things other
than X, this leaves us no better off than if we had said: in
nothing at all. For things other than X, whatever they are, are
themselves, they are not X, and so for them to be themselves and
5. On this example of Aristotle's "reading his own doctrine
into earlier systems", see H. Cherniss, Aristotle's Criticism
of Presocratic Philosophy, pp. 53 ff.; F. Solmsen, Aris¬
totle's System of the Physical World, pp. 81-82. On the
general tendency see Cherniss, op. cit. , pp. 348, 354 - 355.
to exist there is 110 need for X. If there was a time when there
were only things other than X, then X was no more present among
them than it would have been present in a state of affairs in
which nothing at all was the case. So if X comes into being but
is at the same time rooted in what went before, it cannot have
been rooted in nothing, nor in what was other than itself; so
the only remaining possibility is in itself: but not in its own
prior non-existence (for if this made sense, so would either of
the two rejected possibilities); therefore in itself as previously
existing. Thus it must have been before coming to be, and therefore
did not come to be.
(12) From the very first, Aristotle tells us, this dilemma shaped
attempts to philosophise about change and becoming. He himself as his
own approach shows saw the paradox as defining a necessary adequacy-
condition for any theory of change: whatever else a theory might
offer, it must at least solve or dissolve the paradox. It is no
accident, then, that those of Aristotle's predecessors who refused
to draw the Eleatic conclusion that change and becoming are impossible
should have built their theories round the concept of opposites.
(Even Parmenides described the "illusion" of becoming in terms of
opposite poles.) For this concept seems to solve the problem. Let
us consider how it might appear to do this. There are at least three
conceptual advantages in equating X's coming into being with X's
coming into being from the opposite of X, say A. Firstly, this per¬
mits us to say that before X came into being, there was not X, but its
opposite. Secondly, what existed prior to X's coming into being,
namely A, can be positively described as 'A', not merely as something
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other than X, or as the absence of X, or as not-X. Thirdly, the
positive description 'A' necessarily implies a reference to X,
the opposite. For an opposite must necessarily be one of a pair;
without one there could not be the other; thus A, even though it
is not-X and is other than X, does require that X should exist in
order to be A and exist itself. We ourselves are too acutely aware
of the difference between logical and causal relations to find this
convincing; but such would be the considerations that led those
earlier thinkers to see contrariety or opposition as providing a
middle way between the impossible alternatives whereby X must either
come to be from what is already X, or from what is not-X and other
than X and therefore devoid of any connection with X.
(13) Yet that very relationship between opposites that seems to
undercut the dilemma also permits its reformulation in stronger terms
than ever. If opposites of necessity exclude each other, so that each
in itself seems to point to the other, they also exclude each other.
One cannot be present when the other is, and from this point of view
each depends on the other's not existing and continuing not to exist.
How then can opposition begin to explain coming into existence? How
can X come into existence from what is not only not X, but so alien
to it that its own continuation even depends on there being no X?
No reality can be so internally incoherent as to tend, of its own
nature, towards its own non-existence; yet (as Aristotle points out
in connection with the Platonists' account of change, Physics I 9,
191al9 - 22) this is exactly what coming to be would entail if opposite
were generated out of opposite.^ If the thinkers who were content to
6. W.D. Ross, Aristotle's Physics, p. 23; Mansion, op. cit. , p. 276.
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analyse coming to be in terms of opposites did not see this, it may
partly have been because of the ambiguity of 'out of' (eh). The
distinction of meaning which concerns us here is between (a) the
sense in which what X comes to be "out of" continues present in X
when X has come to be; and (b) that in which what X comes to be
"out of" is superseded when X has come to be. Let us call the first
sense constitutive, the second non-constitutive. Further distinctions
are possible within these senses, at any rate within the latter. The
first sense corresponds to Aristotle's material cause, the second
covers both the efficient cause and the opposite or contrary from
which a change proceeds. Both the contrary and the efficient cause
cease as such to exist when X has come to be and as such they are not
present in X. In Metaphysics A 4, 985alO ff., Aristotle comments on
the weakness of his predecessors' grasp of the difference between
material and efficient cause: that is, between the constitutive and
one of the non-constitutive senses of 'out of'. But if these could
be confused, so could the constitutive with the other non-constitutive
sense, that which applies to the opposite superseded in change. Hence
it may not have seemed so obvious that the coming to be of opposite X
out of opposite A means the destruction of A in favour of X. A may
seem still to be present as a constituent of X, so that despite the
opposition there is continuity of existence.'' Better still if we can
think of A itself as having come to be from an earlier X; for A then
seems to have that X as its constituent, so it is no surprise if a
new X comes to be from A: what more suitable material for the second
X than that which is already made of the first?
7. Cf. Physics I 4, 187a31 ff.
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(14) But this semblance of intelligibility vanishes on a clearer
view of the ambiguities of 'out of'. There is then no ignoring the
mutual exclusiveness of opposites, nor the impotence of this relation
to solve unaided the original paradox. The only escape, Aristotle
maintains (I 8, 191a23 - 24), is through his own analysis of becoming.
g
This is more properly termed an analysis of the language of becoming,
since the only evidence to which he appeals consists in 'what is said',
('cpayev', 189b32; 'cpajyev', 190a4-5; 'Aeyexat', 5-6; 'AEyoyev', 9).
He means in effect to show that the ordinary conception revealed in
ordinary modes of speech coherently satisfies both sides of the ancient
dilemma. It is doubtful whether Aristotle would ever have raised
the question of whether and how we can know that the thought-structures
expressed in language reflect corresponding structures in reality
itself. But it is fairly certain that even if he had framed this
question, it would not have seemed to him the concern of the philo¬
sopher of science, whose task is to clarify the concepts necessary for
science; which concepts are inevitably founded on the common-sense
ones expressed in ordinary discourse.
(15) Aristotle's analysis begins as follows (I 7, 189b32 - 190b21):
Sentences of the form '- becomes -' are of three types. In two of
these what occurs on either side of the verb is a simple term; thus:
8. Cf. W. Wieland, 'Das Problem des Prinzipienforschung und die
aristotelische Physik', Kant-Studien LII, 1960 - 1, pp. 206 ff.,
especially pp. 212-213 and 216-219 (translated as ch. 8
in Articles on Aristotle, vol. I, edd. Barnes, Schofield and
Sorabji); B. Jones, 'Aristotle's Introduction of Matter',
Philosophical Review LXXXIII, 1974, pp. 474 ff., especially pp.
476; 478. On the general approach, see G.E.L. Owen, 'Tuhevat
xa cpatvoyeva', Aristote et les Problemes de la Methode, ed. S.
Mansion, reprinted in Aristotle, ed. Moravcsik, pp. 167 ff.
(i) (A/The) man becomes cultured.
(ii) (A/The) uncultured becomes cultured.
In the third type what occurs on each side is a complex term:
(iii) (A/The) uncultured man becomes (a) cultured man.
These sentences are obviously descriptions of one and the same fact.
This is a vital premiss of Aristotle's argument, although he does
not enunciate it. Now sentence (ii) displays the fact that becoming
involves replacement: the uncultured that becomes cultured cannot
still be uncultured; nor can it already have been cultured: this
is ruled out by the mutual exclusion of contraries. Sentence (iii)
displays the fact that becoming involves an element that is present
both before and after. The complex term 'uncultured man' represents
a whole which is replaced as a whole by the whole corresponding to
'cultured man'. But these two wholes each have an element cor¬
responding to 'man'. And man in one whole is not to be thought of
as "replaced by" man in the other, since 'man' and 'man' are neither
contradictory nor contrary terms. Sentence (i), on the other hand,
displays neither replacement nor continuance. The terms on each side
are not contraries, nor are they the same or the same in part. Yet
the fact described by (i) is truly described by (ii) and (iii) . We
may draw two conclusions: (1) Becoming always involves each of the
two aspects severally displayed by sentences of types (ii) and (iii),
even though this may not always be apparent (as when the becoming is
described by a sentence of type (i)). (2) The replacement aspect
must be compatible with the continuance aspect, since the same fact
can be described from either point of view.
(16) Let us sum up the position reached so far in Aristotle's own
words:
'These distinctions drawn Isa. between sentences
(i) , (ii) and (iii)], one can see that in all cases
of becoming, if we examine them in the way suggested,
there must always be something that underlies, viz.
that which becomes, and although this is numerically
one it is not one in form. (By "one in form (eudet)"
I mean the same as "one in formula (Ao'yij))" .) For it is
not the same to be (a) man and to be uncultured. And
one of these remains while the other does not remain.
That which is not an opposite {viz. the man) remains,
whereas the not-cultured and the uncultured does not
remain, nor does that which is a combination of them
both, i.e. the uncultured man.' (190al3 - 21)
Let us say that just as a sentence such as (i) above represents a
fact, so the expressions occurring on the right-hand and left-hand
sides of the verb in (i) represent components of this fact. Then
just as sentences (ii) and (iii) represent the same fact as (i), but
under different descriptions, so the left-hand and the right-hand
sides of (ii) and (iii) represent the same components of this fact
as the left- and right-hand sides of (i), but under different
descriptions. Thus although 'uncultured' does not "remain", in the
sense that it cannot coherently be added to the right-hand formula
in any of the sentences, it does not follow that another description
e.g. 'man', of the same component does not "remain" {-i.e. is coher¬
ently addible to the right-hand side), and in fact of course it does
Thus the same thing (component) "remains" under one description
though not under the other. By the same reasoning, from the fact
that 'man' "remains" it does not follow that another description,
e.g. 'uncultured', also remains.
(17) This analysis is the basis for Aristotle's solution of the
traditional paradox of becoming. It is not in itself the solution,
18
nor does he think that it is, as his order of presentation makes plain.
After reaching the position just outlined and showing how it applies
to various kinds of becoming illustrated by a variety of examples
(I 7, 190a31 - 191a3), he then turns to the paradox and makes further
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distinctions in order to answer it (I 8, 191a23 - 191b27). As the
Wicks teed - Cornford translation says, 'At this critical point of
Aristotle's exposition, the text, as we have it, is elliptical almost
to the point of unintelligibility'.^ I shall therefore offer a
paraphrase. But it will help too if we first consider (not that Aris¬
totle explicitly does this) how the above analysis cannot as it stands
provide a solution. Now the analysis does succeed in showing how
the same fact of becoming, and the same components of that fact, are
and must be describable in different ways which between them reveal
both the replacement and the continuity involved. No doubt vagueness
concerning the distinction between difference of description and
difference of things described contributed to the early thinkers'
perplexity about becoming (and every other topic too, one would sup¬
pose) . But even if they had fully grasped the distinction, they
could still have put the paradox, as follows: We accept that sent¬
ences (i), (ii) and (iii) describe the same fact. But what a survey
of these sentences shows is that this fact cannot be fully described
9. However the answer is partly anticipated at I 7, 190bl8-19,
25 - 27. Cf. W. Charlton, Aristotle's Physios I, II, pp. 46 - 47.
10. Loeb text Aristotle, The Physios, vol. I, p. 83. Small wonder
if Aristotle is "clumsy" here (the charge of Charlton, op. cit.,
p. 80). Without technical vocabulary he must (a) make the dis¬
tinction between what in the text I call appropriate and inap¬
propriate descriptions; (b) differentiate between grammatical
subject and complement of 'Ytyveadau' (either of which may be
meant by 'to yoyvo'yevov') ; (c) manage the different senses of
'eh' (v.s. paragraph (13)); (d) (in my view, although not accord¬
ing to all interpretations) shift the scope of 'xoiTa auyBe3hxds'
from subject to complement of 'yLyvexau' (V.i. note 11).
19
without absurdity. Take sentence (iii), '(A/The) uncultured man
becomes (a) cultured man'. From this one can derive (ii) : '(A/The)
uncultured becomes cultured'. But one can also derive another
sentence, (iv): (A/The) man becomes (something that is a) man'.
Now (ii) and (iv) each represents one side of the original dilemma.
On the one hand, something comes to be from its oxm opposite and
its own absence, and we saw that this was unintelligible. On the
other hand, something comes to be something it already is, and this
is unintelligible as a description of becoming. All that Aristotle
has done so far is to show that the paradox is by no means a vechevche
one which reveals itself only to those who abandon ordinary speech
for some esoteric terminology. On the contrary, ordinary discourse
shows it up in all its force; and while the ordinariness may explain
why the man in the street is untroubled, since he naturally feels
at home and secure in his modes of thinking, it cannot mitigate the
objective problem itself; if anything the paradox is more unnerving
than ever, now that it is so clearly seen to lie at the heart of our
spontaneous untutored responses to our world. The philosopher who
sees this will not stop at wondering how change is possible, for the
incoherence of a notion so central to the human picture of the world
casts doubt on all our claims to knowledge. Who could confidently
assert even the Eleatic alternative once he has realised the extent to
which we are constituted by nature to utter meaningless statements
without suspicion of their meaninglessness? Who having seen this can
be sure that he can acquire knowledge of anything?
(18) Thus in upholding the reality of change and becoming, Aristotle
is also defending our title to consider ourselves potential knowers,
rather than beings incapable of registering reality except through
meaningless responses to an unintelligible environment. But how does
he escape this last formulation of the paradox? His answer (and here
I paraphrase) is this. Different sentences may describe the same
state of affairs; different terms may stand for the same thing.
The sentences may all be true; the terms may all be true o_f their
referent. And the sentences and terms are all meaningful, although
their meanings differ. They each embody a "formula" (Xoyos) or
synthesis of "formulae", although not the same ones. But this does
not entail that meaningful and true descriptions of the same state
of affairs are all equally appropriate, or that they all equally
reveal the structure of the fact. It may be true and meaningful to
say that the physician builds a house, or the architect gives orders
to the physician, but the fact described would be better portrayed by
'The builder builds a house' etc., even though the other statements
are not false if the builder also happens to be a medical man.
Seeming paradoxes result if we assume that every description is as
appropriate as every other to the same fact. Thus the sentence 'The
patient dictates a programme for his medical adviser' may be true,
but if taken as the proper description it is paradoxical, since it
contradicts what (by the very meaning of 'medical adviser' etc.) we
take to be the normal and rational state of affairs. How can it be
true when it conflicts with what is virtually an analytic proposition
There is no difficulty once we see that 'The patient dictates to the
doctor' is not the appropriate description, but is true only because
certain other sentences are unparadoxically true, viz. (1) The
architect dictates a programme to the builder; (2) The builder is
also the medical expert; (3) The architect is one of the medical
expert's patients.
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(19) To continue: There are appropriate and inappropriate
descriptions of becoming. This is because the left-hand and right-
hand sides of a 'becomes' sentence can be filled by appropriate
and inappropriate descriptions. (By 'appropriate and inappropriate
descriptions' here, I mean descriptions which are appropriate or not
for the position assigned to them in the '- becomes -' matrix.) Now
the term appropriate for the left-hand side is the one which in sent¬
ences of types (iii) and (iv) above appears on both sides. The term
appropriate for the right-hand side is the one which appears on the
right in sentences such as (ii) and (iii), replacing a contrary or
contradictory term on the left. Thus the appropriate sentence for
describing becoming is of the form of (i): '(A/The) man becomes
cultured'. The paradox of becoming results if (a) we assume that all
sentences give equally appropriate descriptions, while (b) implicitly
acknowledging two principles already hinted at in the above remarks.
These two principles are firstly, that that which "does the becoming",
■i.e. which corresponds to the grammatical subject, and whose descrip¬
tion appears on the left, "remains"; and secondly, that that which
the latter becomes (corresponding to the grammatical complement),
whose description appears on the right, replaces something present
before. If these principles are let loose on the assumption that all
descriptions are equally appropriate, we get the following absurdi¬
ties. (1) Since '(A/The) uncultured becomes cultured' is appropri¬
ate, it follows that the becoming process ends with something that
is both cultured and uncultured (since what appears on the left in
an appropriate description also remains). We then are forced to
reason that what is supposed to remain does not do so in fact, since
opposites would be true together; or else that opposites somehow
are true together, perhaps because one manages to persist as the
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"matter" of the other. (2) Since '(A/The) man becomes (something
that is a) man' is appropriate, it follows that what does the becoming
was both a man and not (something that was) a man before the change,
since what is mentioned on the right in an appropriate description
replaces its own opposite or contradictory. We have then to conclude
either that nothing can really be replaced in becoming, since the
presumed replacee (not-man) can only have been there to be replaced
if the same being was both man and not-man; or else that there is
replacement and the same being was both man and not-man.
(20) Such are the troubles kept at bay by Aristotle's conclusion
that on the appropriate description ('xuptwg') what comes into being
does not come to be out of not being: nor does what is come to be out
of being (I 8, 191a35 - 191b27). As I read the passage,^ Aristotle
is here using 'out of' in the constitutive sense (V.s. paragraph (13)).
The product of coming to be, say the cultured man, is a complex "made
out of" (= whose continuing constituent is) a man (as a statue is made
11. Fortunately commentators agree on the main drift although not on
details of interpretation. On top of the general obscurity there
is a textual doubt at 191b20-21, although choice of reading here
seems not to affect the main point of the argument. The inter¬
pretation I have chosen to expound in paragraph (20) assumes
(pace Mansion, op. cit., p. 76) that 'ex' has the same (constit¬
utive) meaning in both halves of Aristotle's reply: (i) 'fiyets
6e xau auxot cpayev ytyveadaL ppQev aitAuSg ex pi) ovxog ... (ii)
waaUTWS 6e ou6 ' e£ ovxog oude xo ov yuyveadai.' (191bl3 ff. 'atAwg'
or an equivalent should be supplied in (ii) .) This entails that
in the corresponding 'xaxa aupgegrixds' assertions the scope of
'xaxa aupgegrixds' shifts from the grammatical subject (in (i))
to the complement (in (ii)) of 'ytyvexat'. At 191b20 - 21 I would
keep the MSS reading; the oddity of the example makes this the
lectio difficiliov as compared with Laas' emendation, and the lat¬
ter yields a poor sense for the argument: witness the struggles
of Ross, who adopts it (op. cit., pp. 495 - 496) and Charlton (op.
cit., pp. 80-81; Charlton however seems less convinced of the
MSS' wrongness).
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out of bronze). In this sense of 'out of', that out of which is
what I spoke of as "doing the becoming" (v.s. paragraph (19)), or as
corresponding to the grammatical subject. So Aristotle is saying
that what does the becoming should properly be described as what it
was, is and will be before, through and after the change, i.e. as
'man' , although it would not be false to describe it as not. being what
it will become, i.e. as 'not cultured'. And he is also saying that
what does the becoming should properly be described as becoming what
(as yet) it is not (cultured), although it would not be false to say
that it comes to be what it is (a man; since what it comes to be is
a certain sort of man - a cultured one). The wielders of the paradox
obtained their weaponry by seizing on these not-false descriptions and
treating them as best descriptions.
(21) We might ask: Has Aristotle any ground for his preference of
descriptions of type (i), '(A/The man becomes cultured', aside from
the fact that if these are classified as uniquely appropriate, the
paradox cannot be sustained? If not, is he not begging the question
in his own favour? Adherents of the paradox, if they were alert,
could flatly deny the superiority of type-(i) descriptions; they
might hold that types (ii) and (iv) are not merely as good but better,
since they unlike (i) do not allow you to overlook the paradox, which
after all is still there! But does Aristotle need to give a further
reason for preferring type (i) once he has shown that the "phenomena"
12
make sense if it is preferred, not otherwise? If anybody is going to
wait to have it proved to him that it makes most sense (in conceptual
12. Cf. Eth. Nie. VII 1, 1145b6-7, referred to by Owen, op. ait.,
Aristotle3 ed. Moravcsik, p. 173.
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analysis as well as in science) to choose the account which itself
makes most sense of the data, then his plight is not that of the early
victims of the paradox whom Aristotle describes as students of nature
manques, 'turned back' by this obstacle. A hindrance exists only
for those who desire some goal, and they, once the path is clear,
do not require to be further persuaded of the rationality of taking
that path.
(22) Yet Aristotle is not speaking only to would-be scientists
waiting to be reassured that the language of becoming is logically
coherent. His most attentive listeners have always included those
whose principal concern has been to understand the very possibility
of becoming itself. For them the discussion has only just started.
What Aristotle has shown so far, on our exposition, is that whether
or not becoming and change are possible in themselves, the concepts
cannot be condemned as meaningless on the ground that they generate
inconsistencies. But it is one thing to have it proved that a
concept breaks no logical rules, and another to have it explained
what must be the case if that concept has real application. No doubt
in this instance we cannot help believing that it does; but then the
question is: what must be the case for the world to be in this respect
as we cannot help believing it? To give this question more of an edge,
let us now focus on a problem which the argument so far has left
completely unanswered.
(23) Granted that "something remains" on the analysis of becoming
so far, how does this meet the paradox, when the paradox centres
precisely on the fact that something is supposed to come into being
that was not in being before? For even if something can be shown to
"remain", there must be something new too, or we should not be dealing
with becoming. But if there was a problem in the first place how can
there not be one still - not, perhaps, about everything that earlier
seemed so puzzling, but at least about the nuclear requirement that
there should be something whose presence replaces its own absence.
And if this needs no solution, whether by comparing sentences of
ordinary discourse or by some other means, then why was there a diffi¬
culty in the first place?
(24) The point may be put as follows. Aristotle's explicit
analysis, as I understand it, is devoted to showing how something can
be coherently said to remain the same through becoming without remain¬
ing the same in a way that makes nonsense of the becoming. More
specifically, he shows how we can avoid having to use either 'The man
becomes a man' or 'The uncultured becomes a cultured uncultured' as
the proper descriptions. But this surely leaves unexplained how any¬
thing can become cultured from uncultured, or how a man can "become"
anything but what he always was, a man. The difficulty is this. If
the uncultured becomes cultured, then why should we not say that what
'cultured' stands for has come into being not having existed before?
If there is no difficulty about this, then why was it so important
to show that anything remained throughout? And how does it help to
point out that what 'man' stands for remains throughout? This only
means that there is no immediate difficulty with respect to 'man',
since 'man' in this context does not represent anything that is
supposed to appear where it previously was not. But it does not mean
that there is no difficulty with respect to the new appearance of what
does newly appear, namely whatever corresponds to 'uncultured'. Now
Aristotle will doubtless say that he has already given an answer, in
stating in I 7, 190al5 - 16 and 190b24 - 25, that the man and the
cultured are the same in number (the same individual) although not
in formula. Therefore, he would say, it is false that what 'cultured'
stands for suddenly appears in existence, since it stands for what
'man' also stands for, and this, it is agreed, was there all along.
Now this answer could be made more sophisticated {e.g. by recasting
in terms of the modern sense/reference distinction), but it seems to
take care of the question. But it does not as it stands provide the
vat-ionale of the question's being taken care of in this way.
(25) Aristotle has not, in other words, explained why it is not
legitimate to think of 'cultured' as referring to a new existent or
thing. If it were, then 'uncultured' presumably would refer to a past
existent. The uncultured would be a thing that no longer exists, the
cultured would have started to exist. The cultured man who comes to
be according to sentences of type (iii) would be a conjunction of two
existents: a man, present all along, newly joined by a cultured
appearing where previously it was not. The becoming of the cultured,
then, is really a becoming out of nothing, for what 'cultured' applies
to is not identical with anything that existed before 'cultured'
acquired a hold in the world. Since the man now is a separate thing
from the cultured, the fact that the man pre-existed does not soften
the ex nt-h-Clo arrival of the cultured. But once the problem is set
out in this way, it answers itself (as doubtless Aristotle expected
it to). We have to regard 'cultured' as true of something that pre¬
existed, otherwise the cultured is a thing that comes from nothing.
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'Cultured' therefore has to be true of something, X, of which some¬
thing else was also true (since otherwise X would have had no
character, hence have been nothing at all, before 'cultured' became
true of it). Presumably 'uncultured' was true of X before 'cultured'
was. But that which 'cultured' is now true of, and which existed
before, cannot simply be identified as that of which 'uncultured'
was previously true. For that too would mean that 'cultured' came
to hold of something in itself characterless, which existed through
the replacement of 'uncultured' by 'cultured' but without fulfilling
any one description of its own during this change-over. The X, then,
to which 'cultured' now applies must be describable by some such term
as 'man', which was true of it even when 'uncultured' was true.
(26) But now if the difficulty seems to have evaporated of the
cultured coming into being where previously it was not, this is because
the cultured is no longer being regarded as a separate existent from
the man. But still, when 'cultured' comes to apply, something new
happens, only not the sudden emergence of a new thing. We have to say
that what 'cultured' imports when it starts to apply is not nothing
at all, but not a thing either, in other words, a property of a thing,
whether quality, quantity, relation or whatever, so long as its cate¬
gory is not that of things or substances. And the difference that
is now being driven home between things, and properties in other cate¬
gories, is that the new appearance of the latter where previously they
were lacking is not the paradox of 'something out of nothing' that it
would be if such properties were things in their own right. Thus the
distinction between things and properties furnishes us with an answer
against those who accuse becoming of entailing ' fievi ex n'ih^lo, . We
28
can now say that in every change there is a genuine something, which
does not come to be in that change (so that for it the problem does
not arise), and in every change there is also what is not really
some thing at all, so that although it does come to be where previously
it was not, the problem does not apply to it either.
(27) We have seen that the subject X underlying first the absence
then the presence of culture must be characterisable; otherwise it
could as well be nothing at all. Aristotle's analysis of the ordinary
language 'becoming' sentences bore out this metaphysical point, since
he proved on this level that "something remains" by pointing to the
recurrence of the same general term 'man' on either side of the verb
in (iii). But it is not enough to say that X must be characterisable
by a general term. For the characteristic corresponding to this term
must be such that by its very nature it imports, whenever it is
instantiated, the individual substance in which to be instantiated.
This is perhaps more easily understood by contrast with characteristics
corresponding to terms such as 'cultured'. These must be such as not
to import of themselves the individuals to which they apply; for they
necessarily apply to individuals already constituted and set up:
otherwise change is absurd, implying a new existent for every new
property. Let us call the former type of characteristic 'substance-
constitutive'; by this we mean both that the individual possessed of
such a characteristic is thereby constituted a substance of the sort
that it is, and also that the characteristic itself has to take care,
on its own behalf so to speak, of the realisation of its instances,
since unlike non-substantial characteristics, it cannot rely on there
being pre-constituted individuals to receive it. It is now clear that
the possibility of change and becoming depends upon the metaphysical
distinction between things and properties that are not things, and
hence also on the distinction between substance-constitutive prop¬
erties and others. And these distinctions will have to be treated
as absolute, unless we are willing to concede (as Aristotle emphatic¬
ally would not) that from some points of view becoming is meta¬
physically possible,, from others not, and that none of these view-
13
points is objectively superior to the others.
(28) Does our experience or our language, or both, enable us to
give content to this distinction between the two types of properties
by identifying specific instances as falling on one side or the
other? If not, then although change may still be possible, it will
not be something of which we can have specific knowledge. We shall be
entitled to describe successions of phenomena, or replacements, but
not changes with a subject that "remains". Specific substances too
will be unknowable as such if they are characterised only by properties
whose substance-constitutive power is undetectable by us. Thus since
Aristotle is concerned with human knowledge of becoming, his theory
now depends upon the possibility of our actually distinguishing among
knowable characteristics the substance-constitutive ones from the rest.
We must in other words be able, as he believes that he is, to fill in
the doctrine of the Categories by giving correct examples, and
especially examples in the category of Substance. So now the question
is whether there is any principle on which such a division may be
13. See Appendix to Chapter I.
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14 . .
made? If not then his account of becoming remains a mere schema,
such that we could never say for certain what if anything in the
empirical world counts as a case of becoming (fits the schema). Two
possible candidates for a principle of division suggest themselves.
One concerns the temporal durations of characteristics, the other
their causal properties.
(29) The relative lengths of time during which characteristics
are instantiated in any given situation clearly plays some part in
our allotting to one characteristic (or set of them) the status of
substance-constitutive and not to others. After all, the way in which
'man' was originally distinguished as to its function from 'uncultured'
and 'cultured' in the original example was by reference to the fact
that the former does, the latter do not, continue to hold on each
side of the change, and through it too if it takes time. But equally
clearly, remaining instantiated for longer (in a given situation)
supplies at most a necessary condition for substance-constitutivity.
Not every continuing characteristic has or could have this status.
(Suppose for instance that the man who became cultured was all the
time in Athens.) There must be some difference other than degree of
duration between the substance-constitutive property and the other
properties present in a given case: for Aristotle, a non-substantial
14. The problem is not merely to find a formal criterion (such e.g.
as the complex one offered by D. Wiggins, Identity and Spatio-
temporal Continuity, pp. 27 ff.), but to see whether anything
about the content of a general term tells us that it expresses a
substance-constitutive characteristic or not (and hence whether
or not it fits the formal criterion, supposing a satisfactory one
to have been found. As for this last question, it is not clear
to me how Wiggins could demonstrate that 'triangular' does not
satisfy his set of conditions for a substance-term.)
property could not conceivably get to be in the category of Substance
by continuing to apply for longer. Moreover the difference must be
one that applies in the same way to all cases; that is to say, for
Aristotle, a substance-constitutive property is such whenever it
occurs. Although the concept of substance has been developed in close
connection with that of subject of a given change, being a particular
substance, and being a substance of a given kind, is not relative to
a given change-situation. If the man in the original example is as
such a substance, then he is so in all changes, and all men are so in
all changes. Thus substance-constitutivity cannot be equated with
longer duration, for a property whose presence is relatively permanent
in one instance may be relatively impermanent in another.
(30) 'All men by nature desire to know.' The opening remark of the
Metaphysics throws some light on the question of what more adequate
type of principle might be found to support the distinction between
substance-constitutive characteristics and others. For whereas all
predicates that apply to the subject of change throughout the change
are equally true, they are by no means on a par as regards the inform¬
ation they convey. This being so, it is reasonable to suppose that
when someone reports a change in order to pass information, he will
naturally use a more rather than less informative description under
which to present the subject, unless there is some reason for not
doing so. So far this is merely a descriptive generalisation concern¬
ing human linguistic behaviour. Suppose, however, that we recast the
observation in the normative mode, and maintain that the seeking and
acquiring of knowledge are the highest human activities (or, the
highest whose results can be expressed in language). Now we have a
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basis for also maintaining that the more informative description
is that in terms of which the subject ought, most properly, to be
described. If, moreover, among information-rich descriptions there
are some that convey information of an especially esteemed kind
(for example concerning the object's impersonal relations to other
objects, as opposed to its emotional effect on the speaker himself),
then descriptions of this type will for this reason too be assigned
priority by whoever values this type of information. It is, perhaps,
not difficult to see how such a normative attitude could present
itself to its holder in the form of a metaphysical doctrine of
substance-constitutive characteristics, or essences.
(31) Thus if something equally truly describable as 'a human being',
'a pale object', 'something in Athens', 'something weighing ten stone',
is said to become, say hot, Aristotle's preference for describing
this subject primarily as 'a human being' can be justified as follows:
the first description on the list tacitly connects the subject, thus
described, to the change that is predicated, in a way in which none
of the later descriptions do. The sense in which this is true will
be thoroughly obscured if (like Hume) we approach the matter believing
that a "connection", to deserve the name, must either be necessary or
rationally intelligible or both. By these standards, 'human' no more
provides a connection than the other predicate-expressions. The point
is, rather, that for a language user of normal experience, the first
description provides some indication, however sketchy and incomplete,
concerning various possible circumstances under which, and processes
by which, the change is likely to have taken place, as well as con¬
cerning possible conditions for reversing the change; whereas the
other descriptions, again for someone of normal experience, in them¬
selves provide no such information. The description of something
as 'white', 'cylindrical', 'ten stone in weight', or 'in Athens' by
itself excludes no possibilities whatever concerning the ways in
which the object so described might change, or the conditions under
which a given change might occur or fail to occur or be reversed.
These blanks only begin to be filled in if we are also told what else
is true of the thing so described: whether it is a block of limestone
an animal, a roll of linen, etc. It is to be noted that this way of
distinguishing substance-constitutive characteristics does not (at any
rate on this initial level) depend on any conception of causation as
involving empirically unknowable "powers". We are speaking of causal
relations as they figure in ordinary experience, and whether or not
they can only be explained by reference to "powers", we are concerned
here not with their possible explanation but with their manifestation
in regularities. Different particular things to which 'man' truly
applies behave in more or less the same way under the same conditions,
whereas different things to which 'white' and 'triangular' truly
apply will behave utterly differently under the same conditions, the
behaviour varying according to what else is true of the white or
triangular object in each particular case.
(32) The remarks of the preceding paragraph do not as they stand
offer an unexceptionable criterion for picking out terms for substance
constitutive characteristics. They indicate the area in which such a
criterion (if possible at all) might be found. The area is that of
descriptions the use of any one of which, in reference to a partic¬
ular subject, would furnish someone of ordinary experience with some
information, however rough, concerning the causal processes by which
a given change comes about in the subject so described. (It is to
be noted that the class of these descriptions is narrower than that
of causal terms in general, since there are many causal terms, e.g.
'magnetic', 'poisonous', which denote kinds of changes that their
subjects are likely to produce in other beings, and give no inform¬
ation about changes in the subjects themselves.) It cannot be auto¬
matically claimed that any description meeting the condition just
mentioned is a term for a substance-constitutive characteristic.
This conclusion could be drawn only if it had first been shown that
no description representing what we should naturally regard as an
acquired characteristic {.i.e. belonging, when it belongs, to an
already constituted individual substance) could meet the above
condition. But this seems unlikely to be true. Therefore the class
of substance-constitutive descriptions is only a sub-class of those
mentioned, and it is not clear what the differentia of this sub¬
class would be.
(33) But enough, I hope, has been said to show that there is, in
ordinary usage, a basis for distinguishing substance-constitutive
characteristics from per aooidens ones. The structure of ordinary
thought therefore not only justifies Aristotle's analysis of change
as requiring a continuing subject, but also provides an anchor for
the metaphysical distinction between types of characteristic on which
this account depends. Thus the argument undertaken in paragraph (10)
is now complete. There it was claimed that the idea of a universe
of things lacking all causal characteristics not only rules out any
explanation of change, but makes nonsense of the notion of change as
happening at all. This claim has now been shown to follow as a con¬
clusion from the premiss common both to Aristotle and his predecessors,
that change makes sense only if "something remains". The latter vague
notion was articulated by means of the concept of an "underlying
subject", and this in turn was found to depend on the distinction
between substances and attributes, and therefore on the distinction
between substance-constitutive characteristics and others. We have
now seen that the former type of characteristic is marked off by its
causal content, the causality relating to change and stasis in the
substance thus characterised. In this way the main topic of Physios I
is related to that of II, where the subject of discussion is the
"nature" of a thing as its "inner principle of change". Aristotle
himself underlines the connection when he says near the beginning of
II 1: 'Nature then is what we have said. All things have a nature
that have such a principle, and these things are all substances. For
each is a subject, and a nature is always in a subject.' (192b32 - 34)
Subjects of change are such as to behave as they do. Thus the
behaviour is never a function of external conditions alone. All
change then is at least partially determined by the subject itself,
and in this sense there must be "inner principles of change" if there
is to be change at all.
(34) But we now have to consider another and less obviously justi¬
fiable sense in which Aristotle holds a nature to be the inner prin¬
ciple of change. To elucidate this let us revert to his comparison of
nature with artifice. He initially compares them in order to stress
a contrast, but the very terms of the contrast betray his sense of
fundamental analogy. A natural substance differs from an artifact in
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that the latter does not have an inner principle of change and stasis:
it is developed and then manipulated (caused to "behave") by another
being, artificer or user. But the contrast is not simply between
natural substances and artifacts, for this difference is equally a
reason for contrasting natural substances with artificers. The art¬
ificer, unlike the natural substance, brings about (qua artificer)
change in something other than himself. Now in both wings of the
comparison, the contrast between nature and art impresses Aristotle
precisely because in his view (as his subsequent discussion will
show) the two cases are otherwise so much alike. As artificer stands
to the artificially induced change, so natural substance stands to
natural change, except that in the former case the source and the sub¬
ject of change are different, save per accidens, while in the latter
they are necessarily the same. In putting the matter thus I may seem
to underestimate what we shall see is an essential difference, but I
mean only to display it against the background of equally essential
analogy. Now following the analogy, we find that a natural substance
gives rise to change from "within" itself not merely in the sense that
it, being the kind of thing that it is, helps to determine the changes
occurring in it, so that under the same conditions it would change in
a different way from a substance of some other kind. For the crafts¬
man (as we ordinarily view such a one) is causally autonomous as regards
his craftsmanly activities, in the following sense: he dictates from
within the shape and pattern of the changes he brings about and the
objects or new situations he thereby produces. Although he adapts
his activity to the particular circumstances, still the way in which
they are allowed to influence the pattern of production is determined
by his objective. They play no part in shaping the overall form of
the change, being themselves harnessed to help realise an already
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determined form. What kind of change it is that takes place depends
on the craftsman, his skill and his purpose, and the external con¬
ditions under which it does take place are relevant only insofar as
they make possible that kind of change; they do not contribute to
determining what change it is that occurs when they make it possible.
(35) In parallel with this, the nature of a natural substance, as
Aristotle conceives it, does not simply make some causal contribution
to the character of its changes (which was shown to be a necessary
consequence of the very notion of a subject of change) but in the
primary and central type of case it wholly determines the pattern of
change. If we may extend from substances to changes Aristotle's own
distinction between what something is and the fact that it is, we can
say that a natural substance is causally independent of external con¬
ditions as regards the determination of the whatness of the change,
although dependent as regards its actual occurrence at a given time
and place. Just so, the character of a particular existing substance
is not a function of its surroundings, although it totally depends on
their favour for the fact that being what it is, it exists. Now on
this view of natural change, not all changes that occur in a natural
substance are determined as to their character from within the sub¬
stance, any more than every change that might occur in the sculptor's
stone as he works is dictated by his purpose with it. If rain happens
to drench it, any effect that this might have on the stone lies out¬
side his intended effect, and may interrupt and hinder the change he
is in process of producing. Similarly with a natural substance. Given
15. Cf. A.P.D. Mourelatos, 'Aristotle's "Powers" and Modern
Empiricism', Ratio IX, 1967, pp. 97 ff.
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that the growth of a sapling is the change of which its nature is
the "inner principle", if the sapling burns down, this is no part of
the behaviour that it was its nature to display. We may be tempted
to deny this on the ground that the conditions under which it peace¬
fully grew are of one sort, while those under which it catches fire
and burns are quite different, and we would not expect it necessarily
to behave in the same way when the circumstances have radically
altered. Aristotle would not disagree; but nor would he draw what
to us is the obvious conclusion that the object's nature fits it for
both types of change, and that under different circumstances the same
woody character is differently but equally displayed in variety of
reaction. For Aristotle, this would be as absurd as arguing that
since the builder would not expect a roof necessarily to withstand
hurricane conditions, therefore his purpose in building is as much,
though differently, expressed in its blowing off as its staying on.
(36) We may sum up the last point as follows. If the nature of
a natural substance is exhibited in the changes whose character it
autonomously determines, then in these changes the only role left
to the external conditions is that of permitting the change or not
hindering it. It follows that if the conditions do hinder it, the
resulting situation, whether it is a new change or a quiescent state,
does not exhibit the nature of the substance. Although the new situ¬
ation may come about through natural processes as opposed to human
interference, it is no more natural to the substance concerned than
if it were the product of artifice. It is "by nature" without being
natural to its subject: as Aristotle says, it is "enforced".^
16. Cf. D.D. Heath, 'On some Misconceptions of Aristotle's Doctrine
(37) There is no doubt that ordinary experience affords plenty of
examples that seemingly illustrate this conception of nature as an
autonomous inner principle. Many if not most of the objects that
attract our unreflective practical and aesthetic attention regularly
exhibit patterns of change against a physical background which itself
shows no corresponding isomorphic configuration either dynamic or
static. A stone falls, an animal jumps, a plant blossoms under con¬
ditions in which perhaps no external change at all occurs, or none
that keeps in phase with the changes mentioned. Water may follow the
line of its banks, but equally often it simply falls - through the air
not channelled by it. What more understandable than that a virtual
pioneer in the philosophy of nature should suppose that the natures
of things are to be read off from such changes alone, and that all
other reactions are to be consigned to the category of the 'incidental
as reflecting nothing intrinsic in the objects that suffer them, but
only the tendency of the interfering agent? What more natural than to
adopt (or fail to shake off) the ever-alluring analogy with the human
purposeful agent? But the fact that a notion has many illustrations
does not entail that it is a coherent concept, or has any actual
instances, and we may well doubt the sense, as well as the scientific
usefulness, of a view that obliges us to identify the changes that are
natural to a given object with a mere sub-class of those that occur
in it through perfectly natural causes. Aristotle himself would dis¬
miss as fanciful the attribution of intention and intelligence to
on Causation and to auTo'yaxov', Journal of Philology VII, 1897,
p. Ill: 'Aristotle's system ... slurred over the consideration
of natural inter-action, very commonly ranking it as something
antagonistic to the natural order, gtauov; and ... tended to
reduce the course of Nature to a series of self-developments
of almost independent organisms.'
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plants and animals; but is not the attribution of "natures" in the
sense explained a similar mistake: one, moreover, that loses its
vat'Lonale once we cease to regard all natural substances as purposeful
agents?
(38) The two "mistakes" are not on a level however. Aristotle saw
as clearly as any modern scientist that to interpret animal and plant
behaviour as intelligently purposeful explains nothing that could
not, as he thought, be well explained without it; whereas to deny
"natures" and natural changes would for him be tantamount to denying
the very possibility of all explanation. This concept is the starting
point for any philosophy of nature, and so it is that at II 1,
193al - 9 he writes:
'What nature is has been stated ... But that
nature exists it would be ludicrous to try to prove.
For it is evident that there are in the world many
such things, -i.e. things endowed with "natures" in
the sense explained. And to prove what is evident
by means of what is not evident betrays an inability
to discriminate between what is and is not in itself
knowable. It is obvious that a person can be in this
state: someone blind from birth might reason con¬
cerning colours. What this amounts to is that such
people can only be arguing about words, without any
meaning in mind.'
Aristotle does not of course mean that a normally constituted human
being "perceives" natures as he perceives colour. This might be the
case with change, but a "nature" is a principle of change, and our
recognition of principles, by Aristotle's own showing, comes from
reflection upon experience: if they were sensory "givens", they could
not function as principles. We start with 'confused things, which to
us are initially more obvious and clear', whereas 'the elements
and principles become known later from these upon analysis'. (I 1,
184al0 - 26) The comparison with the blind man makes the point that
people can try to reason while lacking any conception of what they
are reasoning about, and this lack of understanding shows itself in
the very fact that they try to reason: whether the subject matter
is such that it can only be grasped through the senses, or (like
the fact that there are "natures") whether it provides the necessary
starting point for any relevant investigation. The philosopher of
nature must presuppose the reality of the physical world, the
existence of change, and finally the actual part played by "natures",
in Aristotle's sense as inner principles of change.
(39) Unfortunately Aristotle does not distinguish between the
ludicrous activity of proving what is too fundamental for proof,
and the far from ludicrous activity of moving, by reflection, to an
articulated understanding of the assumption too fundamental for proof.
He himself indulges in this second activity when in Physics I 2 he
argues against the Eleatic denial of plurality, or in Metaphysics T
shows how even the denial of the law of non-contradiction involves
at the same time its acceptance. But so far as the existence of
"natures" is concerned, he proceeds as if the case is indeed like
that of colours for a sighted person: such a one not only knows of
their existence without proof, but cannot even conceive that he could
question it. The reason for this may be dialectical: unlike plurality
and the law of non-contradiction, no one had ever challenged (except
by implication, as a consequence of these two challenges) the Aristo¬
telian concept of "nature" and its applicability to the real world.
And the reason for that is surely that Aristotle himself was the first
to articulate this concept. Now in his arguments against Parmenides,
and in part of his argument concerning contradiction, Aristotle relies
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on his own doctrine of substance and the categories as an unassail¬
able point of departure. We shall now see that this also provides a
rational basis for the Aristotelian theory of "natures as inner
principles of change".
(40) Four assumptions make up the grounds of the theory. The first
is that there are substances in the sense explained in the Categories.
Secondly, we discover what it is for something to be a natural sub¬
stance of a given kind by observing the regular behaviour of substances
of this kind. There is no other path to knowledge of the "natures of
things". Thirdly, there are irreducibly different kinds or species
of substance. Fourthly, a substantial essence is unitary and conveyed
in definition by a unitary formula. From these premisses it follows
that a substance of a given sort must exhibit its nature, or what it
is, through change that is specific to that sort and also in some sense
unitary. If observable changes in natural objects cannot be construed
as specific and unitary, this would show, so far as empirical evidence
can decide such a question, that the Aristotelian concept of substance
lacks application in the physical world. Now the main problem turns
on the type of unity that a change must display in order to be seen
as expressing a substance. From our previous discussion it is clear
that for Aristotle unity of change means in effect change in accordance
with a single pattern, whether the pattern is immediately discernible
to the senses, like the typical lines of ascent and descent of "simple
substances" such as fire and earth, or whether it can only be made out
by repeated experience and the marshalling of many observations, like
the complex and far more abstract pattern of a living creature's life-
cycle. It is this conception of the unity of a substance-expressing
change that leads him to hold that any change which diverges from
some single typical tendency in a given direction represents nothing
but interference: not merely with the "natural" change itself, but
with our one source of knowledge about the substantial nature concerned.
(41) Such a view has momentous consequences for scientific practice.
It is notorious that 'with very few exceptions, the Ancient Greeks
throughout a period of eight hundred years made no attempt at system¬
atic experimentation'. So writes Professor Sambursky.^ No doubt
there were many contributing causes, sociological, psychological,
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ethical, religious. But to these we may add the metaphysical notion
of nature as an inner principle of change - for if Aristotle first
articulated this concept, he did not create it exnihilo; it had its
roots in earlier philosophy, if not also in common sense. Once it
is supposed that a natural substance manifests its nature through
some single typifying pattern of change to which external circum¬
stances contribute nothing but the opportunity of realisation, two
things follow. Firstly, posing and answering questions of the form
'How will it behave under such and such (positively specified) con¬
ditions?' adds nothing to a scientific understanding of the substance.
To see this we need only divide the conditions of its existence into
those kinds which favour the occurrence of the "innerly determined"
typifying change, and those which suppress or interfere with it. The
favouring conditions do not reveal the character of the substance;
they only enable it to reveal itself in autonomous behaviour. Given
17. The Physical World of the Greeks3 p. 2.
18. See Sambursky, op. cit.3 ch. X.
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that typifying behaviour T occurs in a substance S under conditions
C, it is incorrect to say that S is such as to exhibit T under con¬
ditions C. For according to the supposition, S is such as to exhibit
T simpliciter. Conditions C are those under which this typifying
change is not prevented and therefore occurs; but from this it does
not follow that S is typified by exhibiting T-under-C. Now consider
the conditions that prevent the occurrence of T. These are evidently
powerless to reveal the character of S, since they preclude the only
kind of behaviour in which this character shows itself. The second
point is more narrowly relevant to the question of experimental
method, since it centres on the artificial control of conditions. It
is Aristotle's view that substance-typifying changes are as a rule
successfully realised in the natural environment. Most of the con¬
ditions in which most individual natural substances find themselves
are such as to permit their typifying behaviour, or at least most of
the time. It is therefore senseless to place a substance under
artificial conditions for better observation. This cannot enable us
to identify the typifying behaviour in a given case; nor, if we
believe that we have identified it, can it help us to study it better.
For if the substance still exhibits the behaviour in question this
teaches us no more about its nature than we could have learned through
observing it in the natural context. But the artificial conditions
are more likely than not to inhibit the typifying behaviour, and in
that case we learn nothing at all about the substantial nature, since
this is revealed only through changes that are not taking place.
Experiment in short opens up no new access to the facts, and may
succeed only in suppressing them. It follows that the only rational
attitude for the natural scientist is that which Sambursky calls
'submissiveness' to the world of nature; for natural substances best
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"tell us" what they are when as spectators we leave them to them-
19
selves to operate under their own direction.
(42) But it is surely a crude mistake to think that an object's
unitary nature is manifested only behaviour of a single observable
pattern. Surely it is more scientific and intellectually satisfying
to construe the empirical data on the assumption that an underlying
unity runs through all the object's behavings, whether in usual,
unusual, natural or artificial surroundings. Seen thus, all its
actions and reactions equally tell us what it is; all are equally
natural to it; none is a divergence or interruption except from the
subjective standpoint of some human purpose, as when we say that a
machine has broken down, well knowing that it is of a nature to react
to current conditions in the way that unfits it for use. For the same
lays by which it worked also make it stop working, so that in this
sense what it does and how it is is always the same, i.e. an expression
of the same set of laws, the differences being due to shifts in values
of the same variables. Our faith in this attitude has been justified
by the actual success of sciences such as mechanics and molecular
chemistry. To understand Aristotle's blindness to the very possibility
of such an approach, let us briefly consider certain aspects of these
two sciences.
(43) In mechanics, it has often been pointed out, there is no place
for the concept of specifically different substances. All bodies can
19. See ibid., pp. 234 - 235 for an excellent statement of the con¬
clusion, although without the metaphysical premisses.
be shown to behave at all times in accordance with the same set of
laws, because the laws depend on the properties of body as such.
These properties, moreover, according to Aristotle's categorial
scheme, fall into categories other than that of Substance: mass,
velocity, position, duration, etc. The same individual Aristotelian
substance could alter in respect of all these without impairment to
its substantial nature. Thus mechanics studies, through their effects,
the "natures" of these properties in their determinations and combin¬
ations. But in a mechanical account of an object's behaviour, none
of that behaviour can appear as issuing from a specific substantial
nature. Thus if the fall of a stone and the rise of vapour are
explained mechanically, we can no longer say that these motions
typify these substances (earth and air) as such. But if the stone's
substantial nature does not determine what seems its most obviously
characteristic behaviour, we are in a poor position to claim that it
determines any of the stone's behaviour; thus substances as such are
metaphysically "inert" and hence unknowable, since knowledge could only
ever have come to us through their actions.
(44) With chemistry the situation is rather different. It is true
that Aristotle's refusal to follow Plato's mathematicising lead in
the study of nature cuts him off from the basic concepts of physics
and chemistry alike. Many writers have dwelt on this point, and I
have nothing to add to their expositions. However, chemistry unlike
mechanics does deal with specifically different substances (elements
and compounds). Now the unity of the chemical behaviour of any one
of these is grounded on the conceptual unity of the molecular and
atomic theory. This theory postulates for each type of substance a
structure which is the starting point for explaining observed inter¬
actions with other types, in accordance with a few principles. Thus
in chemistry as we know it, the structuredness of chemical matter is
regarded as a necessary given, although it is an empirical question
what particular structures should be assigned to given types of
substance so as best to explain the phenomena. Now Aristotle by
contrast with Plato does not regard structure in the natural world
as inexplicable from within the natural world itself, being the
product and sign of some metaphysical interface between physical
existence and a transnatural order. But at the same time Aristotle
does not take structure as given in any individual case: rather, it
is what the individual natural substance by natural processes
achieves. This means that in Aristotle the conception of empirically
knowable structure has to be supplemented by another notion of order,
that of the orderly progression of a natural substance towards the
full development of the empirically knowable structure. The progres¬
sion is described by reference to the structure, as tending towards
it; and it cannot also be described by reference to other already
existing empirical structures, for this would be to substitute the
notion of structure as given for the notion of structure as achieved.
Aristotle in common with Plato assigns to empirically knowable struc¬
ture an empirically unknowable source, but with a difference: Plato's
is the form beyond the world, while Aristotle's is the power of the
natural substance to attain structure. This power is in the physical
world, being centred in a particular natural substance, but it cannot
be identified in its own right with any actual set of empirically
knowable structures or properties. Thus Aristotle like the modern
chemist would account for an object's behaviour by reference to its
structure - except that for Aristotle the structure is the final
terminus of change, not its precondition. In consequence, Aristotle
cannot hold that the nature of a substance is impartially typified
by all its changes under whatever conditions, for there is only one
type of change that depends on the specific structure, namely that
which results in the latter's full development. Aristotle is there¬
fore forced by his own fundamental concepts to identify the behaviour
that manifests substantial nature with a mere sub-class of all the
20
behavmgs of which the substance m question is physically capable.
(45) Thus Aristotle's notion of "natures" as inner autonomous
shapers of change is not to be put down to a naive projection of the
concept of conscious intentional activity. It is his metaphysic of
substance that dictates the idea of "nature", including just those
features that so obviously invite comparison with "artifice". We
shall return to this comparison, since we have not yet examined what
for Aristotle, despite their resemblance, is the fundamental and
decisive difference. First however let me state two corollaries of
the position reached so far. In the first place, the distinction
between changes that are "natural" in the sense explained and those
which are not is as absolute as the distinction between the per se
unity of a substantial form such as that represented by 'man', and
the per accidens unity of a complex such as that represented by 'white
man'. Secondly, natural change is ontologically and conceptually
prior to all other types of change. All other changes either inhibit,
interrupt or modify natural change, or else represent the conjunction
20. Cf. Mourelatos, op. ait. , pp. 102 - 103, who argues on rather
different grounds from mine that Aristotle does not simply
'fail' to refer dispositional properties to micro-structural
bases, but rejects a priori any such attempt at explanation.
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of several natural changes. And in tracing back the causal history
of any such non-natural change, one will always reach a natural one
from which the process started. Individual substances A and B come
into contact, and A causes a counter-natural change in B. But either
A came into contact through pursuing some natural change-pattern of
its own, or it was brought by some other substance C. And if the
latter, the change that brought A under the influence of C is either
natural or not, and if the latter, the same argument can be repeated.
But at some point we arrive at a natural change and an originating
substance that changes "of itself", and what makes this certain is
not any vague finitist distaste for infinite regression as such, but
the following quite precise reason: If no change were natural, then
substances would never as such express themselves through change. The
concept of "substance" would then contribute nothing at all to an
account of the natural world, nor therefore to a metaphysics intended
to subserve science.
(46) So far in this chapter we have examined two senses in which a
thing's nature is an "inner principle of change". To attribute a
nature in the first sense, is to say that the thing in question has
an intrinsic character that makes some contribution to determining
the sorts of changes that take place in it. The relevant contrast
here is with a featureless somewhat which is a mere locus of change
but which lacks any character to limit the changes possible to it, so
that any change would be totally determined from without. In reject¬
ing this, Aristotle has the clear support of ordinary thought as
reflected in ordinary usage. With the second sense of "inner
principle of change" the support is not so clear, although even here
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Aristotle is by no means obviously at odds with ordinary thought.
In this sense, a substance, being of a certain nature, is self-
sufficient to determine the pattern of its typical changes, the
external conditions playing no part in shaping what happens, but only
providing the background in which it can happen. Here the contrast
is with the substances of modern chemistry and the corporeal particles
of classical mechanics, all of whose actions and reactions are co-
determined by the character and properties of the objects themselves
together with those of their environment. Now in both the above
senses, the "inner"/"outer" contrast opposes determination of change
by the substance itself with determination by external conditions or
substances. We have now to consider a third sense in which Aristotle
holds the nature of a thing to be an "inner principle of change".
(47) In this third sense, the implied contrast is not between
determinants but subjects of change. It is from this point of view
that Aristotle draws a distinction between nature and artifice which
for him is no less fundamental than the analogy discussed earlier.
He writes:
'Nature is a principle and cause of change and
stasis in that in which it primarily inheres per se,
■i.e. not per accidens. I say "not per accidens",
because someone who was a physician might himself
become the cause of his own recovery. But all the
same it is not insofar as he has the art of medicine
that he recovers, since it has come about per accidens
that the same man both is a physician and recovers
health. Thus the physician and the one who recovers
are also sometimes found separately from one another.
It is the same with all other things brought about by
contrivance. None of them has the principle of the
contriving in itself. In some cases the principle is
in other things and external, as for instance with a
house and anything else made by the hands, while in
other cases it is in the things themselves, only not
per se_, since it is per aooidens that the subjects in
which they cause change are themselves.' (II 1, 192b
20 - 32)
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So in natural change, the particular subject in which the change
takes place is necessarily identical with the particular substance
whose nature gives rise to the change. In artifice on the other hand
the subject and source of change may be identical, but if so they
only happen to be, as is proved by the fact that the same change in
the subject could have come about at the hands of another practitioner,
and the practitioner who this time treats himself could have performed
as practitioner on someone else.
(48) At first sight Aristotle seems to be saying that a natural
substance is the source of an intransitive activity, while an artif¬
icer is the source of a transitive one. (We here use 'transitive'/
'intransitive' to denote formal properties of activities, not gram¬
matical properties of verbs. But we are using the terms in a sense
analogous to the grammatical, not with the meaning they bear in the
logic of relations.) However, the distinction between transitive and
intransitive does not quite make Aristotle's point, since it fails to
divide all natural from all artificial processes. In the first place,
even where an artificer operates on an external object, his operating
involves certain intransitive changes in himself: the surgeon and
the builder move (intransitive) in order to produce their intended
external effects. Even when the doctor treats himself, the motions
involved in the treating can be distinguished from the change (recovery)
brought about. Secondly, there are skilled activities such as singing
and dancing, which seem essentially intransitive: the dance is
the performer's own movements organised to an artistically conceived
pattern.
(49) These objections force us to realise that the contrast which
Aristotle means is not primarily between natural and artificial
activities, nor between changes, but between natural and artificial
forms and their respective relations to the agent by whose activity
they come to be realised. (Thus the starting point for his philosophy
of nature is not after all so philosophically innocuous as might first
appear from the initial seemingly commonsensical contrast of nature
with artifice. For he is relying, we now see, on an analysis (itself
the product of philosophising) of the concept of skill and exercise
of skill, in which the artificial form to be realised is singled out
as conceptually central.) The exercise of a skill may necessarily
involve movements on the part of the artificer, but these are only
the means by which the intended form is realised. That is, they are
means to further changes in which the realising of the projected form
actually consists, e.g. the patient's return to health. If it were
not for the agent's producing or usually producing changes of this
latter kind, we should not describe him as having the skill in
question. The skill is defined by reference to the form. Aristotle's
point then is that this form and the change which immediately results
in it could just as well take place in a subject other than the agent
himself, so that if they do occur in him, it is only per accidens.
By contrast, the form brought about through natural change, and the
change itself through which it is brought about, necessarily occur in
the very same substance whose nature determines the change. As for
the point about the intransitivity of singing and dancing, even here
it is possible to distinguish the changes in which the realisation of
the desired form consists from those which are necessary as means to
these. It is true as a matter of fact that the agent realises the
form through changes in his own body, but this seems not to be due to
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any inherent necessity for it to be realised in this and no other body
as subject, but to the unavailability of other suitably controllable
subjects. It might be possible to control the limbs or vocal chords
of another person so as to produce the song or dance through his body.
It is true that the skill manifested by the controlling agent would
not be described as skill in singing or dancing, since ex hyipothesi he
does neither: what he is so cleverly doing would be better described
as puppeteering or playing on a kind of instrument. Thus intransitive
skilled activities are not really counter-examples to the distinction
which Aristotle is making in 192b20 - 32. For although the activity
properly described as 'dancing' may be necessarily intransitive,
it consists in the realising of a form which could in principle be
realised in an external subject. But the form realised in natural
change is necessarily realised in the very same individual that gives
rise to the change.
(50) In this way the nature of a natural substance is more highly
particularised (or more "immanent") than the principle of artifice
defining an artificer. Both nature and artifice are embodied in
particular agents, and in this respect Aristotle's anti-Platonism
is impartial between the two kinds of cause. But they differ in that
a particular case of skill (i.e. a particular artificer) stands to
its effects as a Platonic "one over many", whereas the opposite holds
true of nature. The concept of a Platonic Form entails that any
number of particulars can participate in it so as to exhibit the cor¬
responding physical property, and however numerous the participants
the Form's capacity for being participated in is not exhausted.
Similarly the Aristotelian artificer can realise the same form in any
number of particular subjects, and its realisation in one in no way
limits this agent's power to produce it again in others. Whereas
the relation between the natural substance and the particular subject
in which the natural form is to be realised is necessarily one-one,
since they are necessarily the same individual.
(51) It is strange that after carefully distinguising between
nature and artifice in the way that we have just examined, Aristotle
should shortly afterwards come out with the remark that nature oper¬
ates like a doctor doctoring himself (II 8, 199b30 - 32). Is it that
Aristotle has such faith in his own powers of exposition as to assume
that this could cause no confusion once the initial distinction was
made? Or is it that he himself was earlier confused in supposing
the distinction to be either as clear or as absolute as the opening
passage of Chapter I certainly suggests? Obviously the two cases
are alike in that the source and the subject of change are the same
individual. But perhaps the temptation to use the self-doctoring
analogy betrays the fact that we cannot after all conceive of the
same individual from these two points of view, 'i.e. as both source
and subject, except when the case is one where the source and subject
might have been different? In other words, does it perhaps make
sense to identify the two only when the identity statement is true
per acci-denst If this is so, then it is incoherent to say that the
natural substance as source of change is identical per se with the nat¬
ural substance as subject. Instead we ought to refuse to describe the
situation in terms of any kind of identity between source and subject.
This does not mean that we should think of "them" as distinct indiv¬
iduals. On the contrary, it means that there is one individual, and
that this one cannot coherently be regarded as instantiating two
distinct aspects in such a way that it then makes sense to assert
the identity of itself under one of these aspects with itself under
the other. All that we can say, then, is that there is a change and
an individual that changes, and that such change occurs regularly in
individuals of this kind, circumstances permitting. To go further
and attempt to distinguish a source and a subject of change within
the ontological confines of the same individual can only introduce
confusion and pointless mystification.
(52) This criticism is damaging if justified, for it calls into
question Aristotle's right to be talking of a thing's nature as a
principle of change at all, even though it may not be clear either
what it would mean to deny this. On the one hand we should hardly
wish to rule against the legitimacy of saying that objects of a given
kind change as they do because this is how things of that kind behave
or that they do not simply change in this way, but are such as to
change in this way. But on the other hand, we might decide that the
licence to use these expressions is too costly, if the price is a
theory of sources that are somehow distinguishable from, but also
identical with, their subjects. This is not just the crude reaction
of someone unable to see how the same referent can be known and
picked out via more than one sense (according to Frege's use of that
term). For the problem here is compounded by the fact that one of
the alleged "senses", i.e. that corresponding to the "source-aspect",
is not empirically knowable or identifiable at all (v.s. paragraph
21. Cf. Charlton, op. oit. 3 pp. 88 - 89.
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(44)). We see the morning star, and also, later, the evening star,
but we never see the natural substance as giving rise to its change,
only as changing.
(53) A full discussion of the issues involved is out of the ques¬
tion here; for the present I shall confine myself to certain points
directly relevant to Aristotle. I shall argue first that notwith¬
standing his use of the self-doctoring analogy, there is good reason
to doubt his liability to the objection mounted in paragraph (51).
The gist of this objection was as follows: If the natural substance
is properly described as source and subject of its own change, then
this change is or involves a reflexive activity (such as self-
medication) . But a reflexive activity is transitive, and as such
need not be reflexive: the patient could be other than the agent.
It follows that we cannot contrast natural with artificial change on
the ground that in the latter, the agent and patient may be different
individuals, while in the former they must be the same. For if they
must be the same, there is no genuine transitivity; nor, therefore,
is there any genuinely reflexive element in the situation. And so
it becomes meaningless to say that the same individual is both agent
and patient, or both source and subject. Now as it stands this
criticism does not touch the position which Aristotle presents in
the Physics considered as a whole. In the first place, he does not
in Book II or anywhere else say that the operation of a natural sub¬
stance as such is a reflexive activity like curing oneself: he only
compares it to the latter. But secondly, this is not because he never
articulates the idea of a natural substance operating upon itself.
He does exactly this in Book VIII 4-5. Here he speaks of some natural
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substances as changing (transitive), and being changed by, themselves,
and he also speaks of such substances as somehow comprising within
themselves a somehow distinct changer (agent) and changed (patient):
But he also makes it clear that not all natural substances are or
can be changers of themselves. This reflexive concept applies only
to living things, perhaps only to animals, and not to the inanimate
simple bodies, earth, fire, etc. Yet he also makes it clear in Book
VIII that he retains the idea that a natural substance as such is
both source and subject of its own natural change. This notion, then,
continues to apply to all natural substances, including those to which
the title of 'self-changers' is explicitly denied. This shows that
according to Aristotle one can regard a substance as both source and
subject without regarding it as both agent and patient. And this
entails that even if it is incoherent to assert that the agent and
patient are necessarily identical, it does not follow that the
corresponding assertion concerning subject and source is correspond¬
ingly incoherent.
(54) In Chapter V below I shall examine at length the concept of
something's being both agent and patient of its own natural change.
But the remarks just made indicate that we ought not to have to make
sense of this concept (which is undoubtedly obscure) in order to
make sense of the idea that natural substances in general are both
subjects and sources. It appears from Aristotle's account in Book VIII
that agency and patiency with respect to the same natural change are
predicable of the same individual only if that individual displays a
kind of complexity not possessed by the four simple bodies. Thus the
natural "self-changers" of Book VIII comprise both body and soul, both
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matter and form. The simple bodies, being simple in the sense that
they are homogeneous masses, lack the organisation that would permit
a form/matter distinction in their case, and for this reason (on
Aristotle's theory of the soul) they cannot be regarded as ensouled
either. But while these considerations show that the general concept
of natural substance as both source and subject cannot be attacked on
grounds that apply only to the narrower concept of 'self-change',
they do not prove that the former is valid or meaningful in itself.
A sceptic is entitled to ask how it is possible to make a distinction
that applies even to the simple bodies between the source-aspect and
the subject-aspect in one and the same natural substance. Why should
he allow that there is a distinction if it cannot be explained, and
why then should he accept the terminology of "nature as an inner
principle"? Now this question can be asked on two different levels,
on one of which we shall not attempt an answer. For it may be that
what is being demanded is a justification for holding that natural
objects are such as to change in certain ways, as opposed to holding
that they simply usually do so change, and for all we know, always.
Aristotle would surely have regarded this question as lying outside
the province of philosophy of nature, like the questions of people who
wish to have it proved that change exists, or plurality. This is not
to say that had he been faced with Hume, as he was in fact with
Parmenides, he would not have undertaken a counter-attack, even while
making it clear that the philosopher of science as such is under no
obligation to deliver it before pursuing his own line of study. But
how Aristotle would have dealt with a Humean attempt to undermine (as
he would have seen it) a basic (if not the most basic) presupposition
of science, we cannot easily guess. On the other hand, the questioner
may grant that it is meaningful and even necessary to say that things
change as they usually or always do because they are such as to do
so, while still wondering in what way a distinction can be drawn
between the object as a source and as a subject of its changes. On
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this level one might answer as follows. Fire (e.g.) is such as
to move towards and come to rest in the upper region, whenever it is
not prevented. Accordingly it does so move and come to rest, when
it can. It may cease to function both as source and as subject of
this change, but the ceasing takes a different form in each case.
If the fiery mass is kept down by force, it cannot function as the
subject; similarly if it has already reached the upper region; it
then has nowhere upwards to move. But it remains true that it is
such as to move upwards when it can. On the other hand it could be
treated in such a way that it ceases to be such as to move upwards,
i.e. to be a source of this change. Such treatment would involve con¬
verting it into a different type of object, one which is such as to
behave differently. These obvious remarks point to the following con¬
clusion: either there is no difference between saying (i) that the
fire is no longer in a position to move upwards, and (ii) that it has
ceased to be fire and such as to move upwards; or we must recognise
a difference between the fact that something is (of the nature of)
fire, and the fact that it is actually a subject of motion in accordance
with that nature. Although I have taken an example from Aristotelian
physics, this argument can be applied just as effectively to what we
should consider scientifically established facts. Sugar is such as
to dissolve in water. This is true of the sugar lump before it is
immersed in water, i.e. before it is in a position to be subject of
22. Cf. P.T. Manicas, 'Aristotle, Dispositions and Occult Powers',
Review of Metaphysics XVIII, 1964-5, pp. 678 ff.; and
Mourelatos, op. cit.
the change. So long as we find it necessary to distinguish between
the fact that sugar is such as to dissolve, and the fact that some
sugar is dissolving, we shall be regarding sugar as both source and
subject of its change.
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APPENDIX TO CHAPTER I
On the interpretation offered here of Aristotle's account of
coming to be in Physios I 7-8, every becoming involves a subject
which "remains", and this subject is a substance. But it is arguable
that this position holds only of non-substantial coming to be. Space
does not allow a full discussion of this question, and here I shall
only consider what is agreed to be the most problematic type of case,
viz. the coming to be of natural substances. The claim that the coming
to be of a natural substance involves a substantial remaining subject
faces two main difficulties:
(1) Aristotle's own statement of what the subject is in these cases
suggests that it is not something that "remains", for he says that in
the case of living things, it is the 'seed' ('aitepya', 190b4 - 5) ; but
a 'seed' is not as such still present in the product of the change (in
the way in which man is present in the product cultured man).
(2) It has often been held (partly no doubt because of difficulty (1);
of. Charlton, op. ait., p. 77) that the "remaining" subject of natural
substantial coming to be is "prime matter" in the scholastic sense, and
this is not a substance.
Briefly, I would reply:
(a) So far as (2) is concerned, I agree with Charlton that there is
no clear evidence that Aristotle introduces the concept of prime matter
(in the above sense) in Physios I (Charlton, op. cit. , 77 ff. and 129
ff.), although I would hesitate to accept Charlton's broader thesis
that it never appears in Aristotle. (On Physios I, see also B. Jones,
'Aristotle's Introduction of Matter', Philosophical Review LXXXIII,
1974, pp. 474 ff.) Prime matter (or at any rate an in-itself-unknowable
and inseparable subject) seems a necessary presupposition for one type
of substantial coming to be, viz. the transmutation of the simple
bodies into one another described in Be Gen. et Cow. and De Caeto.
However, in Physios 17-8 Aristotle does not appear to consider this
type of case at all. His examples of generation are of plants and
animals, where the new substance cannot be described as coming to be
through transformation from a different sort of substance (pace Ross,
Aristotle's Physics, p. 22), but only as coming to be.
(b) The theory of "nature" expounded in Physios II shows how Aristotle
could coherently hold that organisms undergo a process which (i) is
not a change in quality, quantity, etc., (or in any category other than
Substance), but (ii) has for its subject an identifiable describable
substance. On this view, the subject-substance in generation is the
same individual as the eventual mature creature. While development
goes on, the subject-substance is identifiable and characterisable as
a creature in process of developing the features typical of mature
members of the species. This process cannot be classified as a change
in any of the non-substance categories, for a change in these presup¬
poses a subject whose nature is definable without reference to the
end-state of the change. (What it is to be cultured does not enter
into what it is to be a man.) On this account the fundamental difference
between substantial and non-substantial coming to be is preserved
without resort to a non-substantial unknowable and unidentifiable
subject (prime matter).
(c) However there seems to be a difficulty. The developing but
undeveloped organism cannot be the subject of development, because
the subject "remains", and the undeveloped, qua undeveloped, does not
"remain". (This problem led Charlton to the conclusion that Aristotl
does not believe in a "remaining" subject at all for generation.
Since Aristotle makes it clear that there is a subj ect (the 'under;
lying thing') in all cases of becoming, Charlton has to maintain that
by 'subject' Aristotle does not always mean 'that which remains
through becoming'; which seems highly improbable. See Charlton,
toco, oitt.) But this would be a genuine problem only if there were
no single substance-constitutive characteristic applying both to
developing and to developed organism (giving the covering concept
"under" which "they" are the same individual). But there is: in
both its phases the creature embodies the same nature in the sense
of principle of life and change typical of members of its kind (see
Chapter II, paragraphs (19) - (20)).
(d) Ordinary organic-substance terms generally direct one's mind to
the mature form. Thus although the subject of generation may truly b
said to be all along a human being, it would be misleading to describ
it as such; for then when we say that it develops into a human being
we seem to say that it becomes what already it is. For this reason,
I suggest, Aristotle in Physios I 7 prefers to call the subject a
'seed' (= embryo, not semen, in the case of animals; of. De Gen. An.
I 20, 728b32 - 34 and Jones, op. oit., pp. 488 ff.), even though this
locution risks making it seem that the subject "disappears" before
the change is over, hence is not a "remaining" subject (but more like
a contrary replaced). Unfortunately no handy terms are neutral as
between developed and undeveloped; but Aristotle is used to our
ordinary vocabulary running dry when it comes to providing names for
all the facts that his analyses enable him to distinguish; of.
Physios I 5, 188blO-ll, Eth. Nio. II 7, 1107bl-2.
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CHAPTER II
What Things Have Natures?
(1) Ordinary experience seems to afford plenty of examples of
objects endowed with Aristotelian "natures". This point was men¬
tioned in the last chapter (paragraph (37)) with the proviso that
the apparent examples can only be accepted as genuine if the general
notions of "nature" and "natural change" are themselves coherent
and viable. From now on, this proviso will be taken for granted.
But a question still remains concerning the extension of the concept
of "nature as an inner principle of change". Even if we assume it
to be instantiated, which if incoherent it could not be, we are not
automatically entitled to the further assumption that whatever seems
to instantiate it does so in fact. Now Aristotle himself says that
all the things that exist by nature,
'... animals and their parts, and the plants and
the simple bodies such as earth, fire, air and
water - for these and the like we say exist by
nature - all manifestly differ from things not
constituted by nature, in that each possesses
within itself a principle of change and stasis.'
(II 1, 192b9 - 14)
It is indeed a 'manifest difference'. But does Aristotle mean that
the difference is real in all these cases, as well as clearly dis¬
played; or might he mean that in all these cases there is a clear
display of a difference that may or may not in every case be real?
Even if he unhesitatingly means the former, we might expect him, here
or elsewhere, to give some attention to the question of grounds for
deciding which those things are that are to be assigned the status of
natural substances. For this is what is implied by saying that a being
has (in Aristotle's sense) a "nature". And although it may be certain
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on metaphysical grounds that all change can be traced back to natural
substances whose nature it is to change "of themselves", this does
not tell us what things are natural substances. It is when we turn
an analytic eye on the objects of our experience, bearing in mind the
full meaning of 'nature', that we may well begin to doubt whether
Aristotle is justified in holding that all the objects listed above^
are really endowed with natures.
(2) The problem more specifically concerns Aristotle's right to
suppose that a complex physical object is endowed with an Aristotel¬
ian nature. This may seem an extraordinary question, since for him
organisms, which even in their most primitive forms are structured
and complex, are the paradigms of natural substance. Yet the enquiry
has point in the light of the following considerations. Such beings
are composed of physical parts, and the parts too may be complex.
Experience shows that these beings and their parts are made up of the
apparently simple unorganised stuffs which Aristotle calls the "simple
bodies", earth, fire, water and air. For when the more highly organ¬
ised beings perish, they decompose eventually into these apparently
simple stuffs, and when alive they take these stuffs into themselves
by way of nutrition. It is therefore not unreasonable to suppose that
the organic complexes and their structured parts consist of a few uni¬
versal basic materials differently arranged and modified. On this sup¬
position, the complexity of the complex being appears to involve both
(a) physical and (b) logical composition. For (a) the being has parts
1. As A. Mansion points out, Introduction a la Physique Aristotel-
icienne, pp. 57 and 118, the choice of these examples of natural
substance rests only on 'I'usage'.
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that are external to one another, and (b) these parts are, or are
made of, substances modified in various ways. Now these modifications
can scarcely be regarded as perse attributes of the substances in
question, for if this were the case, how could it also be the case
that the same few basic substances are capable of as many different
modifications as would be required to account for the vast variety of
complex entities? The fewer the basic materials (and theoretical
economy demands that few should be postulated rather than many), the
more indifferent each in itself must be to which of a large range of
possible modifications is realised in it in any given case; for if
the kinds of elements are few, their modifications and combinations
must be many to account for the diversity of nature.
(3) From the point of view just sketched, it is difficult to see
how a complex natural entity is not automatically on a logical par
with a per accidens combination of mutually external circumstances.
Such a set of circumstances may jointly cause a change, but they cannot
on that account be regarded as collectively exhibiting a "nature",
precisely because their union is only per accidens. Now we call a
complex object an object or thing presumably because it preserves its
unity for a noticeable length of time. But apart from this, which
seems an arbitrary distinction, what difference is there between such
a "thing" and what we would normally be inclined to call a set of
circumstances? What difference, in other words, is there between a
physically complex object that changes "of itself", and a set of
mutually external factors one of which externally determines a change
in another of the set? Once we have taken into account all the factors
that determine an externally determined change in a given object, why
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should we not regard these, together with the changing object itself,
as forming a single (even if not necessarily a stable) entity which
changes as a whole because part of it changes through external
determination by other parts (just as a man, Aristotle says, may be
said to move if a part of him moves: see Physios V 1, 224a23 - 26)?
Ex hypothesi this "single" changing entity changes "of itself", i.e.
not through external determinants, because all the determinants have
been included within it. Now if Aristotle would refuse, as he would,
2
to attribute a "nature" in his sense to such a set of mutually
external factors, on the ground that it is not a unity of the proper
type, what grounds has he for attributing "natures" to complex objects
such as organisms?
(4) There is another way of putting the same problem. Given that
Aristotle regards e.g. organisms and their organs as having natures,
although they are complex, on what grounds could he refuse to attribute
"nature" to a self-moving artifact? We cannot dismiss this question
for the reason that self-moving artifacts would have been beyond his
power to conceive, for apparently they were not:
'If every instrument could accomplish its own
work, obeying or anticipating the wills of others,
like the statues of Daedalus, or the tripods of
Hephaestus, which, says the poet, "of their own
accord entered the assembly of the gods": if in
like manner the shuttle could weave and the plectrum
touch the lyre without a hand to guide them, chief
workmen would not want servants, nor masters slaves.'
(.Politics I 3, 1253b33 - 1254al)
Of course, if only gods and their kin can make self-moving artifacts,
then the latter are as mythical as the former, and hardly need to be
2. This is not to say that he would have denied that it exists 'by
nature', tpuae u .
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taken into account in a philosophical classification. But in Physics
II 8, 199al2-14, Aristotle writes:
'If a house were one of the things that come
into being by nature, it would come into being in
the same way as it actually does through artifice.
And if natural things came into being not only by
nature but also by artifice, they would do so in
the same way as they do by nature.'
(By 'in the same way' Aristotle means in the same order of steps, each
being a means to the final result.) It seems then that we cannot
rule out the possibility that Aristotle might have had man-made
automata in mind even while writing Physics II 1, and only chose
inert artifacts to illustrate his initial distinction because (a) they
are the obvious examples (for his audience) of artifacts, and (b)
they obviously contain no principle of change (qua artifacts).
(5) Aristotle would certainly have regarded automata (even
divinely made ones: Hephaestus was a craftsman) as artifacts, hence
as not possessing natures. Now an artifact simply is a combination
of simpler objects put together in such a way that when each part
behaves according to its nature, the whole system comes to be in a
certain desired condition, or changes in a certain desired way. The
parts are together per accidens, for if they were of their own natures
thus combined, there would have been no need of artificial construc¬
tion ab extra. If then we suppose that complex natural substances
are per accidens combinations, it follows that the distinction
between complex natural substances and artifacts is not fundamental.
It may be true that all natural complexes have an inner principle of
motion: but then so do some artifacts (automata). And since self-
moving artifacts are constructed on essentially the same principles
as the inert ones more familiar to a pre-technological era, it follows
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that if complex natural substances are comparable to automata, they
are comparable to artifacts in general. Of course the genetic
process is different in each case, but what comes into being in each
case is a system of essentially the same logical type, demanding the
same type of explanation for its behaviour and characteristics (even
though giving the explanation may be more difficult in the one case
than in the other). In short, the distinction between complex natural
substances and artifacts is not fundamental unless a certain assumption
is true: viz. that expressions such as 'natural substance' and
'having a nature' are not appropriate terms for just anything that
"changes from within", but only for a special kind of thing, a per se
unity, whose changes, unlike those of a machine, cannot be wholly
explained by the changes of simpler components. Now for Aristotle,
it seems certain, the distinction between artifacts and natural sub¬
stances is indeed absolute, despite his awareness of the possibility
of automata. It follows that his entitlement to apply the concept
"natural substances" to such things as organisms rests entirely on his
ability to show that these are perse unities. This is the question
with which I shall be concerned in this chapter.
(6) The problem touches not only Aristotle's employment of the
concept "nature", but also his ontology. If there is doubt whether
organisms (for instance) are perse unities, there is doubt whether
they are substances properly speaking. A per aocidens unity, e.g.
that expressed by 'doctor' (= 'medical man') may indeed be a subject
of attributes, as when we say 'The doctor came and went', but what
this subject is cannot be expressed by a unitary formula, and there
cannot in the strict sense be definition of such a thing. In the
previous chapter we argued the intimate connection between the concept
of nature and that of substance, and in Physios II I, 193a9 -10, we
find Aristotle speaking of the 'nature and substance' of natural
3
beings as if these are alternative expressions. Thus an attack upon
the per se unity of a thing is an attack both on its claim to be
4
endowed with a nature, and on its claim to the status of substance.
Now in Metaphysics Z 2, 1028b8-13, Aristotle gives a list of things
that are held (6oweu) to be substances. This corresponds to the list
of things having natures at the beginning of Physics II 1, except that
in the Metaphysics passage he also includes the heaven and the heavenly
bodies. But in the course of his elucidation of 'substance' in Z, he
finds reason for rejecting some of the items in the 'ev6o^ov', namely
the parts of animals (and presumably of other living things) and the
simple bodies (Z 16, 1040b5 ff.). On this last point the Metaphysics
doctrine differs from that of the Physics. For the equation in Physics
II 1, 193a9 - 10 of "being a substance" with "having a nature (= inner
principle of change)" entails a substantial status for the simple
bodies. However, the point that mainly concerns us here is that in
neither work does Aristotle hesitate to include such complex beings
as whole organisms. Thus, for instance, in discussing "becoming" in
3. Cf. Metaphysics A 4, 1015al3-15. For the indefinability of per
accidens unities, see ibid. Z 4, 1030a2 ff.
4. These remarks together with paragraph (4) imply that artifacts
are not substances, a position which may seem paradoxical given
that they supply Aristotle's favourite illustrations for the
form/matter distinction, which is of primary significance in
connection with substances. Yet he himself denies substancehood
to artifacts in Metaph. H 3, 1043b21-23. Cf. W. Charlton,
Aristotle's Physics I3 II, pp. 75 - 76.
5. See also Metaph. A 3, 1070a20-21. Parts of animals do not
count as substances because they have no 'separate existence'
(V.i. paragraph (41)), the simple bodies because they are
without structure, 'like a heap'.
Metaphysics Z 7, he says: and what comes into being is a man or
a plant or the like, which things above all we say are substances'.
(1032al8 - 19) And although there is no such explicit declaration in
the Physics, this is clearly only because he regards it as unnecessary.
But how is it that Aristotle is so certain? And who are "we" in the
above-quoted passage who "say" with such certainty? As so often, it
is not clear whether Aristotle means himself, or the consensus of
philosophical opinion, or common sense, or all three. Common sense
of course takes men, plants etc. to be as genuinely real as anything
can be, just as it takes tables to be solid, but equally of course it
has no views either way on the question of their metaphysical status
as substances.
(7) It is worth considering briefly why Aristotle qua metaphysician
needs to commit himself on the question of which types of natural
objects have substantial status. For this question appears to be an
empirical one, insofar as it depends on deciding what phenomena are
to be explained as combinations of constituents. The plausibility of
the hypothesis that a given type of complex is to be thus explained
rests with the empirical evidence.^ It is difficult to see how Aris¬
totle could have rejected this point out of hand. But once it is
admitted to be an empirical question whether this or that sort of
object is a "substance", it is not clear how the metaphysician can
continue to maintain his certainty that the concept of substance does
apply to the natural world and plays an essential part in the conceptual
6. Cf. A. Gotthelf, 'Aristotle's Conception of Final Causality',
Review of Metaphysics, p. 253: 'Philosophers of science today
are in increasing agreement that the question of reduction is
an empirical one ...'.
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framework of science. For if the question is empirical, the con¬
clusion that any given type of object is a substance would always be
subject to revision from new evidence. Even the so-called "simple
bodies" might turn out to be complexes of elements. The metaphysician
might continue to maintain that there must be perse unities, since
otherwise there would be nothing for per accidens combinations to be
combinations of; but he could not identify any of the former for
certain, nor therefore any of the latter. According to Aristotle's
scheme, this entails that we should never know for certain which of
our definitions of things were in the strict sense definitions. But
if, despite this, science can still keep going, then in what way is
the concept of substance as per se unity necessary for science, and
what function can it have in a philosophical account of how the
scientist does or should operate? It is not clear that it has any
value even as a regulative principle: on the contrary, it might well
be argued that science should proceed on the assumption that there are
no ultimate unities in physical nature. And although this does not
entail that none exist, what is the advantage, either to science or
to metaphysics, of holding that they do? So far as the knowledge of
nature is concerned, physical substances would be as otiose as Platonic
Forms.
(8) With these issues in mind we turn to the text. In Physics
II 1, having stated what nature is, and that it would be absurd to try
to prove its existence, Aristotle continues:
'Some hold that the nature and substance of
natural beings is, in each case, the immediate
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constituent that is in itself unstructured,^ so
that e.g. the wood is the nature of a bed, the
bronze of a statue. Antiphon says that this is
indicated by the fact that if one were to plant a
bed and the rotting wood got the power to send up
a shoot, what came up would be not a bed, but wood:
which shows that the arrangement in accordance with
the rules of art is in it per accidens, whereas
the substance is the wood, which also remains
continuously present while subject to this
arrangement.' (193a9 - 17)
Aristotle has himself made the point that it is not the bed as such
that has a nature, but the wood; his reason was that the bed is an
artifact, the wood is not. Antiphon's point as Aristotle presents
it is rather different. It is that the wood is endowed with nature
because the wood is matter as opposed to form, 'the immediate
unstructured constituent'. For Aristotle continues:
'And if each of these things isc. such as
woodl stands in this same relation to something
else, e.g. bronze and gold to water, bones and
wood to earth, and so on, the latter is their
nature and substance. For this reason some hold
the nature of things to be fire, others earth,
others air, others water, others some of these
and others all. For whatever thing any of these
theorists takes to be of this sort, whether one
thing or more than one, this or these he says
are the whole of substance (rfiv anacrav ooatav) ,
and all other things are affections, states and
arrangements of these. Each of these moreover
is eternal, since they do not pass away out of
themselves, while all other things come into g
being and pass away time after time without end.'
(193al7 - 28)
7. 'To itpuiTov ev^itapyov kv exaa tw, appuptarov ov na%'kauxo'. The
context shows that Aristotle means stuffs such as wood, not the
"prime matter" of the scholastics; of. W.D. Ross, Aristotle's
Physics, p. 502. It is doubtful whether "prime matter" ever
appears in the Physics (cf. W. Charlton, op. cit. , pp. 78-79
and 129 - 145, where it is argued that "prime matter" is not an
Aristotelian concept at all). If it does occur in Book II, it
is only in the most oblique fashion: see paragraph (16).
8. Cf. Metaph. A 4, 1014b26 - 35. I take 'the whole of substance'
to mean (i) that the simple bodies are all the substances that
there are, and (ii) that they give substantiality or being to
other things by constituting them.
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(9) Aristotle does not dispute that complex physical objects
are made of and can be broken down into a few simple stuffs (see,
e.g., De Caelo III 3, 302al0 - 25). The fundamental difference
between his position and the materialists' (to use a convenient
label) concerns the following question: given that 0 is made
of M^, M , etc., does it follow that 0 has no nature apart from
the natures of M^, M^, etc.? Alternatively: does it follow that
0 is nothing but M^, M^, etc., in certain states and arrangements?
An affirmative answer sums up the materialist position presented
in the passage above. According to this, not only artifacts fail
to count as natural substances, but all natural objects composed
of natural substances. For the composite is only its constituents
combined, hence it is no single substance with a unitary nature
in its own right. So if Aristotle is consistently to maintain that
men, plants, etc., are such single substances, his answer to the
question just posed must be negative. But before turning to this,
let us consider the materialist position in more detail.
(10) The case as Aristotle presents it falls into two parts:
(i) where it is claimed that the "nature" of a thing is its immediate
matter (193a9 - 17) and (ii) where it is claimed that the only real
substances or things with natures are the elements that ultimately
9
underlie all physical objects (-Lb-id.. 21-23). The second claim is
reached from the first by analogical reasoning (ibid. 17 - 21) : if
what a structured thing is immediately composed of is its nature, then
9. Cf. J. Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy (4th edn.), pp. 10-12,
363 - 364.
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whatever what composes it is composed of must be the latter's nature,
and so on until we arrive at some stuff or stuffs that are not them¬
selves composed of anything. Now it is strange that Aristotle does
not notice that this analogical argument leads to a conclusion quite
contrary to the intended one. For if the nature of a thing is the
matter of which it is immediately composed, then simple stuffs which
are not themselves composed of anything cannot be said to have a
nature: in which case, how can they be the nature and substance of
everything else? It seems that Aristotle has missed a point that
favours his own position. For he could have argued: if there are
ultimate constituents, then either they themselves have natures, or
not. If not, then the internal principle of change in a complex being
cannot be identified with the nature of any ultimate constituent of
it; in which case there is room to argue that the complex being has,
as a whole, its own nature, and therefore is a genuine substance. But
if the ultimate elements do have natures, then "having a nature" does
not necessarily depend on being composed of something; and in that
case, there is room to argue that although a complex being is composed
of simpler substances, its having a nature does not consist in its
being thus composed, so that there is no ground for the claim that the
nature it has is not really its nature, but that of some simpler con¬
stituent or constituents.
(11) Thus there are particular reasons why the analogical argument
fails as a link between parts (i) and (ii) of the materialist position,
but in fact no argument could succeed. For given the synonymy of
'having a nature' with 'being a substance', it follows that if either
part is true the other is false. If earth, fire, water etc. are 'the
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whole of substance', then wood, being composed of these, is no more
a natural substance in itself than the bed is."^ The contradiction
could be avoided by making 'substance', like 'matter', a relative
term, or else by making it admit of degrees. Thus one could say that
the wood is a substance relatively to the bed, or that it is more of
a substance than the bed is, being fewer removes from the. ultimate
(and non-relative) substances. If any materialist did hold both (i)
and (ii) as a unified position, he would be compelled to admit that
'substance' can be said of wood only in a qualified sense. But
there is some reason to think that (i) and (ii) actually represent
distinct positions, each employing a different criterion of sub-
stancehood or nature. According to Aristotle, those who claim that
a thing's immediate matter is its substance or nature support the
claim by pointing to cases in which the immediate matter can propa¬
gate or reproduce itself, while the thing as a whole (e.g. the bed)
cannot. Thus they seem to be identifying the nature of a thing with
whatever it is in it that gets itself reproduced without external
contrivance. But if this is the criterion of nature or substance-
hood, then 'substance' in this connection is being used in an absolute
sense: for the proposition that e.g. wood can reproduce itself is
simply true, not true in relation to a particular conceptual context
(like the proposition that wood is matter). Thus positions (i) and
(ii) cannot be combined in the way suggested above. And in any case,
the use of "self-reproduction" as the criterion for 'nature' fits
badly with the view that the only real substances with natures are
the primitive elements. For on this view, as Aristotle reports it
10. This appears to be the meaning of Empedocles fr. 8 Diels,
quoted in Metccph. A 4, 1015al - 3, on which see W.D. Ross,
Aristotle's Metaphysics, vol. I, pp. 297 - 298.
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(193a26 - 27), the elements are held to be eternal, hence neither
propagated nor reproduced. Indeed, this supposed eternity appears
to be the criterion followed in identifying these elements with 'the
whole of substance': the presumption being that only the eternal
is truly real, so that transient things are merely the latter's
modifications.
(12) Now the two materialist positions just distinguished have one
feature in common: they both contradict Aristotle's own view that
structured organic beings have, as such and in their own right,
substancehood and nature. But they are sufficiently different to
need to be argued against separately. It is therefore surprising, not
to say disappointing, to find Aristotle treating them as a single
position, or rather, as if the second were entirely merged in the
first. For he opens his reply as follows:
'So according to one way of looking at it,
nature is said to be the immediate underlying
matter in each of those things that have within
themselves a principle of motion and change. But
according to another way, nature is the shape and
the definable form.' (193a28 - 31)
He then goes on to argue (a) that it is right to regard form too as
nature, and (b) that the form of a thing is its nature more than the
immediate matter is (193b6 - 7). And this is the whole of his reply
in Physics II 1 to the materialists. In other words, he here makes
out no explicit case at all for the claim of form to be nature as
against the claim of the non-immediately underlying matter, i.e. the
more basic constituents. Nor, as we shall see, do his arguments in
II 1 offer even an implicit defence against the second materialist
position. Yet it is this position that seems to the modern reader
so clearly to present the real menace to Aristotelianism. In
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particular, it seems to make teleological explanation redundant or
even meaningless. It is strange that in II 1 Aristotle appears
unaware of the danger from this quarter. But by the end of Book II
he has recognised, and, I shall argue, replied to it in full.
(13) Meanwhile, let us return to his more immediate concern in
Chapter 1. He begins as follows his attack on the materialism that
identifies nature with the "immediate" matter:
'Just as the word "art" is applied to what is
by art and an artifact, so the word "nature" is
applied to what is by nature and natural. In the
former case, we should not say that anything is by
art while it is only potentially a bed and does not
yet have the form of a bed, and nor do we say that
it is art. It is the same with things constituted
by nature. For that which is potentially flesh or
bone does not yet have its own nature Lsa. as flesh,
etc.] until it acquires the form specified in the
definition, and nor is it by nature. Thus on this
other account [sc. of what nature is], nature would
be the shape and form of those things that have
within themselves a principle of change, not
separable from them except in formula. The com¬
bination of these li.e. the form with the matter], as
for instance a man, is not a nature, but by nature.'
(193a31-b6) 11
(14) This argument is based on usage, and as with all such argu¬
ments it is not clear how linguistic premisses can establish a philo¬
sophical conclusion. But the present instance has defects of its
own as well. It depends on a play on words, and on a question-begging
use of the analogy between art and nature. In the first place, the
remark 'that which is potentially flesh or bone does not yet have
its own nature Iso. as flesh, etc.] until it acquires the form
11. Cf. Metaph. A 4, 1015a4-7.
specified in the definition' may be taken two ways. On the one hand
it states that something cannot be said to be a thing of a given
kind unless it has the typifying characteristics of that kind, and
that the typifying characteristics include the form, not merely the
matter (what is 'potentially' the thing in question). Here, 'nature
is being used to mean typifying characteristics, or what one would
12
mention if asked to say what the thing is. In this sense the
remark is a virtual tautology; but in this sense too even artifacts
have "natures". Such "natures" are not the prerogative of per se
units or substances in the strict sense. They belong to anything
whatever concerning which it is possible to state what it is. Thus
13
to take an example of Aristotle's, we say what a threshold is by
saying that it is a piece of wood in a certain position; but this
position occurs only per accidens in the wood considered as wood.
However, 'nature' in the sense with which Aristotle is primarily
concerned in Physics II 1 means 'inner principle of change'. On thi
other reading, the sentence just quoted asserts that an object's
inner principle of change cannot be or be grounded in its component
materials alone, and must therefore be (or at least depend upon) the
form. But this is not only not a tautology, it is not self-evident
either, considering that it expresses precisely the conclusion which
Aristotle by this argument is in process of trying to prove.
12. Cf. Mansion, op. ait., pp. 102-103, and I. During, 'Aristotle
on Ultimate Principles from "Nature and Reality", Aristotle
and Plato in the Mid-Fourth Century, edd. During and Owen.
13. Cf. Metaph. H 2, 1043a7-8.
(15) In the second place, Aristotle uses the analogy between
nature and art to insinuate that the material of a structured
natural object of type T is devoid of nature of its own so long as
it has not yet received the specific form that makes it of type T.
From this it would follow that nature (in either of the senses
above distinguished) resides in form rather than in matter. If
this seems plausible, it is because of the alleged parallel with art.
14
As Aristotle points out, 'art' (in the sense of 'work of art' )
is properly applied to the product, not to the raw materials of an
artifact. Since the materials become the product called 'art' by
taking on some imposed artificial structure, there is good reason to
hold that the product's 'art'-status depends upon the structure or
form alone, since the materials necessarily acquire the one when they
acquire the other, and vice versa. But a similar conclusion cannot
be drawn for 'nature' unless it is as certain that the materials
composing natural objects lack natures as that the materials of
artifacts lack 'art'. Now the raw material of an artifact by defin¬
ition lacks 'art' in the sense of 'artificial structure'. It also
lacks art in the sense in which an artificer has 'art', i.e. the
power to cause artificial change - necessarily so, since if the wood
were able to turn itself into a bed, a bed would not be an artifact
but a natural substance containing its own principle of growth. But
the immediate matter of a structured natural substance does have a
'nature' in the sense of a definite character: it is flesh, etc.
And so far Aristotle has said nothing to show that it does not have
'nature' in the sense too of 'inner principle of change'. And if it
does, we have been given as yet no reason against supposing that the
14. Cf. Charlton, op. ait., p. 90.
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natural changes of a structured natural object of which flesh etc.
is the material are not entirely due to, or indeed identical with,
changes whose source is the nature of flesh as such. In any case,
the art/nature analogy cuts two ways. Aristotle would hardly wish
to deny that the materials of artifacts have natures (inner prin¬
ciples of change), since the materials of artifacts are natural
substances. So, if natural structures are analogous, why not say
that the materials of natural structures also have natures? And if
this is conceded, the way is open (for all he has so far shown) to
the further conclusion that the nature of a structured natural object
is nothing but the nature of its material. Such is the lesson which
Antiphon draws from the analogy between art and nature, and on the
present showing he is as much entitled to his conclusion as Aristotle
to his.
(16) We found fault with Aristotle's equivocation between two
senses of 'nature', but the confusion also suggests an insight on his
part which we have so far ignored. For although it is not the case
that everything with a definable character possesses, as such, an
internal principle of change, the converse does hold. Anything that
has a nature in the second sense must be of a definite character.
Since changes from within are expressions of what it is, there must
be a positive answer to the question 'What is it?'. From this point
of view, Aristotle's argument effectively answers a purely meta¬
physical "materialism", such as would seek to identify the source of
change with "prime matter", or the indefinite ('aopuoxov')^ partic-
15. Cf. Physics III 2, 201b24 - 27.
ularising element in a concrete thing, discernible only metaphysically
from its "whatness".
(17) This position may be part of what Aristotle is opposing in
II 1, 193a31-b6. But if so, his presentation is far from clear.
In the first place empirical cases such as that of the bed sprouting
are irrelevant. Secondly, the distinction between immediate and
"remote" matter employed at 193alO only makes sense as applied to
empirically characterisable components at different levels of physical
analysis. Thirdly, he does not maintain that matter contributes
nothing to a thing's nature, only that the role of form is paramount.
But the pure particularity of a thing cannot in any sense be or
contribute to its nature. For the natures of things are, after all,
what the natural scientist is supposed to study. This last point
incorporates what for Aristotle would be the decisive objection
against identifying the source of natural change with the metaphysical
principle of particularity: for since the particularity of things
lies beyond or below the scope of science (of. Metaphysics B 6,
1003al4), so, on this view, would the causes of change. So far then,
the position which Aristotle has countered is a mixture of empirical
and metaphysical materialisms. While he may be assumed to have
answered the latter, he has made no headway against the former. In
particular, the metaphysical thesis that the source of change must
lie in the definite character of something, tells neither for nor
against the theory th'at the only true substances and natural sources
of change are the basic (but empirical) elements, earth and fire, etc.
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(18) Arguing still in II 1 that nature is form, Aristotle
continues:
'Moreover, man comes into being from man,
although not bed from bed. This is their
reason for saying that the wood, not the struc¬
ture, is the nature: because if it grew what
would come into being would not be a bed but
wood. But if this is nature, the shape too is
nature, since man comes into being from man.'
(193b8 - 12) 16
Here Aristotle is explicitly attempting to show what so far he
has not shown, that nature in the sense of the defining shape is
also nature in the sense of principle of change. Growth and repro¬
duction are the changes that are significant for this argument.
Here Aristotle is accepting Antiphon's criterion for "nature",
■i.e. that what has a nature is what reproduces itself, but saying
in effect that Antiphon's conclusion is based on just one type of
case, and not even a representative one at that. As soon as we look
past the bed example we find ones where something of a given struc¬
ture produces something else of that same structure. It is not
clear whether by 'Man comes into being from man' Aristotle means
growth of an immature into a mature human, or the begetting of one
by the other, or both. But if Antiphon were right, man, whose
"immediate matter" is flesh, bones etc., would only give rise (in
either sense) to flesh and bones not organised as a man (or if so,
only by accident). And there is no reason to think that Antiphon
is even right in some cases, since his example is an artifact, which
as such has no nature. Not only is it false then to say that its
nature lies in its matter, but the example provides no ground for
16. I have translated Ross's text, but the MSS 'et 6'apa touto
xex^h' yields an argument with the same import.
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saying this of any natural kind.
(19) Aristotle's objection to Antiphon, that man gives rise
to man, was based on a fact of experience. But Aristotle now
moves the discussion back on to the linguistic level, and draws
further support from 'what we say' or rather, the presumed etymology
of 'what we say'), by means of the following obscure dialectical
argument:
'Moreover, "tpuats", in the sense in
which the word is equivalent to "genesis", means
the process by which something arrives at its
nature (tpuats).^ For it is not like "curing",
which denotes not the process towards the art
of curing, but towards health. For whereas curing
necessarily proceeds from but not to the art of
curing, cpuoLg is not related in this way to
cpucrus. Instead, the growing thing ("to cpuoyevov")
passes from something into something, insofar as
it grows. What, then, is the growing thing? Not
that from which, but that into which. The shape,
then, is the nature.' (193bl2 - 18)
This passage is confusing because Aristotle's point depends upon a
contrast between nature or cpuoLg, and activities or artifice such as
medicine; yet at the same time he relies on certain features common
to the two cases. In both, the process results in a "shape", i.e. a
structured state of affairs, whether this is the balance of qualities
within the cured patient's body, or the mature form into which a
natural substance develops. (In both cases too, although he makes no
direct allusion to this point, the specific character of the process
is defined by reference to the sort of "shape" achieved.) Now for
the contrast. Firstly, the state in which the process of healing
17. Cf. Metaph. A 4, 1014bl6-17, with Ross's comm., vol. I, p. 296,
and Mansion, op. cit. , pp. 104 - 105.
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results is not medical art, i.e. the state of the healer which
is source of the healing process. But the natural process of
growth denoted by the word 'cpuaus' (in the sense in which this
means 'genesis') does result in a state that in turn gives rise
to such processes, and this state is also called '(punts'. Evid¬
ently Aristotle is thinking of the fact that man generates man:
i.e. that a full-grown man is a source of processes (in offspring)
identical to that by which he developed. Secondly, the agent that
does the healing does not (qua healer) come to be in any new or
more developed condition; whereas the natural entity that "does
the growing" itself passes into the developed state. Thus a kind
of conceptual coincidence obtains between (a) the concept of the
developed natural state and (b) the concept of the source of the
process that gives rise to that state, for which there is no
parallel in the case of curing. For in the first place, as we
have just seen, the developed state in which the natural process
results coincides with a condition which is itself a source of
such processes. And secondly, when we ask (as in the second to
last sentence of the quoted passage) what the growing thing is,
i.e. what sort of a growing thing it is, the answer is given by
predicating of that object the same word as is used of it in
the developed state. Thus we say that a tadpole is a (developing)
frog, a child a (developing) human being, whereas we do not say
that a doctor as such is a (coming to be) healthy person. Now
the developing creature is not merely developing, but also still
contains within itself the source of its (continued) development.
For if by developing to some extent it somehow lost this principle
of change, it could not be said to be still developing. Thus the
developing creature has firstly, cpuaus in the sense of the process
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of growth, and secondly, cpuotg in the sense of the inner source
of this change. It is also defined by the term denoting what it
will develop into, which term, being definitive, gives its cpuacs
or nature in yet a third sense, the sense in which the nature
of a thing is what somebody asks for who asks to be told what
it is. Putting all this together, we may say (i) that both qua
developing and qua developed, the natural substance is endowed
with an inner principle of change; and (ii) that if 'C' is the
predicate expressing the form when fully developed, or as Aris¬
totle says, the "shape", the creature both qua developing and qua
developed is to be defined as a C. From this Aristotle concludes
that nature in the sense of an inner principle of change is the
developed form or shape.
(20) Now it might be objected that despite the close dependence
just exhibited between nature as principle of change, and the
developed structure or "shape", Aristotle exceeds his warrant in
concluding that the former is the latter, since by the very terms
of the argument, the latter is the result of the former, and is not
always actually present at the same time. This indeed is perhaps the
main difficulty surrounding the Aristotelian concept of "form", which
in a living thing at any rate is supposed somehow to comprise both
efficient and final causes of the substance's natural behaviour. How
can what something is to be, which it necessarily is not yet, b£
what brings about the present process towards what is to be? Writers
sympathetic to Aristotle have failed to explain this to those who are
not, and perhaps in the end the equation of final with efficient cause
is a concept which one either can or cannot accept, with no more to be
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said (apart from the tracing out of its consequences, for good or
ill, in Aristotle's system). At any rate I cannot here undertake the
full discussion that this question requires. But one point may be
made here in Aristotle's defence. It concerns certain absurd conse¬
quences of refusing to identify nature as a principle of change or
development with nature in the sense of fully developed structure.
Suppose that we refuse this, on the ground that the developing creature
has one but lacks the other. It follows that when the creature
attains developed form, it has a property which earlier it lacked. If
this developed form is, as Aristotle always holds it to be, that in
virtue of which the creature is a substance of the kind that it is, it
follows that the still developing creature was not a substance of that
kind. Either it was of a different kind, or it was no substance at
all. In either case, it is impossible that developing and developed
should be the same individual substance at different phases of its
history, for the same individual substance must, for as long as it
exists, be of a single individual nature throughout all changes
(including development). But if developing and developed are not the
same individual, the "developed" never did develop, and there is no
such thing as development. The alternative, which is also absurd,
would be to deny that the fully developed structure is an essential
property of the creature which attains it. In that case, the devel¬
oping creature lacked nothing in virtue of which the developed is the
kind of substance that it is. But then what is the essential or
substantial nature that was present throughout? The only likely
candidate is the property of being a source of development (or devel¬
opments) into such and such a description of structured object. This
property is common to the developing and also to the developed (the
latter being a potential parent of like offspring). This implies that
being endowed with a source of development into mature structure C
is of the essence of the object, even though having C itself is not
of the essence; from which it follows that the substance might
itself cease to be characterised by C {e.g. the structure of a mature
human being) while retaining the essential power of giving rise to
developments towards C: thus what is no longer a man (of human
structure) could nonetheless generate man. To conclude: if a
developing thing is a substance of the kind it is on account of
the principle within it of development, and if a developed one is
of the kind it is on account of its fully structured form, then
these two natures, natura naturans and natura naturata, must be and
all along have been in some sense identical, or else the same
individual substance has different substantial essences.
(21) Having supported Aristotle thus far in his identification
of nature (= principle of change) with form rather than matter, let
us now see how effective this is against the materialist position,
and in particular against the second of the materialist positions
distinguished in paragraph (10) above. This was the theory that
the only real substances are the physical elements, while 'everything
else' is only these elements in various 'affections, states and mod¬
ifications'. Now the concept of "nature" which Aristotle has just
developed combines (a): "nature" = a thing's typifying characterist¬
ics: with (b): "nature" = what it is about a thing that gets repro¬
duced in growth and generation: and these two with (c): "nature" =
the power of growth and generation. And his construction of this con¬
cept has not only been carried out without refuting the "elemental" mater¬
ialists, but on the face of it does not even logically presuppose their
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refutation. For it seems perfectly consistent to hold (i) that a
thing has a nature in the complex sense just explained, while also
holding (ii) that this nature, both the power of reproduction and
the typical characteristics reproduced, derives entirely from the
ways in which the basic components of the organism are, and are
together, in it. And the conjunction of (i) and (ii) again seems
perfectly consistent with the view (iii) that the component elements
are as they are in the organism merely in the natural course of their
own natural behaviour and interactions. If (ii) and (iii) are true,
then the nature of the organism can be fully accounted for, scientif¬
ically, in terms of the natures of the constituents. But in that
case, the organism is not, qua having its nature, a per se unity, and
any organic behaviour resulting from its nature derives ultimately
from a per accidens combination of mutually external factors.
(22) There is one possible explanation for the fact that in II 1
Aristotle does not even notice this as a threat to his position.
It is that he has now developed a coherent and viable concept of
"nature" which does not require that a nature should represent a
metaphysical unity. As it stands, the concept that results from
interweaving (a), (b) and (c) above is not only coherent and
commands considerable support from ordinary usage, it is above
all applicable to objects of experience. And it is not clear
how this last advantage could be preserved, or the former ones
enhanced, if we were to impose the further condition of per se
unity. Now if the notion of "nature" which has just emerged does
not include per se unity, Aristotle can still maintain his initial
equation between "having a nature" and "being a substance" (v.s.
paragraph (6)) by (implicitly) relaxing the concept of "substance"
so as to apply it to whatever in experience presents itself as a
thing for ordinary purposes of description and identification, without
any presumption of unity in an absolute sense. And in that case, the
only part of the elemental materialists' position that Aristotle
needs to reject is their claim that the simple bodies are 'the whole
of substance' (V.s. paragraph (10)). To do this, he does not require
a special argument to disprove their position, but only an account
(which he has now given) of a sense of 'nature' from which it follows
that 'nature' (and therefore 'substance') applies to some beings other
than the simple bodies.
(23) However inviting this path (for the reasons indicated),
Aristotle makes clear by the end of Physios II that it is not for
him. This emerges beyond any doubt from his discussion of necessity
in Chapter 9. He asks concerning necessity in nature:
'Is the necessary necessary on a supposition,
or absolutely? .... I ask this because on the current
view of necessity in [natural] coming to be, it is as
if one were to think that a house-wall had come into
being by necessity because it is of the nature of
heavy things to move downwards and of light things
upxrards, and therefore the stones and the foundations
go at the bottom, the earth higher because it is
light, and the wood at the top because it is lightest.
But although it has not come into being without
these, it is not because of them (except in the sense
in which matter is a cause), but in order to enclose
and protect. It is the same with everything else that
has an end: they do not come into being without those
things that possess the necessary nature, but these
are not the cause, except in the sense in which matter
is. The cause is the end: e.g. the question "Because
of what is a saw like this?" gets the answer "So that
such and such may result, and for the sake of such and
such". But this end cannot come about unless the saw
is of iron. So it is necessarily iron if it is going
to be a saw and to function as one. Thus what is
necessary is so on a supposition, but the end product
is not necessary. For the necessity is in the matter,
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whereas the end for the sake of which is in the
formula. (199b34 - 200al5) .... It is clear that
there is necessity in the natural world only in the
sense in which "necessity" indicates matter and the
changes of matter. The physicist must take account
of both causes, the matter and that for the sake of
which, but of the latter more than the former. For
this is the cause of the matter, but the matter is
not the cause of the end. The end is that for the
sake of which, and the principle of a natural thing
should be drawn from its definition and formula, as
in the case of artificial products. Since a house
is such and such a thing, these things must neces¬
sarily come about and be the case first, and since
health is this, these things must necessarily come
about and be the case first: so too, given that a
man is this, then these, and if these, then those.'
(200a30 - 200b4)
These passages occur after the discussion (Chapter 8) in which Aris¬
totle takes himself to have shown that the organisation and behaviour
of organisms and their organs can and ought to be accounted for
teleologically. He now concludes that it is correct to say of an
organism that it and its organs come about or are as they are by
necessity only to the extent that the organism is made of certain
materials which must necessarily be present and be disposed in various
ways in order that there should be that organism. Only the matter and
its states are necessary, and the necessary is only conditional. By
thus confining necessity to the matter, Aristotle implies that the
form, which is the end, is not only not necessary in the way in which
the matter is {i.e. for a further end), but that it is not necessary
18
at all, and therefore not a necessary consequence of the matter.
18. M. Polanyi, 'Life's Irreducible Structure', Topics in the
Philosophy of Biology, edd. Grene and Mendelsohn, pp. 128 ff.
(originally in Science 160), calls the organism (or its form)
'the boundary condition', an expression well chosen to
emphasise that the direction of necessitation is from form
to constituents.
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(24) Aristotle's immediate purpose in limiting the role of necessity
in nature is to uphold teleological explanation. But the passage just
quoted also shows that he is committed still to regarding beings
endowed with natures as per se unities. He has not lost hold of this
metaphysical concept, even though our examination of II 1 led us to
wonder whether it might not get quietly forgotten. For the condition
for predicating per se unity of a complex being is identical with the
condition for applying teleological explanation as Aristotle under¬
stands it. This condition is that the properties and behaviour of
the complex being are not wholly explicable as the product of a per
aceddens combination of simpler components and their respective
behavings. Once such explanation is shown to fail, it follows (a)
that the complex being is something other than a per accidens combin¬
ation and (b) that in order to explain the being's characteristics and
behaviour something other than its components must be invoked. (It
should perhaps be remarked that (b) alone does not entail that the
new explanatory concept will necessarily be teleological. For 'teleo¬
logical explanation', as ordinarily understood by philosophers, in¬
cluding Aristotle, implies not merely that the explanation is not
mechanical, but also, positively, that it invokes the notion of a
good. In practice however, whoever accepts (b) will almost certainly
regard (b) as proving the applicability of teleological explanation,
since no other type of non-mechanical explanation seems to have been
envisaged.)
(25) In the last paragraph, I spoke of teleological explanation 'as
understood by Aristotle' . The point was to indicate the difference
between him and those philosophers who hold that the same phenomenon
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can in principle be adequately explained both mechanically and
19 . .
teleologically. Sometimes, too, it is suggested that while a
teleological explanation may be satisfactory as long as the knowledge
is lacking to provide an adequate mechanical one, such knowledge is
in principle available and once it is achieved, the teleological
account should become a thing of the past, at least for the
scientifically-minded. It was useful as a heuristic device only, a
... . . . 2<
metaphor for facilitating the construction of mechanistic hypotheses.
However, Aristotle's treatment of the artifact examples in II 9 shows
that for him an explanation of complex natural substances in terms
only of the necessary behavings of their component materials would be
inadequate; inadequate, that is to say, not because such an explan¬
ation is as it stands sufficient, yet is not the only type of suffi¬
cient explanation, so that on its own it does not account for the
phenomenon in all the ways in which it is possible to account for it:
but because the nature and behaviour of the components are on their
.21
own insufficient to provide even one satisfactory explanation. In
other words, for Aristotle the concept of "end" provides not an
additional explanation, nor one that can eventually be dispensed with,
but the only explanation of something additional (to the materials) in
19. For a discussion of this and related topics, of. J.L. Mackie,
The Cement of the Universe3 pp. 276 - 284; for a tentative applic¬
ation to Aristotle, see Charlton, op. cit.3 p. 93.
20. See e.g. W. Wieland, Die aristotelische Physik, (translated as
'The Problem of Teleology' in Articles on Aristotle3 vol. I, edd.
Barnes, Schofield and Sorabji), pp. 267 - 268: 'teleological
explanation ... is a concept which makes possible a more, exaot
search for causes simply by presenting itself as a guideline for
the exploration of the particular'. (Author's italics.) For
further references, see M. Grene, 'Aristotle and Modern Biology',
Topics in the Philosophy of Biology3 p. 7 (this article first
appeared in Journal of the History of Ideas XXX). See also A.
Gotthelf, op. cit. pp. 252 - 253.
21. Cf. Mansion, op. cit., p. 340.
the phenomenon to be explained.
(26) We must now face the question whether Aristotle has any good
ground for supposing that the form of an organism (and therefore also
the principle that gives rise to the form considered as an empirically
knoxrable structure) is causally extra to the matter. It is of course
possible to distinguish conceptually between the shape of a thing and
what is shaped, but this does not prove that what is thus shaped did
not by the laws of its own nature come to be in that shape. This
distinction can be made even for some mass of inanimate matter, say a
lump of earth, yet Aristotle would certainly not attribute the shape
in this case to a form that is somehow beyond the matter (his matter-
form distinction cannot be made at all for the "simple" bodies: this
is part of what he means by 'simple' in this connection). It might
be objected that this example makes no point, since bits of earth
can be any shape, which shows that the particular shape is not of the
nature of a piece of earth as such, whereas what we are concerned
with is organisms, which, within a given kind, always display the same
morphology. But it could be answered that this difference tells, if
at all, on the side of the materialists, since the very regularity
with which an organic form recurs suggests causal dependence: and
\vdiat is_ there for it to depend upon if not the physical constituents?
We may begin to wonder whether Aristotle has not been enticed too
far by his analogy with artifacts. More often than not (even in the
Physics, but especially in the Metaphysics) he takes artifacts as
illustrations of the distinction between matter and form. And we may
be forgiven for suspecting that they are apt examples because they are
the only ones. For in an artifact, by definition, the form is causally
extraneous to the matter, since that is why there was need of the
artificer. In them too the form is contingent to the matter for the
additional reason that the same artificial form can in many cases be
imposed upon quite diverse types of matter: there can be iron as
well as wooden bedsteads. Whereas Aristotle makes it clear that in
natural substances the relation between form and proximate matter
is not in this sense contingent. 'What always happens necessarily
happens': so that if there are never trees of iron this is because
there could not be. It is true that the fact that there could not be
a tree except of a given type or types of material does not entail
that such material must necessarily result in a tree. But the acknow¬
ledged dependence in one direction (no tree without woody material),
which is not in general paralleled in the case of artifacts, suggests
that he has not sufficiently investigated the possibility of depend¬
ence in the other direction too (no woody material of such and such a
kind which is not necessarily in the form of a tree) . The fact that
this latter dependence does not hold in the case of artifacts cannot
be used as evidence for its not holding in the case of natural sub¬
stances. If natural substances differ from artifacts in respect of
the former dependence then why not also in respect of the latter?
And a similar argument could be based on another difference already
examined in Chapter I, paragraph (31). A natural substance by
contrast with an artifact not only requires a particular type of
matter, but the principle which in any individual case brings the
form to completion is so intimately related to matter that it can
only operate on one particular material object, viz. the body of the
individual itself, and no other.
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(27) If Aristotle simply ignored these disanalogies between
natural objects and artifacts in order to maintain that matter in
the former case cannot account for form, we might reasonably accuse
him of falling unawares into the Platonism he is resolute to avoid.
For if the form neither springs from the matter, nor is imposed by
a maker within the natural world, where can it be "from" if not some
transnatural realm, or the mind of a divine maker? In fact, however,
Aristotle seems to see himself finding an adequate alternative to
. 22
such Platonism when he emphasises precisely those aspects of natural
substance that indicate the immanence of form. And these are pre¬
cisely the respects in which we have just seen the analogy with arti¬
facts to break down. In short, our discussion so far has failed to
show any way in which Aristotle could rebut the charge of taking up
and putting down the analogy just as it happens to suit him. On the
one hand, form in natural substance is regarded as causally extraneous
to matter on the ground that natural substances are like artifacts;
while on the other hand, natural substances must be held (on both
a priori and empirical grounds) to differ from artifacts on precisely
the points that enable us to say of an artificial form that it is
causally extraneous to its matter. But if the analogy turns out to
be useless to establish Aristotle's position (as set forth in II 9,
and also in 3 and 7, where the final cause is presented as irreducible
to any other kind of cause), the arguments of II 1 that we earlier
reviewed are equally xrorthless. To point out that the structure of a
thing, or that its developed state, primarily determine our concept
of what sort of thing it is (and so of its "nature" in one sense), is
22. For his rejection of the Demiurge of. Metaph. A 9, 991a20 - 23.
See Wieland, op. ait., p. 273 and D.M. Balme, Aristotle's De
Part. An. I and De Gen. An. I, pp. 94 - 95.
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not to show that this structure and development is not explicable
by the laws of the component materials. And whereas Antiphon's
formulation of materialism may have fallen to the objection that man
generates man, this does not disprove the deeper materialist thesis
that being a man and a generator of men arises solely from the prop¬
erties of more basic materials in certain arrangements. Now if the
position of Aristotle in II 9 has any serious foundation in argument,
the argument must have recognised and met this deeper thesis. So
Aristotle himself realises, for it is on this level that he reopens
*
the issue of form as nature versus matter in Chapter 8, to which we
23
must now turn.
(28) Having stressed in Chapter 7 the theory of the four causes,
Aristotle now sees the necessity to defend this against an attack that
threatens to demolish not only teleological explanation but also any
basis for maintaining that a complex natural substance is more than a
per accidens conjunction of its elements.
23. The present account, it will be seen, is at odds with D.J.
Allan's remark, The Philosophy of Aristotle^ p. 33; 'Since
he does not assume the movement of inanimate matter to be gov¬
erned by inflexible laws, he does not have to answer the question
raised by modern exponents of vitalism and mechanism, i.e.
whether these same laws can, without invoking new factors, be
made to give a sufficient account of living organisms and their
changes.' I accept the 'Since ... ' clause, but it does not
justify the conclusion drawn. Prof. Allan here seems to
confuse 'mechanism' (which in the context means 'biological
reductionism') with 'rigid determinism'. ('Mechanism' has
another unwanted modern association, with the concept of matter
as inert. Thus the latter-day mechanist may in effect be deny¬
ing the reality of what Aristotle calls 'inner principles of
change'. But this is hardly at issue between Aristotle and the
Presocratics attacked in II 8. For neither side is matter inert
in the Newtonian sense (of. D.M. Balme, 'Greek Science and
Mechanism I and II'. Classical Quarterly XXIII and XXV, 1939
and 1941) . But there still is room for a reductionist contro¬
versy. Cf. paragraph (42).)
97
'Now we must explain, firstly, that nature is
a final cause, and secondly the place of necessity
in natural events. For everyone refers things to
necessity as a cause, saying that since the hot and
the cold etc. have such and such natures, such and
such things exist and come to be, of necessity. For
if they mention another cause, they only touch on it
and let it go - Love and Strife in one theory, Mind
in another. But there is a problem: what objection
is there to holding that nature does not operate for
an end, nor because it is better so, but instead is
like the rain, which does not fall in order to make the
corn grow, but of necessity? For what has been driven
up must get cooled, and what is cooled turns into
water and must come down: and it is an incidental
result that the corn grows. Similarly, if someone's
corn is spoiled on the threshing floor, the rain does
not fall in order to spoil it, but this has happened
incidentally. So what is the objection to saying that
it is the same with the organic parts of natural sub¬
stances: of necessity the teeth come up with the front
ones sharp and fit for tearing, and the molars flat
and useful for grinding the food; since they do not
come into being for the sake of that end, but happen
to appear together? And similarly with all the other
parts in which there appears to be an end. Thus in
the cases in which all the parts came together as if
it was for an end that they came to be, the organisms
survived, being spontaneously composed in a suitable
way. Whereas wherever this was not the case, they
perished, and still perish, as Empedocles says of the
man-faced oxenkind. This and any similar arguments
might present a difficulty [sc. to the teleologist].
But it cannot be as they say. For these things and
indeed all things that happen by nature either always
come about in the way they do, or for the most part,
whereas this is not true of any of the things that
come about by chance or spontaneity. For we do not
think it due to chance or coincidence if it rains often
in the winter, although we do if this occurs in August;
nor do we think it of heat-waves in August, though we
would of heat-waves in the winter. If then it is
agreed that "by coincidence" and "for an end" are
the only alternatives, and if these things can- ^
not be either by coincidence or by spontaneity,
they must be for an end. But all such things are by
nature, as the holders of the theory themselves would
agree. So "being for an end" applies to things that
come about and exist by nature.' (198blO - 199a8)
24. He is using 'by coincidence', 'by chance' and 'by spontaneity'
as synonyms.
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(29) Aristotle begins by preparing what seems an easy victory for
himself. He attributes to his opponents a position that appears to
be needlessly incoherent. He depicts them as holding that complex
organically useful phenomena such as the set of teeth occur both by
the necessary workings of the laws of their primitive components (the
hot and the cold, etc., 198bl3 - 14), and by "coincidence" ('auyueaeLv',
198b27, and 'otno aupTUTwyaros ', 199al) . Yet these, we might well
object, are two very different positions, although both alike exclude
Aristotelian teleology. It seems obvious too that whereas the first
is reasonable and accords with the spirit of science, the second
cannot be so described. Serious opponents of finalism would surely
take their stand on the former ("necessity"), and would neither need
nor wish to assert the latter ("coincidence"). Yet it is only against
the second that Aristotle directs his reply. The reply then seems
based on an ignorat'to etenchi., or at any rate on an ignovatio of the
genuinely challenging core of the proposed theory, however confused
its actual formulations by Empedocles and the others. But this
objection to Aristotle betrays anachronistic misunderstanding. If
we assume that "necessity" (i.e. "causal or natural necessity") and
"coincidence" offer necessarily different and even contrary accounts
of the same phenomenon, this is because we are obsessed with the
relatively modern problem of how to distinguish a causal or naturally
necessary sequence of events from an accidental succession. For
clearly the proposition that A caused B entails that B did not simply
happen to happen after A. Thus we may think that no coherent theory
could combine necessity with coincidence in the way in which Aristotle
presents his opponents as doing. And since we are unlikely to believe
that the only alternative theory to Aristotelian teleology is just
such an incoherent amalgam of necessity and coincidence, we may well
conclude that knowingly or not, Aristotle is misrepresenting the
opposition.
(30) We shall see later whether this charge is a fair one. But
first it must be said on Aristotle's side that he is not at all con¬
cerned with coincidence as a property of successions or sequences of
events, or as implying absence of causality between earlier and later.
He is not for instance saying that his adversaries suppose that the
growth of the teeth is causally unconnected with any causal ante¬
cedents - a view which of course they did not hold. He is here using
'coincidence', and also 'by chance' (199al) and 'by spontaneity'
(198b30, 36) to refer (a) to a group of simultaneous phenomena each
of which has an independent antecedent cause, and (b) to a (desirable)
outcome of the "co-happening" of such a group. (This is the gist of
his own analysis of chance and spontaneity in Chapters 5 and 6 of
Book II.) In this sense, "coincidence" is fully compatible even with
universal causal determinism of later by earlier. For 'coincidence'
means only that the result represents a convergence of mutually
independent diachronic causal lines. Empedocles and the other physiko
are therefore portrayed by Aristotle as saying that organisms and
their complex organic parts have come about through sets of indep¬
endent causal processes involving separate material factors which
behave and undergo transformation by the necessity of their own
natures (of. 198bl2-14), and which merely happen to occur together,
since none occurs because any of the others do, or through the same
25
c au s e.
25. On this and the preceding paragraph see W.K.C. Guthrie, History
of Greek Philosophy, vol. II, pp. 163 - 165 and 414-419.
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(31) Aristotle's statement of the theory he is opposing is not
then logically incoherent, as at first it might have seemed, but
even so he appears not to do his adversaries justice. This emerges
from his reply, where he argues (a) that the phenomena to be explained
cannot be regarded as happening "by coincidence", and (b) that given
that it is agreed ('Sonet', 199a3) that they are either "by coincid¬
ence", or "for an end", they must be "for an end". Now Aristotle's
reason for (a) is that we regard only exceptional phenomena as coincid¬
ental (in the sense explained), and that biologically useful conjunc¬
tions of organs and parts of organs are not exceptional. On this, he
can appeal to the common-sense reaction to regularities of conjunc¬
tion: if a conjunction regularly recurs, we take this as evidence of
a common cause, which accounts not only for each conjunct severally,
but also for their togetherness. And indeed the materialists can
hardly have supposed that the teeth and other organs are "together",
forming an animal, through the entirely independent workings of
separate causal lines. Why should Aristotle have imagined that they
did think this, or that their position entailed it? The entailment
does of course hold given Aristotle's premiss (b), but why should he
have thought that anyone not already convinced of the need for teleo-
26
logy would accept (b)? Granted that it is unreasonable not to
suppose a common cause for phenomena regularly conjoined: but why
should this cause necessarily consist in a common end? It might also
be granted that if a regular conjunction regularly contributes to some
good result, a satisfactory explanation of the regularity should make
26. Cf. H. Cherniss, Aristotle's Criticism of Presocratic Philo¬
sophy, pp. 251 - 252. Cherniss attributes Aristotle's failure
to recognise mechanical causation to a sheer inability to step
outside his own conceptual system. Wieland, while more sympath¬
etic, makes essentially the same point, op. cit. 3 pp. 260 - 261.
some reference to that good. But the materialists are not logically
committed to denying the relevance, in an explanation of the set of
teeth, of the fact that the set is useful (while its members would
have been individually useless) . Empedocles at any rate believed
that he could do justice to our sense that such a denial would be
absurd or unreasonable, without resort to a teleological account.
Because such and such independent natural processes occurred, a
particular fortunate conjunction came about, and being useful it (or
rather the organism in which it occurred) survived, and reproduction
together with the non-survival of non-viable conjunctions saw to it
that conjunctions of this useful type became the regular thing.
Aristotle's insistence that what happens regularly cannot be by
coincidence seems crudely to miss the point of the Empedoclean account,
which implicitly distinguishes between past and present infrequency,
and between infrequency of types and of instances. The types of
conjunction that are viable are few by comparison with all possible
types, and also by comparison with all the types that have ever been
actually instantiated. The original instances of viable types of
conjunction were probably infrequent by comparison with contemporary
instances of non-viable types. But the present instances of the
viable types are for obvious reasons vastly more frequent than their
non-viable contemporaries. Thus in one sense the set of teeth (and
the animal it belongs to) is exceptional, in another sense not.
There is no contradiction here, but a coherent (even if rather
quaintly illustrated) theory, and one which does without teleology.
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(32) If Aristotle fails to notice how the concepts of frequency
and infrequency operate on different levels in this account, it may
not surprise us that he commits what seems another obvious mistake:
that of transferring the concept of "coincidence" as applied to the
original coming together of elements to form a viable combination,
to their remaining together in this combination, and also to the
subsequent togetherness of similar components in creatures descended
from the original viable one. He seems to think that the opposition
are committed to holding that because the original coming together
(which may have occurred in very few cases) was a coincidence, the
same is true of the subsequent staying together, and also of the
consequent being together of similar components in the offspring. Just
as the original conjoining was due to the mutually independent behav¬
iour of different objects, so the continuing existence of the result¬
ant combination is due to nothing more: each constituent stays with
the others by being and behaving just as it would even if they were
not present. On this view, the only kind of explanation for the com¬
bination's continuance will be a conjunction of explanations each
showing how a given component came to be and still is where it is.
This is the Empedoclean case as Aristotle construes it, and it looks
like a straw man of his own making. Everyone would agree with Aris¬
totle's rejection of this account, insofar as rejection implies belief
in some connection between the factors in the stable and self-
reproducing compounds: a connection warranting explanation in terms
not reducible to a mere conjunction of independent causal stories.
But Aristotle goes further: he assumes that the materialists could
indicate no connection except a teleological one: the factors are and
remain together in order to maintain a useful whole. Yet to us it
seems obvious that they could have held the connection to lie in the
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natures of the factors themselves: that these stay combined because
they are such as to interact to form a stable whole - which latter
is the result but not the end. It results because the factors, once
together, affect each other in such a way that they cohere. But it
need not be supposed that when together they are as they are and
behave as they do in order to cohere, any more than that when apart
they behaved as they did in order to come together, or from any cause
other than the necessity of their natures.
(33) No doubt the materialists' ideas as to the actual specific
workings of combination in given types of case were nebulous almost
to non-existence. Does Aristotle the philosopher then rest his refut¬
ation on nothing more than their inability to give convincing empirical
content to an a pviovi position? Or is it that he takes 'Either by
coincidence or for an end' to be some kind of conceptually necessary
universal truth? Hardly this, since he himself does not treat the
27
dichotomy as exhaustive. He is willing to concede propositions such
as 'what is driven up must get cooled, and what is cooled turns into
water and must come down' (198bl8 - 20), being well aware that these
'musts', in his opponents' mouths, do not signify his own (as yet
unproposed) concept of 'necessary-for-a-given-end' (v.s. paragraph
(23)), but the "brute" necessity that excludes finality. Nor on the
other hand did Aristotle think that these elemental motions and
transformations occur "by coincidence": They come about through the
intrinsic natures of the substances concerned (air or fire, and
water), and (unlike the spoiling of the corn) they do not depend on
27. Cf. Charlton, op. ci-t. , pp. 120-121.
the accidental occurrence of some special external circumstance
(as e.g. that the corn happens to be laid out just where the rain
falls). Such occurrences, then, he admits (or admits for the purpose
28
of the argument) are neither by coincidence nor for an end, but
as we should say, by a law of nature. But given this recognition
of a tertium quid between "by coincidence" and "for an end", how
can he be so certain that it does not apply to organic phenomena?
(34) Unfortunately Aristotle does not answer this question himself,
nor even indicates having given it a moment's thought. This is
because from his point of view, as I shall now argue, it hardly
deserves serious consideration. First it must be stressed that in
this discussion Aristotle regards the onus of proof as lying with the
materialists. This is clear from the fact that he has already (Chap¬
ters 3 and 7) propounded, without demonstration, his own doctrine of
the four distinct types of cause. No doubt his confidence is partly
a Platonic legacy. But that 'the teeth are for chewing' etc. would
also have seemed (perhaps still seems) plain common sense. Further¬
more, empirical investigation itself shows that at least in one field
of natural phenomena the systematic and detailed application of teleo¬
logy results in hypotheses that are clearly statable, empirically
28. It seems that most writers take Aristotle's teleology to apply
to all types of natural substance, including the simple bodies.
See in particular Balme, 'Greek Science and Mechanism I', loo.
cit. , pp. 129 ff. This view is challenged by Charlton, op. ait.,
p. xvii, and Gotthelf, op. cit., p. 237, note 19. It is not
clear how far there is real disagreement, since Aristotle did
not always recognise the simple bodies as substances (v.s. para¬
graph (6) and note 5). Aristotle need not share the Empedoclean
view that the descent of rain etc. is not for an end. He con¬
centrates on the end-directedness of organisms because they are
the most obvious examples, not necessarily because they are in
his view the only ones.
verifiable, and very frequently also confirmed: whereas materialism
at the time could claim no corresponding scientific success, nor did
... 29
it suggest any definite method for achieving it. Thus Aristotle
does not see himself as obliged to argue against the abstract propos¬
ition that 'Nothing in nature happens for an end', but only against a
particular proposal to this effect. The proposal in question is a
reductionist thesis, as is clear from the second sentence of Chapter 8
Complex organic phenomena come about by ("brute") necessity because
they are reducible to simple phenomena which everyone would agree
occur by necessity. It may be that there are coherent denials of
final causation which involve no reductionism. But Aristotle is not
concerned to refute wholesale every possible denial of what to him is
prima facie obvious, and if he can deal with the problem in the form
in which it had actually to date been posed, this is all that he needs
to do.
(35) The simple phenomena on which the proposed reduction is based
are "the hot and the cold", and the physical substances, fire, earth,
etc. which are the primary bearers of these qualities. But for Arist¬
otle the fundamental natures of such substances are expressed by
motions in different directions. Apparently Empedocles for one did
30
not disagree. In De Antma II 4, 415b28 - 416a2, Aristotle says:
'Empedocles is wrong in adding that growth in
plants is to be explained as follows: the downward
29. Cf. Balme, Classical Quarterly XXXV, p. 28, Wieland, op. cit.
pp. 267 - 268.
30. Although his view, like that of Anaxagoras, is based on "like to
like", not on "natural place". This difference from Aristotle
does not affect the argument.
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rooting by the natural tendency of earth to travel
downwards, and the upward branching by the similar
natural tendency of fire to travel upwards.'
Aristotle has two objections to this explanation, the first being that
it disregards the functions of the plant's parts: functionally, the
roots correspond to the head of an animal (both contain the organs
of ingestion). Presumably Empedocles would explain the upward growth
of a head by the tendency of its main constituent element to travel
upwards: thus phenomena which from the functional point of view demand
the same type of explanation, are for Empedocles instances of opposite
tendencies. To this, Empedocles might reply that it is begging the
question against him to insist that he be concerned with explanation
in terms of function. But Aristotle's second objection meets him on
his own terms:
'Further, we must ask what is the force that
holds together the earth and the fire which tend to
travel in contrary directions: if there is no
counteracting force, they will be torn asunder ...'
(416a6 - 8)
Clearly, if there is a counteracting force, it does not stem from the
nature of any extra material element: for Aristotle, every element
is necessarily characterised by locomotion in a specific direction;
so that far from countering the "aliofugal" tendencies of earth and
fire, anything else of the same type would simply add its own such
tendency to the situation.
(36) Against this theoretical background, which Aristotle's oppon¬
ents themselves do not reject, the materialist programme of reducing
organic phenomena to the processes of their simple inanimate constit¬
uents must have appeared a hopeless fantasy to anyone who saw clearly
the issues involved. Certainly there are no mechanical principles that
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could hold the components in a structured unity, and even the absurd
suggestion that (in repeated instances) they are together because they
happen to be together implies a physical impossibility. When the
nature of a simple substance is to move in a single simple direction,
how could masses of even one such substance (let alone more than one)
retain (if they could fall into) arrangements resembling even the
most primitive organic structures? Even "coincidence" could not
account for the phenomena, so that in saddling his adversaries with
a coincidence-theory as their only alternative to teleology Aristotle
actually allows them more than they deserve. Or are we perhaps over¬
stating the case against them? Not, it seems, if we suppose that
they suppose the simple elements to be present in the compound by
way of mechanical synthesis. But we ought also to consider whether
the notion of chemical combination might not serve them better.
31
(37) Aristotle distinguishes between two types of combination,
(i) synthesis, which gives rise to a mere spatial aggregate of differ¬
ent objects (ears of wheat mixed with ears of barley); and (ii)
mixis, in which the simple bodies combine to form a homogeneous sub¬
stance with different properties from those of its components. This is
his closest approach to our distinction between mechanical and chemical
combination, but his concept of a "mixtum" is nonetheless very differ¬
ent from our idea of a chemical compound. We conceive of a quantity
of some chemical compound as consisting of qualitatively identical ionic
agglomerates or molecules each of which is a structured system made
31. On this topic see De Gen. et Cow., I 10, II 6-8; H.H. Joachim,
'Aristotle's Conception of Chemical Combination', Journal of
Philology XXIX, 1904, pp. 72 ff. ; the same author, Aristotle
on Coming-to-be and Passing-away, pp. 175 - 189, 230 - 246.
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up of "atomic" components, themselves in turn structured. An atom
of a given substance (element) E is seen as a unit having just that
structure or internal configuration that would enable it to combine
(by electrical attraction) with atoms of other elements to form all
the known compounds of E. There is a sense in xtfhich an atom of E in
some compound cannot be described in exactly the same terms as an
uncompounded atom of E. Thus, e.g., in the compound, the outermost
electrons of the E-atom relate not only to the nucleus of this atom,
but also to the nucleus of another - hence the compound; whereas
when E is uncompounded, its electrons relate only to its own nucleus.
All the same there is an isomorphism between the compounded and the
uncompounded E-atom, as between a one-inch square drawn on its own
and a one-inch chequerboard square (which shares its sides with other
squares), that makes it legitimate to say that the E-atom is present
in the molecule or ionic agglomerate. (Moreover the nucleus and inner
electronic shells of the atom are not affected by chemical change:
which seems to entail that they are present in the compounded and the
uncompounded atom in just the same way.)
(38) All this is alien to Aristotle. For him, a compound ("mixtum")
of simple substances is through and through homogeneous, not only in
the sense that physical division never reaches a part that does not
have the same observable properties as the larger mass, but also in
the following sense: the mixtum cannot from any point of view be
regarded as structured, or as consisting of structured units (like
molecules) that are systems of "interlocking" component factors. This
view of the nature of a compound may rest in part on the difficulty
of seeing how a structure of "interlocking" components could differ
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from a mechanically conjoined aggregate: in the absence of some
32
account of the special nature of a chemical bond, the original dis¬
tinction between synthesis and mixis would be threatened. But the
path towards any theory of compounds as structured is for Aristotle
even more fundamentally blocked by his own conception of the simple
elements as essentially characterised by locomotion in a given
cosmic direction. It follows from this conception that compounds
cannot be regarded as consisting of elemental particles that actually
instantiate in full the same essential nature as uncompounded par¬
ticles of the same elements, nor therefore the same nature as they
themselves instantiated prior to entering the compound. Such a
situation would imply that the compound was either so unstable as
never to exist at all for any span of time, or that it was held
together by a continuing miracle. We might conclude that Aristotle's
doctrine of the elements simply cuts him off from the concept of a
compound altogether, and in our sense of 'compound' we should be right.
Yet Aristotle himself does distinguish between mixis and synthesis,
and what is more, he holds that mixis produces those stuffs that are
the immediate matter of the organic parts of organisms: flesh, bone
etc. These are homoeomerous compounds of all four elements in varying
proportions. But how can he even coherently conceive of such stuffs?
Only by dispensing with the assumption that the elements that make up
a compound are actually present in the compound once formed. The
compound is actual only when its components (the elements) are not
32. Cf. Joachim, Aristotle on Coming-to-be3 etc. , p. 183: 'The
reader will observe that yt£ts, as Aristotle conceives it,
demands a more thorough union of the constituents than that
assigned to the constituents of a chemical compound by modern
chemical theory. In so far at least as modern chemistry
regards a compound as a mere arrangement or shuffle of the
atoms of the combining constituents, Aristotle would accuse
it of confusing yt£ts with auv^eatg.'
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fully actual. But this is not to say that they in no sense are, or
that they are destroyed out of all possibility of existence when they
form the compound, for when the compound exists actually, they are
present potentially, in that the compound can be transformed back
33
into the separate elements.
(39) Only in this way does Aristotle achieve a concept of "chemical
compound" that is not logically at odds with his ascription of
essentially locomotory natures to the elements when "freestanding".
The solution is not without its difficulties, however. To mention
only one, it is implausible to hold that a compound wholly lacks the
locomotory characteristics of all its elements. Flesh and bone have
weight, i.e. tend towards the centre, like earth their major component.
And how is this to be explained except on the supposition that earth
is not totally absent, i.e. not merely potentially present in the
sense in which 'being potentially F' is compatible with the total
absence of the corresponding actuality? A good craftsman builds
taking maximum account of the continuingly actual forces of the prim-
34
itive components, and the stability of the finished product depends
as much upon their presence as upon the balance which if left to them¬
selves they could never have achieved. How can something like this
not be the case with natural complex structures such as organisms
and organs? But if this is so, then standard senses of the formula
33. Cf. Joachim, locc. citt. , Cherniss, op. cit. , pp. 140 - 143;
L. Robin, Ar-is tote, pp. 138 - 139: S. Sambursky, The Physical
World of the Greeks, p. 144; E. McMullin, 'Four Senses of
• Potency', The Concept of Matter in Greek and Mediaeval Philo¬
sophy , ed. McMullin, pp. 305 - 308, 315 - 317; E.J. Di jksterhuis,
The Mechanisation of the World Picture, pp. 23 - 24 and 200 ff.
34. E.g. of the housewall in II 9, 200al ff., quoted paragraph (23).
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'potentially but not actually present' cannot do justice to the fact
that the independent natures of the four elements are not totally
"suspended" in flesh, bone, etc., but are permitted limited expression,
35
the bounds of which are set by requirements of organic functioning.
Thus the earth-composed roots of the plant tend sufficiently downwards
to give it necessary stability, but not so as to part company with the
36
other organs, thereby ceasing to be roots. But we need not reach
a decision on how precisely to conceptualise the status of the earth
in this example in order to see that for Aristotle there can be no
question of explaining the structure and behaviour of organisms and
organs by reference to the properties of their simple components. The
reductionist programme presupposes that a knowledge of the independent
natures of the components {i.e. of laws concerning them which have
been established independently of the organic context) would, given
known boundary conditions, make it theoretically possible to predict
organic structure and behaviour. But we now find that the elements
"in" the organic context either totally lay aside their original
natures or modify them so as to fall in with the needs of the whole.
On the first alternative they are not actually present at all in the
organism, so that it would be absurd to attempt explaining it and its
behaviour, which are actual, by reference to the non-actual properties
of the non-actual. On the second alternative, while the elements may
35. Cf. Joachim, Avistot~le on Coming-to-be, etc., pp. 180-181 and
McMullin, op. cit., p. 306. For the later history of the problem
see Dijksterhuis, op. cit., pp. 200 ff.
36. Many writers find irresistible the metaphor of the organic form
'compelling', 'constraining', 'bending', 'harnessing', the behav¬
iour of the materials. This wrongly suggests that the latter are
present in the full actuality of their independent natures so as
to need repressing. If a metaphor is needed 'voluntary self-
subordination' better describes the normal case. Or: the well-
functioning organism is to its matter as the otljtppwv to his
passions, as opposed to the eyxpaxps.
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in a sense be there, the ways in which they manifest their presence
are deducible only from a prior knowledge of the organism and its
requirement, not vice Versa as the reductionist would have it. The
whole, moreover, is inexplicable not only in terms of its simple
ultimate components, the four elements (this answers what we earlier
called the second materialist position, v.s. paragraph (10)), but in
terms too of its immediate materials, the homogeneous compounds (which
answers the first position). For these, being (as they must be)
absolutely free of configuration at any level of analysis, could never
alone explain organic structure and the functioning that depends on
and maintains structure. Such is the basis of Aristotle's position
in Physics II 8, and insofar as the materialists share his view of
37
the elemental locomotions, they too are bound by its consequences.
37. Through lack of space I have taken no account of Aristotle's
explanation of elemental combinations in terms of the four
contrary powers and their combinations in the simple substances
and compounds of these. This topic raises fundamental problems,
not least that of the conceptual relationship between the theory
that defines fire etc. as Hot-Dry etc., and that which defines
them by reference to natural places. Has Aristotle his own
version of the wave/particle problem? See F. Solmsen, Aris¬
totle's System of the Physical World, pp. 363 - 364. But I do
not see that a full discussion would affect the present argument.
The theory of contrary powers is supposed to explain (a) the
mutual transformation of the simple bodies, (b) their transform¬
ation into mixta with different properties from the components'.
But it does not allow us to say that e.g. Fire (= Hot-Dry) is
actually present in a mixtum. For Hot and Dry are supposed to
have merged with their opposites contributed by other elemental
components, so as to form a new intensive property. The Aoyoc;
of a given type of mixtum refers to the proportions of the
elements that went into it, but (unlike a modern chemical
formula) not to any actual resultant structure in which, say,
2 discriminable units of fire are bonded with 3 of earth, 1 of
water, etc. Thus the introduction of the contrary powers leaves
us as far as ever from being able to explain the structural
properties of an organic whole by reference to its constituents.
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(40) So in a modern discussion of mechanism versus teleology there
is no point of entry for Aristotle. This debate gets off the ground
by means of considerations such as these:
'The physical sciences are concerned with a
hierarchy of structure and patterns resulting from
very different processes: the fusion of the funda¬
mental particles within the nucleus of the atom;
the association of various numbers of electrons with
atomic nuclei of different net charge to produce over
100 different elements; the combination of these
elements to produce millions of different chemical
compounds; the interaction of elements, compounds
and energy in various forms to make the large scale
features and phenomena of the natural world, moun¬
tains and seas, stars and planets, storm and earth¬
quake. Living organisms continue to persist in the
world by imbibing less organised material from out¬
side (in respiration and feeding) and when they cease
to exist their organization breaks down into chemical
compounds such as salts, carbon dioxide, ammonia and
water which are structurally not different from those
obtained by mining, combustion, or the synthetic
processes of chemical industry. It seems therefore
legitimate, and a reasonable prima facie assumption
on which to base further study, to regard living
organisms as matter organised in a special manner,
and not as matter invested with a special property
"life" beyond the scope of the physical sciences.'
(A.R. Peacocke, in 'The Molecular Organization of Life',
in Biology and Personality, ed. I. Ramsey, p. 17.)
So many things are 'matter organised in a special manner', so why
38
should not the same be true of living things? This is where the
controversy starts between the modern mechanist and the "emergence"
theorist, or between reductionists and organicists. But for Aristotle
the fundamental problem occurs a long way back: How can inanimate
matter be organised at all? Living things, from this point of view,
are no more surprising than inorganic compounds: in a way less so,
for whereas the character and behaviour of the former can be explained
38. Cf. also H. Hein, 'Molecular Biology Vs. Organicism', Synthese
XX, 1969, p. 242: 'The molecular biologists claim ... that the
dynamic, system building character of organisms can be accounted
for in terms of a basic architectonic tendency inherent in the
fundamental particles of matter itself.'
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teleologically, those of the latter cannot, nor by reference to the
behaviour of any actual constituents either.
(41) I have argued that within the framework of his theory of the
simple bodies, Aristotle's refutation of contemporary materialism in
Physics II 8, 198bl0 - 199a8, can be seen to be cogent. It follows
(within this framework) (a) that there is a sound basis for applying
teleology to at least some natural phenomena, and (b) that organic
creatures can properly be regarded as ontologically fundamental
substances in their own right, rather than arrangements of other,
physically more primitive, substances. They are, in other words,
pev se unities. This conclusion does not make it illegitimate to say
that they are also combinations of components. In the first place,
they have organic parts, both the structured organs and the various
homoeomerous stuffs such as flesh that the organs are made of. But
these are not self-sufficient substances having each its own inner
principle of change which it exhibits in actual change whenever not
physically prevented. That would imply that even (if not especially)
when separated from the organic context the objects in question would
change naturally so as to express autonomous natures. But in fact
organs and flesh etc. are never found except in the organic context,
or if separated they begin at once to decay. Thus although the organic
whole is in a sense a combination of them, it is not a per accidens
combination of substances. Secondly, the organic whole does in a
sense consist of the simple bodies, and these are indeed autonomously
natured substances (at least in the Physics they are so treated). But
they, unlike the flesh and organs, are not actually present in the
organism, i.e. not as autonomous beings. Hence the organism, which is
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actual, cannot be viewed as a per acoi-dens combination of them either.
The per se unity of the whole is not diminished by its being composed
of different things, for the actually present components are not
substances, while the substantial components are not as such actually
present.
(42) Despite the close relation between conclusions (a) and (b)
above, they are distinct. This is clear once we realise that so far
as (b) is concerned, it makes no difference to Aristotle's argument
whether the materialists view the simple bodies as necessitated to
behave as they do, or as meaning to. They may or may not have
thoroughly disengaged these two concepts from one another: the
English word 'will' itself bears witness to a proto-concept in which
the ideas of purpose and of predictability as such had not yet parted
company. 'By necessity' and 'for an end' express opposing concepts
only when the latter is applied to creatures that act for more than
one end, or that do not always achieve the same end in the same way.
Thus even if we say that earth falls in order to be at the centre,
it remains true that it must fall, since for earth there is no other
end and no other way of getting there. Suppose, then, that the mat¬
erialist notion of the necessary movements of the elements was not
wholly untinged with teleology (in which respect it would probably
have resembled Aristotle's own). In that case there would be no need
for Aristotle to prove that some phenomena are teleological, since
this (by the supposition) has never been clearly denied by either
party to the controversy. Aristotle would therefore be wasting his
time in arguing in II 8 for a teleological account of organic structure
and behaviour, if his only purpose in so arguing were to show that
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teleology has application to nature. But his purpose, I suggest, is
also to refute those who in II 1 were described as holding the simple
bodies to be 'the whole of substance, and everything else to be affec¬
tions and states and arrangements of these'. This position is compat¬
ible with a theory of goal-directed simple bodies. It may also be
compatible with a theory of organisms as goal-directed. But it is not
compatible with viewing organisms as genuine substances in their own
right. From this point of view, the importance of Aristotle's argument
in II 8 does not lie in the bare conclusion that organic phenomena are
teleological, but in the proof that they cannot be explained as combin-
ations of simple substances. The proof is the same whether we think of
the latter as having wills of their own, or as necessitated in some more
clinical mechanist sense. Either way, "coincidence" would be the only
cause of combination; and either way, combination would mean one of two
alternatives: totally unstable synthesis or totally unstructured mixis.
(43) A number of writers have stressed the empirical basis of
Aristotle's philosophy of organic substance. I refer in particular
39
to a strong statement by A. Gotthelf, who has shown clearly how
Aristotle's teleology of organisms depends on a theory of the
irreducibility of their behaviour to that of inanimate components.
'Philosophers of science today are in increasing
agreement that the question of reduction is an
empirical one; they insist that one cannot legislate
the precise form of the laws in which our understand¬
ing of nature is expressed. Aristotle's attitude is
39. Op. ait., pp. 253 - 254. With this passage compare F.S.C.
Northrop, Science and First Principles, p. 18. See also
A.P.D. Mourelatos, 'Aristotle's "Powers" and Modern Empiricism',
Ratio IX, 1967, esp. p. 97.
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similar: he does not attempt to legislate a priori
the particular form which a successful account of
the natures and potentials of living organisms must
take. His arguments for his teleological doctrine
make this clear. What he insists is that the facts
as we have observed them, and the identification of
the natures and potentials of things that these
observations have led us to, entail the irreducibility
thesis which is at the core of the concept of final
causality asserted to obtain in nature. Though the
simplicity and the non-mathematical character of
Aristotle's chemistry (and physics) eliminates for
him any real possibility of a successful reduction
to element potentials [i.e. to the natures of the
simple substances] of the complexities of the organic
world, this makes his thesis no less empirical - for
his view of the inanimate world is equally subject
to revision. There is nothing in the fundamentals of
Aristotle's philosophy, and nothing in his philo¬
sophical or scientific method, that would prohibit
the adoption of a reducibility thesis, should the
scientific evidence be judged to warrant it.'
The long tradition of bitter attacks on Aristotle as arch-enemy of
the true spirit of science may still have life enough in some quarters
to merit sharp reaction. But Mr. Gotthelf's defence of the "empiric
Aristotle" (an image whose increasing vogue parallels that of
40
"Aristotle the philosopher of ordinary language") is exaggerated.
It is true that observation supports the theory of elemental loco¬
motions, as well as the distinction between aggregates and homogenenous
compounds. But observation could not teach Aristotle that the latter
must be absolutely homogeneous, any more than it could dictate that
the elements themselves must be simple. (This could be deduced from
the teleological consideration that a substance whose nature it is to
move straight up or down does not need to be anything more complicated
than a homogeneous mass.) In general, observation may have seemed to
40. I agree however with the bulk of Gotthelf's article (unread
when most of this chapter was written), and have found in




confirm, but it could not enforce, the conception of a world of
substances whose natures are expressed each in some single pattern
of behaviour to which external objects are relevant only negatively
as possible hindrances. This view, developed as it is by Aristotle,
leaves no conceptual room for a view of basic physical units whose
character is shown in and through all their specific combinations.
Thus chemistry and biochemistry as we understand them have no
beginnings of a purchase. One of the recurrent themes in Aristotle
42 . .
is conceptual pluralism. We have m logic the mutually irreducible
categories, in metaphysics the four types of cause, in logic of
science the autonomy of subject-matters. His philosophy of nature
adds a striking example to the list: there is no single sub-class of
laws from which all other laws and generalisations could theoretically
be deduced. The four elements are all-pervasive, but they cannot
account for living structures, and in each type of case the explan¬
atory gap is filled by a different form or telos, of which there are
as many as there are species of organism. To exchange this view for
a reductionist alternative, Aristotle would have had radically to
alter 'the fundamentals of his philosophy'.
41. Cf. J.D. Logan, 'The Aristotelian concept of $YEI£', Philo¬
sophical Review VI, 1899, pp. 18 ff., esp. pp. 32 - 33; 'The
Aristotelian Teleology', ibid., pp. 386 ff., esp. pp. 392 f f.
42. Cf. G.E.L. Owen, 'The Platonism of Aristotle', Proceedings of
the British Academy L, 1965, pp. 125 ff., esp. pp. 140 ff.
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CHAPTER III
The Definition of Change
(1) Having examined the concept of nature as a principle of
change, we turn now to change itself.
'Since nature is a principle of process (xuvqcrews)
and change (yeTagoAris) we must determine what process
is. For if we do not know this, then we cannot know
what nature is either. And having defined process, we
must try to deal in the same way with the concepts next
in order. Process is held to belong to the class of
continuous things, and the infinite makes its appear¬
ance first and foremost in the continuous. For this
reason, when people define the continuous they often
bring in the concept of the infinite, saying that the
continuous is what is divisible to infinity. Moreover,
it is held that there cannot be process without place
and void and time. Thus it is clear that for these
reasons, and because these are common and universal
to all [sc. physical] things, we must take each of them
up for discussion, since inquiries into specific
topics cannot precede inquiry into common concepts.
So first of all, as we said, we must examine process.'
(II 1, 200bl3 - 25)
(2) On the principle declared in the last sentence but one, we
might suppose Aristotle to be undertaking the most general and compre¬
hensive enquiry into change. Yet the very wording of his preamble
might also cause us to doubt this. In the first line he uses
'yexagoAn', his most general word for 'change'. But he uses it as
interchangeable with 'xuvqcrts' and similarly a few lines below
(200b32 - 33, 201a2, 8-9). In Physios V 1 Aristotle distinguishes the
two terms, assigning to 'xuvriacs' a narrower meaning.-'- This somewhat
technical distinction we should not expect him to be observing here at
1. 'Kuvqats' is there applied only to non-substantial change.
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the outset, and nor does he. Here in III 1 we find him using
'yexagoAq' to cover changes ruled out by the meaning stipulated in
V 1. Even so, it is surprising that prior to any discussion he
should treat the terms as interchangeable, since in their ordinary
senses too they are not equivalent. Briefly, ' liexctBoArj' means
change from one state of affairs to another (of. V 1 224b35 - 225a2),
while 'Mtvnots' implies or even means 'process'; and to describe an
event as a change from one state to another is not necessarily to
describe it as a process. So is Aristotle here using 'Ktvpatg' to
mean the same as 'ysxaBoAq', the wider term, or is it the other way
round? And what are we to make of the fact that despite the apparent
equation of the two, he shows in the subsequent discussion an over-
2
whelming preference for 'wtvnaus'?
(3) Aristotle's use of 'yexagoAq' expresses his determination
to let nothing that could be called change from one state to another
fall outside the net of the definition he is about to propose;
whereas 'xtvnots', creeping in from the first and soon taking
over, is symptomatic of a restriction controlling his entire approach
to the concept of change. A few lines below the passage quoted above,
and just before Aristotle proposes his definition of pexa(3oArj/Kuvr)GLS,
he tells us insistently that changes are to be exhaustively classified
in terms of the categories: the categories and the categories alone
determine all the respects in which change is possible (200b32 - 201a9).
What better evidence of Aristotle's aim that his definition should be
fully comprehensive? But there are more ways than one of dividing
2. On Aristotle's varying uses of 'pexagoAq' and 'xtvriaLs' see W.D.
Ross, Aristotle's Physios, pp. 7 - 8, 45 - 47.
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the class of changes: there can be division, for instance, in terms
of cause of change as well as in terms of respect. Some changes are
from the natures of substances, some from conscious purpose, some
from neither: and just as a proper concern for comprehensiveness
leads him to take account of each categorially determined type of
change, so it should deter him from concentrating exclusively on
changes caused in one of several possible ways. But this, as I shall
argue in this chapter, is precisely what does not happen. Aristotle
has come to consider change in general because of his interest in
nature, since change is that of which nature is the inner principle.
But considered as changes, the changes which spring from natures
instantiate a concept whose other instances have other sorts of
cause. Thus we should expect an adequate analysis of this concept
to abstract at some stage from the differences entailed by the
differences in sorts of cause, and to display a conceptual nucleus
common to change as such. In the present chapter I maintain that
Aristotle, on the contrary, takes natural change as the type and
model of change as such. As a result, his proposed definition suits
only natural changes and changes formally analogous to these, namely
those that stem from purpose. But as for changes that are neither
natural nor intentional, it is as if they do not exist so far as
Aristotle's definition in Physics III 1 is concerned, or do not
count as changes at all. I shall begin by mounting an argument to
show that this conceptual partiality for natural change is responsible
for Aristotle's initial unargued assumption that a definition of
change will be a definition of Kuvncrts (rather than yexaBoAn) .
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(4) The distinction between 'yexagoArj' and 'xuvriaus' with which I
am here concerned rests on a difference between ways of individuating
changes. Change necessarily involves the emergence of a new state of
affairs B, to the exclusion of some prior state A. (Thus to indicate
that there is a change, we should describe A and B by means of incom¬
patible predicates, either contraries or contradictories, as Aristotle
says in V 1.) Now (a) we can regard the actual emergence of B as the
change. From this point of view, there is no change to B either before
or after the moment when B emerges. Thus before the emergence, there
was no event describable as a 'change to B'. No doubt there were con¬
ditions C causally related to the emergence of B, but these were not
the change to B itself, nor any part of that change. Again, someone
with knowledge of the causal relationship would have been justified
in saying, when C was present, that a change to B would occur, but if
the change itself is being identified with the actual emergence, he
would not have been justified in saying that the change was occurring.
Nor would one be justified in saying that the change was occurring at
the moment of the emergence itself, since 'was occurring' implies that
what occurred took a length of time to occur, whereas the emergence
itself happens in a moment. Thus according to this way of regarding
change there is no use for the continuous tenses. On the other hand,
(b), we frequently take 'the change to B' as including the conditions
that causally led up to the emergence of B. Far from being all of the
change, the emergence is the termination of a prior state of affairs
which as a whole is regarded as the change to B. Thus in this sense
the change to B is, or was, going on before the emergence of B. I
shall call these two concepts of change the E(emergence)-concept and
the L(leading to)-concept. Now the difference between 'yexagoAq' and
'xLvqaus' is this: in speaking of yexagoAn (change from one state of
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things to another) we leave it open whether we mean change in the
E-sense or the L-sense; in speaking of Mtvnats, we mean it in the
L-sense.
(5) It is to be remarked that this initial explanation of 'Kcvncrts'
(which in this chapter I usually translate as 'process') leaves us
uncommitted on a number of issues. I shall mention two of partic¬
ular relevance (as will appear) to Aristotle's account. Firstly,
the process leading up to the emergence may or may not be usefully
described as continuous in the mathematical sense. It is correct
to speak of it as going on for a time, but we are under no pressure
to decide whether this entails that it (or the time) is infinitely
divisible. This is not to say either that we mean to leave open the
alternative possibility of its being a succession of mathematically
discrete units. The point is rather that we are not committed to
applying the dichotomy 'Either (mathematically) continuous or
discrete'. Secondly, the process leading up to the emergence may
or may not be a condition of the same object in which the emergence
itself occurs. Suppose that X is doing something that can be
described as 'changing some other object Y'. Then Y is in course
of being changed by X, and this licenses an inference to 'Y is in
course of changing' (in the L-sense of 'change'). Here 'Y is in
course of changing' is true on account of a condition of which X is
the subject, even though the emergence in which this L-type change
results will be the emergence of a new property in Y. The possib¬
ility of this sort of case shows that Y can properly be described
as in course of changing (in the L-sense) even at a time when no
activity is occurring in Y itself, but only in the external agent X.
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(6) It is true that Aristotle generally seems to regard a MLvpats
or L-type change as an identifiable process occurring in the same indi¬
vidual that will eventually be subject of the final emergence or E-type
change. But as we shall see, it is to his advantage if the III 1 def¬
inition of Ktvpats can be interpreted so as to cover the sort of case
just described. One immediate advantage of this wider interpretation
may be mentioned here. On the one hand, the very meaning of 'xuvnots'
implies a process that takes time. On the other hand, Aristotle occas¬
ionally speaks of Ktvpoets from one state A to a contrary B as happen¬
ing all at once, apparently meaning by this that the subject spends no
3
time passing from one contrary to the other. On the assumption that
Y can be said to be in course of changing only on account of an
activity of change in Y itself, Aristotle has contradicted himself.
For while Y is still in state A, the terminus a quo of the change, no
change-activity in Y itself has yet begun, and once Y is in B, the
terminus ad quem, Y's change-activity is over; so that if its being
in B followed without interval on its being in A, there was no change
in Y that took any time at all. Thus it seems that what happens to Y
might be correctly described as a change (ptTagoAn) , for it is an
emergence (of B, or being in B), but not as a Ktvpats. But there is
no contradiction if we allow that Y can be said to be changing even
when considered in isolation it is in a static condition (A), provided
that there is occurring some process in another object X which will re¬
sult (by X's agency) in the emergence in Y of the other contrary B.
From this point of view, Y is already changing even when it is in its
terminus a quo condition; thus the change may take some time even though
none of the time it takes occurs between Y's being in A and its being in B.
3. E.g. Physios VIII 3, 253b21 - 30; I 3, 186al5-16; De Sensu 6,
447al - 3.
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(7) Many phenomena can equally truly be described as changes in both
the E-sense and the L-sense. That is to say, we can either identify
the change with the emergence of a new state, to which the preceding
condition is conceptually external though causally related, or we
can include the latter under the change itself, which in that case is
being considered as a process. It seems that the choice of which
principle of individuation to use in a given case is often determined
by epistemic considerations. If we perceive the emergence of B but
do not know what led up to this causally, then we describe the preced¬
ing conditions as 'whatever caused B' and regard them as the conditions
in which the coming about of B, or the changing to B consisted, or more
briefly, as the leading-up to B; for there is no other specification
of these conditions available. Again, if the causal conditions are
known but uninteresting by comparison with the emergence of B itself,
we shall be less inclined to give them the equal status as objects of
attention that would be suggested by a conceptually self-sufficient
specification, even when such is available; we shall therefore tend
to think of them, again, simply as what leads up to B. For this reason
we describe the actions leading to an intended result (even when these
can be separately described) as the process of bringing about of that
result. However, there are some changes in which the event immediately
leading up to the result cannot be described in conceptually independ¬
ent terms. These are changes of spatial position. Take the case in
which the new property B to emerge in Y is the property of being at
place Pn. What immediately led up to the emergence of B was Y's going
(or being taken) to Pn. And there seems to be no alternative descrip¬
tion of this leading-up event which both (a) allows us to say that the
event so described was the immediate cause of B's emergence, and (b) is
conceptually independent of 'B'. If we describe it as 'going to Pn',
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it is not conceptually independent. If we describe it as 'going to
Pn-1', where 'Pn-1' designates some place not far short of Pn, then
we have described an event which cannot be regarded as the immediate
cause of B's emergence, since more is needed for this than that Y
should go only to Pn-1. And although going to Pn can take many dif¬
ferent forms (walking, swimming, being thrown to Pn, etc.) there does
not seem to be anything in which going to Pn consists, the description
of which would not entail 'going to Pn'. For instance, the process of
coming to the boil consists in (is the same concrete event as) being
in contact with the fire (under given conditions, a given length of
time etc.). But 'sitting on the fire' does not entail 'coming to the
boil', and for this reason, what is described as a process of coming
to the boil can also be described as an emergence (of boiling) caused
by sitting on the fire. But with 'arriving at a place', there appears
to be nothing that corresponds to 'sitting on the fire'.
(8) Since change of place can only be described in L-terms, or as
a process, it is not surprising that so many discussions of process
(including much of Aristotle's) should revolve round this as the para¬
digmatic example. But this fact cannot justify Aristotle's assumption
that the concept of change in general will be adequately dealt with by
means of a definition of process. That assumption would be legitimate
only on one of two further assumptions: either (a) all changes are
changes of spatial position, and must in the end be described as such,
and therefore as processes; or (b) even those changes which can be
described as caused emergences are nonetheless best or most properly
described as processes. Now Aristotle of all people is in no position
to assume (a). It is true that for him locomotion is, for a number of
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reasons, the primary type of change (see Physics VIII 7, 260a26 ff.),
but not because all change is reducible to locomotion. That theory
could only be held by a philosopher who takes all large-scale pheno¬
mena to consist in the spatial configurations and spatial changes of
microscopic constituents. But we have seen how Aristotle's theory
of nature as form rules out any such reduction. Therefore, if his
approach to the concept of change has a rational basis at all, that
basis must lie in (b) above. But why does he assume (b)? This is
easily explained on the hypothesis for which I am arguing, i.e. that
Aristotle's entire conception of change in Book III is governed by
the logic of natural change.
(9) Let me begin to support this claim by recalling the distinction
expounded in Chapter I (paragraphs (18) - (19)) between appropriate and
inappropriate descriptions of the same fact. There we saw Aristotle
employing this distinction to solve the paradox of becoming. We saw
too that the solution could not satisfy unless it was assumed that the
choice of one type of description as "appropriate" was not arbitrary,
but rested in the end on an absolute metaphysical difference between
substance and accident, or between substance-constitutive character¬
istics and accidental ones (v.s. Chapter I, paragraph (27)). I shall
now argue that the concept of a natural substance developed in Chapters
I and II cannot be sustained except on the assumptions (i) that natural
change is more properly described as L-change, or as process; and
(ii) that this type of description is superior precisely because it
best reflects the structure that must objectively belong to any change
that can reasonably be regarded as manifesting the nature of a sub¬
stance. In other words, the concept of natural change entails that
128
some phenomena necessarily and of their own nature have the character
of "leading up to" others, while others equally necessarily have the
character of being led up to, while not themselves leading further.
The idea is of course familiar to us from Aristotle's teleology, but
in my view is not a consequence thereof; rather, the dependence runs
the other way. It is not entirely certain that Aristotle saw all
natural change as teleological. It is not clear, for instance, how
the simple bodies, fire etc., could be said to move as they naturally
do for the sake of their own good. When he calls these movements
'necessary' (in the sense in which this denies 'for the sake of an
end') he may, it is true, be conceding a point for the sake of argument
(v.s. Chapter II, paragraph (33)); but then again he may not. But it
is certain that even these cases involve a relation between phenomena
whose status is objectively intermediate ("leading up to"), and pheno¬
mena in which the former objectively culminate and which are not them¬
selves intermediate steps to an ulterior culmination. This is the
basic structure of natural change as such, whether or not it makes
sense to describe the "culminating" state as a good. But in those
cases where it does make sense (as in the biological field) teleology
is the natural type of explanation to adopt.
(10) Except for the simple bodies, natural substances display many
different kinds of change.^ The more highly organised the substance the
wider the variety of changes. If the changes are described as emerg¬
ences of perceptibly new states (which often will follow one another
in quick succession), then it is impossible to identify any single type
4. Cf. Physics VIII 4, 255alO-ll.
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of such change as "natural" to the substance, since none has a better
claim to be singled out than another. If on the other hand we say
that they are all natural (all, that is, that cannot reasonably be
attributed to external constraints), then it becomes impossible to
see how they can all be manifestations of a single unitary substantial
nature. Ex hypothesi the differences cannot be put down to differences
in external conditions. If we describe organic changes as series of
caused emergences (the cause-events being treated as conceptually
isolable from their effects) there is no sense in attributing them to
the nature of a substance, nor therefore in regarding a substance as
having a_ nature or being an Aristotelian substance at all. 'Natural
substance' becomes a contradiction in terms. If on the other hand the
various changes of a particular natural object can as a matter of fact
be described so as to bring out in all or most of them a common struc¬
ture or pattern, then the situation is saved for Aristotle's basic con¬
cept. And as a matter of fact this is the case. The simple bodies do
each behave in a way that can be perceived to be the same each time.
Organisms display a bewildering variety of emergences which are neither
bewildering nor so various when they are seen as having in common what
(as a matter of fact) they do have in common: a tendency to contribute
to the life and on-going of individual and species. Thus the primary
and most proper description of these perceptibly quite different
emergences must be as "changings towards" some condition T, where 'T'
denotes the mature or the healthy state of the organism, or some more
narrowly specified condition that implies health or maturity. Unifying
descriptions of this latter type have a different epistemological status
from the descriptions of the simple bodies as 'falling', 'moving up'
etc., which can be applied on the sole basis of immediate perception.
In the organic case application of a unifying description requires
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experience of trains of apparently quite different events drawn from
many different instances. Thus as a rule natural Ktvpots is not
perceived. Not only are we generally unable, merely by immediate
perception, to know whether a change is or is not externally deter¬
mined: nor are we able to identify what the MLvqats is (what life-
supporting condition of what organism it is a change towards). But
we can of course perceive the "matter of the process", i.e. the
particular emergence in which it happens at this moment to consist.
(11) In Chapter I it was necessary to take an oversimplified view
of the part played by external conditions in natural change. There it
was said that these must be such as to permit the change, but without
determining its character. But the distinction between the "matter"
of the change (the perceived emergence) and the "form" (corresponding
to the overall process-description) makes possible a less schematic
and more realistic view of the way in which external conditions con¬
tribute to the change. For although they do not determine the form
of the change but only make possible a change of that form, they can
now be regarded as helping to determine its matter at any given
stage, and this without prejudice to the self-sufficiency of the
form. It is because of the external conditions that maturing,
reproducing, getting healthy etc. consists on one occasion in a
change of temperature, on another in a change of position, on another
in a different change of position, etc.
(12) By contrast, the natural behaviour of the simple bodies, earth,
fire etc., is itself simple and consists always in the same upward or
downward movement. From this point of view it is easy, in their case,
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to describe the behaviour in a way that brings out its substance-
expressive unity. But at the same time, the simple bodies present a
difficulty that does not arise for any other kind of natural substance.
Natural change expresses the specificity of substance, not only its
unity, or not only some unspecific unity (v.s. Chapter I, paragraph
(40)). The difference, then, between the uniform movements of fire
and earth must be as absolute as the difference between fire and earth
as substances. For if they are not different substances, what ex¬
plains the fact that unimpeded they move always in different directions?
Either fire should (sometimes anyway) behave like earth or vice versa,
or both should exhibit some common behaviour which in fact is exhib¬
ited by neither. Or can we say that although they are different sub¬
stances, the difference is not exhibited in their unimpeded locomotions,
so that we need not believe in an absolute difference between upward
and downward movement in order to maintain that fire is one type of
substance, earth another? But if not in these locomotions, in what
changes are these different substantial natures expressed? What other
obvious ones are there? And even if there are others, what of the
disastrous methodological precedent created by dismissing certain
frequent and universally recognised changes as "accidental", and
looking for something more recondite to fill the role of "substance-
expressive" behaviour? The doctrine that only one kind of behaviour
is natural to a given type of substance effectively ties Aristotle
down to identifying the natural change with whatever behaviour is most
familiar and typical to common sense. For once he leaves the beaten
track, he requires a principle for selecting the one and only natural
change from all the other strange and uncharted manifestations that
may or may not be significant; a job which none of his established
principles can begin to perform.
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(13) It was inevitable then that Aristotle should regard the dif¬
ference between upward and downward motion as absolute. The differ¬
ence cannot lie in the shape of the motions, since in both cases this
is the same: rectilinear as far as possible. It must then lie in
what each is directed towards. They differ because each homes in on
something different in kind. Could the "homing points" be determined
by physical substances, different in each case? But why should these
substances be where this theory demands that they should be, one kind
high up to "receive" fire, the other below to constitute a terminal
for earth? If the substances simply happen to be where they are, we
might as well have said at the outset that fire and earth merely
happen to move in their usual directions, so that their directions are
not intrinsic to their natures. It is for this reason that Empedocles'
principle of "like to like" does not account for the natural motions.
For granted that experience supports the view that fire, e.g. moves
upwards to where more fiery matter already is, nothing in this fact
shows it not to be arbitrary that the latter is where it is. Why does
it not lie to the north, for instance, so that the motion of the
smaller "homing" masses would be sideways; or itself change position,
so that the smaller masses go first one way then another to rejoin it?
Since in fact the latter go always in the same direction, and it is
absurd to suppose that they merely always happen to, then even if their
motion is governed by the principle "like to like", it follows that the
larger mass of fire does not merely happen to be always where it is.
So there must be something about where it is that determines its being
there. This "something" cannot, by this very argument, be a physical
object or landmark: it must, then, be the very character of the region
itself considered simply as a part of space, independently of whatever
physical object it holds. But how can different parts of space differ
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intrinsically from one another? This makes sense only on the
assumption that space is shaped. Probably the simplest hypothesis
is the one which Aristotle accepts, namely that space is spherical.
We have now the absolute difference for which we have been looking.
For the centre of a sphere differs from its periphery regardless of
the observer's point of view: what is right from one standpoint is
left from another, but what is the centre of S from one standpoint
cannot from any other be peripheral to the same sphere S.
(14) Thus it is that Aristotle reinterprets 'upwards' and 'down¬
wards' as 'towards the periphery' and 'towards the centre'; a re-
interpretation necessitated by his theory of substantial nature as
expressed through change. But before returning to the main discus¬
sion, I must try to remove a false impression. The argument just
presented seems to attribute to Aristotle the view that space and
its parts have a reality prior to and independent of the things that
are in space: that there is something, which is the geometrical
centre of the physical universe, and something else, its geometrical
periphery.^ But Aristotle was of course as far from holding any such
theory as he was from holding that the characteristic directions of
the simple bodies could just as well have been different or variable.
To account for these directions by reference to the absolute geo¬
metrical difference between the "components" of a sphere (centre and
periphery) may be a useful corrective to the idea that there is no in¬
trinsic difference between "up" and "down". But if this commits us to
5. This picture seems to be implied by statements to the effect
that Aristotle sees different regions of space as exercising
"attraction" on different kinds of body. See e.g. A.E. Taylor,
A Commentary on Plato's Timaeus, p. 665.
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hypostasising the sphere, we are no longer interpreting Aristotle.
But there is, I suggest, a way out of the difficulty if we consider
the variety of meaning that Aristotle himself attaches to the word
'because'. Fire does not just happen to move in the direction that we
call 'up'. It moves upwards because that direction is intrinsically
different from any other, thus making manifest the intrinsic differ¬
ence of fire from the other elements. But the 'because' clause need
not refer to an already constituted fact concerning a "periphery"
regarded as some kind of distinct reality. It can mean, and I suggest
does mean, that fire moves upwards because by so doing it will form
the physical periphery or spherical outer shell of the (sublunary)
world. It is in the nature of fire to encircle the other three elem¬
ents. It is in the nature of air and water to range themselves in
concentric shells encircled by fire and encircling earth as the centre;
and it is in the nature of earth to be encircled by the rest. Thus
earth tends towards the centre of the universe for no other reason than
that it is the tendency of earth to make the centre of the universe by
assuming the central position relative to the other elements. This
has the interesting consequence that the natures of each of the four
are not conceptually self-sufficient (and in this it may be that they
differ radically from more complex substances). For where earth tends
would not be the centre unless the other three elements were themselves
tending to take up positions encircling earth in their successive
layers, and so on for each element in relation to its three peers.
(15) The natural movements of the simple bodies illustrate with
particular clarity the relation of change to terminus which for Aris¬
totle gives the fundamental structure of all sublunary change. The
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terminus is intrinsic to the change, for without the terminus there
would be no direction of change. Direction is not an extrinsic deter¬
mination that is somehow added to a per se directionless change. Change
without direction is sheer abstraction, like genus without differentia.
Aristotle himself also puts the point in terms of the categories.
'There is no process independently of definite
respects of change. For in every case what changes
changes either in respect of substance, or quantity,
or quality, or place. Our doctrine is that there is
no common factor running through all these that is
neither quantity nor quality nor in one of the other
categories. So there is neither process (xuvnatg)
nor change (uexagoXq) in any respect apart from those
mentioned, for there is nothing apart from what has
been mentioned. (Ill 1, 200b33 - 201a3)
Real change is definite change, and definite change is in a definite
direction, or a definite pattern, and since the direction is intrinsic
to the change, so therefore is the terminus. Thus a change must cease
once the terminus is reached, for to go on beyond the terminus would
to be continue without direction at all, i.e. to continue as a change
that was no definite change.^ So change, because of its intrinsic
terminus-directedness, allows a distinction between "complete" and
"incomplete" which is meaningless in connection with static con¬
ditions, such as being green or being a house. For change can come
to an end either because it reaches the terminus and has nowhere else
to go, or because it is interrupted part-way towards that terminus.
In the latter case it is incomplete by contrast with the completion it
would have achieved had it been allowed to continue for the necessary
6. So when a change ceased in a given subject, this is not because
it has been "passed on" to objects in the environment. Cf. D.M.
Balme, 'Greek Science and Mechanism I', Classical Quarterly
XXXIII, 1939, pp. 129 ff., esp. pp. 137 - 138. The point is all
the more startling in that Aristotle believes that the simple
bodies accelerate as they near their natural regions, so that at
the moment of arrival the up-to-then on-going impulse vanishes
when at its maximum.
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time. But if a house is demolished or a brown wall painted white,
the wall's previous whiteness, the bricks' and planks' previous
arrangement, were for as long as they lasted as complete as they
would ever have been however much longer they had been permitted
to last. And so these static conditions are not self-terminating,
since to be so would presuppose being incomplete (because further
completable) for as long as they "went on".
(16) It is this self-terminating^ character of change that makes
it so puzzling to comprehend. Change must be real since it is the
manifestation of the primary realities, namely substances. The
difference between the occurrence and the non-occurrence of a given
change must be as genuine as the difference between the existence
and non-existence of some given substance. Yet how can a real thing
or a real condition be of a nature to head for its own finish? Static
conditions, we have seen, are terminated only by external interfer¬
ence. Organic substances exist for their own continued existence,
and since this is not possible indefinitely they make up for it by
g
the power of producing individuals as like as possible to themselves.
Nor is this self-propagatory tendency the unique property of sub¬
stances. Qualities too such as heat generate new versions of them-
9
selves in patients available to receive them. In fact, Aristotle's
theory of the mutual transformation of simple bodies seems to imply the
7. Cf. Chapter I, paragraph (13), and L.A. Kosman, 'Aristotle's
Definition of Motion', Phronesis XIV, 1969, pp. 40 ff., esp.
pp . 57 - 58.
8. See e.g. De Anima II 4, 415a25 ff.; De Gen. An. I 1, 731b31-
732al.
9. Cf. Physics VIII 5, 257b9 - 10; Metaph. Z 9, 1034a21 ff.
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continuing identity of the very same instance of a quality (hot, dry,
etc.) as it arranges itself with different quality-partners to con¬
stitute a new simple substance, fire (hot-dry) becoming air (hot-wet),
etc. But a change of a given type does not of its nature generate
another similar change in the same subject, nor yet in another sub¬
ject. Once the terminus has been reached the first time, what need
is there to reach it all over again by another such change; and how
can it help one individual substance to produce another change like
its own change in some other individual? It is true of course that
one individual by changing in certain ways will generate another
individual of its kind, which in turn will behave in the same way.
But it is not that change generates change; rather substance by
changing generates substance: change, then, is not directed to its
own continuance or the continuance of its like, but to the continuance
of substance."^
(17) The paradox is that whilst change must be real on account of
its necessary connection with substance, it is this same connection,
spelt out so as to reveal the unity and specificity of substantial
nature, that ties change down to an inbuilt terminus, and hence to the
ambiguous status of a being vowed to its own non-being. On this
matter Aristotle's position stands in curiously exact contrast to one
strand in the Platonic view of change. In the Republic and Timaeus,
change and becoming are refused any place of their own in the domain
of true being and substance. Yet there is a sense in which Plato's
becoming, relegated to a limbo peculiar to itself, has just the
10. Cf. De Part. An. I 1, 64al8-19.
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ontological stability that Aristotle's lacks. Becoming, on Plato's
Heracliteanised view, is never superseded except by further becoming.
Becoming in its own way is as eternal as the world of Forms. Here
I am speaking of becoming in general, and it might be said that for
Plato every instance of becoming is necessarily transient. But the
theory of the Timaeus can be read in terms of a single unbroken and
intrinsically undifferentiated process that successively takes on
different patterns. The source of becoming is the "receptacle", which
is a metaphysical factor in all created things. Since created things
are ontologically derivative from it no less than from the Forms, any
distinctions we make betwTeen numerically and specifically different
changes on grounds of their occurring in numerically and specifically
different created objects are likewise purely derivative. Behind
everything is the one becoming, whose total lack of structure and
direction makes it the ideal medium for reflecting the Forms. Here
we are not many steps away from the line of thought that culminated
in the principle of conservation of energy. Plato himself would have
started down this line if besides postulating geometrical structures
for his elements to enable their orderly transformations, he had
also postulated rules by which the single underlying becoming converts
itself from one to another form of empirical energy or motion.
(18) We must now turn in detail to Aristotle's definition of
11
XLvnaus• He introduces it as follows:
'We distinguish between what is only actual,
and what is potential and actual. This may be
substance, quantity, quality, or in one of the
other categories of being. Under the category of
11. For an interesting close study see L.A. Kosman, op. eit.
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"relative to something" fall excess and defect,
agent and patient, and in general mover and mobile.
For the mover is mover of the mobile, and the
mobile is able to be moved by the mover. There
is no Mtvqaus independently of definite respects.
For in every case what changes (to y exagciAAov)
changes either in respect of substance, or quantity,
or quality, or place. Our doctrine is that there
is no common factor running through all these that
is neither quantity nor quality nor in one of the
other categories. So there is neither xtvqaus nor
yexagoAq in any respect besides these, since there
is nothing besides these. Each of these applies in
two ways to a subject, in all cases: for instance,
as regards substance, there is the shape of it and
the privation; for quality there is [sc. e.g.]
white and black, with quantity, the complete and
the incomplete. Similarly in locomotion too there
is up and down, or the light and the heavy. Thus
there are as many kinds of xtvriats and yexagoAq as
there are of being.' (Ill 1, 200b26 - 201a9)
(The last statement will be modified later by the arguments in V 1-2,
where Aristotle shows that the only categories in respect of which
there can be change are the four he explicitly mentions here.)
(19) This passage leads up to the definition at 201a9-15. There
Aristotle will state that change is a certain type of actuality.
Uncompromisingly, this means that change is real, as real as anything
else actual is real. But the point must be carefully prepared since
it contradicts so much of the philosophical tradition. And this means
too that the definition itself will fail unless it manages to give
due weight to just those considerations (however vaguely in the past
expressed) that led so many of Aristotle's predecessors to deny the
reality of change. In part their problem lay in not seeing how the
concept of change could involve "not-being" without thereby consigning
itself to its own non-being and absurdity. Already in Book 17-8
Aristotle has shown one way out, in terms of substance and accident
and the subject that remains. But as he said at the time (I 8, 191b27 -
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29), the concept of potentiality also carries a remedy, and this is
what he invokes here. Something comes to be what previously it was
not. But to say simply that X was not-P is misleading. This bare
statement contrasts X with things (including itself later) which are
P, in a way that takes no account of another and equally essential
contrast, namely between X's being not-P and the not-P-ness of things
that never are or can be P. Even when X lacks the actuality, it has
the potential; and this is something. Change then must be concept¬
ually located in the domain of what is sometimes actually and sometimes
potentially P, and this is Aristotle's point in the first sentence of
the last quotation. But what sort of "something" is a potential?
If it is anything definite then surely it is a way of being, not of
not-being; but unless it retains something in common with not-being
(so that 'potentially P' carries some of the same message as 'not-P')
it will be no use to explain change. Is potentiality then simply
indefinite, a kind of being that is not anything in particular? Aris¬
totle has already made clear his repudiation of any such concept, when
12
in I 4 he argued against Anaxagoras' "Infinite". But the positive
answer of course lies in the categories. What is actual is actually P,
where 'P' is a predicate in one or another category; and the potential
is only ever potentially what it would be if actual. Thus potentiality
in any given case is as definitely specifiable as actuality, being
specifiable in exactly the same terms. There can be no indescribable
potentiality for the reason that all actualities are specifiable by
categorially pigeon-holed predicates. So an indescribable potential
would be one for which there was no corresponding actuality; which is
impossible.
12. See especially 187b7 ff.; also Metccph. A 8, 989b6 ff .
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(20) Thus far Aristotle is making the point which most obviously
emerges from the passage last quoted: that change is from potential
to actual in some definite respect. But now he has a problem, and
it is this problem that explains his apparently disconnected remarks
13
in the third and fourth sentences. The passage as a whole would
read more smoothly if these were omitted, but (so far as I know) there
is no independent evidence to suggest their having crept in from
elsewhere. And if they were omitted, Aristotle would not be able to
pass as he immediately does in the next section to his definition
of change as itself a sort of actuality. To show that change is
respectable and real it is not enough to show that it is the passage
to a real property, an actuality, from a no less definite potentiality.
For any ground that is hereby gained would immediately be lost if a
critic were still able to argue that nonetheless Aristotle has failed
to show that change itself is something actual. But Aristotle has now
tied "actual" to the categories (so as thereby to anchor "potential")
in such a way that nothing that is not in some category or other can
be said to be actually anything. So he has to be able to show that
change is not only in respect of categorially specifiable properties,
but also itself finds a niche in some category or other. And this
must mean: in one or another of the already recognised categories,
since to create a special one ad hoc would only concede the critic's
point. Now Aristotle is bound, I think, to choose for change a cate¬
gory in respect of which there is no change. For if a change-condition
were classed as {e.g.) a quality (a category that already has a fairly
mixed bag of members), then since change is possible in respect of
13. Cf. Ross, op. cit., p. 535: 'The connexion of this section with
what precedes is not very close'.
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qualities, there could be change in respect of changes. But Aristotle
cannot admit change of change to be a coherent concept, notably
because he holds that if something is said to change to changing in
a given x^ay, it must also be said to change to the change to this
change, and so on (of. V 2, 225b33 ff.). Now the category of
Relation is one in respect of x^hich it makes no sense to speak of
change, for all so-called relational changes are already taken care
of by changes in other categories. If X dyes his hair darker than
Y's no extra "relational" change is needed to account for the fact
that Y's has "become" lighter than X's. So the category of Relation
(which like that of Quality already includes a lot of different kinds
of properties) is chosen to house change. But this will not do
unless change is relational! Noxxr when agent acts upon patient, this
is a kind of relation. Also it involves change, since the agent
causes some new condition in the patient. Logic alone, it is true,
cannot take us from this to the conclusion that every change is by
agent upon patient and therefore necessarily relational. But Aris¬
totle does not need to believe this inference valid in order to em¬
brace the conclusion. The pressure is metaphysical. Even natural
change, x^here the object changes "of itself" must, x^e now see, somehow
involve agent and patient: in fact natural change above all, since
this is the primary type xjithout xjhich there could be no other. How
agency and patiency finds a foothold in natural change is a problem
which, as X7e shall see, Aristotle is very far from able to brush
aside, but he has no choice but to take it on, since the only alter¬
natives xrould be to allow that change is not strictly real or else
that his categories fail to comprehend all that is real.
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(21) Aristotle continues:
'Given the distinction (which applies in
each category) between that which is actually
(evxeAexeta) Isc. so and so] and that which is
potentially (Sovapec) [sc. so and so], xLvricrus
is the actuality (evT£Aexe^9) °f that which
is potentially [so and so], insofar as it is
potentially [so and so]. Thus the actuality
of the alterable insofar as it is alterable is
alteration; of what can grow and contrariwise
shrink (there is no common word for both) it is
growing and shrinking; of what can come into
being and pass away it is coming into being and
passing away; of what is spatially mobile it
is locomotion. That this is what xuvpocs is may
be shown as follows: when materials that can be
built up into a house possess actuality insofar
as they are as we have just specified [sc. cap¬
able of being built into a house], then they are
being built up, and this is the process of
building. It is the same too with learning,
healing, rolling, jumping, maturing, aging.'
(Ill 1, 201a9 - 19)
Here Aristotle gives his formal definition of xcvpats. He first puts
it in general terms, then in terms of specific types of processes,
and then appends examples. The definition is obscure in both its
formulations, and the examples do nothing to make it clearer.
(22) The main difficulty concerns the meanings of 'potentially
[so and so]' and 'alterable' etc. However, let us begin with the
'actuality' ('EvreAexeta') that xuvpaus is here stated to be. Some"^
render this as 'actualisation' and 'realisation': misleading terms,
in that they can mean the process of becoming or making real or actual.
Aristotle cannot be read as defining process by 'actualisation' in
any such sense, since that would be blatantly circular."'""' Circularity
14. E.g. E. Zeller (or his translators), Aristotle and the Earlier
Peripatetics_, vol. I, p. 381, note 1; P. Wicksteed and F.M.
Cornford, Aristotle_, The Physics (Loeb ed.) vol. I, p. 195;
Ross, op. cit., pp. 45, 359 ff.
15. Cf. Kosman, op. cit. p. 41.
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apart, to offer such a definition would be to give up the fight to
show that process and change are themselves real and actual. For if
one says only that a change tends towards some eventually actual end-
state, one is left with no basis for maintaining that the tending
itself is real while it continues and of an ontological status com¬
mensurate with that of the actuality brought about. But process must
itself be an actuality even though it is the making or becoming actual
of some state not a process; thus Aristotle aptly calls it an
'EVTeAe'xeta', a word that says that becoming, when it takes place,
does so not because it itself becomes, but because it successfully
16
manages to be. However, those who translate ' evxeAextta' here as
'actualisation', when 'actuality' would be more appropriate, may be
impelled by the sense that process and change are activities, as
opposed to the apparently static and inert actual conditions in which
processes start and terminate. That is, 'actualisation' and 'realis¬
ation' capture the dynamism which is essential to change, and which
may seem to be lacking to actuality as such. And here we may wonder
whether this too does not show Aristotle's definition to be circular
from the start, since we may think that because the most obviously
active activities are changes and processes, this is the case with all
activity; so that 'activity' already implies process and change, which
16. ''EvreXextta' is preferable to the equivalent 'evepyeua' (used
of process at III 2, 201b32 - 202a2) because, Aristotle tells us,
'evepyeua' in its original and most usual sense (on which he
refines in Metaph. 6) means the actual occurrence of process
(see Metaph. 0 1, 1046al -2; 3, 1047a30 - 1047b2). C-H. Chen, in
'The Relation between the terms evepyeua and evTeXextta in the
Philosophy of Aristotle', Classical Quarterly N.S. VIII, 1958,
takes Physics III 1, 202al0 as evidence that 'evxeXextta' has a
secondary "kinetic" meaning. However, he supports this from no
other contexts, and the present one proves, if anything, the
opposite of Chen's contention, for if the word did have a
"kinetic" meaning this would ipso facto render it unsuitable
to stand on the right-hand side of a definition of 'process'.
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therefore turns up on the right-hand side of its own definition. But
this fear is quickly settled when we consider that being active may
take the form of preserving some state of affairs rather than changing
it, so that the man who keeps his head is no less actively exercising
a potentiality than those "all about him", who exercise their poten¬
tialities for panic and hysteria. A physical object which, on the
Newtonian view, continues indefinitely to move with constant speed
and direction thereby evinces what is just as truly described as
'behaviour' as its change of velocity in reaction to external force;
yet the former behaviour by comparison with the latter is a mode of
staying the same. I have not here drawn upon Aristotle's own favourite
examples of activities that are not changes, such as exercising a
skill (as opposed to learning it), and perceiving and thinking,^
since their non-kinetic status may require to be justified, in which
case they would be poor illustrations. But it is enough that there
are some illustrations for us to grant that in calling change and
process 'activities' or 'active exercises of potentiality', Aristotle
is not simply allotting them to a class of which it is analytically
true that all its members are changes.
18
(23) But a more likely prey for the circularity-spotters is
provided by that part of the definition where Aristotle speaks in
general and then in more specific terms of the potentiality of which
process is said to be the actual exercise. Here the issue cannot be
17. Cf. Metaph. 0 6, 1048b23 - 24; De Anima II 5, 417b3-9. V.i.
Chapter IV, paragraphs (27) ff.
18. E.g. P. Duhem, xvho makes the charge without particularising,
Le Systeme du Monde, vol. I, p. 160.
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settled by examples, only by analysis of the concepts involved.
Consider in particular the more specific formulations. Alteration,
he says, is the actuality of the alterable insofar as it is alter¬
able; growth/shrinkage is the actuality of what can grow and shrink
insofar as it can do so, etc. But 'alterable', it is pointed out,
means capable of, or having the potentiality of, altering. So Aris¬
totle is defining each type of process as the actuality or actual
19
exercise of the subject's potential for - that type of process.
Now in a way this is exactly what he is doing, because the potentiality
of which change is defined as being the actual exercise is indeed the
potentiality of that change itself. But that potentiality can and
must be spelt out in terms that make no reference to change, and for
this reason the definition is not circular. For the part of the
definiens in which the definiendum occurs can be analysed so that the
definiendum no longer occurs in it explicitly or implicitly. Leaving
aside for the moment consideration of external conditions, we ask:
what has to be true of a given subject, taken on its own, if it is to
be properly described as having the potentiality for a certain change?
If the change is a process towards being in some new condition C, then
the subject must (i) lack that condition but (ii) be suitable for being
in it. Thus a healthy man lacks the potential for convalescing
since in his case (i) is not fulfilled; and water cannot be made into
a pair of gloves through non-fulfilment of (ii). But these conditions
19. This is Ross's interpretation, op. ait., p. 536 (although Ross
vacillates; see Kosman, op. ait. , pp. 43 - 46). Ross is followed
by J.L. Ackrill, 'Aristotle's Distinction between ENEPTEIA and
KINEEIE', New Essays on Plato and Aristotle, ed. Bambrough, pp.
121 ff., esp. pp. 138 - 140. For criticism based on what I take
to be the correct interpretation, see especially T. Penner,
'Verbs and the Identity of Actions', Ryle, edd. Wood and Pitcher,
pp. 393 ff., esp. pp. 427 - 431; also Kosman, op. cit. , pp. 44 -45.
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of the subject (i) and (ii) not only constitute that subject's
potentiality to change to the state in question: they are also
what is meant by the statement that the subject has the potential
. , 20
to be m that state.
(24) The point will be clearer if we consider the passage immed¬
iately following the one just quoted, where Aristotle speaks of the
actuality and potentiality of states brought about through change,
states such as being hot and cold. He says:
'... in some cases the same things are both potentially
and actually [so and so], but not at the same time, or
not in the same respect: for instance, what is hot is
potentially cold.' (201al9 - 21)
These words show that this is one of the many contexts in which
'actually F' and 'potentially F' are being used as mutually exclusive,
or in which 'potentially F' means 'only potentially F' , i.e. 'suitable
21
to be F, but not actually F'. In this sense, the potentiality to
be in condition C is identical with the potentiality to change to
being in C. Thus in saying that alteration is the actuality of what
is alterable insofar as it is alterable, Aristotle is saying that
alteration is the actuality of a subject truly described as having
the potential to be in whatever final condition the alteration in
question is an alteration to. And although this condition will come
20. That the potentiality is (primarily) the potentiality to be in
the end-state is supported by Physics VIII 5, 257b6 - 10, which
makes sense only if 'to 6e duvapeb' in 6 - 7 means 'potentially
hot' (v.i. Chapter V, paragraph (38), note 27). This is the
interpretation of Themistius; see esp. Schenkl, p. 70, 33 -
p. 71, 5. It is also presupposed by Simplicius' remarks at
Diels p. 414, 1-6. Recently Kosman, op. ait., pp. 44 - 45 and
Penner, op. ait., pp. 429 - 431, have come to the same conclusion.
21. Cf. Bonitz, Index Avistotelicus, s.v. '6v5vapts* (2), p. 207b33
ff.
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about through alteration, its nature can be specified without reference
to alteration or the way it came about, e.g. as white, hot, etc. And in
the more general formula of definition ('Process is the actuality of what
is potentially so and so insofar as it is potentially so and so') we can
if we like fill in the ' so and so' with a phrase like 'undergoing process'
and thus obtain a circular definition; but this does not matter, since
'potentially undergoing process' is cashable in terms that make no refer¬
ence to process, -i.e. as 'suitable to be in some new (static) condition
C but not actually in C'.
(25) In change three different actualities play a part; the actual
change itself, the actual result or product of change, and the actual sub¬
ject in which the change occurs. Anadequate def initionof the f irst of these
three must make it possible to draw a formal distinction between it and each
of the others. In distinguishing change from subj ect, Aristotle relies on
the point central to his discussion of change in Physios I 7-8, that same¬
ness in number does not entail sameness in formula. Just as the man was un¬
cultured, so the bronze is potentially a statue. But to be bronze is not the
same thing as to be potentially a statue. If it were, we should have
equal right to say that to be bronze is the same as to be potentially
anything that the bronze can be, a helmet, a dish, etc. Then all these
potentialities would be the same as each other (because each is the same
as being bronze), and this would imply identity-in-formula of the cor¬
responding actualities, the statue, the helmet, etc. But once the
difference between being bronze and being potentially something that
bronze can become is grasped, there is no difficulty in formally dis¬
tinguishing the actuality in which a change consists from the actual¬
ity of the subject. The change holds of the subject only insofar as
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the latter has the potentiality to be so and so . It does not therefore
hold of the subject insofar as the subject is the kind of thing it is,
bronze. Nor is the actuality of the change the same thing as the actuality
of being bronze. If it were, then there would be no diff erence between what
it is to be bronze and what it is to change in that given way. There
would be no subject of change determined as to its nature by a substance-
constitutive characteristic; for the "substance"-constitutive charac¬
teristic would be - to be changing. Substance would be change.
(26) To display the diff erence between the actuality in which change
consists, and the actuality that comes about through change, it is enough
to attend to the sense of 'potentially F' already explained. The changing
that turns the bricks into a house holds of the bricks insofar as they are
not a house but suitable to be so formed . The actuality of the house-form
itself also holds of the bricks at a later stage, but not insofar as they are
potentially a house. Or, if we wish to say that they are, a diff erent sense of
'potentially' must be called in, one that refers only to the bricks' suit¬
ability and the positive characteristics, hardness, weather-resistance,
etc., that render them suitable. For the bricks built up are not now
potentially a house in the sense in which this implies that they are not
actually so formed. Thus the change-actuality differs from the product-
actuality in that the former holds of its subject in virtue of an
irreducibly negative condition. This phrase 'in virtue of' cannot be
understood in logical terms. Aristotle's definition of change does
not state the obvious falsehood that the subject's not being F is a
sufficient condition of its changing to being F. That would imply no
difference between the actuality and the mere potentiality of change.
But it states more than that not being F is a necessary condition of
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its changing to being F. It is not the case that every actuality
that obtains only if the subject is in some negative condition is
a change towards the corresponding positive one. The actuality of
being formed as a statue is true of the bronze only if certain other
things are not true of it, such as being formed as a helmet. But
being a statue, which is an actuality, is not the actuality of
becoming a helmet. If it were, then by the same argument, being a
statue would be the same as becoming a set of coins, a set of nails,
etc., and all the things that the bronze logically cannot be if it is
a statue. The relation between the negative condition of the subject
of change, and the actuality of change itself, is stronger than neces¬
sary but weaker than sufficient. The change is the active expression
of the negative condition and is grounded in it. Changing to F is
what something does on account of being not-F, and the change is the
manifestation of the absence of F. But when 'being a helmet' holds
good of the bronze, this is not on account of the bronze's not being
something else, nor does being a helmet express this negative fact.
Being at Athens entails, but does not express not being at Sparta,
whereas going to Sparta both entails the latter and expresses it.
(27) In general we may say that the following holds of actualities
that are not processes: just as we give no information about what or
where or what-like a thing is by stating what, where, etc., it is not,
so we give none about the basis or ground of its being as it is by
saying what it is not. But with process-actualities the opposite
holds good. We give the ground and basis of what actually is true of
the subject (namely the fact that it is changing) by saying what the
subject is not. We can deepen the contrast by noting that the terminal
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condition whose absence is the ground of the change is such that
its presence will necessarily exclude the change itself. Being a
statue is incompatible with becoming just such a statue. Therefore
becoming a statue is an actuality grounded not only in its subject's
potentiality to be a statue (which it is not), but in its potentiality
to be in a state in which the former actuality no longer exists. In
short, change is the active expression of a subject's potential to
be no longer changing. Whereas it would be absurd to say of a non-
process actuality A that it expressed its subject's potential to be,
eventually, without A. In this way, Aristotle's definition of change
and process succeeds (a) in avoiding circularity, (b) in defining
change as something real and actual, and (c) in preserving a funda¬
mental type-distinction between process and non-process. This last
requirement is as essential as the others, if only because the defin¬
ition must give some explanation of the problematicity of change. If
becoming were simply a sub-class of being, differing from other sub¬
classes no more radically than they from one another, how could any¬
one have been so misled as to think that becoming made best sense
when consigned, by one argument or another, to the realm of non-being?
We have now seen how the definition meets requirement (c) by exhibit¬
ing the subject of change as essentially (qua subject of change) in a
state of privation.
(28) Aristotle sums this up by typifying process and change as
'incomplete actuality'. He does not mean that change is not a genuine
actuality. Its incompleteness is derivative: process is incomplete
'because the subject of whose potentiality it is the actual exercise
is incomplete' (III 1 201b31 - 33) . We might wish to carp at this
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formulation on the ground that the subject's negative condition may
not necessarily render it 'incomplete'. That is to say, 'incomplete'
here can hardly be understood except evaluatively, but the property
which a subject acquires through a given change need not be one that
enhances or fulfils the subject: it might be one that is neutral in
terms of value, or one that although describable in positive terms
(so that as such it is not a privation) constitutes a damaging con¬
dition for the subject, as e.g. being on dry land for a fish. In
other words, the formulation just given can only be guaranteed to
cover natural and purposed changes to states valuable or "proper" or
life-enhancing for the subject. Aristotle could have avoided this
objection by stating the special structure of process-actuality in
terms of the subject's negative condition, without committing himself
to any evaluation of the corresponding positive one. But there is
little point in attempting to correct him on this detail, since as we
shall see, the entire analysis is moulded to fit not change as such
but natural and purposed change. His description of the subject as
'incomplete' reflects an orientation so pervasive that any attempt to
accommodate the account to all changes, natural, unnatural and any
others that there might be, would result in its collapse.
(29) Before I proceed to argue for this claim, as well as to point
out certain advantages of the account just developed, a few remarks
are in order concerning the relationship between this analysis of
change and the positions variously reached by Aristotle's predecessors,
and secondly between this analysis and Aristotle's own main results in
the first two books of the ~Physi.cs. So far as the earlier philosophers
are concerned, Aristotle is anxious to show that the very feature of
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his own theory that guarantees an ultimate distinction between
process-actualities and others, also explains the bafflement that
drove his forebears sometimes to deny change altogether and sometimes
to define it in strange terms that succeeded in expressing little
beyond their own sense of its incomprehensibility. His own words
make the point.
I
'A proof of the adequacy of this account may
be found in what others say about process, as well
as in the fact that it is not easy to define it in
any other way. For the only heading under which
process and change find a place is the one suggested ^
here. This is clear if we consider how some thinkers
define it: as otherness, and inequality, and not
being. Process is not a necessary property of things
describable in any of these terms, ■i.e. as other or
unequal or not being. Nor is change to or from these
properties rather than to and from their opposites.
But the reason why they located process among these
is that it does seem to be something indefinite,
and the principles in the second column ^
are indefinite on account of being privative.
For none of them is a this or a such or in any of
the other categories. The reason why process is
regarded as indefinite is that it cannot be straight¬
forwardly allotted to the domain of potentialities,
nor to that of actuality. For something that is
potentially of a certain quantity is not necessarily
in process, nor is something that is actually of
that quantity. Process emerges as a kind of actuality
but incomplete. This is because the subject of whose
potentiality it is the actual exercise is incomplete.
And because of this it is difficult to seize what it
is. For it has to be either privation or potentiality
or actuality in the strict sense; but it cannot be
included among any of these. So our approach is the
only remaining one, which is to say that it is a sort
of actuality, but an actuality such as we have
explained: difficult to grasp but capable of being.'
(Ill 2, 201bl6 - 202a2)
22. See Ross, op. oit. , pp. 538 - 539.
23. Cf. Metaph. A 5, 986a23 ff.
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(30) Turning now to the relation between the account of change in
III 1-2 and the doctrines of the earlier books, I shall take space
here only to touch on one large issue. This concerns the coherence
of the concept of subject of change developed in III, with the earlier
schema in which change was related to the idea of substantial nature.
Much has already been said about the way in which Aristotle's concept
of substance as unitary and specific determines his notion of change,
and of natural change in particular. But the examination of III 1-2
enables us to detect an equally close dependence in the reverse
direction, this time of the idea of substance itself upon the account
of change formulated in III. Let me begin to glance at this major
topic by raising the question whether there is not a contradiction
between the Book II doctrine of change as expressing substantial
nature, and the Book III doctrine of change or process as the activity
of the subject insofar as it lacks the property gained as a result of
the change. For if natural change expresses substantial nature,
which if knowable at all is susceptible of positive specification and
definition, how can it also express some negative property possessed
by the subject for as long as the latter is changing but no longer?
The two positions are easy to reconcile in fact, but the basis of
reconciliation deserves attention. Aristotle means that whereas it
belongs to the substantial nature to dictate the kind of end-state to
be reached through change (if possible and necessary), it is the
present lack of this state that accounts for the change's actual
occurrence. The nature determines what change will be if any will
be, but the privation determines that it will be, circumstances per¬
mitting. The difference between the roles of nature and privation is
clear if we recall that nature is a principle equally of change and
stasis. Which alternative is realised on a given occasion depends
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then not upon the nature, but upon the presence or absence of the
natural end-state which the natural stasis is £t and the natural
change towards.
(31) But the main point of interest to emerge from this answer is
this: were it not for the assumption that the change terminates,
Aristotle would find it difficult if not impossible to disentangle
the positive and essential substantial nature expressed through
change from the accidental negative condition which, by the account of
III 1-2, is also thereby expressed. Given a terminus or intrinsic¬
ally determined stasis, there is a "moment" of change in which the
negative condition can no longer be actively exercised, for the simple
reason that the stasis has superseded it with its own positive, so
that it is no longer there to be expressed. This being so, we can
conceptually sift out the substantial nature from the negative property
by insisting that the former is still expressed even when the latter
cannot be, i.e. through the terminal, static, condition. And we can
add that unless the same substantial nature is supposed operative
then as during the change, there is no basis for regarding the now
changing, now static, subject as one and the same individual. But now
let us consider the conceptual impact of denying an inbuilt termina¬
tion to change. Suppose for instance that the direction of change
were dictated by some "ideal" terminus which the subject by nature is
unqualified to be able to reach. Plato's concept of imitation might
be construed in this way, the particulars being regarded as aspirations
rather than static "copies". In that case, the subject would neces¬
sarily always be subject of change and as such never free from the
privation. Thus it is not surprising that the Platonists should have
committed what Aristotle evidently takes to be a serious mistake in
equating the Great and Small (which in their system he sees as filling
the role of matter or subject of change in his) with not-being or the
privation opposed to the form towards which becoming tends. He takes
them to task for thus reducing the number of principles involved in
change from the Aristotelian triad (subject - form - privation) to an
inadequate pair (Physios I 9, 192a3 - 25). In this, Aristotle makes no
allowance for the fact that within the Platonic framework the reduction
was reasonable not to say inevitable, if only because there is never
a time when the extensions of the subject-concept and the privation-
concept could ever fail to coincide. Aristotle on the other hand
assumes that the sugject of change, e.g. a man, will emerge on the
other side of the change as no longer changing, i.e. as a now cultured
man. Thus he can dissolve the paradox of becoming by insisting that
although the troublesome 'What is not comes to be' is not false, it
fails to reveal the true structure of change by describing the sub¬
ject with a term true of it only -per aooidens, the appropriate de¬
scription being the positive 'man'. The best proof that 'not cultured'
holds only per aocidens is that it is what is left behind after the
change. In this way the individual that was subject of change
emerges as per se positively describable; its essence then can be
given by saying what it is, not what it is not.
(32) Here we have the basis for the doctrine of the categories,
whereby negative properties are negations of positives in some cate¬
gory or other. There would be no categories other than Substance
unless there were the category of Substance: this then must comprise
positive terms (substance-constitutive characteristics), since other-
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wise the whole doctrine collapses. This means that the concept of
substance as king-pin of the categorial division of being is recon¬
cilable with the concept of substance as subject of change on one
assumption only: that change (depending as it necessarily does on
its subject's privation) cannot continue indefinitely towards an
unattainable end. Change must be structured so as finally to release
its subject de-negativised, thus showing that the negative property
was never intrinsic to the latter. Change and process then must be as
the definition of III 1 prescribes: an actuality incomplete in itself
and self-terminating. These considerations give special significance
to the fact that the term for 'potential' is also the term for
'possible'. Verbally it is probably tautologous to say that what is
24-
potentially so is possibly or not impossibly so. But a substantial
point emerges when we consider that within the context of Aristotle's
definition of process, 'potentially F' has the function of stating the
direction of change. In other words, 'potentially F' harbours one
purely intentional element, which it might be more apt to call
'gerundive', stating what is to be and would be if the change were
to reach completion. And that the state F that gives specific content
to this gerundive is one that the subject can attain, is a synthetic
proposition, although for Aristotle nonetheless necessary a pviovi.
It is necessary for him a pviovi because, as I have tried briefly to
argue, the categorial conception of substance depends upon the actual
terminability of change. In the Physics, as for instance in the Ethics,
Aristotle usually treats his doctrine of categories as a starting-
point already settled prior to the task of conceptualising the specific
subject-matter in hand. This of course is why he can then use it as a
24. Cf. Physics VI 10, 241b3 - 11, and paragraph (52) below.
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tool. But the issue just raised shows that in one case at least,
the dependence runs the opposite way too. Aristotle's definition of
change, a physical concept, sustains his theory of the categories.
(33) We must now return to the definition itself and its consequen¬
ces. So far I have attended only to its formal structure as stated by
Aristotle in III 1, 201a9 ff. But there are two ways of interpreting
this. On the one hand, it can be understood as analysing the common
meaning of process-words. These form a fairly obvious class in Greek,
as in English, the verbal nouns being usually of the '-aug' ending.
On this interpretation, 'xuvricrtg' on the left-hand side of the defin¬
ition may be regarded as a variable ranging over the class of "entities"
individually named by specific process-nouns. Taken in this sense the
definition presupposes that language already marks off the class of
actualities that fall under it. The job then of the definition is to
tell us what these linguistically specified actualities have that is
common and distinctive. On the other hand, the definition can also
be taken as laying down the conditions under which we are entitled to
regard an actuality as a process whether or not the standard linguis¬
tic expression for that actuality is a typical process-word. On this
interpretation, if it is actually true of a man that he is standing
still, but this actuality holds only insofar as something else is not
yet actually true of him, as for instance when he stands on the door¬
step waiting to be let in, so that his being there is the expression
of his not yet being where he is going, then under these conditions,
the definition tells us, the standing is a process, and the standing
man may be regarded as 'ev xuvqaeL' . And indeed ordinary language
would not reject the description 'He is on his way inside'. Similarly
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if an animal lies in wait for its prey; in lying in wait, it is "on
the road" to some end, and the lying in wait is grounded in its not
having got there, since this is the means.
(34) It is hard to think of examples illustrating this last point
in which the behaviour is not purposive or lends itself to description
in purpose-like terms. However, the fact that Aristotle's definition
of process can be interpreted so as to fit even a narrow class of
examples such as the above shows that in one area at least, the differ¬
ence between process-actuality and non-process-actuality does not
depend upon any immediately perceivable on-goingness or moment to
moment emergence of new properties. This suggests that although in
III 1, 200bl6 - 20 Aristotle names 'the infinite' as one of the concepts
to be examined in his philosophy of nature, on the ground that process
is continuous, and infinity rears its head in connection with contin¬
uity, his actual analysis of process does not represent it as math¬
ematically continuous or infinitely divisible of necessity. This is
an advantage, for had he restricted 'process' to situations which it
is not unreasonable to describe in terms of mathematical continuity,
he would have consigned to conceptual limbo a vast range of occurrences
that we should naturally class as processes and becomings; including
many examples of his own. How could we begin to apply the model of
the continuous series to getting healthy, or to house-building? It
is not clear how any type of change apart from locomotion (and in¬
crease and decrease so far as they imply locomotion of an object's
boundaries) could be handled in this way. And for Aristotle, not only
is change in general not scientifically reducible to locomotion (v.s.
paragraph (8)), but even if it were, conceptual reduction would still
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be out of the question. A given change is of the kind that it is on
account of the type of end-state in which it terminates. Unless the
latter not only empirically depends on but essentially consists in
some spatial arrangement, macro- or microscopic, the change itself
cannot be characterised as locomotion. Being healthy may as a matter
of fact consist in a certain disposition of "primary qualities", but
to call this health is simply to evoke a per acctdens identity. This
is not what the convalescent is regaining insofar as he is so described.
One might as well say that health is the same thing as warmth, on the
ground that getting better in his case involves a rise in temperature.
(35) In paragraph (5) above we noted that an object Y may coherently
be said to be in process, or in course of changing, on account of some
condition in another object X which leads up to the emergence of a
new property of Y. Thus someone is already 'getting his hair cut'
even when the barber is only fetching the scissors. In this way it
is possible to preserve the ordinary implication of 'process' as taking
time while predicating the term of changes where the subject passes all
at once from one state to another. Now the III 1 definition still
permits the application of 'process' to such events, provided that the
"leading-up" condition in the agent can be seen as grounded on and
explainable by the patient's current non-possession of the property
in which the change terminates. This point is of some importance for
Aristotle's system, since it is only by some such analysis that he
would be entitled to class as 'processes' one vitally important group
of changes, those switches of quality-pairs that constitute the mutual
transformations of the simple bodies. These must be instantaneous in
the subject because they are qualitative, for Aristotle does not hold
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that between every pair of qualities terminating a change there is
another quality "through" which the subject must "pass", thereby
25
taking time to get from one termt-nus to the other. And while this
is true of qualitative change in general, there is an extra reason
why the transformation of the elements cannot be a process whose
subject takes time to move from one to another terminus. The termini
of elemental transformations are the quality-pairs that constitute
the physically simple substances, and "between" two such pairs there
is no further substance for the subject to be, which means that if
for any time "it" were between termini, there would exist something
of which nothing whatever was true, for if the subject is not sub-
stantialised (by bearing a quality-pair), it cannot be qualified,
quantified, or anything else either.
(36) Thus far, then, the definition can be shown to be usefully
flexible: but is it a definition of change in general, or even,
in general, of "led-up-to change" (V.s. paragraph (4))? By now, I
suppose, the answer is fairly obvious. Where it makes sense to say
that the change's occurrence is grounded in the fact that the sub¬
ject lacks a given property which it is capable of possessing, there
the definition applies: otherwise not. Natural change and purposed
change then immediately fall under the definition: if it is some¬
thing's nature or purpose to be P, its being not-P grounds and ex¬
plains the actual change to P. Now there are some unnatural but not
artificial changes which can nonetheless be brought within the fold:
these are ones that are "nature-directed" but by the nature of some
25. V.i. paragraphs (44) ff. On the finite number of sensible
qualities in a given range, see Be Sensu 6, 445b20 - 446a20.
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external agent. Thus if bees bring pollen to the hive, the pollen's
being transferred may be seen as grounded on its not being (naturally)
where it will eventually be, the latter location being gerundively
marked out for it by the needs of the bees pursuing their own natural
existence. But what about changes dictated by no nature or purpose,
whether external or internal to the subject? What for instance of the
twig that gets entangled in some animal's pelt and so is carried along?
The animal goes from P^ to P^ so therefore does the twig. This de¬
scription of the event logically entails that the twig is not at P
since it is attached to a creature that is (by its own nature, let us
suppose) going there. But we have already seen (paragraph (26)) that
the fact that the presence of a given actuality in a subject logically
implies some negative condition of that subject does not by itself
permit us to view the actuality as grounded upon that negative condi¬
tion or in any sense expressing it. The fact that the stones are not
formed into a pavement is not the ground of their being what they
actually are, namely formed into a wall. Again, it follows from our
description above that the twig is not at P^ either, but what is
happening to it is not grounded on this, for then by Aristotle's
definition it would be in motion to P^. But why should we not say
that the twig's motion is after all grounded upon its not being at ¥
even though the motion is caused by an animal which in no sense
"means" it? The reason is that the motion of the twig is without in¬
trinsic direction. We only say that it is to P^ because that is where
the carrier is going, or because at that point the twig gets detached
and left. But the twig would have moved as it does move in just the
same way even if the animal had gone further or not so far. In itself
the twig is no more going to P^ than to any of the points in between.
Yet within Aristotle's scheme of concepts it cannot be said to be going
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to any or all of the points along the line of its actual course, for
this would mean that it had not one motion but many, and infinitely
many. The unity of the twig's passage cannot, within the present
system, be described by the simple expedient of showing that a single
mathematical formula will generate all the possible and actual posi¬
tions of the twig along a line thus defined by the formula. For this
implies a profound shift from Aristotle's own position, which is that
the unity of change depends upon unbroken progress to a single goal.
(37) We might say that the motion of the twig is accidental change,
since it comes about neither by nature nor purpose, but by the chance
contact of two independently behaving entities. But accidental change
is still change. The twig is being moved, therefore ordinary logic
would invite us to infer that it is in motion. Aristotle's failure
to take account of this type of case is due, I should suppose, to his
general tendency to bind the concepts of cause, scientific account,
and definition together in a tight package. In the first place, all
changes (including purposive ones) can be shown to depend ontologic-
ally on natural change (U.S. Chapter I, paragraph (45)). Secondly all
change is either natural or unnatural, and therefore depends concept¬
ually for its description as such on the concept of natural change.
.26
Thirdly, there is no scientific knowledge of the accidental. For
the accidental is the conjunction of what already can be traced back
to nature or purpose, so that apart from the statement of the conjunc¬
tion itself, no extra explanation is needed for the accidental. These
three propositions we might be willing to accept, since they express
26. Cf. Metaph. E 2, 1026b2 ff.; K 8, 1064bl5 - 1065a6.
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a scheme which supplies explanations and verifiable predictions of a
good range of phenomena, and to that extent deserves some scientific
respect. But from these propositions, it appears, Aristotle tacitly
draws the conclusion that the accidentally caused need not fall under
any definition. In particular, accidentally caused change need not
fall under the definition of change, which accordingly is framed so
as to leave it out. And yet an accidental locomotion (this case is
perhaps the most obvious) may share all the spatio-temporal proper¬
ties of its recognised natural or purposed counterparts. We cannot
say that the twig is not in motion. In fact it is more obviously so,
most of us would think, than the man standing on the doorstep. But
the furthest that Aristotle's system would allow him to go in accom¬
modating this type of case, would be to say that the twig, though not
in motion by the III 1 definition (nor at rest), participates in the
animal's natural motion in which it is physically involved. Aristotle
never makes this move. The problem, it seems, simply escaped him.
It is strange that a philosopher whose genius lies in creating
conceptual status for what one might call metaphysical hangers-on (so
that not everything real has to be a substance or actually whatever
it is, and process too can be shown to be a reality, though definable
in terms of more primitive concepts than itself) should so totally
have overlooked the multitude made homeless by his own definition
of change.^
(38) We may sum up our criticism of the III 1 definition as follows.
Not only does it fail to convey what is common to all change, but in
27. Aside from accidentally caused change, the definition of III 1
poses a serious problem for the eternal rotation proved in
Book VIII. V. -t. Chapter V, paragraphs (43) ff.
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confining itself to change that stems from a particular type of cause
(that which determines an intrinsic direction), it provides a concept
operative only on the level of explanation and therefore fails to
capture change as immediately perceived. Until we have reason to
believe that a nature or purpose is the principle of a given phenomenon
we have no ground for classifying the phenomenon as a change at all by
this definition. Again, until we know what substantial nature or
purpose directs the change, we do not know whether the subject is
changing, even in the restricted sense of the definition. If a load
of bricks is on the ground, then from the point of view of their own
nature they are not in process, but in their material's proper place.
From the builder's point of view, they are "on their way" to a place
destined by his intention (positions in a vault as yet unbuilt). The
same relativity affects the concepts correlative to "change", those of
"enforced rest" and "natural stasis". From their own "point of view"
the materials of a bird's nest are in enforced rest; from that of the
agent they are in the condition that naturally terminates the active
process that got them there. This relativity does not give rise to
logical contradiction or any kind of absurdity, but it does entail
the impossibility of knowing whether an object is or is not in process
until the total situation is understood and all the relevant agents'
parts in it identified. The definition fails to elucidate any sense
of 'change' that can readily apply to perceived events even before it
is known what they or their principles are.
(39) Such being the limitation of the analysis in Book III, it is
not altogether surprising to find Aristotle elsewhere mounting another
attack on the problem of change. I refer in particular to the dis-
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cussion of Physics Book VI, where he approaches the question on an
entirely different conceptual level. The failure of III to provide
an account of change and process in general was due to the pervasive
influence of the concepts of substance and nature. But in VI, by
contrast, these metaphysical concepts have sunk out of sight, and the
analysis depends instead on the ideas of time, space and the magnitude
of the changing subject. These are indeed, as he says in III 1, 200b
2-3, common and universal properties. In particular, they are common
to all physical changes. So it is evident from the start that Aris¬
totle's conclusions in VI will apply as much to changes undictated by
nature or artifice as to their opposites. Here then we might perhaps
hope to find an improvement on the elitism of the definition in III.
(40) We have, it is true, no reason to think that Aristotle himself
at any stage saw that definition as defective. But the existence
of Book VI shows that at some point (whether earlier or later^) he
believed that change could be profitably discussed from a point of
view altogether different. Yet the Book III conception is the one
to which in the end he returns (if he ever left it), in Book VIII.29
Moreover Aristotle never departs from the fundamental assumption of
the Book III definition, viz. that change is properly to be described
as process: not as emergence, but as emergence-led-up-to, where the
leading-up is itself the change, or rather the changing. This assump¬
tion, we saw, was necessitated by the metaphysic of "nature", but it
is present even in VI where that metaphysic is least in evidence. Now
28. Ancient tradition assigns Books III and VI to different works.
See Ross, op. cit.3 pp. 1-8.
29. Internal evidence makes it clear that VIII postdates both
III 1-3 and VI.
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the concept of process has two aspects, each represented in III 1: a
process is (a) of a different structure from a non-process-actuality,
but (b) in common with the latter it has a unity and identity of its
own. The rest of this chapter centres on the question whether in VI
Aristotle succeeds in developing a non-metaphysical concept of process
that does justice to both aspects. I shall argue that the account of
Book VI fails because it analyses the first in terms that make nonsense
of the second.
(41) Assuming that change is to be regarded as essentially a changing,
the problem as always is how to characterise this. On such a view,
change necessarily occupies time, so how is it distinguishable from non-
process conditions, which also last for a time? In III 1, relying on
the concept of "nature", Aristotle was able to define process in a way
that did not entail either that process is mathematically continuous or
that it is temporally intermediate between its termini. But if process
is not to be distinguished from non-process in metaphysical terms, what
is left but to attempt a distinction in temporal terms, by reference to
temporal structure and position? Thus the focus of discussion shifts
from the "negative" element of the III 1 definition to infinite divisi¬
bility, while the metaphysical dependence of change upon its terminus is
replaced by temporal intermediacy. On reaching Aristotle's discussion
of Zeno's paradoxes in Book VI, the reader of the Physics may find it
surprising that Aristotle, with his unparalleled sensitivity to differ¬
ences of conceptual level and his constant insistence that each subject-
matter be treated in terms proper to itself, should have so enthusiastic¬
ally accepted Zeno's initial assumption that the concept of mathematical
continuum can be applied to physical space, time, and motion. We should
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have expected Aristotle to make at least some move to question this,30
even granted that his main concern in VI is to meet the paradoxes on
their own terms. But his attitude becomes more intelligible once we
see that the concept of the continuum seems to provide him with
exactly the materials he needs in order to make out afresh the dis¬
tinction between process and non-process. A process necessarily lasts
for some time, as do non-processive or static conditions,31 but the
difference between them lies in the temporal variegation of the former.
A single process has many stages, each different from the last, so
that at each stage in the life of the process something different is
true of the subject; which is just what cannot be said of a static
condition, since as long as it lasts, what is true of the subject is
at each moment the same. And since the difference between process and
static condition is assumed to be absolute (it is still the difference
between being and becoming), an adequate account must rule out the
possibility of reducing process to a series of static conditions. Thus
30. Cf. G. Vlastos, 'Zeno's Race Course', Studies in Presocratic
Philosophyj edd. Allan and Furley, vol. II, p. 218, note 25 (the
article first appeared in Journal of the History of Philosophy
IV, 1966): 'To humour Zeno's claim that the sequence of Z-runs
is infinite we must allow that any point reached after traversing
a finite number of Z-intervals would be physically distinguish¬
able from the terminal point, G, as also from infinitely many
intermediate points.' Aristotle is not in the habit of humouring
his adversaries; that he does so here requires some explanation.
31. These terms are not synonymous, although they will be so treated
for the rest of this chapter. "Process" has two contraries,
(a) "static condition", and (b) "complete (or "perfect")
activity", as for instance (in Aristotle's view) thinking and
perceiving. The contrast between "process" and (b) makes sense
only in the context of the Book III definition from which pro¬
cess emerges as incomplete activity. Complete activity (it is
clear from Aristotle's examples in Metccph. 0 6) does not entail
stasis in the sense of a condition uniform in content through
the period of its duration. But in a context where the temporal
variegation of process is being stressed, the relevant contrast
is between it and (a).
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the concept of mathematical continuity, entailing as it does that
between every two points dividing the whole there is another point,
seems the ideal tool for Aristotle's purpose. A process to P and a
static condition S have one thing in common: given the infinite
divisibility of time, for each instant I after the beginning there was
a prior instant when the subject was already changing to P, or was
already in condition S. But the difference is that being S consists
in fulfilling the same description all along; whereas changing to P,
Aristotle tells us at length and enthusiastically in Book VI 6, con¬
sists in having reached, at each instant, a different new condition
along the way. Now to reach a new condition is to have changed or
been in process, and for every new condition reached, there was a
process of reaching it. Therefore, within the temporal bounds of any
one process to P there have been infinitely many different processes
forming a nested set, one for each new stage reached in the course of
reaching P. As Aristotle says at VI 6, 237a26 - 28:
'In half the time it will have performed another
change ('aXXo carat peraBegApxds') [i.e. other than
what it performs in the whole time], and in half of
that another, and so on ad infinitum' .
(42) A process to P, then, is a passage along an infinitely gradu¬
ated series. The grades are grades in one and the same medium or
dimension, and the terminus ad quem P is itself another such grade.
In any selection of grades or points that we care to take, the members
are specifiable in systematically related terms: they are all points
in the one medium, and each is uniquely designatable by a formula of
the same conceptual type, giving the ratio of its distance to P's
distance from the starting point. Thus the process to P is unitary
because however many different stages in it we care to identify, they
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are all systematically related by a single mathematical ordering.
Let us briefly contrast this unity with that of a process under the
III 1 definition. That definition applies to processes described in
terms of mathematical continuity; but also equally to processes con¬
sidered as having conceptually heterogeneous stages. Thus house¬
building involves a number of quite differently describable operations,
some of which {e.g. waiting for the mortar to set) display no visible
on-going-ness. What makes it all a unified process is the same as
what makes some apparently static condition a stage in the process,
viz. that all these heterogeneously describable actualities are true
of their subject on account of one and the same potentiality for one
and the same end-state. They are, in other words, all stages in the
same actuality or activity, since the potentiality exercised is the
same.
(43) On the mathematical schema, the process must take place in a
temporal interval between the times when the terminus a quo and
terminus ad quern contraries hold of its subject. These contraries lie
in the same conceptual range as each other: if one is a spatial
position, so is the other, if one is a magnitude, the other is too,
etc. The same is true of the properties corresponding to the stages
of the process itself. That is to say, if the process had stopped at
some point before its actual stopping point, the subject would have
found itself in possession of a property on the same range as (because
"between") the actual terminal properties. But different properties
on the same range are logical contraries. It follows that a subject
cannot at the same time possess the property that functions as terminus
a quo and be in process to the terminus ad quem. For if the process
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had stopped half-way, the subject would have displayed a property
intermediate on the range, and this is by construction other than
but on the same range as, and therefore contrary to the terminus a
quo. So the occurrence of process necessarily presupposes having
left the terminus a quo (and by a similar argument, having not yet
reached the ad quern). But on the account of Book III there is no such
necessity for the process to be temporally intermediate between con¬
traries. A dish of water is put into the freezer: suddenly its sur-
9 9 . . .
face is frozen. (If we think of this as the culmination of a gradual
process, it is on account of an empirical explanation in terms of
particle-structure which was unavailable to Aristotle.) Was there
then no time-taking process? The III 1 definition permits us to say
that there was one. It consisted in the water's simply standing in
the place concerned, and this was a process because that standing was
on account of and grounded in the subject's not yet being in the state
in which standing there it would come to be. But the process in this
sense is not incompatible with the subject's still being in the a quo
terminal condition of liquidity. Being liquid is not logically con¬
trary to standing in a certain place. On this account, the process is
still of necessity temporally prior to the realisation of the terminus
ad quem. But while it presupposes not having reached the latter, it
does not presuppose having left the former, the a quo. In this way
there can be process and contrary termini without the process filling
• 11
a temporal interval between the termini.
32. Cf. Physics VIII 3, 253b25 - 26.
33. 0. Hamelin, Le Systeme d'Aristote, p. 308, writes as if Aristotle's
one concept of process were the temporally intermediate one: 'Ce
qu'il y a de plus essentiel dans le changement aux yeux d'Aristote,
ce ne sont pas les deux contraires qui lui servent de limites, c'est
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(44) So change analysed in terms of the mathematical continuum
turns out to have a structure very different from that of change as
metaphysically defined in Book III. We now have to consider whether
the former account succeeds any better than the latter in capturing
the meaning of change as such. Since locomotion most obviously illus¬
trates the continuity model, it is no surprise that so much of the
discussion in Book VI should revolve round locomotion and its con¬
ditions. Yet Aristotle makes it clear that the doctrine that contrasts
change with the static in terms of the former's infinite temporally
nested variety is to hold for change of all types: see VI 6, 237a34
ff. So it is the universal character of change as such to be math¬
ematically continuous and hence to occupy a temporal interval between
its termini. But there is a difficulty which Aristotle himself notes,
although his response to it leaves much to be desired, as we shall see
shortly. The problem is that not all properties are members of contin¬
uous ranges. Qualities, he says, are 'indivisible' (VI 5, 236bl - 6),
which amounts to saying that it is not the case that between any two
contrary qualities there is another contrary. In this Aristotle is
surely right, for in what sense of "is" could it be credibly maintained
that there always is an intermediate? A perceptible change of quality
may involve a perceptible gradation between the termini_, but perception
cannot discern another shade between every pair of perceptibly dis¬
tinguishable shades. Nor have we, as with spatial position and magni¬
tude, a mathematical method of designating an intermediate for every
pair, in terms of fractions of some size or distance. And in any
case, even if theoretically a quality could be found between any two
l'intervalle de progres qui s'etend entre ces deux limites, et
cet intervalle est, selon lui, continu.'
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contraries, in what sense are the intermediate qualities actually
passed through in a qualitative change? The nature of space dictates
(or so we assume) that all positions on a line must be passed through
by an object moving from one end of the line to the other, so that
if the passage had been halted after any given temporal fraction of
its actual duration, the object would have been somewhere. But even
if between any two musical tones there i_s an intermediate in the sense
that a tone could be produced lower than one and higher than the
other, it does not follow that a passage from F to A for instance must
"go through" all these, as if a player could only ever move gldssando
from F to A.
(45) Yet Aristotle maintains (VI 6, 237a35 - 237b2) that even in
qualitative change, what changes has already performed another change,
and in performing this had already performed another, etc. His argu¬
ment is that although the respect of change is indivisible, the time
of the change is not (237b2-3). But this assumes that the change
did take time between its tevmin-i3 and why should we assume this?
For Aristotle, I suggest, the fundamental reason is that he hopes to
discover in the infinite divisibility of change into smaller changes
a universal criterion contrasting change with the static. If this
fails to apply to qualitative change, then qualitative change is not
change, but a mere succession of static conditions. Thus becoming is
not in general a different type of actuality from being, but a temporal
arrangement of being. But Aristotle cannot take it for granted that
possible opponents will automatically accept the mathematical contin¬
uity criterion as applying all across the board. Having admitted him¬
self that qualities are indivisible, he has the onus of showing that
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qualitative change is nevertheless divisible. An atomist opponent,
for instance, would be a fool to let Aristotle walk away with this
point. The alert atomist, unless given a demonstration to the
contrary, will assume that the indivisibility of quality entails
the indivisibility of qualitative transition. For in a context of
discussion where mathematical continuity is being stressed as the
characteristic of change, he can then argue that there are no
qualitative changes, or alternatively that qualitative change exists
only because it is really (= reducible to) quantitative or positional
change, thus reinforcing his own doctrine that all is atoms in their
various shapes, spatial arrangements and motions.
(46) It is for Aristotle, therefore, to argue that even qualitative
change takes time between its termini (so that the change is "divisible"
because the time is). And he does argue.
'Not only is it the case that what changes
(to pexagoAXov) has changed, but it is also the
case that what has changed was changing before.
For whatever has changed {.i.e. completed a change]
has changed in a period of time. To see this,
suppose that it has completed the change from A
to B in an instant. Then it has not completed the
change in the same instant in which it was at A,
since in that case it would be in A and B at the
same time. This is supported by our earlier
conclusion that what has changed, when it has
changed, is not in the terminus a quo. But if it
has completed the change in a different instant
from that in which it was in A, then there is a
period of time between, since instants are not
together. So since it has changed in a period of
time, and all time is divisible, in half the time
it will have performed another change, and by the
same reasoning in half of that another, and so on
ad infinitum, so that it was always changing prior
to having changed.' (VI 6, 237al7 - 28)
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(47) The earlier conclusion referred to was reached in 5, 235b6
ff., where Aristotle argued that whatever has changed has left
(aitoXettetv) the terminus a quo. Now both here and in the later
passage just quoted we note that Aristotle uses spatial terminology.
In particular, in speaking of the object as being at or in (ev) the
termini A and B, he invites us to think of them as places, therefore
as spatially distant, so that the passage from one to the other is
through space and takes time. But since his avowed purpose is to
prove that all change is, like locomotion, temporally intermediate
between termini, not to beg this question, I shall interpret him as
meaning that the object changes from being P to being Q, where 'P'
and 'Q* may be replaced by spatial predicates, but also by quality-
words like 'black'. And discounting the spatial metaphor, I shall
take it that 'X has left being P' means simply that X is no longer P.
(48) The argument in VI 6, 237al7 - 28 rests on the Law of Non¬
contradiction. It is because 'P' entails the contradictory of 'Q'
that the subject of change cannot be P and Q at the same time, and
must no longer be P (must have "left" being P) once it has effected
the change to Q. Therefore, Aristotle argues, the P-state and the
Q-state cannot be immediately consecutive, since the instant of trans¬
ition would be an instant in each state, the first of one and the last
of the other, so that at that instant the object would be P and Q.
. . 34
Hence there cannot be an instant of transition: there must be a
34. On Aristotle's handling of this concept see G.E.L. Owen,
'TuAevau ta $aivdyeva), Aristotle, ed. Moravcsik (first
appeared in Aristote et les Problemes de la Methode, ed. S.
Mansion), pp. 167 ff., esp. pp. 177 ff., and R. Sorabji,
'Aristotle on the Instant of Change', Aristotelian Soe. Supp.
L, 1976, pp. 69 ff.
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period of transition between the terminal states, and it is the
"between-ness" of this period that saves the subject from being both
P and Q when it changes. But the argument proves too much. It
proves that there can be no instantaneous transition from any con¬
dition to its own contradictory. Where P and Q are contrary terminal
states, there may be a finite interval of transition between them, as
for instance if they are different spatial properties. It is this
that gives the argument the semblance of plausibility. But there
cannot be a finite interval between not-Q and 0, or at any rate not
for Aristotle, who holds by the Law of Excluded Middle (of. VI 5, 235b
15 - 16). But even if the Law of Excluded Middle were ignored and we
found ourselves able to assert that an object might be neither Q
nor not-Q while it is becoming Q from not-Q, the reasoning would make
change impossible. If there has to be a period of transition between
not-Q and Q because an instantaneous transition would entail the
object's being both contradictories at once, then there cannot be
instantaneous transition from not-Q to N (where 'N' = 'neither not-Q
nor Q') or from N to Q, since 'N' and 'not-Q', and 'N' and 'Q' are no
less mutually exclusive than 'Q' and 'not-Q'. So there must be a
period of neither not-Q nor N between not-Q and N, and so the argument
would go on, proliferating to infinity the number of finite temporal
periods required by any single change.
(49) Aristotle himself saw the difficulty, strangely enough, in
the chapter preceding his proof that a change betweeen contrary termini.
always occupies an intervening period. His problem there was the
transition from rest to process. An instantaneous transition seems to
entail a moment when the object is both at rest and in process. But
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this time Aristotle cannot step out of it by postulating a non-
instantaneous transition between rest and process. This would produce
the infinite regress. His answer consists in the assertion of instan¬
taneous transition together with the denial that this concept implies
a moment when the object has both the properties characterising the
periods on either side. The object, he says, must not be described
as in process of changing at the instant in question. It is changing
from this instant, and at every subsequent instant (up to the latter
end of the change) it is true of it that it has already been changing.
However early a subsequent instant we select, there was always an
earlier (yet one still later than the instant from which it was true
that the object was changing); thus he is able to phrase his con¬
clusion as: 'There is no moment which is the first at which the
thing has changed'. (VI 5, 236a25 - 26)
(50) Here, then, Aristotle breaks the paradox by refusing to allow
the inference from 'Instant I limits the period during which X is in
process' to 'Instant I is a moment when X is in process'. In this
way he can ensure that rest and process are immediately consecutive
without being committed to a moment when both are happening. How was
it that he failed to see that the same treatment could be meted out
against his own a priori- argument in VI 6 refuting instantaneous
transition between contraries? The situation here is different, in
that logic does not forbid a time-taking transition. But there need
not be one; or at any rate Aristotle has not shown that there need.
For the argument by which he tries to do so can be defused by treating
the supposedly impossible instant of instantaneous transition as a
limit in the sense just explained: i.e. in the sense in which 'being a
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limit of the period during which X is P' does not entail 'being a
moment when X is P'. Aristotle's failure to realise this is not easy
to explain. It rests in part, I suspect, on some buried assumption
concerning the conceptual relations between 'limiting instant' and
'process', and this is an area which I cannot at present attempt to
discuss. But if he had seen clearly the apparent discrepancy between
his treatments of rest-to-process transition in VI 5 and contrary-to-
contrary transition in VI 6, he would surely have tried to bring the
buried assumption to light. As it is, there is no sign of awareness
that any unearthing might be in order. And this, I suggest, is due to
his conviction sustained throughout Book VI that (metaphysics being
for the moment in abeyance) mathematical continuity provides the one
key to the difference between change and non-change. The transition
from rest to process cannot be classed as change: anyone who says
otherwise runs against the paradoxes that supposedly vitiate the idea
of "change of change" (of. V 2). But transition from contrary to con¬
trary is change. A static condition "contains" within its own duration
nothing but shorter periods of the same condition. But a change, ac¬
cording to VI, "contains" infinitely many shorter and different
changes. To differ in the required manner from stasis, change must
be mathematically continuous, and therefore (as we saw; of. para¬
graph (41)) it must be temporally intermediate between its termini.''^
35. Aristotle's attempt to apply this analysis to all types of change,
including qualitative, runs into a further difficulty consequent
on his account of time in Book IV. There (IV 11, 219alO - 19;
220al - 11) he argues that the divisibility of the time of a
HtvricTLS derives from the divisibility of the xcvnots itself,
which in turn is seen as having peyebos on account of its tra¬
versing a divisible spatial interval; of. G.E.L. Owen, 'Aris¬
totle on Time', Mot-ion and Time, Space and Matter, edd. Machamer
and Turnbull, pp. 3 ff.; esp. pp. 19 ff. But in VI 6, Aris¬
totle's general thesis requires him to revise the conceptual
order, at least in the case of qualitative change. Since this
179
(51) We have examined one lacuna in the Book VI account of change.
The mathematical schema that is supposed to apply to change as such,
and, if I am right, to define it, fails to cover change in quality.
We have still to consider a group of more serious difficulties, prob¬
lems that cast doubt on Aristotle's whole project of analysing change
in terms of mathematical continuity. I say 'Aristotle's project', for
the following discussion does not show that there could be no coherent
theory making continuity the crucial notion in an account of change.
But it is doubtful whether such a theory is possible for Aristotle,
because it has no place for the fundamental assumption never discarded
by him even in VI, that the direction of change is to be identified by
reference to some terminal property. A change is still essentially
a change to something or other. This entails that once the property
has been realised, whatever happens thereafter (except in one special
case) is not the same change or a continuation of the same change
that brought about the realisation of this property. Inevitably,
then, if circumstances remain the same, the object will stop changing
once that point is reached, for to go on would be to go on without
direction, which is impossible, and if it acquires a new direction,
this can only be because something new has happened to prompt change
in a new direction. The exceptional case just mentioned is that of
circular motion, in which as Aristotle says in VII 8, 264blO - 13,
the termini, a quo and ad quem are identical. The directionality
of circular motion does not entail its eventual ceasing, because in
this one case, the object never reaches a point such that "going on
is in an "indivisible" respect, his only ground for asserting
that the change itself is divisible ("contains" lesser changes)
is that its time is. Thus in this sort of case he treats the
divisibility of time as prior to that of change.
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changing" either implies changing without direction or presupposes
the emergence of a new factor determining a new direction. Once the
object has completed a circle, it can without break still continue
to perform as before, because the terminal point (whichever point on
the circle we choose to identify this with) is always still there
for it to reach if it continues the same pattern of motion.
'terminus ad quern' . In all but this one case the expression stands
for the property which (a) defines the direction of change; (b) is
that in which the change actually terminates. But in circular
motion, the terminus ad quem (once it is specified to be identical
with the a quo) fills the first of these roles but not the second,
so that here they are distinguishable as nowhere else. From now on,
however, I shall be concerned with the changes that necessarily term¬
inate at their terminus, and the question is whether these can after
all fit into the schema of Book VI. But before going further it would
be as well to make sure of my claim that in VI as elsewhere Aristotle
still clings to the notion of non-rotatory change as essentially self-
terminating. A glance at Chapter 10 is enough. Here Aristotle shows
that his position regarding change is essentially the same as his
position on magnitude. Magnitude is infinitely divisible, but there
could be no infinitely great magnitude; change too is infinitely
divisible, but (with the exception of circular motion) every change
must be of limited duration. This follows from the principle that a
change is from something to something (10, 241a26 ff.); i.e. that
change necessarily has direction. He then adds an argument which
strikingly illustrates the assumption that having direction means
(52) Consideration of circular motion brings out an ambiguity in
181
changing to the realisation of some one given property.
'Consider something that cannot be cut, in
the sense of not possibly being cut (for "cannot"
has different senses). Something that "cannot" in
this sense is not possibly cut, and in general
what cannot happen is not something that possibly
happens. Nor is it possible that what cannot change
should change to that to which it cannot change.
If then something in locomotion is in process of
change to a certain place, then it will be something
that can also carry out this change. So process is
not infinite, and the object will not be in loco¬
motion infinitely, for it cannot traverse the
infinite.' (241b3 - 11)
The only reason, Aristotle assumes, why something should be supposed
to go on changing {e.g. moving in a straight line) for ever (or for
ever unless interfered with) is that the position to which it changes
is infinitely far removed: but this, he says, is nonsense, for it
cannot reach that position; but something cannot be said to be
changing to a point at which it could never be; hence change is
intrinsically finite. But suppose direction of change were identified
otherwise than by reference to a single property or position reached;
for instance by a formula determining a series of positions? Aristotle
is still as far from this conception in Book VI, for all its non-
teleological, unmetaphysical approach, as he ever was in II and III.
(53) Let us now draw out some consequences of the Book VI conception
of all change as involving the prior performance by the subject of a
different and "smaller" change in half the time, etc. Except in the
case of circular locomotion, we obtain the following results.
Firstly: Every change takes infinite time. Argument: A change
from A to C is supposed to "contain" a temporally shorter change K2
from A to B. K-^ and K2 are different changes because their termini
ad quo s differ, thus giving them different directions. Given that
K^, being directed to C, should terminate at C, it follows that K^,
being directed to B, should terminate at B.^6 So the subject must
stop changing at B. Even if it starts again on its way to C, the
stop will have taken time. But at every stage there will have been
such a stop, and there are infinite stages. But what if we seek to
evade the conclusion by saying that the subject need not stop at B
even though it does change to B (so that it is still true that the
change to C "contains" a specifically different change, the one to B)?
Granted this, if B is a direction-giving terminus but not -ipso facto
a point of termination, why should the same not be true of C? In that
case, (a) the subject need never cease changing (unless hindered);
and (b) since it can continue to change after reaching its direction-
giving terminus C, whether or not anything has arisen to give it a
new direction, it follows that it can change without direction.
(54) Secondly: There is no such thing as a change. Argument:
A change K-^ from A to C is supposed to "contain" a temporally shorter
change from A to B. But these are different changes, and at B the
change which the subject had been undergoing, viz. from A to B, is
over. So it is only now that it begins a change other than K2,
namely a change to C from B. Let us call this change K3, for although
it has the same terminus ad quem as , it has a different a quo. It
is now clear that "the" original change K^, which was supposed to be
a unit containing the smaller unit K2, is not a unit at all, but a
sequence of two changes, from A to B and from B to C. But these two
consecutive changes are not a change, since they have no single
36. Cf. Physics VIII 8, 263a23-31.
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direction. Moreover this argument shows that at no point does any
change to C even begin. It did not begin from A, as originally
seemed to be the case, for the change that did take place from A was
not to C but B. We therefore said that the change to C began at B.
But of course it did not really. What began at B was a change to
some point short of C, this change being "contained" by the change
K^, just as what began at A was not a change to C after all, but one
to B. So no change to C ever begins (by infinite repetition of this
argument), nor any change to any other terminus. This reasoning holds
whether or not we suppose (as in the previous argument) that the sub¬
ject must stop for a time at each terminus ad quem. However, it
may be objected that these absurd consequences follow only on the
assumption that a subject cannot be undergoing two differently direc¬
ted changes at the same time. If this is possible, then there is no
reason why we should not say that while changing from A to B, it is
also changing from A to C. In that case, the change from A to C
remains "whole", and has a beginning at A. If however this move is
allowed, there is nothing to bar the conclusion, which for Aristotle
is self-evidently impossible, that something could undergo opposite
.37
changes (i.e. changes to opposite termini ad quos) at the same time.
Suppose something first becomes sick, then becomes healthy. There is
nothing absurd about this as long as it is understood that the becoming
37. For the concept of opposite changes, see Physios V 5. For the
impossibility of the same subject simultaneously undergoing
them, see VIII 7, 261b5 - 6, 20 - 22. For the inference to the
conclusion that where and C^ are contrary changes, one cannot
be part of the same continuous change as the other, see VIII 7,
261b6-7. Here Aristotle claims that there is an intervening
period of stasis. This is due partly to his assumption that
the changes are natural (hence naturally terminate in natural
stasis), but also to a reification of the conceptual point
that one change must be over before the other begins.
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sick is over and done with before the becoming healthy begins. But
if it is possible for something to be undergoing one change K2, and
at the same time another, K^, to a different property on the same
range, there is no reason why it should not be simultaneously under¬
going changes to opposites. For we could regard the becoming sick
as the temporally shorter change which is "contained" in the larger
and already on-going change to health. If this is nonsensical, then
the change to health must be described in such a way as not to entail
that it or any temporal sub-stretch of it coincides with the change to
sickness; and this can only be achieved by stipulating that the
change to health does not start until after the change to sickness is
complete. Thus again, we get two consecutive changes, not one unit
"containing" another.
(55) These absurdities arise only on the assumption that direction
of change is given by the terminus ad quem. If we define direction
by a formula covering all stages on a given range, then the statement
'If X has changed from A to C, then X has changed from A to B' does
not imply that if X has changed from A to C it must first have stopped
at B. For unless 'X changes to -' gives the direction of change,
there is no reason why in changing to Q, X must be going to stop at Q.
If Q does not give the direction, then the subject has not, by reaching
Q, exhausted its change in that direction, so that it must either stop
or go on without direction. Again, if direction is specified by a
formula covering all the stages on a range, then if a pair of oppos¬
ites could be brought under a single formula, the second difficulty
cannot arise. It is not clear what this could mean in connection with
health and sickness (an example which therefore favours Aristotle's
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position). But other examples he gives of opposite changes are
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motion upwards and downwards. Here the termini could be brought
under one formula, and if this formula, rather than any one terminus,
defines the direction of change, then the object could coherently be
described as going upwards while it is going downwards, since the
down-most point is only a stage on the way upwards. It is not oppos-
ites as such that resist this treatment, as the up-down example shows,
but only opposites that do not lend themselves to mathematical formu¬
lation. And in general, when the direction of change is given by a
single formula covering stages A, B, C, etc. (which being on the same
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range are contraries in the logical sense, even if not opposites),
there is no absurdity in the idea that the object changing from A to
C is also changing from A to B: this is the same change, since the
direction is the same. The phrase 'A to B' describes that change as
it was when it had only got as far as B; it does not, on this view,
describe a specifically different change which occurred somehow
tucked away inside the A to C change without (per impossibile)
threatening the latter's own unity and identity.
(56) Some time after he composed Book VI Aristotle's cosmological
concerns generated a problem whose solution, as he saw it, cost him
the conclusion so proudly iterated in Book VI 6, that whatever com¬
pletes a change has completed an infinite number of other changes.
For cosmological reasons, there must be some change that is everlasting
{Physics VIII 6, 260al7 - 19). What kind of change could it be? For
38. Cf. Physics VIII 8, 261b34 - 36.
39. Cf. Physics V 5, 229bl4-21.
Aristotle, this amounts to the question: How can there be change
with direction but without termination? In effect, the problem of
the eternal change forces him to clarify his own conception of the
relation between "change" and "terminus". As a result, circular
locomotion emerges as the one type of process capable of filling the
bill (Physios VIII 7-9). But along the way Aristotle comes face to
face with the conceptual absurdities generated by his earlier attempt
to analyse change in terms of infinite divisibility while still re¬
taining the notion of terminus as source of direction. Theoretically,
it might be said, Aristotle had a choice: he could have abandoned
the connection between direction and terminus. But there is no sign
that he even saw this as an alternative, and it is the account of
VI 6 that has to go. The lesson of the paradoxes displayed above is
that one completed change is not a Chinese box of other completed
changes, and any hope of spelling out in this way the difference
between process and the static must be set aside. The most that can
be said is that in any single continuous process, e.g. locomotion, the
total distance covered contains potentially the halves, quarters, etc.
of that distance. That is to say, we can (mentally or physically)
divide it. But it does not therefore actually contain or consist of
halves, etc. (VIII 8, 263all - 263b9) Nor does it if it i^ divided,
for then there is no "it", not one distance but two, or however many.
And what is true of the distance is true also of the change. An actual
change that took time could have stopped (been divided) half-way. But
it does not follow that if not "divided", the whole actually has that
half-change present in it. And as with space, if the division did
take place, so that the lesser change was the actual one, it would not
be an actual half of a larger change, because the larger one would not
have happened. If the parts are actual, the whole is not (in which
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case they are not properly called parts), and vice Versa.
(57) With regard to space, Aristotle draws the conclusion:
'One who moves continuously has traversed
infinite stages per aocidens, but not strictly
speaking. For it is per accidens that the
infinitely many halves [halves of halves, etc.]
are in the line, whereas its essence and being
are different.' (VIII 8, 263b6 - 9)
A line along which a man travels is not definable as halves, quarters,
etc., any more than an animal is definable by reference to the sub¬
stantial natures of the simple bodies that are "in it" in the sense
. . 40 . .
that they would emerge on decomposition. Similarly with respect
to change: what a given change is, is not any or all of the lesser
changes any one of which would have occurred through interference at
the appropriate stage along the way. It is absurd to define something
actual in terms of the remnants that would have been left of it had
it been destroyed or prevented from fully being. Thus infinite div¬
isibility cannot give the essence of change, even if it is a universal
(and necessary) fact about it. However, once it is clearly seen that
infinite divisibility does not give the essence, there is no longer
the pressure felt in Book VI to insist that infinite divisibility
is even a universal property. In any case the essential difference
between change and non-change must be made out anew (or rather, by
recourse again to the analysis in Book III), and although infinite
divisibility is interesting, its interest cannot lie in its telling
us the essence of change; so it no longer matters if there is reason
40. Cf. Simplicius, Diels p. 1293, 3 - 5: 'h'civ opl^dyeda ... to
auveyes to duvaysvov eit 'atEtpov duatpeua^au, to evepyetqi 'ov
MaTa to ev autijj duvayeu opu^oyeda, d>s ed Tts tov TaOpov opdcotTO
tov duvayevov ye'Ataaav ye'veaftat.'
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to doubt whether all change is infinitely divisible.
(58) It is no accident then that immediately after concluding the
argument just examined, Aristotle turns to redefine his position with
regard to the paradox of the transitional moment. In VI 6 he had
argued that change necessarily occupies an interval between its
termini., since otherwise there would be a moment when the object had
both terminal properties at once. He put more trust in this argument
than it deserved because of his current conviction that the essence of
change was mathematical continuity, which entails temporal between-
ness. But if change need not be mathematically continuous, nor need
it occupy time between the termini. So Aristotle is now free to
muster precisely the argument which in VI 6 he so oddly ignored.
And his present example is qualitative change, just the kind to which
the mathematical schema was least appropriate and was only made to
seem so at all by dubious reasoning. In VIII 8, 263b9 - 264a6 he
states that we must avoid saying that when something changes from
white to not-white, it has both properties. But this, he argues, is
done if we refuse to treat the moment of transition as a moment shared
by the periods which it divides. Since (he assumes) something must
be true of the object at that moment, let us say that it then has
the property _to which it has changed. (For at that moment it has
changed, hence has the property to which the change was a change.)
So at the moment of having changed the object is not-white. But
there is no need to say that it was then also white. 'The moment
belongs already to the later period' (263b21).
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(59) It is true that Aristotle conducts this argument in terms of
a quality and its contradictory, not contrary qualities. Thus it
might be thought not to constitute a direct rejection of VI 6, 237a
17-28, since that passage was concerned with transition between con¬
traries. In VIII 8 Aristotle is saying that if we describe a
change as a transition between contradictories, then there cannot
be a period of time between the two; but the instantaneous transition
presents no paradox provided we look upon the instant as a limit.
And in saying this, it may be thought, he does not deny that change
between contraries occupies an intermediate period. The moment the
white object ceased to be white it would be not-white (have "left"
being white); but this does not entail that the change to the terminal
contrary colour is complete as soon as the subject has ceased to be
white. But the present passage cannot be reconciled with VI 6,
237al7 - 28 in this way. For the position there was that change from
contrary to contrary occupied a time between the times when the
object had first one contrary, then the other. Aristotle's words in
the present passage contradict this. At 263b21-23, he says:
'If the not-white was coming to be or the
white ceasing to be in the whole of the period
preceding the moment of transition, then at that
moment the coming to be or ceasing to be was
complete.'
The context shows that Aristotle is implicitly asserting the antecedent
of this hypothetical. He continues (263b23 - 24) :
'So at that moment it is first true to say
that the object is white or not-white [sc. de¬
pending on whether the change was from white to
not-white or vice Versa].'
Suppose that it is from white to not-white. Then, Aristotle says, the
object is white up to the moment of transition, when it is first true
to call it not-white. But he has also said that the not-white was
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coming to be and the white ceasing to be throughout the period before
the transition. Thus he is willing to describe the pre-transition
situation as one in which the object both was white (was "at" the
terminus a quo) and was ceasing to be white or becoming not-white.
This description we saw to be coherent (even on the assumption that
the change is a time-taking process), given the III 1 definition of
change (u.s. paragraph (42)). Aristotle has already proclaimed in
Book VIII his loyalty to this definition (1, 251a8 - 10; 5, 257b6-9).
That loyalty we have no reason to believe him ever to have renounced,
but at one stage perhaps he thought that the accounts of Books III
and VI would usefully supplement each other. But the possibility
of any such co-operative relationship is precisely what these latest




(1) We turn now to the most puzzling part of Aristotle's theory of
change, the topic of agent and patient. It is difficult to determine
his position on this matter, and difficult to see its philosophical
sense. Yet these problems have a special claim on the attention of
anyone concerned with his notion of change, because for Aristotle,
"agent-patient" more than any other concept is bound up with his
account of change itself. The connection is so close that his analysis
of change can hardly escape the reach of such charges of confusion
and obscurity as might be levelled against his views on agency and
patiency. No one would dispute the latter concept's relevance to
change, any more than the relevance of space, time, infinity and the
problems of the vacuum (of. Ill 1, 200bl5 - 25). But Aristotle does
not deal with agency and patiency as he does with these, devoting to
each on its own a methodical discussion whose beginning and end are
clearly marked. This procedure means that the original definition of
change in III 1 enjoys a certain measure of immunity from difficulties
arising independently in connection with these separate studies. But
his remarks concerning agent and patient in III 1-3 are so embedded
in the discussion of change itself that it is hard to resist the
impression that for him the two notions stand and fall together.
(2) We have seen, for instance, how he refers to agent and patient,
changer and changed, even at the very moment of introducing the defin¬
ition of Ktvpots (200b25 - 32; v.s. Chapter III, paragraph (20)).
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And he has no sooner proposed the definition than he turns briefly
to the question 'Is the agent of change necessarily also a patient?'
The definition is then discussed in detail and compared with accounts
of change in earlier thinkers. This leads, with no indication of a
diversion, to a more expansive treatment of the question just men¬
tioned, which in turn leads to an argument designed to show that 'the
HbvqcTLS is in the patient (not in the agent)' (III 3, 202al3-b22).
Immediately after this Aristotle gives formal notice that the section
on the definition of change is at an end, winding up with the following
words:
'It has been stated what xuvnots is, both in
general and as regards its particular species. For
it is clear how each of its kinds will be defined.
Alteration is the actuality of the alterable insofar
as it is alterable. But it is more perspicuous
('YVcoptptoTepov') to say that xuvrious is the actuality
of the potential agent and patient (toO Suvapeu
TtourirxoO xau raBriTLXou) insofar as they are poten¬
tially so, whether we say this simpliciter or in
application to particular types of case such as
building or healing.' (202b23 - 28)
So Aristotle concludes the account of XLvqats with what amounts to a
reformulation of the original definition in terms of agent and patient.
The potentiality so central to the definition is now explained as the
potentiality of agency and patiency. But if change by definition
involves a potential agent and patient, then the actuality of change
must be the actuality of agency and patiency (since it is only in
actual change, caused or suffered, that something is an actual agent
or patient). In effect, then, these concluding lines declare that
change is by definition the actuality of agency and patiency, these
actualities being grounded on their own corresponding potentialities.
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(3) What moves him to this reformulation, and how can it be
supposed even to make sense as applied to change in general, and in
particular to the primary type of change, viz. natural change? These
questions will engage us in this and the next chapter. But it should
be said at the outset that the text of the Physios offers hints rather
than answers. In particular Aristotle never explains how it is that
the very definition of change as such is supposed to involve the
agent-patient relationship. In the discussion of Book III the trans¬
ition is made as if justification were unnecessary. This situation
is not remedied by a subsequent argument in VIII 4 purporting to show
that everything that changes is changed by something, for Aristotle
can only achieve this conclusion by departing radically from the
meaning he has assigned to 'agent' and 'changer' in III. In De
Generatione et Corruptione he devotes several chapters (I 6 - 10) to
just such an independent discussion of agency and patiency as we might
have expected him to instigate in the Physics along with similar
discussions of space, time, infinity, etc. But it is noteworthy that
in De Generatione et Corruptione he never tries to delineate an
essential relationship between agent-patient and change as such. He
is there concerned only to state what agency involves when it occurs,
not to show that it occurs of necessity whenever change does (although
no doubt this is taken for granted). These defects of exposition
would hardly matter if in the Physics the agent-patient concept
figured only as an unimportant offshoot from the account of change.
But nothing could be further from the truth, since it is this concept
that has to bear the whole weight of the massive argument in VIII for
a supreme immaterial unmoved mover.
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(4) We shall consider that argument in the next chapter. Mean¬
while we must examine the general position from which Aristotle is
able finally to reach his conclusion in VIII. But a word first about
terminology. I am translating Aristotle's pairs ' tououv' /' itaaxov'
(and cognates), and 'xuvouv'/'xuvouyevov' (and cognates) by 'agent'/
'patient' (etc.), and 'changer'/'changed' (etc.) respectively. In the
present discussion the pairs will be used interchangeably, in accord¬
ance with Aristotle's own usage in III 1-3. As a rule, he tends to
reserve 'ica^os' and its cognates for qualities and changes in respect
of quality."*" If 'itaaxetv' is taken as meaning the same as 'to have a
itdbog', then in this narrow sense something itdoxee only if it is a
patient with respect to qualitative change. However, when in III 3,
202b26 - 7 Aristotle recasts his definition of xuvqaus in terms of
'itouetv' and 'itdoxeuv', he is obviously using the latter word to cover
all the categories of change covered by 'xuvqaus' itself. Now his
general position concerning agency and patiency may be summed up in
the following propositions:
(i) Everything that changes (intransitive) is changed by a
changer.
(ii) A changer is a source of change distinct in some way
from that which is changed. (Eor this, see especially
Physios VIII, 4-5.)
(iii) To act as a changer is not to change (intransitive).
We shall begin by considering (i) and (ii).
(5) Although in III 1 Aristotle speaks as if 'xuvqaus' and
1. Bonitz s.V. 'itdBog', 3 (556b - 557a4). For Aristotle's own dis¬
cussion of the wider and narrower senses of 'itouetv' see De Gen.
et Com. I 6, 323al5 - 20.
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'yexagoAn' were synonymous, he conducts his analysis almost entirely
in terms of 'xuvqaLs'. Hence it may have seemed a necessary truth
that every change that takes place, takes place in a subject that is
changed. For the verb 'xtvetv' can express a meaning equivalent to
the intransitive 'X changes' only when used in the passive voice. (It
is otherwise with 'yexagdAAexv', which may be used intransitively in
the active, and often is so used by Aristotle, as e.g. in Book VI
passim.) However, his reformulation of the definition of xtvpots in
III 3 entails that for every change there is not only a changed, but
a changer. It might seem that this too follows from the linguistic
rules of usage for 'xlveuv'. For if change is predicated of the sub¬
ject of change by means of a verb in the passive, does not the gram¬
matical relation between active and passive ensure that there is a
logically equivalent sentence with the same verb used transitively in
the active, and the subject of the previous sentence functioning now
as grammatical object? This however is not so obviously true.
Grammar alone dictates that where the verb of change is 'xuveuv', the
subject of change must be described as a 'changed' ('xtvouyevov').
But it is not obvious that grammar alone forces us to accept the cor¬
responding active-voiced sentence, and so to acknowledge a changer.
Linguistic rules oblige us to suppose a changed for every changer,
but not the reverse. For where 'changes' is transitive, 'X changes -'
is grammatically ill-formed, as much so as 'X is with -'. The same
is true of 'X is changed by -'. But in using the passive, there is
no need to append the preposition that asks to be completed by an
agent-term. We can simply say: 'X is changed (xtvetxau)'. This is
not grammatically ill-formed. It is a complete sentence, fulfilling
2
the basic requirement of 'saying something about something'. It may
2. Cf. De Int. 5, 17a20-21.
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indeed be^ a necessary truth that for every changed there is a changer,
but if so, the necessity is not grammatical: it is like that of the
sentence: 'For every changed, there are conditions whose presence
would have prevented it from being a changed'. The rules of language
do not demand that a well-formed sentence make reference to the
conditions whose presence would have hindered; nor do they demand
reference to an agent, even when the verb is grammatically in the
3
passive.
(6) 'xLvetadau' then is passive as to its grammatical form, but
not necessarily passive as to its meaning, and I have just argued that
the grammatical form does not grammatically require the construction
of an equivalent sentence with the verb in the active and an agent-term
as subject. But it may be that conceptual if not grammatical consid¬
erations justify the inference from 'change' to 'changer'. Every
change, after all, is dependent on something, and every change takes
place in a subject. Is it legitimate to equate subject with changed,
and that on which change depends with changer? The second of these
questions is the difficult one. For it seems clear that the subject
of change is the changed, i.e. the patient - on one proviso. The
proviso is that there be an agent or changer. For if there is no
agent, then although there may be a change and a subject of change,
the subject is not a patient, or a changed, in any but the weak
grammatical sense displayed in the linguistic behaviour of the Greek
3. Cf. J. Lyons, Introduction to Theoretical Linguistics, p. 378:
'If there is any function that is common to the passive in all the
languages that are customarily said to have a passive voice (and
in certain languages this seems to be its sole function: e.g. in
Turkish), this is that it makes possible the construction of
"agentless" sentences: e.g. Bill was killed.'
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verb 'mlvelv'. But it is safe to say that if there is an agent, then
it is the subject of change that is the patient. So the question is
whether there is in every case an agent, and, more specifically,
whether the fact that every change is causally dependent proves that
every change has an agent.
(7) Aristotle is given to speaking of the agent or the changer of
a given change. Thus he does not see any and every condition on which
a change depends as its agent. There are many such conditions, so
that none is as such the condition. 'The agent' makes sense only if
used of some factor uniquely related to the change. Given Aristotle's
scheme of concepts, the uniquely related factor ought to be identified
with that which determines the form or pattern of change. For there
are many conditions without which the change could not occur, but what
determines the type of change is a single individual embodying a single
principle, whether substantial nature or purpose. This conclusion is
borne out by Aristotle's words at III 2, 202a9-12:
'The changer will in each case confer the form,
either of substance or of quality or of quantity,
which form will be the principle and cause of the
change whenever the changer operates. For instance,
an actual man makes what is potentially a man into
a man.'
Now this remark is intended to apply to all changes as such, or
(given the inbuilt restrictiveness of the definition in III 1) at
least to all changes dictated by nature or purpose. But natural
change, which is presupposed by all other kinds, typically involves
only one individual substance. The man begotten by man in Aristotle's
example must also grow. In this case the same individual substance
is the subject of growth and also its source, being not merely the
locus of change but such as to change in that way. Does this mean
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that the substance is agent (and therefore also patient) of its
change? An affirmative answer would entail abandoning the second
of the three principles set out in paragraph (A) above, viz. that
there must be some distinction between agent and patient. Where
source and subject are the same individual, as in natural change,
there appears to be no room for the agent-patient relationship as
defined by those three principles. This problem is especially discon¬
certing given the context in which it occurs. That context is Aris¬
totle's reformulation (as he takes it to be) of the original III 1
definition of change in terms now of agency and patiency. In the last
chapter we saw (paragraphs (36) ff.) how the original formula fitted
only natural changes and their analogues. Now we find that the new
(agent-patient) formulation fits natural change not at all. Both
formulations of what is intended to be a definition of change fail to
cover the whole field; but worse still, they fail to cover opposite
areas.
(8) But to avoid this latest difficulty perhaps we should identify
the agent in natural change with the nature itself or principle
embodied in the changing substance. In arguing against the Eleatics
in I 2, Aristotle remarks that a principle cannot be identical with
that of which it is the principle (185a3 - 5). Since nature is a
principle of change, we can infer that a thing's nature is other than
any of its changes. Can we also infer, though, that the nature is
other than the subject of those changes? And if in some sense this
is true, is it a sense of 'other than' that would license saying that
the nature is the agent? Our earlier discussion revealed no grounds
for saying that the nature is a special kind of thing "inside" a
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particular substance. Indeed, if 'thing' is interpreted precisely to
mean 'particular substance', Aristotle's concept of nature decisively
forbids any such view. If a nature were itself a particular sub¬
stance, it would not be, as he says in II 1, 192b34, 'in a subject';
hence the subject of change of which a nature is supposed to be a
nature would not have that nature "in" it. The subject of change,
then, would either be identical with the nature (which in that case
cannot stand to the subject as agent to patient) or not; and if not,
then since the nature is not "in" the subject either, the subject,
it seems, is without a nature, hence without substantial character,
hence no substance. A nature, then, is not a distinct thing from the
particular individual natured. No doubt we can say that it is an
aspect of the individual, distinguishable in thought from other aspects.
But is this distinction strong enough to justify regarding the nature
as an agent? In cases of externally determined change, Aristotle
identifies the agent or changer with the concrete individual substance
that is sufficient cause, the begetting parent, the house-builder,
etc. It would therefore be risky to suppose that where the change is
not externally determined, he assigns the agent-role to a "nature",
which is only an abstraction. How could the "nature" stand to the
subject in a relation sufficiently similar to that which holds between
concrete agent and external subject for it not to be sheer confusion
4
to speak of 'agent and patient' in both cases?
4. Cf. A. Mansion, Introduction a la Physique Aristotelicienne, pp.
226 and 233, for a strong statement of the view that (on Aristot¬
elian principles), the efficient cause of change is not, strictly
speaking, the principle (nature or art) but the concrete substance
that embodies it. Mansion does not indicate how this can be recon¬
ciled with the notion of 'self-change' introduced in Physics VIII.
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(9) We shall recur to these questions in the course of the next
chapter (paragraphs (8) - (9) and (34) - (36) in particular). We are
not obliged to pursue them at present in order to interpret Aris¬
totle's general theory of agency-patiency. For as we shall see, he
does not indulge in any general identification of natures with the
agents of natural change. Hence the problems of this identification
are for the moment a side-issue. What concerns us now is whether he
can make good the principle that for every change there is a changer,
or whether he can make it good without giving up some other principle
or assumption. For instance, if changer and changed need not be
distinct, natural change would present no problem; the same concrete
individual would function as both. Or if the changer need not be the
determinant of change, but only something on which change depends,
natural change could be put down to an external concrete agent (or set
of agents). In the end it is this last assumption, that the agent
determines the form of change, that Aristotle drops so as to save
principles (i) and (ii). This takes place in Physics VIII 4.
(10) The context is an argument designed to demonstrate that what¬
ever changes is changed by something. (It is assumed that what some¬
thing is changed try is its changer.) The reasoning has an ambiguous
flavour; it betrays on the one hand an a priori resolve to save at
all costs the conclusion to be proved, while on the other hand pro¬
ceeds as if this conclusion were no longer self-evident or true by
virtue of the very definition of 'Ktvpaus'. The argument parades as
empirical; it is an induction from cases, but with a foregone con¬
clusion. The types of change are divided into enforced and natural,
and natural change is subdivided into organic and inorganic. Aristotle
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then argues that in each division, change is a change by something.
Enforced change presents no problem; obviously it is by something,
viz. an external physical substance. Nor does Aristotle find any
difficulty in supposing an agent for the natural changes of living
things. These are changed "by themselves", and although the meaning
of this is not fully explained, he takes it as intuitively certain that
a living thing (and especially an animal) contains an agent of its
natural changes which differs from the subject of change in a way
which may, as he says, be difficult to analyse, but which clearly per¬
mits us to regard the subject as a genuine "changed".
'The proposition that whatever changes (huv£Ctoil)
is changed by something is most obviously true in the
case of things changed against their nature, since it
is apparent that they are changed by something else.
The next most obvious cases after these are things
that change by their nature but are changed by them¬
selves, such as animals. For what is difficult to
make out is not that they are changed by something,
but in what way the changer in them is to be dis¬
tinguished from the changed.' (VIII 4, 254b24 - 30)
The whole question of "self-change" in Physios VIII will be a major
topic of the next chapter, but meanwhile let us see how Aristotle
deals here with the remaining class of cases, the natural changes of
the simple inanimate bodies. These present the worst problem
('pdAtOTa S'anopeuxoiL' , 255b33) for anyone who maintains that whatever
changes is changed by something. For here there is no external deter¬
minant of change, yet Aristotle refuses to class the simple bodies
along with substances that are changed "by themselves". Self-changers,
he says, are alive, they naturally change in diverse ways, they are
physically complex (255a5 - 18). This is enough to show that the mere
fact that a substance has a nature is not for him a sufficient ground
for holding that it has "within" itself an agent. For the simple
bodies no less than organic creatures have natures that are sources
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of change. If every nature as such were an agent of natural change,
then all natural change would be "self-change" in substances of every
type.
(11) So what are the "changers" responsible for the natural changes
of the simple bodies? Aristotle can solve the problem only by a con¬
ceptual shift: -i.e. by breaking with the original meaning of 'changer'
laid down in III 2. The natural changes of the simple bodies are
not, he argues, totally independent of everything else: in the first
place, a mass of earth or fire owes its natural motion to the agent
that generated it and made it be what it is, fire or earth; and
secondly, the realisation of the motion depends on the absence of
external interference, so that whatever removes an obstruction is
also responsible for the change. In these changes then, he concludes,
the subject is changed, not by itself, but by something, whether the
generator or the remover of hindrances (255b35 - 256a2). But neither
of these changers can possibly be said currently to determine the
motion while it is happening. The generator (according to his theory
of elemental transformation) no longer exists,^ and the remover of
hindrances not only does not determine the form of the change, but
might rather be said to gain its character an remover of hindrance
from the very change of which it is supposed to be the agent. For
what constitutes a hindrance, and what (therefore) the removal of
one, depends on the direction of the tendency pre-existing in the
simple body.
5. As Simplicius puts it {Comm. -in Phys. ad 255b31 - 256a3, Diels,
p. 1220, 9 - 11): 'et to ytvvrjaav xau touhaav tup tetauxat evuote
nab ouxe rdpeaxLV oute Ecpatxexau xou xuvoupevou, tcijg ut'sxEtvou
Aeyexau xLvetaftau to tup;'
203
(12) It is perhaps no accident that during this argument Aristotle
speaks only of that by (uto) which the simple body is changed and not
of its changer (xcvouv). For the latter expression unavoidably
suggests a currently acting determinant, whereas the former permits
the interpretation that the change itself (the natural motion) is an
intransitive event brought about by the earlier action of an agent.
On this interpretation, the body is only a patient with respect to
the earlier action, say of releasing: this it "suffers", but not the
change that thereby becomes open to it. However, Aristotle decisively
blocks this interpretation when he writes in 255b29 - 31:
'It is clear that none of these [the simple
bodies] changes (transitive) itself. But each has a
principle of change, not of (transitively) changing
something (xou xuvetv), nor of making something come
about (toO itoueuv) , but of suffering (toO naaxeuv). '
Since the principle investing the simple body is a principle of change
(not a principle for being released by some external agent), Aristotle
must mean that the change itself is a "suffering". But he cannot mean
to assert this merely on the ground that the change owes its being
to the prior action of an external agent. For by that criterion many
things would count as "sufferings" which for him are conceptually
opposed to suffering. For instance, where the activity of an agent
results from the agent's release from constraint, this would be
"suffering". (Even the activity of the changer within the "self-
changer" might turn out to be a "suffering", at this rate.) In 4
255b3 - 11 and 20- 23 Aristotle carefully compares the natural motions
of the simple bodies when released with the knower's exercise of
knowledge, which is supposed to take place whenever nothing prevents
it. Yet the exercise of knowledge is an evepyeta in the special sense
in which Aristotle contrasts this terms with 'xdvpoLs' (v.i. paragraphs
(27) ff.). It is like thinking, seeing and being happy, all of which
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occur 'unless prevented' (given the appropriate state of the subject);
but these are the very last conditions that Aristotle would connect
with "suffering". Not only is this term's suggestion of subjection
to the undesirable wholly inappropriate in their case, but so is its
broader and more neutral meaning of 'condition that does not come from
the subject itself' . For these activities are the highest expressions
of the natures of beings capable of them. It is clear then that
Aristotle's only reason for classing the principle within a simple
body as a principle of suffering, is that it is a principle of change;
the reason is not that it owes its manifestation to a releaser. In
other words, he is simply identifying change as such with suffering
for no apparent reason other than that change is change. For seeing
and the exercise of knowledge are not sufferings because, as we shall
see, they are not changes (Ktvpaeus) but evepyetat. (The difference
between these categories turns on the difference between the complete
and the incomplete. An evepyeua is essentially complete as long as
it lasts, a Ktvpous essentially incomplete.)
(13) We shall presently investigate this last-mentioned distinc¬
tion in some detail; meanwhile let us summarise the position to have
emerged so far. (a) Aristotle's doctrine of nature makes it impossible
for him to hold that every change has a changer in the sense of a
concrete agent (other than the subject) that determines the shape of
the change. (b) It remains to be seen whether in some cases the nature
of a substance might not fulfil the role of "changer". However (c) it
is clear that in some cases (the natural changes of the simple bodies)
the nature is not seen by Aristotle as an inner agent. (d) Since in
these cases there is no external concrete substance shaping the change
either, Aristotle can only preserve the principle that for every change
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there is a distinct agent by diluting the concept of agent so that
it no longer implies 'currently acting determinant'. Thus (e) even
the generator and the releaser are now "agents", and the change is
considered to be a "suffering" in relation to them. On the other
hand (f), it is not because of what these so-called "agents" do
(i.e. generate and release) that the subject is said to "suffer", but
because of what happens as a result, viz. a change. In effect, Aris¬
totle cannot or will not recognise such a thing as intransitive change
that is neither an acting upon nor a being acted upon. His assumption
appears to be that since the nature manifested in e.g. the typical
movement of fire is obviously not a principle for acting upon other
things (save per accidens), it must be a principle for being acted
upon or suffering. He admits no third possibility. But it cannot
simply be the event's dependence on the action of prior agents that
justifies equating it with suffering. For states of natural rest
(the fire's at last being where it belongs) are likewise dependent, as
are various non-kinetic activities. Perhaps it is the incompleteness
of change that provokes this classification of it as essentially passive.
But Aristotle does not bring into the open the conceptual connection
between passivity and incompleteness, and it remains thoroughly
6
mys terious.
(14) So far then we have failed to uncover any sound basis for
6. Simplicius tries to explain as follows {-Lb-id. lines 21 ff.) :
'Bauyaoxcos fiupev xau ev rots xaxa cpuatv xuvouyevots to uio tlvos
MiveiaSai to xovouyevov, exeLbq to xtveta-daL uaaxetv tl eotl, to
6e taaxetv SeLxau tou uolouvtos. q yev yap xeAeta evepyeua ex
xns xeXeuas ouauas xpoLouaa ou Seuxao tlvos aAAqs xqs xapayouaqs
aLTLas, q 6e xuvqats axeXqs oi5aa evepyeua xat rca-dos yaXAov xau
TtoAAcp xqj Suvayet auyxexpayevq betxaL toO toloOvtos auxqv.'
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Aristotle's assumption that change is essentially dependent on an
agent. However, there is one aspect of the original definition of
xuvpaLS in III 1 which we have not yet considered at all and which
might serve to bridge the gap between this and the reformulated
version at the end of III 3. The original version has a defect,
noted with unease by the ancient commentators,'7 which it might seem
can only be remedied by reference to the concept of agent-patient.
If xtvpaus is defined simply in terms of the subject's potentiality
to be in a state that it is not actually in, then it follows that the
concept of xuvnous is co-extensive with that of potentiality: to
every potential condition, there corresponds a possible change defined
as the actuality that holds of the subject insofar as it is poten¬
tially in that condition. But there would appear to be at least one
class of potentialities to which there do not correspond changes or
Muvnaets. These are comprised under the category of Relatives.
There seems to be no good reason for refusing to extend the 'actually/
potentially' distinction to this category. Thus it should make sense
to speak of X as potentially smaller than Y, etc. Suppose now that
it comes to be true of X that X is actually smaller than Y. According
to the definition, this transition from the mere potentiality to the
actuality ought to count as a change on the same logical level as that
of bricks becoming a house or a boy growing to full height. But
intuitively we reject the idea that 'coming to be smaller than Y'
describes a change in X. For, as we say, it could be true of X even
though X has not changed, but only Y. Aristotle endorses this common-
sense reaction when he excludes relatives from the list of categories
7. Ad Phys.j 202a3-7; Themistius, Schenkl, p. 75, 3 ff. ; Philoponus,
Vitelli, p. 367, 8 ff.; Simplicius, Diels, p. 436, 26 ff.
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in respect of which xuvqats is possible (V 2, 225bll - 13). Yet
this is not justified by his own original definition of xuvqous. The
conceptual elements of that definition, viz. potentiality and actual¬
ity, occur in all the categories including that of Relatives. So if
Aristotle's manipulation of these elements can succeed in producing
a formula that covers, say, qualitative change, how can it fail to
cover, at the same time, "changes" in all the categories?
(15) Our unwillingness to count the acquisition and loss of
relational properties as "real" changes may have no single simple
9
reason. But perhaps the most obvious difference between these and
"real" changes arises over the spatial relationship of cause to
effect. If X grows ("really" changes size), thereby becoming taller
than Y, then Y becomes shorter than X. Now the only cause of this
new relational property is whatever it is that causes the growth of X.
It is because X grows that its size changes in relation to Y's and Y's
8. It is clear that here Aristotle excludes the acquisition of new
relational properties from the class of pexaBoAau as well as from
the class of xuvnoets, which in this context are regarded as a
sub-class of peraBoAaL.
9. For a contemporary statement of the problem, see P.T. Geach, God
and the Soul, pp. 71-72: 'The only sharp criterion for a thing's
having changed is what we may call the Cambridge criterion (since
it keeps occurring in Cambridge philosophers of the great days,
like Russell and McTaggart): The thing called 'x' has changed
if we have 'F(x) at time t' true and 'F(^) at time t-^ false, for
some interpretation of 'F', 't', and 't^ . But this account is
intuitively quite unsatisfactory. By this account, Socrates
would after all change by coming to be shorter than Theaetetus . . . ' .
(Along with Russell and McTaggart, Geach could have included G.H.
von Wright, Norm and Action, ch. II, on 'The Logic of Change'.) On
p. 99 ibid. Geach continues: 'These, we should wish to say, are
not real changes in Socrates. But I do not know of any criterion,
let alone a sharp one, that will tell us when we have a real change
in Socrates, and not just a 'Cambridge' change. The search for
such a criterion strikes me as an urgent task of philosophy.'
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to its. Thus whatever cause results in X's growth results also in
Y's acquisition of a new relative size. But there is a striking
difference between the relation of this cause to X, and its relation
to Y. Let us call the total cause of X's growth 'C'. Now C is a set
of conditions in and around X. For the various component-conditions
of C to produce the effect in question, it is not enough that they
should simply exist; they must exist in or in the environment of X.
If they were cancelled from there but reproduced somewhere else, they
might as well not exist at all for all they would do to assist the
growth of X. But it is quite otherwise with the causal relation
of C to its other "effect", namely the transition from one to another
relative property in Y. Y becomes (by the same amount) smaller than
X wherever Y may be; however far removed from X, and however far
removed, therefore, from C which caused the growth of X. But C is
also and thereby the cause of this "change" in Y. Yet this "effect"
of C in no way depends on or varies with the particular spatial
relationship between its subject Y and its cause C. Provided that C
does result in the growth of X, it is enough that C should occur merely
in the same universe as Y for it to be true that C "makes" Y shorter
than X. This surely is one reason why we put the inverted commas round
"makes", and "change", and "effect". If we counted these shifts in
relational properties as real changes or real effects, we should be
attributing to the cause C a power of absolute scope and absolute
immediacy. For its "effect" would be in no way diminished by the
distance of the object "affected"; nor would it vary in any way on
account of changes in the contents of the space separating C from that
object. It is because we refuse to recognise this "effect" as a real
change at all that we need not recognise a "power" to produce it.
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(16) The subject of a "real" change of a given sort must not only
be capable of changing in that way, but it must also stand in a
particular relationship to a cause sufficient for producing that
change. And that the subject stands in this relation does not follow
from its being of a kind capable of the change. Thus if a particular
cause produces a change in a given subject, there is no reason to
suppose that it also produces a similar change in other potential sub¬
jects. On the contrary, if the cause is identified with a spatial
object or spatial condition that stands to the subject of change in
a given spatial relationship, it is clear that there could be in exis¬
tence other suitable subjects that would be debarred by the very logic
of space itself from an appropriate spatial relation to that particular
cause. For the same particular cause C cannot be in contact with, or
at a given distance from, every suitable subject at the same time,
unless it so happens that there are in existence only as many suitable
subjects as there is room for near or around or at the appropriate
distance from the particular cause C. And if this were the case, it
would be a purely contingent fact. Thus in general, a cause of a
"real" change selects, by its situation, only some among all possible
subjects to be the actual subjects of its effect on any one occasion.
By contrast, the particular cause of a "change" in some relational
property causes at one and the same time comparable "changes" in all
possible subjects that exist. If Y "becomes" smaller than X, because
of C, then every other object commensurable with X and Y ipso facto
"undergoes" a corresponding "change" by the mere fact of being a member
of the class of objects thus commensurable. We may say then that what
distinguishes a "real" change from a relational one is that the former
owes its existence to a particular cause that does not necessarily
produce a similar effect in every object of the same kind. Now although
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we have argued this point by reference only to physical causes that
occupy space, we may extend it to cover also incorporeal causes,
such as e.g. souls. For although the reasons for or against regard¬
ing these as causes have not yet been considered, we should at least
make room for them in an account of Aristotle's notion of agency.
Now the incorporeal causes recognised by Aristotle (V.i. Chapter V,
paragraph (10)) are as selective in their operation as corporeal ones.
A particular soul, for instance, controls not every body of a given
sort, but one: nor could it control any other. Even the supreme
incorporeal mover, which is not (at any rate in the Physios) explic¬
itly identified with a soul, immediately affects one body only, the
outermost sphere of the universe.
(17) We may conclude, then, that the very concept of change makes
essential reference to the concept of a particular cause of change
that stands in a special relation to the subject. For without this
reference, no distinction can be upheld between "real" and relational
change. If we could allow ourselves to identify this notion of a
cause that stands in a special relation to the subject with Aristotle's
notion of agent or changer, it would follow that his reformulation of
the original definition of Mtvpcrus in terms of agent and patient is
entirely justified. It is true that so far as corporeal agents are
concerned, Aristotle restricts the range of the "special relationship"
more narrowly than facts now known may warrant, since he holds that
it must consist in contact between the two bodies. In speaking
vaguely as we did above (paragraph (15)) of the cause C as 'in or
around' the subject of the real change, we deliberately left this
question open. It is perhaps an empirical matter whether or not
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contact is necessary. The point of conceptual importance is that
the subject should be within a given range of the cause. What the
range is will vary with the circumstances, with the particular
characteristics of cause and subject, and with the type of change in
question. All that matters for our argument is that 'within range
of C' cannot be interpreted so widely as to cover any object where¬
soever located. In the same way we may extend the specification of
the "special relationship" which Aristotle employs when describing
the case of an incorporeal agent causing change in a physical object.
He says of the former that it touches without in turn being touched
(De Gen. et Cow. I 6, 323a25 - 34) . Commentators have usually dwelt
on the negative aspect of this curious extension of the concept of
touching, i.e. on the implication that the agent is not and cannot be
affected in turn by the patient. But that the agent touches is no
less significant than that it is not touched, for this makes the point
that the agent stands to the patient in a relation in which it
(numerically the same agent) does not stand to any and every possible
patient. The agency of the agent presupposes that the agent has an
ubi, although it has, in this case, no locus. Thus the metaphor of
'touching without being touched' is appropriate insofar as it attrib¬
utes position to the agent even though incorporeal. It is inappro¬
priate so far as it suggests that the literal fact from which the
metaphor is taken must always involve the over-restrictive condition
of contact. We can remedy this by rephrasing the metaphor as follows:
the incorporeal agent 'reaches to the patient but without the patient's
in turn reaching to it'.
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(18) If the argument of the last four paragraphs is acceptable,
does it succeed in upholding Aristotle's apparently illegitimate
slide from the concept of change as such to the concept of change
brought about by an agent in a patient? It certainly illuminates
this slide, but would fully justify it only if 'agency' in Aristotle's
scheme of concepts had no other function than to mark the logical
difference between properties in respect of which real change is
possible, and relational properties acquired and lost without real
change. We have argued that the need for a specially related cause
is what differentiates "real" changes. But this conclusion is only
a special case of a wider conclusion that can be reached by the same
argument. For the having of a "real" property, no less than the
acquiring it by a "real" change, differs in just this way from the
having of a relational one. If X grows (or is made to swell) to a
certain size, then its remaining at this size depends upon what
happens where it is, and similarly with qualitative states. But Y's
remaining shorter than X depends in part on a situation which may be
as far removed as we please from Y itself, namely the environmental
situation of the other term of the relation, X. If by 'agent' we were
to mean no more than 'cause (or causal condition) whose causality
depends on its special situation vis a vis the subject', then it is
not just change that requires an 'agent'. But it is evident that for
Aristotle 'agent' has a narrower meaning which relates especially to
change. He would insist that some non-relational non-change conditions
require an agent: e.g. conditions of contra-natural rest in natural
substances. But there is no sign of his supposing that in general
rest depends on agency. By contrast, he holds that all changes are
"sufferings" and as such are agent-dependent. No doubt one motive for
this insistence is the need for a universal premiss from which to
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argue that the ultimate physical change of the universe depends on
something other than the mere changing body itself (V.i.. Chapter V).
This aside, his grounds for maintaining a necessary connection between
change in particular, and agency, remain obscure. And in view of his
willingness to alter the meaning of 'agent' in order to be able to
locate an agent for every change {of. paragraph (11) above), we cannot
but wonder whether there is any single interpretation of this concept
by which he would be prepared to abide.
(19) But although we have not succeeded in pinning him down to a
precise meaning of the terms 'agent' and 'changer', there are some
instances of change to which it would seem reasonable to apply the
notion of 'agency/patiency' if to any at all. I refer to those cases
in which one individual physical substance brings about a change in
another. Let us now leave the question whether all changes have
agents, and concentrate on those which most obviously do. If we can
make out the conceptual features of these paradigm cases, it may be
possible to decide whether the more dubious ones resemble them suf¬
ficiently to be brought under the same schema. How otherwise, for
instance, can we evaluate the curious notion, propounded in Book VIII,
of a "self-changer", a single substance that somehow comprises within
itself both agent and patient? Unless the alleged "inner" changer
and changed within the self-changer can be shown to bear some analogy
to changer and changed in clear-cut external cases, 'self-changer' is
only a metaphor, and provides no sound basis for philosophical argu¬
ment. Moreover we have still to elucidate the third of the propos¬
itions listed in paragraph (4) above, namely that a changer as such
does not (intransitively) change, according to Aristotle. If this
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cannot be shown to make sense in the obvious cases, there is little
hope of defending it in connection with dubious and marginal ones.
(20) But since we are not criticising Aristotle only on his own
terms, let us begin by asking what from a philosophical point of
view is ever gained by speaking of agency and patiency, even in those
cases where this phraseology seems most obviously to apply. To say
that one thing acts upon another, or does something to it, or makes
something happen in it, seems to suggest that there is a concrete and
particular process of causing, as concrete and particular as the
change itself that is caused, and as the substances concerned in the
change. Yet Hume's theory of causation, whatever its defects, has at
least, one might suppose, succeeded in correcting any tendency to
believe in "causing" as some kind of particular process. Such a thing
is empirically unidentifiable, and the idea of it fails to explain
either the events themselves or our knowledge of them. Indeed "making",
"acting upon", etc., appear to represent nothing more than the projec¬
tion on to nature of mere forms of language. These forms are the
transitive verbs, active and passive, by which we so often describe
causal relations. These verbs are tensed, and they connect grammatical
subjects and objects which denote actual concrete particulars (called
the 'agent' and 'patient'). As a result, it might be argued, it is
easy to imagine that these verbs denote certain particular connecting
relationships that exist at particular times and places, just as the
objects connected do. But even critics of Hume are almost unanimously
agreed that he has rightly taught us to think of causation as a
relation between objects and events considered not in their particul¬
arity but as members of classes of resembling ones. Where there is
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disagreement, both with Hume himself, and of the critics with one
another, it concerns the precise specification and grounds for
asserting this general relation. But it is assumed on all sides that
the general relation (which for our purposes it is sufficient simply
to denominate as 'law-like', however this be interpreted) cannot
itself be regarded as a particular. Neither (a) the connection
between antecedent and consequent of a law-like generalisation, nor
(b) the "falling-under" relation in which particular objects and
events stand to that antecedent and consequent, is itself a partic¬
ular fact pertaining to a particular region of space-time. These
relations hold, if not timelessly and spacelessly, at any rate every¬
where and always. Thus the transitive verb can, on this view, be
eliminated in favour of a universal hypothetical covering particular
objects or events whose changes are describable intransitively. The
singular sentence 'X heated Y' is translated as: 'X was a member of
the class cp, and Y of the class (1, and whenever under certain conditions
(supposed to have obtained on the occasion in question) a cp is within
a given range of a cjj, the c|j becomes hot.' In this formula, the
clauses following 'whenever' do not denote a particular fact or facts.
Thus, if this analysis is correct, it shows that the apparent "this-
ness" of what is referred to by 'heated' in 'X heated Y' is only
apparent: it is nothing but a reflection of the particularity of
the terms of the relation, X and Y, not of the relation itself.
(21) If all transitive causal verbs are indeed reducible in the
way just outlined, it follows that the philosopher would do well to
discard them altogether from his reflective vocabulary, so as to be
rid of a standing source of temptation to read into real events and
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changes mysterious connectings: a notion that may possibly satisfy
some psychological need, but lacks all cognitive meaning. Now there
can be no question here of entering fully into this issue. But
raising it serves to frame two results of the discussion on which we
are about to embark. These are (i) that for Aristotle, no less than
for Hume, 'agency' and 'acting upon' are not to be understood as
referring to any kind of extra non-empirical process beyond or behind
the phenomena; but (ii) that for Aristotle by contrast with Hume,
these expressions, far from being eliminable from the cognitive
vocabulary, perform a cognitive function that could not be adequately
catered for by formulae in which the particular terms of particular
causal relations are connected only by a covering law-like general¬
isation.
(22) The Aristotelian passage that first concerns us is III 3,
202al3 - 202b22. Aristotle's problem here is different from the one
which we have just raised in response to the Humean theory, but his
discussion contains the elements of an answer to the latter. His
question (apparently a familiar one^) is: Is the change (xdvqaus)
in the patient, or in the patient and in the agent? And his answer
is: In the patient."'""'" The problem arises because Aristotle must
tailor his concept of agency and patiency to accommodate the notion
of a first changer in every causal series of changes. There must be
a first changer, because there must be an originating determinant of
change. But if there is an originating of change, then it cannot be
10. Cf. W.D. Ross, Aristotle's Physios, p. 540.
11. Cf. Metaph. 0 8, 1050a28-bl.
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the case that the substance which originates itself changes
(intransitive) in so doing. For then either we have a change without
a changer; or there is a changer other than the originating substance
(which would contradict its being an originator); or the originator
itself causes the change in which its originating consists: but then
this causing too would consist in a change (intransitive) in the
originator, so that another causing is required, and so on, and there
will thus be no originating by the originator, since every act of
originating would require an infinite number of similar acts by
the same agent. Therefore the causing of change by the originator
(whether the latter be the cause of the heavens' motion or a sublunary
natural substance operating according to its own nature) must noL be
or involve any change in which the originator changes (intransitive).
So whatever causing a change may be, it is not for Aristotle, any more
than for Hume, an extra process of change.
(23) Although Aristotle will use this conclusion in connection with
the problematic "self-change" of organisms, in which one "part" is
supposed to be changer of another, he argues for it in general, and
takes as his only illustration the case of teaching and learning, where
the agent and patient are clearly different individual substances.
His argument proceeds on the following assumption: the only reason
anyone could have for supposing that being a changer (an actual
changer) entails change in that changer, rests on a false view of the
difference between causing and suffering change. It is only through
regarding these (in some given instance, such as teaching and learn¬
ing) as different concrete events, that one could be misled into
thinking that the changer undergoes a change. But once it is seen
that these are different ways of describing the same event, the prob¬
lem disappears, leaving only one change, which is to be located in the
patient. This is the outline of Aristotle's argument, and its drift
may be roughly clear, but some detailed comment is necessary.
(24) The problem as Aristotle presents it in III 3 is shaped by
two assumptions. The first (i) relates to the meaning of 'change'
or 'xtvriaLs'. Aristotle is here using 'xuvncrts' as the generic
term for any process corresponding to a verbal noun with the typical
'-atg' ending. By this criterion, not only are comings-to-be-in-a¬
new-state (represented by such nouns as 'ynpavaug', 'yadqaug')
changes, but so are transitive activities such as those represented
by 'OLKoSopnous', 'dbda^ug', 'uaTpeuaus', etc. This double use of
'wtvqaLg' is reflected in the passage already quoted from VIII 4
where he says that the simple bodies each contain a principle of
change, 'not of causing change (tou mlvelv) nor of making it happen
(tou noueLv), but of suffering it (tou itctaxetv) ' (255b30 - 31) . This
shows that he regards 'principle of change' as interpretable as
'principle of causing change'. However, this usage is not the common
one of the Physics. As a rule, Aristotle uses 'xuvqatg' to mean a pro
cess of coming to be in some new state (see especially Books V and VI)
The second assumption (ii) is that for every change, something changes
(ktvetTub), i.e. comes to be in a new state. Now these assumptions
taken together seem to yield the following: teaching (dbdagug), no le
than learning (yadqatg) is a change, (by (i)). Thus teaching no less
than learning involves the coming to be of a new state (by (ii)).
Thus the teacher, who is the subject of the verb 'teaches', must be
the subject of the coming to be. Hence the teacher (the agent) is
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as much a subject of change (in the more usual sense) as is the pupil
in whom the teacher brings about a change. (So being the agent of a
change necessarily involves a change in the agent. Thus, given that
for every change there is an agent, every change would entail an
infinite regress of logically prior changes.)
(25) But this argument is valid only on the assumption that X's
teaching is a distinct concrete event from Y's learning. If this were
the case, then indeed, since teaching is a change, by (i) above, and
since by (ii) for every change there is a coming to be, it would
follow that the teacher, being the only substance involved in the
distinct event of teaching, would be the subject of this coming to
be, since no other subject would be available within that distinct
event. But the point of crucial importance which Aristotle emphasises
again and again in this passage, is that X's teaching is not a dif¬
ferent concrete event from Y's learning. These are one and the same
actuality under two descriptions. In effect Aristotle's reply consists
in refining presupposition (ii) so as to read: for every concrete
change-event there is a coming to be. Now no one denies that Y's
learning involves a coming to be of which Y is the subject. But if
Y's learning is the same actual event as X's teaching, there is no need
to look for another coming to be that corresponds to that teaching:
it has already been specified as Y's learning. And this coming to
be is in Y; so that it already has a subject, and there is there¬
fore no need to pin it on to X as if it would otherwise float about
without any subject at all. This would be necessary only if X's teach¬
ing were a self-contained actuality that was, as he says, 'cut off'
(' aTiOTexpnuevri' , 202b8) from Y; but then it would not be teaching
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since no one would be taught. Nor is there any paradox in saying
that the teaching and the learning (since they are the same concrete
event, and the learning is a coming to be in Y) are both in Y. Some
. . 12 ...
dialecticians may try to twist this into absurdity by saying that
it would entail Y's learning and also teaching the very same thing.
But they achieve the appearance of paradox only by ignoring the
different "directionality" of the two descriptions. The same road
runs from Thebes to Athens and from Athens to Thebes, but it does not
follow that a man travelling this road is at one time travelling to
Thebes and to Athens. If 'Athens' enters into the description of his
journey as the name of his destination, then 'Thebes' must enter into
the description in the opposite sense, as naming his tevm-inus a quo.
Thus if another man is travelling on the same road to Thebes, 'Athens'
must enter into the description of his journey in the sense opposite
to that in which it enters into that of the first man. Similarly, if
Y is learning and X is teaching, 'teaching' applies to Y only in the
opposite sense from that in which it applies to X; thus while X is
teaching, Y is being taught. If we think of 'teaching' ('6t6a£us')
as a neutral verb-stem determinable by active and passive voices, then
we may say (a) that teaching is to be located in Y as well as in X;
and (b) that teaching appears in Y in a determinate form (the passive)
that is perfectly compatible with the predication 'Y learns'.
(26) It is to be remarked that in this argument Aristotle dispenses
altogether with any discussion of the meaning of transitive verbs of
agency, or any comparison of that meaning with verbs of becoming. What
12. The Eleatics, apparently. Cf. Simplicius, Diels, p. 440, 23 - 24.
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matters here is what we should call the distinction between sense
and reference: it is enough to show that 'X teaches' and 'Y learns'
have the same concrete referent, and any difference in logical struc¬
ture between these two "senses" is unimportant. This impression is
reinforced by the Thebes - Athens illustration, for this is a case in
which the two descriptions, 'the road from Thebes to Athens' and 'the
road from Athens to Thebes', have senses of identical logical struct¬
ure apart from the direction of the relation. Similarly with 'teach¬
ing' and 'learning' for all that we could gather from III 3. And
this suggests that III 3 is not on its own adequate to ensure Aris¬
totle's desired conclusion that being an agent is not to be the sub¬
ject of a becoming. What III 3 shows is that there is no extra
becoming, true of the agent, beyond the becoming which the agent
brings about in the patient. It shows therefore, that ii we have
reason to locate the one and only becoming in the patient, then we
are left without any further becoming to locate in the agent. But
the argument does not explain why the becoming should be associated
only with the patient. In arguing that there are not two distinct
becomings corresponding to 'X teaches' and 'Y learns', Aristotle has
not shown that these are not descriptions of a single becoming which
belongs equally to X and Y. But if this were so it would be as true
of X that it is a subject of becoming as it would be of Y.
(27) Thus to complete his proof Aristotle needs to be able to show
that transitive agency is not as such a becoming. He offers no argu¬
ment for this, but an argument can be constructed on his behalf which
not only accords with his general position but bases itself specific¬
ally on the Aristotelian concept of the incompleteness of Ktvpots.
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This notion has already come to the fore at the end of III 1, where
he asserts that Mbvriaus is an incomplete (or imperfect) actuality.
It is further developed in Metaphysics 0 6, where he draws a dis¬
tinction between xtvnots and what he calls 'evepyeta', in terms of
completeness and incompleteness. I shall now argue that his method
of drawing that distinction can be applied in such a way as to show
that the transitive causal activity of an agent is not incomplete
in the way in which the change effected in the patient is. If this
"incompleteness" is to be regarded as built into the notion of change,
it follows that an agent's transitive activity is not only not an
extra change (or coming to be) but not a change at all.
(28) Aristotle normally uses 'evepyeua' to mean 'actuality', and
in that sense a klvpols, when actual, is an evepyeta. But in Meta¬
physics 0 6, 1048bl8-35, he marks off a narrower sense of the latter
13
term m which it is contrasted with the former. He opposes the two
categories by reference to the concepts of 'teAos' (meaning both 'end'
and 'complete condition') and 'nepas' (limit). A KtvpaLS has a built-
in limit, and the end or complete condition associated with the xuvnoug
occurs only when the limit has been reached. A MbvpaLg continues only
so long as the limit has not been reached, and therefore while it con¬
tinues, its reAos has not been achieved, and so it is (while it exists)
'ateAns' and 'ou reAeua'. An evepyeua in the narrow sense has, by
13. For contemporary discussions of the distinction see J.L. Ackrill,
'Aristotle's Distinction between ENERGEIA and KINESIS', New
Essays on Plato and Aristotle, ed. Bambrough, pp. 121 ff.; T.C.
Potts and C.C.W. Taylor, 'States, Activities and Performances'
(symposium), Proc. Arist. Soc. Supp. XXXIX, 1965, pp. 65 ff.;
L.A. Kosman, 'Aristotle's Definition of Motion', Phronesis XIV,
1969, pp. 40 ff.; T. Penner, 'Verbs and the Identity of Actions',
Ryle, edd. Wood and Pitcher, pp. 393 ff.
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contrast, no built-in limit; its end or complete condition exists
already in it, at any moment of its duration. Now at first sight it
may seem that this distinction is not going to show any logical dif¬
ference between transitive agency and the corresponding change in the
patient, since in Metaphysics H 6 Aristotle illustrates the concept of
xbvpabs by reference to both kinds of process indifferently. Thus
'making thin' and 'building' are offered as examples along with
'learning' and 'becoming'. This shows, I suggest, that Aristotle is
not here fully aware of the power of his own distinction. But this will
become evident only when we have examined the way in which he spells
out the difference indicated above between Ktvpats and evepyeba. He
does this by asserting and denying certain conceptual relationships
between 'X cps' and 'X has cped', where the values of ' cp' are verbs cor¬
responding to the two categories.
'Thus for instance at the same time one sees and
has seen, thinks and has thought, understands and has
understood [all examples of evepyEbctb]. But it is not
the case that one learns and has learnt, is [being]
restored to health and has been restored. At the same
time one lives well and has lived well, is happy and
has been happy. Otherwise it would be necessary at
some point to stop, as when one makes something thin.
But as it is, this is not the case: one lives and has
lived. So we should call the one class 'Kuvnaeus',
the other 'evepyeboib'. For every xbvpabs is incom¬
plete (dxeAn's) : making thin, learning, walking,
building. These are Kbvpaebs , and certainly they are
incomplete. For it is not the case that at the same
time one walks and has walked, or builds and has built,
or becomes and has become, or changes and has changed
(xbVEbxab xat xbKbvnxab). If these happen at the same
time the subject is different. But the same subject
at the same time has seen and sees, thinks and has
thought. I call the latter kind 'evepysba', the former
' Kb'vnobs' • '
(29) Here, then, Aristotle is saying that when ' tping' designates
an evepyeba, 'X cps' is compatible with 'X has cped', while where it
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designates a HbvqabS, the sentences are not compatible. ^ This point
depends on a rather special sense of 'has (ped' , in which it means
neither (a) that the (ping is over, nor (b) that there has been some
cping. For if (a) were meant, 'X cps' would in all cases be incompatible
with 'X has (just) (ped'; while if (b) were meant, 'X tps' would be
compatible with, since it would entail, 'X has tped' even where (?ing
is a xtvriacg. Or at any rate so Aristotle would hold, according to
his doctrine of 'no first moment of xtvpats', {Physics VI 5, 236a7 - 36).
Thus in the passage just quoted, 'X has tped' must mean somthing like:
'X has completely (ped' or 'X has performed a complete act of tping'.^
This sense fits well the condition for xbvpcrebs, namely that in their
case ' cps' is incompatible with 'has cped'. But it requires an effort
of interpretation to fit it to the condition for evepyeLab, since it
is by no means clear what, in ordinary speech, could be meant by e.g.
'"X sees" is compatible with "X has completely seen"', or '"X thinks"
is compatible with "X has completely thought"'. However, it is ob¬
vious that Aristotle means that if X continues to think or to see,
this does not entail that its previous thinking and seeing were
incomplete. A xbvpabs can continue only for as long as it has not
reached its inherent limit, hence it can continue only so long as it
is in this sense incomplete. Since evepyeboib have no inherent limit,
they cannot in this sense be at any point incomplete: and Aristotle
chooses to say that they are therefore at every moment complete. We
might prefer to say that they are neither complete nor incomplete,
14. But see note 19 below.
15. Potts, op. cit. , p. 68, adduces Chomsky's transformational proof
that the perfect in English is not a past tense. Potts argues
that in Metaph. 0 6 Aristotle uses ' cps' and 'has (ped' not as
present and past tenses, but as progressive and perfective.
(Cf. Potts, p. 76.)
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not being completable by attainment of an inherent limit. Thus, in
the sense of the perfect tense that implies completeness, we might
prefer to say that when cping is an evepyeta, 'X has cped' is neither
true nor false. We should then have to re-phrase his distinction
between xcvpots and evepyeua as follows: In the case of the former,
'X cps* entails that X's previous (ping was incomplete; while for the
latter, 'X cps* does not entail that X's previous cping was incomplete
(since it was neither complete nor incomplete). The reason why Aris¬
totle prefers to say (by means of the special use of the perfect
tense) that the present continuance of an evepyeta is compatible with
its earlier completeness, is that he wants to stress that evepyeuau
(or at any rate those which he lists) are ends in themselves, while
xuvpoets are not. For in fact the notion of completeness embodied
in the special use of the perfect shares all the ambiguity of 'xeAos',
'xeXeuos', etc. A xtvpous is axeAps, both in the sense that so long
as it continues it is incomplete (being incompletable) and in the
sense of not being an end in itself. Aristotle's evepyetac are
xeAetat in the sense of being ends in themselves, so that even as they
continue, the ends (i.e. themselves) for the sake of which they are
engaged in have already been realised for some length of time. But
in the other sense an evepytLa is neither xeAeta nor axeAps. Not
distinguishing these senses, Aristotle holds that the evepyeuau, while
they continue, are already xeAeuat simplic-itev.
(30) Let us return to the logical difference between the transitive
causal activity of an agent, and the corresponding change in the
patient. Above (paragraph (27)) I claimed that the former can be
shown not to be incomplete like the latter. If this is true, then the
transitive activity is or resembles an evepyeua. Now in one respect
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activities such as building differ from the evepyetau of Metaphysics
H 6, in that they are not ends in themselves. In one sense then they
are "axeAeCs", since their xeAog lies beyond them, in the completed
house etc. However, perhaps because of the conflation of senses of
'xeAog', Aristotle in Metaphysics 0 6 overlooks the fact that from one
point of view housebuilding is free from the incompleteness that
characterises KLvpaetg. This point of view emerges if we make a con¬
ceptual separation between the transitive activity of a particular
agent, and its particular patient. By the argument of 0 6, house¬
building counts as a KLvriatg if it is tied down to a particular
patient; where 'X' and 'Y' name individuals, 'X builds up Y' is
incompatible with 'X has built up Y'. But instead let us particular¬
ise only with respect to the agent X, and speak not of X building Y,
but of X building something, or, for short, of X building. 'X builds
something' is not incompatible with 'X has built something'. 'Build¬
ing something' designates an activity that the same subject can con-
16
tinue indefinitely, or better perhaps without a break. What this
shows is that building something has no inherent limit. It is not a
process of acquiring a new property."^ If it were, then the subject
16. Cf. E. McMullin, 'Four Senses of Potency', The Concept of Matter
in Greek and Mediaeval Philosophy (ed. E. McMullin), p. 313:
'[Learning, healing and building] as they stand, .... do not
exemplify "terminating" activities, as they purpose to tsc. in
Metaph. 0 61. One, having built, could still have the ability
to build. To see them as "terminating", they must be partic¬
ularized (building a particular house, learning a particular
theorem ...).' However, McMullin is mistaken in classifying
learning along with the other two examples. The schema in
paragraph (31) shows that learning is a xuvriats in its subject,
while healing and building are not.
17. This gives a foundation for Aristotle's statement in De Anima
II 5, 417b8-9: 'It is wrong to say that the thinker, when he
thinks, is altered (aAAotouaHat), any more than the builder when
he builds.' Note that Aristotle here takes it for granted that
the builder is not altered: he is arguing for extending the
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(the agent) would have to lose this property before re-engaging in
the process of acquiring it, and therefore there would have to be an
interval between successive acts of building during which the loss of
the acquired property took place. By contrast, 'being built up by
something' does designate a process involving a necessary break before
the same subject can undergo it again even at the hands of a different
agent. If Y is being built up, a limit is eventually reached, and Y
must undergo some contrary change before being built up again; but
X the builder does not have to be "unbuildered" before building
. 18
again.
same concept to the thinker. His point is that builder and
thinker are not patients; but given the principle that every
XLvqous has an agent {i.e. is a form of passivity), this entails
that they are not as such subjects of XLvqatg. Again, Eth. Nic.
X 5, 1175a34 - 35, where Aristotle mentions 'lovers of house¬
building' , may be another passage showing tacit recognition that
housebuilding is not a xbvqoLg like becoming a house. This in¬
terpretation would be justified if in Eth. Nic. X Aristotle
clearly laid it down that enjoyment relates only to activities
that are not xlvqoels but cvepyeLOiL in the narrow sense opposed
to 'xLvnaug'. In that case, what the lover of housebuilding
loves would, in this context, count as an cvepycLOi in the narrow
sense. But although in Eth. Nia. X Aristotle states that enjoy¬
ment itself is not a xtvqaLs, he nowhere explicitly denies the
possibility of enjoying XLvqaetg. Cf. G.E.L. Owen, 'Aristotelian
Pleasures', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society LXXII, 1972,
pp. 135 ff., esp. pp. 146 - 147. (However Penner, op. cit. , pp.
446 - 450, in a very acute discussion takes the view that an en¬
joyed activity functions logically like an evepyeta in the narrow
sense).
18. I have drawn upon the evepyeua/xLvqaLS distinction as presented
in Metaph. 0 6 only in order to show that the logic of causing
change differs in at least one important respect from the logic
of (intransitive) changing. I have not here attempted a full
treatment of the distinction. Two major issues in particular
have not been discussed: (a) the question whether for evepyeLa-
values of * cp' , 'X cps' entails 'X has cped'; and (b) the 'quickly/
slowly' criterion for xuvqaug that Aristotle advances in Eth.
Nic. X 3, 1173a31-b4. As to (a), although in the Metaphysics
passage Aristotle makes the distinction in terms of the incompat-
ibility of 'X cps' with 'X has cped' where ' cp' denotes a xuvqatg
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(31) If the distinction of Metaphysics 0 6 is extended to cover
activities not tied down to particular subjects and objects, it becomes
the basis for a classification of grammatically transitive verbs which
will show (a) whether such a verb implies change at all, and (b)
whether, if it does, the change is to be located in the subject or
the object. Thus:
(i) If 'X cps Y' is compatible with 'X has (just) cped Y' , then
the activity of (ping implies no change in either X or Y.
(ii) If 'X cps Y' is incompatible with 'X has (just) cped Y', then
tping involves a change in either X or Y. This holds of
e.g. 'builds', 'learns', 'makes thin'.
(iiA) For all verbs ' (p' falling under (ii) : If 'X cps Y'
is compatible with 'X has just cped Z' (where 'Z'
names a particular object other than Y) , but 'X cps Y'
is incompatible with 'W has (just) cped Y, (where 'W'
names a particular subject or agent other than X),
(so that it would appear that for evepyeua-values, it is the
compatibility of the two sentences that is being emphasised by
contrast, rather than any entailment relation), Ackrill argues
convincingly on the basis of other passages that Aristotle also
holds the stronger position: that for evepyeuctu, 'cps' entails
'has cped' . Penner too takes this view. Now on the entailment
criterion, 'building something' would not denote an evepyeta.
But as Ackrill points out, many apparently obvious examples of
evepyetaL (such as seeing a play) seem not to count as such
either, by this rule. Hence I would not regard the failure of
'building' to meet the entailment criterion as telling against
the view that building should be classified as an eve'pyeua no
less than seeing. Potts and Penner both indicate ways in which
the troublesome evepyetau noted by Ackrill could be accommodated
to the entailment criterion. Penner's remarks are especially
relevant since he explicitly refers to transitive causal activi¬
ties such as building. As for the second point (b) above, it is not
clear whether Aristotle means 'A Hovqats takes place quickly or
slowly' as a necessary, or as a necessary and also sufficient
condition for Htvpous. if the latter, then building would seem
to count as a XLVpots by this rule. (But for a different inter¬
pretation, see Penner, pp. 446 - 448.) However, the determination
of issues (a) and (b) does not affect the position for which I
have argued in the text, viz. that from one point of view, build¬
ing etc. are to be classed as non-changes in their subjects.
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then the change indicated in a general way in (ii) is
to be located specifically in Y, not X. This holds
for 'builds', 'makes thin' .
(iiB) For all verbs ' cp' falling under (ii) : If 'X cps Y' is
compatible with 'X has (just) cped Z' (Z being other
than Y) , and is also compatible with 'W has (just) cped
Y' (W being other than X), then the change indicated
generally in (ii) is to be located specifically in X,
not Y. An example would be 'comes to know', with 'X'
as grammatical subject, and a phrase designating some
"object of knowledge" as object. The condition holds
good for different kinds of objects of knowledge (or,
alternatively, different kinds of knowledge): e.g.
this man (acquaintance); that today is Wednesday
(propositional); the art of bookbinding (knowledge-
how) . The same object can both come to be known and
have come to be known - by different subjects, just
as the same builder can build and have built different
buildings. This shows that coming to be known no more
implies that the known acquires a new property which
it must lose before coming to be known again (i.e.
by someone else), than building confers upon the
builder a property he must get rid of before he
, .19
builds again.
(32) It must be stressed that the concept of HUvqaLS sustaining
this classification is not simply the concept of a process that
necessarily (even in the conceptual sense of 'necessary') results in
a new state of the subject. It is, rather, that of a process properly
defined as tending to result in a certain state, and whose occurrence
in a given subject is grounded on the subject's not being in that state.
19. Cf. my article 'Affecting and being Affected', Mind LXXIX, 1970,
pp. 92 ff.
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This distinction between necessary results and results definitive of
the process solves a puzzle which would otherwise cast serious doubt
on the evepyeta/MUvnaus distinction of Metaphysics 0 6. Readers of
this passage may well be left with the sense that evepyeuat, since
they are not changes, are somehow supposed by Aristotle to be outside
time, or else to be in time in the way that static conditions are,
homogeneous throughout their duration and permitting within themselves
no distinction of "before and after". But it is clear from his
examples that Aristotle is not confining the term 'evepyeuot' to con¬
ditions in which the empirically identifiable subject is in any ordin¬
ary sense static. The most obvious example is "living", but the
cognitive activities thinking and seeing also illustrate the point,
for Aristotle does not use these terms only of fixed contemplation
resting in a single object. Discursive thought is for him as much an
, , . 20
evepyeta as intuitive. This may lead us to think that since the
empirically identifiable subject is not static, he must mean that
evepyeuau, since they are not changes, really pertain to timeless non-
empirical subjects. This conclusion might be welcomed by some as
tending to support certain of Aristotle's metaphysical doctrines (those
concerning the active intellect and the God of Metaphysics A). But at
the same time it renders the method of classification in 0 6 thoroughly
dubious. For that classification depends on the analysis of tense
21
relationships holding of ordinary verbs in ordinary language, and
these verbs are predicated of empirical subjects and the conditions for
20. Cf. Ackrill, op. cit. , pp. 132 - 133.
21. However, cf. A.P.D. Mourelatos: 'The doctrine that "enjoyment
is energeia" is a metaphysical doctrine; it does not simply
record usage, ordinary or Aristotelian; it interprets it and
it corrects it.' (Philosophical Review LXXVII, 1968, p. 516.)
No doubt Mourelatos would say the same of the evepyeta/Ktvnous
distinction itself.
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their application are empirically verifiable. Thus the analysis would
appear to be self-refuting if it yields a classification one of whose
divisions makes sense only in connection with timeless metaphysical
subj ects.
(33) But this problem arises only if we ignore the distinction
stated above. There is no reason why we should not think of an
evepyeLa as a process necessarily resulting, on each occasion, in
new states of its subject, provided we do not define it as the acquis¬
ition of a given state, or take its occurrence to be grounded on the
latter's absence. The activity of thinking, for instance, and also
of seeing (if by 'seeing' we understand, as Aristotle often does, a
cognitive activity, not a mere state of consciousness), might be said
necessarily to leave "traces", t.e. memories, increased understanding,
etc. A man might reasonably be said not to have seen a play even if
he sat through it awake and with his eyes open, unless for some time
after he could tell others about it, saw things in the light of it,
found it more familiar on another occasion, etc. And the fact that
one may think about so and so even though one has already thought
about it, is not in general due to the previous thinking's having left
no trace, but to the subject's not being readily exhausted. And if
a process of thinking left no trace, how could the different stages
within one such process do so either? But if not there could be no
reasoning, since this involves reaching new stages by means of results
carried forward. But although an evepyeua may of necessity result in
some specific state new to the subject, this does not define what that
Evepyeua is. Acquiring memories of watching The Tempest is not what
watching The Tempest is or consists in. If it were, then indeed
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specifically the same evepyeta could not be immediately repeated (or
indefinitely continued), since repetition of it would be repetition
of a process defined as bringing about a state of a given kind; which
entails that the instance of this state previously achieved must
first have disappeared for there to be room to achieve a new instance
of the same. As it is, a new instance of the same type of evepyeua
can take as its point of departure the state achieved through a
previous instance.
(34) This discussion arose out of the comparison we drew between
the operation of an agent, e.g. a builder, and evepyeba as contrasted
with Mbvnats in Metaphysics 0 6. Let us return now to the concept of
the unchanging agent, and relate certain results so far reached to
the questions raised in paragraphs (19) - (20). Our discussion has
shown that for Aristotle no more than for Hume does the agency of the
agent consist in a mysterious extra change which is the agent's exer¬
cise of its "efficacy". The only change, when X acts upon Y, is the
change in Y: this is the same concrete event as that which is de¬
scribed as 'Y's being acted on by X', and this in turn is the same
concrete event as that which is described as 'X's acting upon Y'. All
the same, it might be replied that although X's acting upon Y is the
same concrete event as Y's changing to some new state of itself, this
change does depend on the agency of X, since otherwise why should we
speak of agency at all? So that X's agency must be something more
than the mere change in Y. And even if this "something more" is not
a change in X, it does not follow that it is not something in X, some
event or process or operation, and in showing that this cannot be a
change, our discussion has not shown what it is. And if, as seems
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likely, whatever it is is not empirically identifiable, then is it
something mysterious and metaphysical; or is it nothing? If the
latter, what is to be gained by speaking of agency at all as if it
were something; and if the former, what place can it possibly have
in a scientific account of nature?
(35) On one level Aristotle can answer these questions in a way
that even Hume would approve. In III 3, 202a7-8, he says:
'Change is the actuality of the changeable, insofar as it is changeable,
and this comes about through the contact of the changer'. A type of
case that obviously fits this is heating, already mentioned in III 1,
201a21-22. A hot body causes a body in contact with it to get hot;
it thereby loses heat itself and becomes cool, so that the action is
reciprocal. But the hot body's heating of the other does not consist
in the change to coolness which the former thereby suffers, although
this is an inevitable consequence. In fact, the heating by the
initially hot body does not consist in any isolable doing: for the
heat to be "imparted", all that is necessary and sufficient is contact
(or the appropriate proximity) between the hot body and a suitable
patient. Under these conditions the latter simply gets hot. So far
Aristotle hardly differs from Hume. But the advantage is all on Aris¬
totle's side when we consider the significance of this shared position
for each of the two philosophers. In Hume's eyes, it is the 'most violent
of [his] paradoxes' that transitive causal activity should consist, ob¬
jectively, in nothing but what has just been mentioned. His problem now
is to explain why we, Hume himself included, should have thought that
there was more to causality than events in conjunction; and the explanation
can refer only to subjective conditions, since Hume has eliminated the
possibility that any extra objective feature of the external situ¬
ation provides us with the idea of necessary connexion. However,
Hume's subjective impression would not be needed to fill the gap
left by his analysis of the external agent-relationship unless there
were a gap to fill. And there only is one because he assumes that if
transitive agency were anything real and objective, it would consist
in something extra, a tevtium quid between objects. Since this is
not conceivable, let alone identifiable, he must end by denying the
reality of transitive agency. But this conclusion depends on that
assumption, and the assumption presupposes that the objects themselves
are intrinsically non-dynamic, an inevitable position for the empir¬
icist who insists that power is not present in objects because its
presence cannot be perceived. Thus "connection", if it exists at all,
must lie outside and between what is connected, and if this is imposs¬
ible, "connection" is a figment of imagination.
(36) But within a conceptual system such as Aristotle's it is no
paradox that the transitive activity of heating should consist simply
in the fact that a suitable patient Y becomes hot when in contact (or
whatever degree of proximity) with a hot body X. The objects are in
themselves essentially dynamic. Given that it is the nature of fire
to fly upwards, there is no need and no room for some further activ¬
ity, a tevtium quid binding the fire to its own actual natural move¬
ment. If this were necessary then it would be false that the fire of
itself shoots up unless prevented. If the concept of natural change
in the self-same natural substance is intelligible, why should it
be any less intelligible that natural dynamism should issue also in
changes in other subjects? If the parallel is accepted, there is
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no place for the idea of an extra link negotiating the efficacy of
22
agent on external patient. The potential agent would not be a
potential agent if on encountering the potential patient under
suitable conditions it needed some further metaphysical mechanism by
which to administer its effect. Aristotle's system excludes a tertium
quid, "between" agent and patient not because there is for him no
efficacy in the world, but because efficacy is anyway present, in
substances whose nature it is to have change happen in and around
themselves.
(37) So far we have considered only the example of heating. But
does contact suffice for the change in all cases of transitive action?
In III 3 Aristotle's illustrations are teaching, building and healing.
In VIII 4, 255a34 - b2 he says:
'In all cases, whenever that which is capable
of acting and that which is capable of being acted on
are together, that which is potentially so and so
sometimes becomes actually so and so, as for instance
the learner, from being potentially so and so, becomes
potentially something else.'
('Potentially something else' refers to the fact that the actuality
which the learner acquires through learning is not the actual exercise
of knowledge, but the (actual) power to exercise it.) The apparent
discrepancy between 'in all cases' and 'sometimes' led Ross (Aristotle's
22. Cf. H. Carteron, La Notion de Force dans le Systeme d'Aristote3
p. 168: 'Aristote considerait 1'action a expliquer comme aussi
evidente que le mouvement lui-meme.' Also: 'Voila pourquoi la
difficulte sur la dualite de l'acte dans l'actif et le passif
(202a21) est appelee logique, tout comme les difficultes des
Eleates sur le mouvement. C'est que la communication du mouve¬
ment est aussi evidente que 1'existence du mouvement et de la
nature.' (Ibid. f.n. 773) In Carteron's view, Aristotle has for
this reason failed to explain transitive agency or even to see
the problem it poses. But I cannot find in Carteron a clear
statement of what kind of explanation he holds to be lacking.
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Physios, p. 696) to prefer a less well-authenticated reading which
omits the 'sometimes' (evuoxe, line 255a35). But there is no contra¬
diction if we take 'in all cases' to mean 'in all types of case'. If
this is the correct reading and interpretation, then Aristotle here
shows himself reluctant to assert that contact alone between potential
agent and patient is sufficient for the change in the latter. He is
surely right, since in all cases a further condition must be met, viz.
the absence of external interference to the change. But his choice
of example (teaching/learning) suggests that he may have something more
in mind. Where the change in question is heating, cooling and such¬
like, contact and the absence of interferences are doubtless jointly
sufficient. But it would be implausible to suggest this of a change
such as learning. It is not just that 'contact between agent and
patient' cannot here be given a straightforward spatial meaning, since
some sort of mental "contact" is necessary between teacher and pupil.
There is also the fact that even when the latter has been established,
and nothing interferes, something more seems necessary for actual
teaching and learning to occur. Or at least, they do not necessarily
occur under the conditions just stated. So the question is what else
does Aristotle suppose is needed to convert his 'sometimes' into an
'always'? There can be no clear answer to this until we are told how
much to include under (mental) "contact". Does it, for instance,
involve the mutual recognition of willingness to teach and to learn?
But granted the existence of "contact" even in this rich sense, and
the absence of interference, the teacher must surely also do something
in order to set going the learning-process. In short, this case is
not at all like that of heating. In heating there is no reason to
postulate an extra activity whereby the hot body propagates its heat
once contact is established under suitable circumstances. But unless
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the teacher, apart from standing in the correct relation to his
pupil, also engages in a definite activity of propagating knowledge,
23
the pupil will not learn.
(38) We may begin to wonder whether Aristotle's vagueness on this
matter is not intended to blur the awkward fact that the teacher's
teaching comprises various performances which we should be hard put
to it to describe without implying that he himself, the agent,
(intransitively) changes. The builder gives still more cause for
suspicion. Yet Aristotle must mean his general account of agency-
patiency to cover building, since building is his paradigm of change
in III 1, and the problem of change is there treated as inseparable
from the problem of agency. The difficulty cannot fairly be evaded
by saying (in line with the doctrine as yet to emerge from Book VIII)
that the real cause of change is an immaterial unchanging something
"within" the builder, with the builder's changing body functioning only
as a mediating or instrumental cause. In the first place, by any
ordinary standard it is no less clear that the builder, while operat¬
ing, changes mind-wise as well as body-wise; so that the alleged un¬
changing cause would be neither mental nor physical, or else is as
likely to be either as the other. Secondly, we are at present fol¬
lowing Aristotle in his attempt in III to elucidate the general feat¬
ures of agency and patiency, and he is attempting to do this by refer¬
ence to the most obvious type of case, where one substance changes
another external to itself. Thus we are entitled to expect him to
23. As Philoponus says (ad 202b7, Vitelli p. 381, 15 ff.: 'eu ye
kat napovtos tou yaftryroO eCtitj yev o 6u6aaxaXog yrj 6paap 8e eis
xov ya^rixfiv, ou AeyexaL dodd^ab. '
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make good the general claim that 'the change is in the patient' (not,
therefore, in the agent) without reducing interaction between dis¬
tinct substances to the problematic case in which the role of agent
is played (or supposed to be) by something that is not a distinct
concrete substance at all, but a factor "within" one. After all, we
say that it is the man who builds, and the man is an embodied being,
not an unmoved mover within a human body. It may be that even if
Aristotle cannot show satisfactorily that there is no change in the
man as agent, he will still, by some special argument, be able to
arrive at the supreme Unmoved Mover of Book VIII. But he will not be
justified in relying for support on any general presumption that a
changer as such does not change, if in some cases (indeed, the most
obvious) this has proved false or even absurd. To maintain this
assumption intact, Aristotle would either have to deny that the empir¬
ically identifiable changes in the mind and body of the builder are
changes at all, or he would have to say that they have nothing to do
with the builder's activity as agent. Both alternatives seem absurd,
and the second implies, in addition, that the "real" building activ¬
ity, since it is not to be identified with any visible goings-on, must
be something wholly mysterious and indescribable.
(39) So far as the second of these alternatives is concerned, it
is hard to believe that Aristotle himself would not be the first to
scoff at the idea that the builder's bodily and mental movements have
nothing to do with his building. On the contrary, they are what con¬
stitute it. The problem then is this: The discussion of the
evepyeLa/MUvriaus distinction showed that building is not a change in
the builder, in the sense that building is not a process defined in
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terms of a new state to be achieved in the builder himself. Rather,
it is a process defined in terms of a new state to be achieved in the
external materials. However, this purely conceptual point does not
save the builder from having to stir in order to be building. There
is no concrete event that displays only the definitive features of
building, and no others, any more than there is in nature a form
without matter. Building is not to be defined as moving one's limbs
and calculating weights and positions, but these processes are the
flesh and bones in which the form is realised, and what are these if
not changes in the agent?
(40) It will help to approach this problem by considering the notion
of a single (particular) change. In V 4, 227b20 - 29, Aristotle says
that a Kuvnotg is numerically one only if it takes place (a) in a
single subject; (b) in respect of one specific type of property;
(c) continuously throughout the time in which it occurs. Now these
remarks amount to an analysis of the concept 'numerically one xuvriaus';
they do not offer criteria by which to decide in practice whether some
phenomenon or other is a numerically single change. Characteristics
(a), (b) and (c) could function as criteria only if it were possible
to identify their presence without having first employed the notion
of 'one change'. That this is not in general possible will be clear
if we consider actual cases. As examples of single subjects, Aristotle
mentions an individual man, a particular piece of gold. His examples
of changes are: walking, becoming healthy, becoming white. These
cases are very different. A piece of gold is perceptibly simple and
homogeneous: its only internal "diversity" consists in its divisib¬
ility, and since this is infinite it cannot be a reason for doubting
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that the piece of gold is a single subject. To say that the gold is
a plurality of subjects would be to say that it is an infinite plur¬
ality, from which it follows for Aristotle that there would be no
actually existing subject that was the gold. But it is otherwise with
a man. Why do we not say that the many perceptibly heterogeneous
parts of a man are different subjects? When a man walks, different
parts of the body move differently: why do we not say that these are
many changes in many subjects, but rather (as Aristotle assumes) that
there is one subject, the man, doing one thing, namely walking? Our
basis for seeing the man as one subject lies in precisely such facts
as that the various movements of the limbs and organs are co-ordinated
to some over-all result such as that of getting to a different place.
Thus our notion of the unity of the perceptibly multiple subject de¬
pends on the prior assumption that the various movements make up one
change, described as 'walking'. Again, perception alone can decide
whether something has become white: whiteness is simple, like gold.
But what about becoming healthy? This may involve what from some
points of view would be described as many specifically different
changes, in temperature, in position of parts, in size and shape, etc.
Again what from one point of view may be a new change may from another
be the continuation of a change that was already occurring. The
bronze is melted, then it is poured into the mould, but the same
process is going on all the time, the production of a statue.
(41) We have already seen {e.g. Chapter III, paragraphs (10) - (11);
of. also Chapter V, paragraphs (35) - (36)) how Aristotle's theory of
substance necessarily favours the adoption, in a particular case, of
a standpoint from which what might otherwise be regarded as a
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multiplicity of distinct objects and distinct changes are seen as
composing one object and one change. This is not to say that the
theory of substance provides a licence for indiscriminately viewing
any and every phenomenon as parts of some single unit. The point is
rather that since every phenomenon must be traced back in the end to
some one substantial principle or nature, we are not entitled to look
upon a particular phenomenon as lying "outside" a whole composed by
other phenomena unless there is reason to suppose that the former
manifests a different principle from the latter. Now the empirical
criteria for deciding whether a given phenomenon is to be included in
one whole rather than in another may be difficult to spell out, and
one may well suspect that the decision-procedure will involve concep¬
tual circularity of some sort. This is a problem of methodology
rather than metaphysics. Aristotle would not, I imagine, be disposed
to give up his metaphysics on account of it, just as there are latter-
day philosophers who remain faithful to the 'analytic'/'synthetic'
distinction despite a similar difficulty. This however is a general
problem, and at the moment we are concerned with the particular ques¬
tion of how it is that an agent can be thought of as not changing even
though it is only through its changes that some other change is ef¬
fected in an external object. I suggest that the "unifying" approach
just mentioned can solve this problem, whatever the general diffi¬
culties attending such an approach. (These are no more severe, so
far as I can see, in this connection than in any other.)
(42) The material used by the builder, always referred to by Aris¬
totle in the singular as 'to olxo6oyr|Tdv' , consists in many different
things, wood, stones, etc., which are seen as one only in relation to
the one end. Again, the processes undergone by these are different:
hewing, planing, positioning, etc., but they all constitute the one
process of becoming a house, for the same principle controls them all.
But are not the builder's bodily and mental movements also parts of
this one process even though their subject is not one of the materials
They are not logically distinct changes from the change we call
'becoming a house', for their end is the same, that there should be
a house. And the raison d'etre of the changes in the agent is the
same as that of the changes in the materials: it is the potentiality
of there being a house. If the singleness of the end justifies us in
seeing the perceptibly different changes in the materials as parts
of one process, why should it not justify seeing the changes in the
agent as parts of that same process? If instead we take them as
logically self-contained changes, then we must suppose them to be
completed on reaching the end-states in which they terminate. Thus
if the builder, in building, raises his arm and this is a self-
contained change, it is complete when his arm is up. But this de¬
scription is actually self-contradictory. Insofar as he is a builder,
the change of which he is the source is only completed with the emerg¬
ence of an edifice. Thus if he is also regarded as the source of a
change that is completed by a certain position of his own arm, it must
be assumed that it is not qua builder that he is the source of this
change. But this is absurd, since the arm-raising is not a per
accidens accompaniment of the building but part of carrying it out.
It follows that he can only be taken to raise his arm qua builder
building, if the arm-raising is not treated as a self-contained change
In this sense, then, what takes place in the working agent is not a
change, although it is not a condition of rest either.
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(43) Since change is the coming to be of some new state in a
substance, and is grounded on the substance's not yet being in that
state, it is natural to designate this substance the 'subject of
change'. But now the case of the builder presents a problem of term¬
inology. For here the change, which is the coming to be of a house-
structure, takes place (or certain stages of it do) in another sub¬
stance, the agent. Movements of his are parts of the change, and
these movements are in him. Yet if we said that the change is in
him as subject, this would seem to imply that the builder turns into
a house. Some type of term is needed to convey the builder's connec¬
tion with the change which does not imply that he is subject of the
end-product. This descriptive function is performed by transitive
verbs of agency. 'X builds' indicates (a) that X is no less necessary
to the one change than the genuine subject, viz. the materials; (b)
that the one change does not have X as subject; and (c) that whatever
does occur in X that is relevant to the one change is not a distinct
and self-sufficient change in X. We can now see that Aristotle's
retention of the language of agency has nothing to do with any postul-
ation of a mystical (and mythical) transaction tying agent to patient,
or to its effect in the patient. Aristotle, from all that we have
seen, could have joined heartily in Hume's conclusion that all that
happens is (a) certain behaviour in one object, and (b) a change
culminating in a new state of some other object; although Aristotle's
reasons would be the reverse of Hume's. And where the agent-object
is a creature incapable of "telling its purposes", he would have
agreed that regular conjunction of similar events is our primary clue
to the existence of a connection. 'What happens by nature happens
always or for the most part' (Physics II 8, 198b34 - 36). But what
Aristotle could not allow is a Humean description of the two sides of
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the causal relationship as a pair of conceptually distinct and self-
sufficient changes. The language of transitive agency makes it
possible to register the fact that the change has two sides and
involves two objects, without implying that there are two changes.
Thus while 'builds' represents nothing extra going on "between" X and
Y, it is not on that account eliminable from a correct, and from
Aristotle's point of view, a scientific account of the situation.
(44) There is however another way of viewing the matter, one which
undercuts altogether any attack on 'agency' as introducing a non-
empirical relationship. Instead of identifying "the change" with the
coming into being of some new state, let us follow Aristotle in III 3
in treating it as one concrete event in which the agency of one being
and the patiency of another are distinguishable but inseparable
aspects. Now if we consider this event prior to analysing it into
the two aspects, can we say that two different beings are involved in
it? What we call the agent and the patient are of course perceptibly
and spatially different. But Aristotle would not in general take
this as a sufficient criterion for there being distinct beings or
substances: e.g. the organs of an organic creature are not different
substances. And in the case which we are considering, we cannot dis¬
tinguish one being as that in which the new state happens, and the
other as that which contributes to this without itself suffering the
new state, since this distinction presupposes that the concrete event
has already been conceptually split into its two aspects. It seems
then that considered prior to analysis, this event occurs in a single
subject, which only upon analysis reveals different factors, an agent
and a patient. Now although Aristotle's analogies in Book II between
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natural and artificial change are intended to illustrate the former
by the latter, why should we not reverse the analogy, and regard the
artifex and his material as forming, in the change, a concrete organic
24
unity, as if the material were an extension of his own body? What
happens in the one and what happens in the other have the same end and
are from the same principle. Such a consideration is what justifies
thinking of the parts of one body (in the ordinary sense of 'one body')
as an organic unit; so let it justify a similar view in this case.
However, the difference between this case and a real case of natural
change in a single substance, is that in the former, the "organic unit"
exists as a unit only during the change. In particular, the change
terminates in the unit's dissolution into two free-standing substances,
one the house and the other a being capable of entering into similar
"organic" relations with other sets of building materials. And it
would be a strange natural substance indeed whose natural change
necessarily resulted in its own dissolution! However, if we may dis¬
regard this important disanalogy in order to finish the conceptual
picture, let us say this: it is only because there are two distinct
beings before and after the change that we assume that there were
during it too. The two distinct being are materially continuous, both
before and after, with the one subject of the change as it actually
occurs. But is this a reason for supposing that during the change
there were two actually distinct beings involved? Surely not, any
more than the fact that different simple bodies are yielded up when
an organism decomposes would be, for Aristotle, a ground for saying
that they were actually present as their distinct selves during the
24. Cf. Be Mot. An. 8, 702a31 - b6 for a comparison of a stick moved
by the hand to an extra limb.
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life of the creature.
(45) If this view of the matter is not too far-fetched, then nor
is its implication, which is that there is no actual agency and
patiency. In the change as a concrete unitary event there are not
different entities to bjj agent and patient. The active and passive
of the verb, from this point of view, are used of the change itself
only derivatively, on the basis of an actual distinction existing only
ante and post eventum. We cannot even call the two beings the
'potential agent and patient', since this implies that they could be
actually so. But they could be actually so only in the actual change,
and Jni the actual change they are not distinct and therefore not agent
and patient. At any rate, on this account the question 'What is it
that takes place when agency takes place?' cannot arise. Since there
are not two beings to connect, there can be no mystery, nor any at¬
tempts to reduce any mystery, about the nature of the connection. If
we and Aristotle find this account unacceptable, the reason, I suggest,
does not lie with the concept of change as such, but with the structure
of the concepts we use to describe our own practical activities. Sup¬
pose we intend to produce some change in an object other than our¬
selves. Then in the event, if all goes well, we do what we earlier
intended. If we describe what we are doing while doing it, the de¬
scription differs only in tense from the verbal expression of the
prior intention. So in seeing ourselves as executing the intention,
we see the actual happening as of the same logical structure as the
intention itself. But in the intention, which preceded the change,
the object-to-be-changed figured as something distinct from ourselves,
and therefore even when the change is actual it continues to figure
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as distinct. In other words, when the change is one that we bring
about in an external object, we cannot primarily view it as a concrete
event undifferentiated into the two aspects of agency and patiency.
The point of view of the human agent is one from which the two "halves"
already present themselves as distinct.
(46) Any further discussion of the issues that open up here would
take us far afield from Aristotle, who never follows out the line of
thought just sketched, although his conception in III 3 of the concrete
unity of change may be said to contain its germ. While the account
just given brings the obvious, mutually external, cases of agent and
patient under a schema predicating a single undifferentiated develop¬
ment of a single unitary subject, Aristotle himself travels in the
opposite direction. He looks for agency and patiency even in the
apparently intransitive changes of single living organisms, beings
which for him are unitary not in some esoteric sense that stretches
the conceptual imagination, but fundamentally and paradigmatically so.
To this, the topic of "self-change", we now turn.
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CHAPTER V
Self-Change and the Eternal Cause
(1) If Aristotle is in general elusive on the subject of agency
and its connection with change, nowhere is he more so than when treat¬
ing of the mysterious concept of something's 'changing (transitive)
itself', or being 'changed by itself'. The import of this concept,
the grounds of its application, its point and its relation to other
Aristotelian notions are all more or less obscure. But these obscur¬
ities especially demand elucidation not only because of the intrinsic
interest of the idea of something's being changed by itself, but also
because this idea plays a crucial part in one of the most important
arguments of the Physics. This is the massive argument of Book VIII
in which Aristotle seeks first to show that change never was nor will
be absent from the universe, and then to show the nature of the cause
on which this fact depends. It might seem that the subjects of Book
VIII, namely the eternity of change and the eternal cause of change,
are remote from the central topics with which we have so far been
concerned, i.e. the conceptual structure of change as such and its
relations to substance and to agency. For in considering these ques¬
tions we have so far found it unnecessary to assume that change either
is or is not an eternal feature of the universe, or to investigate what
follows from either of these suppositions. Given that change exists,
which in a work on "physics" cannot even be questioned (I 2, 184b25 -
185a3; 185al2-16; VIII 3, 252a32 - 253b6), we have followed Aristotle
in his analyses of what change involves and presupposes when and where
it does exist, and these analyses have made no reference to the actual
distribution of change through time (or for that matter through space).
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However, as will emerge from the ensuing discussion, the conclusions
of Book VIII have a vital bearing on the validity of Aristotle's
original notion of natural substance put forward in II 1. In partic¬
ular, the proposition that there never was nor will be a time without
change may be regarded as underpinning the fundamental conception of
the nature of a natural substance as an inner principle of change.
Aristotle demonstrates and defends the aforesaid proposition in the
first two chapters of VIII, and devotes the rest of the book to spell¬
ing out certain presuppositions and consequences. It is in the course
of this reasoning that 'change by self' or, as I shall usually call
it, 'self-change' makes its sole appearance in the Physios, in VIII
4-6.
(2) The concept is first introduced in a section where Aristotle
means to establish that whatever changes (intransitive) is changed 'by
something' (Chapter 4). 'By something' is used by him to cover two
alternatives: 'by something other', and: 'by itself' (255b31 - 256a2).
Now at first sight it may look as if something's being changed 'by
itself' means the same as something's changing naturally or by its own
nature. In speaking of natural change, we have sometimes described
the object as changing 'of itself', and Aristotle speaks of the nature
of a natural substance as a principle of change 'within itself'.
These reflexive locutions are perhaps easily confused, but for Aris¬
totle they represent distinct concepts."'" He makes it quite clear in 4
1. Cf. 0. Hamelin, Le Systeme d'Aristote, pp. 325 - 326, L. Robin,
Aristote, pp. 125 - 126, and W.D. Ross, Aristotle's Physics,
p. 435. By contrast, F. Solmsen speaks in vaguely general terms
of 'nature as self-moving principle' ('Platonic Influences in
Aristotle's Physical System' in Aristotle and Plato in the Mid-
Fourth Century, edd. During and Owen, p. 227). It is true that
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(especially in the summarising lines 255b31 - 256a2) that the class
of beings that can be said to be changed by themselves is only a sub¬
division of the class of beings that can be said to change by their
own natures. Self-change belongs only to living creatures (or anim-
2
als: Aristotle seems to hover between these two positions ). But
the realm of natural substances includes also the inanimate bodies,
fire and earth, etc., or, as he here terms them, the light and the
heavy (255a2 ff.). And Aristotle is no more disposed to deny natural
movements to these substances in VIII than when he first introduced
the concept of natural substance in II 1. The distinction between
natural change and change that is enforced or contrary to nature still
applies in full force to the inanimate members of the physical world.
Thus in VIII 4, 254b21 - 22 he writes: '... some things change
(xLvetxou,) by nature, others against nature. Change against nature
is illustrated by earthy things moving upwards and fire downwards.'
These movements could not be regarded as 'against' the natures of the
substances concerned unless it were still being assumed, as it was
in Aristotle's System of the Physical Vlorld, pp. 100-101, Solmsen
says: 'To have the principle of motion in oneself is not entirely
the same as to be moved by oneself', but he does on (ibid.)'.
'Aristotle himself seems at times to regard the two notions as
synonymous', citing 254bl4 ff. But this passage implies only that
change 'by oneself' counts as natural change, without any hint that
the converse is also true; hence it affords no evidence of even a
temporary assumption of synonymy on Aristotle's part. (Possibly
Solmsen's interest in Platonic influences misleads him here: what
Plato calls 'self-change' corresponds, in his system, to 'natural
change' in Aristotle's in that for Plato 'self-change' denotes the
type of change that is primary and presupposed by any other. See
footnote 23.) It is unfortunate that H. Cherniss too (Aristotle's
Criticism of Plato and the Academy, Appendix X) uses 'self-motion'
and 'moves itself' of any change not externally determined,
although he is well aware that this is not Aristotle's meaning
(ibid., p. 590). For similar misleading language see also W.
Charlton, Aristotle's Physics I, II, p. 92.
2. See footnotes 4 and 28.
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originally in II 1, that they have natural directions of motion too.
And in 4, 254bl6 - 17 Aristotle recalls his original definition of
nature as an inner principle of change with the following remark:
'We say that whatever has the principle of change within it changes
by nature'. It is almost as if he is here warning us against suppos¬
ing that the newly introduced term 'changed by itself' implies any
revision in content of his initial concept of nature. But it would
be strange indeed if in the same context he were then to put forward
a doctrine entailing a radical departure from his earlier view con¬
cerning the extension of this concept. Yet this in effect is what
Aristotle would here be doing in VIII 4 if he meant by 'self-change'
the same as what he earlier meant by 'natural change'. For this
equation of the two terms would entail that on the theory of VIII 4
the concept of 'nature' applies now only to animate things, since
these alone merit the title 'self-changers'.
(3) It is precisely because Aristotle does not equate natural
change with self-change that he is faced here with what he regards as
a particularly knotty problem, that of showing how even in their nat¬
ural motions the simple bodies can be properly described as moved by
something. For they are not moved by themselves; and the absence of
any external determinant to enforce the pattern of movement makes it
look as if it is wrong to speak of them as moved by anything other
than themselves. But this Aristotle cannot accept, for he would then
have to say that they are not moved by anything, but simply move,
which contradicts the conclusion towards which he is steering, that
every change is a change by something. In the end, and with consider¬
able effort, he argues that a simple body in its natural motion is
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"moved by" those external substances responsible for the motion
either through having produced the body in the first place or through
removing hindrances (V.s. Chapter IV, paragraphs (10) - (11)). Thus
he is willing to extend the phrase 'changed by something other' so as
to cover two such different dependence-relationships as (a) that
between an object changing against its nature and the external object
that enforces this change, and (b) that between an object changing
naturally and those external objects that make or have made this
change possible. We may well suspect any doctrine that requires such
a blanketing of differences, but Aristotle's deliberately indiscrim¬
inate use of 'changed by something other' puts him at a a strategic
advantage vis a vis the question of what exactly we are to suppose
could be meant by something's being changed 'by itself'. What re¬
lationship can a thing have with "itself" that would justify describ¬
ing it as both agent and patient of its own change? But by using
'changed by something other' to cover such diverse relations, Aris¬
totle in effect establishes for 'changed by -' a meaning so wide and
abstract that the reader is in no position to complain at its further
extension to the reflexive case, or to object if no obvious image
comes to mind to illustrate this latter application.
(4) All that we have so far gathered concerning change by self,
or self-change, is that it is natural change, and occurs only in anim¬
ate beings. In what then does it differ from the natural change of
the inanimate? The term might seem to hint that self-change is more
self-sufficient. But in general this is not so. For if it is true
to say that an inanimate thing in natural change is changed by things
other than itself, on the ground that other things are responsible for
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its existence and for its free path, then it is equally true to say
this about a living thing in its natural change, which is self-change.
A creature that is changed by itself at the same time owes this
change to external factors. Aristotle does not himself bring out
this point, but it follows directly from the account he has given of
'changed by something other' in connection with the natural changes
of the inanimate. In fact it appears from VIII 2 and 6 that the self-
changes of living things are more dependent on external conditions
than are the natural movements of fire and earth. The latter pre¬
suppose only (a) generation of the substance in question, and (b)
conditions that make or keep the pathway clear; but the former
require not only these but also (c) environmental stimuli that trig¬
ger the changes although without enforcing their pattern (2, 252bl5 -
20), and (d) certain physiological conditions of the living substance
which it owes to earlier interactions with the environment (such as
ingestion of food) (6, 259b6 - 15).
(5) What distinguishes self-change for Aristotle is not superior
self-sufficiency of the change as compared with change of other types,
but the logical complexity of that which has the change. A self-
changer, 'i.e. a substance that changes (transitive) itself, or is
changed by itself, comprises within itself both agent and patient of
the same change, and this agent and patient, Aristotle insists, are
in some way distinct from one another. Supplementing Aristotle's
account (since he himself seems resolved to say as little as possible
about self-change) we may state the following analytic difference be¬
tween the case in which a self-change is externally obstructed and
then released, and the case in which this happens to a change that is
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merely natural and not self-instigated: In the latter case, what is
repressed and then released is simply a change in the object; while
in the former, not only is the change first prevented, then permitted,
but something else too, namely the effective exercise of agency by
the agent-element "within" the object. When self-change is hindered,
then not only is something prevented from changing (intransitive),
but something in some sense else is prevented from producing the
change. That there is some difference between changer and changed
within the self-changer is one of the few points on which Aristotle
is quite definite. At 4, 254b28 - 33 he asserts that there is a dif¬
ference, and at 5, 257a31 - bl3 he attempts to prove that there must
be. The self-changer is a complex whole, in which the agent- and the
patient-element are "parts". The idea of a being in which changer
and changed are in no way distinct Aristotle regards as inadmissible.
(6) In this respect his concept of self-change differs radically
from its Platonic forerunner. Plato had argued that every causal
series of changes must have a causally first member, and that this
first member is a change in which the being that changes is itself
the source of its change. He described this being as 'changing (tran¬
sitive: xtvetv) itself' (Laus X 894 Bff.). He further argued that
self-change is the defining characteristic of soul (ibid. 895 C- 896 A;
of. Phaedvus 245 c- 246 A). He regarded the soul not merely as the
source of vitality in beings other than souls, but as itself enjoying
the life of which it is source. Now this life he identified with
motion (Phaedrus 245 C). On this view, then, the very same entity,
namely the soul, is both source and subject of motion in itself. What
is agent is also, in this case, patient: or, if the language of
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'agent/patient' presupposes a distinction, then the soul must be
described as in motion (alive) with a motion not due to its being
passively moved by anything, even itself. To live and move is of
the essence of soul, and it might well be argued that it is as absurd
to describe the soul as the agent of its own essential property as
to speak of the number five as the agent of its own oddness.
(7) Now Aristotle may be right in holding, as against Plato, that
the phrases 'X changes (transitive) itself', 'X is changed by itself',
are used incoherently unless the user would allow that there is some
difference between changer and changed. But this hardly entitles
Aristotle to claim coherence once this condition is met. On the con¬
trary; if changer must differ from changed, how can 'X changes itself'
escape being nonsensical or self-contradictory? On any analysis, it
seems, the concept of self-change collapses, for identity of changer
with changed conflicts with the meaning of 'changer' and 'changed',
while their difference conflicts with the meaning of 'self'. How can
it help to say with Aristotle that a self-changer is a whole of which
one part, factor or element is changer, the other changed? For the
changed is on this view changed by something other than itself. It
seems that Aristotle's attempt to make sense of 'self-change' ends by
3
reducing it to change by something other. If self-change is change
in one part of a whole by another part, what is to prevent us from pred¬
icating 'self-change' of any combination of changer and changed, e.g.
craftsman and materials, the stone and whatever pushes it contrary to
its natural direction? It is extraordinary that Aristotle does not raise
these problems, let alone discuss them. However it is clear enough on one
3. Cf. Solmsen, Aristotle's System, p. 233.
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level what his answer to the last would have been. The craftsman
and his materials may for some purposes be considered as a whole per¬
haps, but they do not form one substance, and Aristotle's self-
changers are single substances, organisms. Thus the postulated dif¬
ference between changer and changed within the self-changer is not
such as to detract from the unity of the substance. Following this
line, we may say that Aristotle's position is this: Nothing literally
changes itself in the sense that would deny any difference at all be¬
tween changer and changed. But this does not erase the distinction
between being changed by self and being changed by something other.
For these two phrases mark two genuinely different relationships: that
which holds between elements which together form a substantial unity,
and that which holds between beings, themselves each a substance,
which together make up no more than a combination.
(8) On this account then, 'being changed by something other'
refers to a relation between substances, while 'being changed by
self' refers to a relation between different elements of a single
substance. But how could anyone suppose that no discussion is needed
to establish that the relation of 'being changed by' should be predic-
able on what would appear to be two categorially different levels?
Yet from Aristotle no such discussion is forthcoming, and this silence
of his is so striking a feature of his whole treatment of self-
change that in addition to the philosophical difficulties of this
concept we are faced with an extra puzzle in Aristotle's refusal to
consider them. For the questions he leaves unsettled are basic on any
view. What ontological status, for instance, would he attribute to
the "something" in a self-changer which is identified with the changer,
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and that other "something" identified with the changed? How is it
possible to predicate either 'changer' or 'changed' without illegit¬
imately hypostatising the entities of which they are predicated?
With regard to the term 'changed' this difficulty is especially ob¬
vious, as the following argument will show.
(9) Every change, at least according to the definition of Book III,
results in a new state of that which has undergone the change. If the
change is, as Aristotle says it always must be, a change brought about
by a changer, then that which undergoes the change must be described
by the term correlative to 'changer', i.e. 'changed'. Thus the changed
is identical with that which undergoes the change. But what undergoes
the change ends by being in a new condition of some kind. And in
three out of the four types of change which Aristotle recognises in
III, the new condition is represented by a term predicable of a sub¬
stance. The new state is a quality, a size or a position in space,
and according to the doctrine of the Categories, the subjects of such
properties are substances. What undergoes a change resulting in such
a property must therefore be a substance. Thus the changed in a change
resulting in such a property must be a substance. And this holds true
however the change in question comes about: whether, for instance,
it comes about through "self-change" or through change "by something
other". Thus the changed, even in self-change, must be a substance.
Now Aristotle says (Physics VIII 6, 259b5 - 20 and 7, 261a23 - 25) that
organisms have the power to change themselves only in respect of
4
place. This view has its difficulties, but at least it shows that
4. Because according to the doctrine of De Anima III 9 only animals
among living things have the power of natural locomotion; but if
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Aristotle does not think of self-change as involving some special,
mysterious and as yet uncategorised type of terminus ad quem. On the
contrary, what changes itself moves itself from one place to another, so
that what it moves when it moves "itself" must be the kind of thing
of which place is predicated; i.e., if the doctrine of the Categories
is still retained, a substance. But if the changed is a substance,
then is the changer something else in addition to this substance? And
if so, how can the "whole" which is the self-changer be itself a sub¬
stance, if it consists in a substance plus something else? On the
other hand this might be condemned as a spurious paradox generated by
the gratuitous introduction of terms such as 'in addition to' and
'plus'. In stating that changer must differ from changed, Aristotle
does not state, nor necessarily imply, that the difference must be
such that the two are addible. Perhaps then he means that in self-
change, the changer, though different from the changed, is not a dif¬
ferent individual thing or substance. Resorting to a handy word, we
may say that he might mean that it is the same individual substance
under different "aspects". Thus the doctor is a substance and so is
the patient a substance, but not necessarily a different one. On
such a view the changer in self-change is not a meaninglessly hypost-
atised aspect of a substance, "acting upon" another hypostatised
aspect, but is the same substance, to which two different descriptions
apply. This seems the most promising line of analysis, or at any rate
the one least at variance with Aristotle's metaphysics, but Aristotle
does not at any point steer us towards it by indicating, for instance,
that changer need differ from changed only in description (Adya)) and
plants are not self-changers, then the division of changes in
Physios VIII 4 into (a) counter-natural, (b) self-changes and (c)
the natural changes of inanimate substances, is not exhaustive,
which the argument requires it to be. See also footnote 28.
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not numerically. He is as studiously vague as to the nature of the
difference as he is positive that there is some difference. 'That
[living things] are changed by something is clear, but what is not
clear is how we ought to distinguish in them changer from changed.'
(4, 254b48 - 30). But if we cannot articulate the distinction, how
can we be sure that it is such as will bear the weight of the changer-
changed relation? The next sentence is equally unilluminating:
'For it seems that just as in the case of ships
and things not constituted by nature, so in the case of
animals the changer and changed are distinct (duqpqyevov),
and in this way [i.e. only when there is a distinction]
the whole changes itself.' (-ibid. , 30 - 33)
If the illustration points in any specific direction, it is that of
the metaphysically disastrous hypostatisation of changer and changed
as distinct substantial entities, like ship and oarsmen. But it is
more reasonable to suppose that Aristotle is here saying that just as
there is some difference (whatever type it may be) between an artifact
and what pushes or manipulates it, so there is some difference between
changer and changed in an animal. For it is unlikely that he would
have used the illustration to specify the type of distinction supposed
to obtain in the latter case when he has only just said that it is not
clear how this distinction should be made.
(10) Our unanswered questions have so far been of the most abstract,
but even on a more descriptive level Aristotle is equally unforth-
coming. Even if the metaphysical status of changer and changed in the
self-changer is to be left unexplained, we might expect to be told what
those features or elements or aspects are to which these roles are
assigned. Aristotle gives a list of empirically knowable criteria for
distinguishing self-changers: they are alive, they exhibit more than
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one kind of self-change, they have the power to stop their own
changes, they are physically complex (4, 255a5 - 18). But the con¬
text shows that his purpose in stating this list is not to explain
what is involved in self-change but rather to establish that the
simple bodies do not count as self-changers. He shows that they do
not so count by pointing out that they possess none of the listed
characteristics of self-changers, but this says nothing as to which
(if any) of these characteristics is what being a self-changer con¬
sists in, and which are merely signs and symptoms. However, Aristotle
could hardly have expected his immediate audience with their Platonic
background not to take him as identifying the source of self-change
with soul. Soul, then, it would be understood, is the changer-element,
and body therefore the changed, and being ensouled is not a mere
criterion for predicating 'self-changer', but that in virtue of which
the predication would be true. That this is Aristotle's meaning in
or behind the text of VIII 4 may seem to go without saying.^ All
the same, it is odd that he never once in the Physics explicitly
identifies soul as the changer-element in self-change. However, we
shall see later that this omission, if deliberate, is one for which
he had good reason (v.i. paragraphs (33) and (37)).
(11) On the whole perhaps it is not surprising that Aristotle does
not spell out an equation of soul with changer and body with changed
in the case of live creatures. Given that he describes the latter as
5. Since he holds that locomotion is the only type of self-change
(see paragraph (9)), this must mean locomotion in different
directions.
6. Simplicius ad 255b28 - 29 (Diels 1208, 36 - 37): ' tpocpaveg yap
eaxtv oti uiio t?is <iuxhs xlvettat xpv dig ?iou)v xuvqatv. '
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(sometimes) changing (transitive) themselves, it is a reasonable
guess that he has this equation in mind. But what is puzzling is
that he should commit himself to this description in the first place.
After all, Aristotle had good reason to refuse to handle the concept
of self-change at all. On Plato's interpretation it is incoherent,
as he himself argues (V.s. paragraphs (5) - (6)), and he cannot have
been entirely unaware of the problems threatening his own. Why then
think of organisms as self-changing? Why not think of them as simply
changing (intransitive)? Of course these substances are physically
and psycho-physically complex in ways that set them apart from the
inanimate bodies that also simply change. But why should we assume
that the elements in the complex, however they are distinguished,
stand to one another in a relation of agent to patient? It might be
suggested that Aristotle has to say that organic creatures are, in
their natural changes, changed by themselves, since otherwise they
would not be changed by anything, which would falsify his universal
principle that whatever changes is changed by something. But salva¬
tion of the principle does not require the introduction of "self-
change". In denying this predicate to the inanimate bodies in their
natural motions, Aristotle does not deny that they are changed by
something, but identifies the agent(s) with the external substance(s)
that make or have made possible those motions. Similarly, even if
organisms were not said to change themselves, there would still be
just such external agents of their natural changes, as we remarked
earlier (paragraph (4)), so that even without self-change, it would
still be true that every change, organic and inorganic, natural and
counternatural, would have some kind of agent.
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(12) Aristotle goes some way towards providing an answer to the
question just raised when in 4, 254bl7 - 20 he mentions situations in
which the natural change of an organism may consist in or involve
some change contrary to the natural bent of a limb or organ, or of
the whole body considered as composed of a given material. Thus it
is natural to a bird to move (fly) upwards, but not to the earth of
which its body is mainly composed. And in some cases a creature may
only be able to perform some function natural to the type of creature
it is by moving some part of itself in a manner contrary to that in
which the part normally moves. Thus a man might have to use his hands
to walk with, or to grow upwards a plant might have to send shoots
sideways at an unnatural angle. If we think of the nature of an
organism as being to pursue certain biological ends as best it can,
then we may say that in such cases the organism moves naturally,
although some bodily part, or the material of its body, moves in a way
contrary to the nature of that part or material. Thus (a) we differ¬
entiate between the organism and its parts, and between the organism
and its matter; and (b) we describe their relation in terms similar
to those used to describe situations in which one external substance
acts upon another. The matter of the organism moves contrariwise to
its'nature as earth or whatever, and it does so because of the natural
change of the organism whose matter it is. Thus there is a basis for
applying the language of changer and changed to the organism and its
part or to the organism and its matter.^
7. The statement that the whole organism is agent and its bodily
matter or bodily part the patient may appear to conflict with
what in paragraph (10) we said was surely Aristotle's implied
meaning in VIII 4, viz. that the soul is agent. But on the
doctrine of Be Anima, whereby the soul is the form constituting
the bodily parts an organic whole, these are two ways of saying
the same thing.
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(13) If Aristotle had confined himself to such cases when speak¬
ing of the self-change of organisms, the concept would be relatively
unproblematic. At least we could understand why he uses it even
though the theoretical difficulty of articulating the conceptual
nature of the difference between changer and changed still remains
unsolved. A similar difficulty arises over the analysis of common
English reflexive phrases such as 'X controls himself', 'X makes
himself eat', where what is said to be overridden is not a purely
physical propensity of some physical part or component, but a desire
or inclination. But inability to produce a theory explaining how the
"self controlled" differs from the "self controlling", and what it is
that the "one" does to the "other", does not prevent us from using
these expressions in ordinary discourse, confident that they hit off
something not conveyed by non-reflexive expressions such as either
(a) the intransitive 'X eats', or (b) the transitive 'Y makes X eat'
(where X is a different person from Y). In the same way we can see
the point of reflexive expressions that imply the checking of a phys¬
ical tendency. But these considerations do not ease the difficulty of
Aristotle's theory, for the simple reason that he sees all cases of
organic natural change as cases of self-change.
'That which is changed by itself changes by nature,
as for instance each of the animals. For the animal is
changed by itself, and everything that has the principle
of change within itself we say changes by nature. Thus
the whole animal changes itself by nature, but its body
can change both by nature and against nature. It depends
on what type of change is occurring and on what type of
element constitutes the body.' (4, 254bl4 - 20)
Here Aristotle shows that he would describe the animal as a whole as
changing itself by nature even in the case where its body and bodily
parts follow the natural tendencies specific to each. Thus when the
man walks on his feet, and when the bird swoops downwards, allowing the
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downward tendency of its earthy component for the moment to take
over, this according to Aristotle is not merely natural movement of
the whole, but self-movement. Now it is true that the drop of a
bird that lets itself drop is, as we say, controlled, since the bird
can check it and gear it to the purpose in hand. This power to check
a natural motion, we recall, was one of Aristotle's criteria for being
a self-changer. But in ordinary discourse, the fact that the falling
creature can stop itself, and can move upwards against the weight of
its body, would not license the description 'It makes itself move
down'. Nor would it be correct to say of someone who is following a
strong inclination to eat, but who can all the same do what might
reasonably be described as 'stopping himself from eating', that he
'makes himself eat'. Ordinary discourse, in other words, applies the
language of self-change to movements and actions that are actually
contrary to nature or inclination, not to those which are not, even
when they are such that it is in the agent's power to halt them in the
face of nature or inclination.
(14) The reason, I believe, for Aristotle's failure to discuss or
even acknowledge the difficulties we have been surveying is this:
the concept of living things as self-changers figures in Physics VIII
not as an item of any interest in itself, but purely as a step in an
argument concerned with other issues. 'Self-change' tells us nothing
about organic substance, nor about the agency of beings familiar to
our experience. It is intended to uphold a certain conclusion con¬
cerning the ultimate eternal source of change in the universe as a
whole, and Aristotle has accordingly invested 'self-change' with no
more meaning than is necessary for the discharge of this ulterior
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function. I shall argue below, moreover, that attempts to precisify
the concept as applied to organisms can only render it unfit for the
larger task; thus it is left obscure not because it is difficult,
but because if clarified it would be useless for the main argument,
and the main argument provides its only raison d'etre in the Physics.
That argument we must now consider, in order to prove this claim.
(15) Let us begin with the opening words of Book VIII:
'Did change ever come into being, not having been
before, and will it revert to non-being, so that then
nothing will change: or is it something that always
was and always will be, an immortal and unceasing
property of things, like a kind of life of beings
constituted by nature?' (250bll - 15)
This, if a genuine question, is a courageous one to be asking at this
stage, for it calls into question the fundamental starting point of
many elaborate investigations already conducted. I mean the assumption
that the nature of a substance is a principle of change. Possession
of such principle, it was stated in II 1, is what distinguishes a
natural substance from an artifact; possession of a principle for a
specific type of change is what defines the specific type of a natural
substance. Yet what stronger basis had Aristotle for these assump-
8
tions than everyday experience? It is one thing to observe that an
inner principle of change distinguishes the natural substances with
which we are familiar from the artifacts with which we are familiar;
another to erect this into a necessary feature of natural substance
as such. Aristotle may have been justified in assuming that no one
would dispute the observation. But some argument is required to up¬
hold the view that the observed difference is a definitive difference.
8. Cf. A. Mansion, Introduction a la Physique Aristotelicienne3 p. 101.
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It is not, for instance, self-evidently absurd to suppose that the
natural world might for a time have existed, or one day exist, without
any change at all taking place in it. Certain eminent thinkers had
believed themselves to be talking sense when they stated that just
such a changeless state of things had occurred or would occur in the
history of the natural world. And if this is even possible, let alone
true, then change and principles of change cannot be what defines
natural substance, since according to such hypotheses, the world of
nature, i.e. of natural substances, could exist without change. Now
Aristotle never envisaged this problem in Book II. There he simply
assumed that the natural world is as we have always found it to be
(and cannot perhaps imagine it otherwise than being). He pronounced
it absurd to ask for proof that nature (in the sense of an inner prin¬
ciple of change) exists:
'That nature exists it would be absurd to try
to prove, for it is clear that many beings are like
this [i.e. possessed of such principles]. And to
prove what is obvious by means of what is not is
the mark of someone who cannot distinguish what is
knowable in itself from what is not.' (II 1, 193a3 - 6)
It never occurred to him that it might not be so absurd to ask for
proof that nature, in this same sense, always has and always will be
instantiated: i.e. that the existence of change-originating sub¬
stances is not just an episode in the history of the world. But if
it is possible that 'nature' in the sense of II 1 has application in
some epochs but not in others, then 'nature' in the sense of II 1 can¬
not be taken as the fundamental starting point for inquiries into
physical reality as such. This is the threat posed by the theories to
which only now, in Book VIII, Aristotle gives his attention.
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(16) Empedocles, for instance, had held (or so Aristotle tells us
in VIII 1, 250b26 - 251a5) that the universe as a whole alternates be¬
tween periods of stasis and periods of change. Aristotle interprets
Empedocles as implying that these periods belong to a single contin¬
uous history. This is to say, when change takes over from stasis
or vice versa, it is not as if a totally new universe has come into
being. The alternation is a single pattern, not a succession of
discrete universes. So on this view, this world, at present under¬
going an age of change, has been and will be devoid of change. It
makes no difference whether we are to suppose that there are special
types of substance which get their chance of existence only in the
epochs of stasis, or that throughout history the same types always
exist, expressing their natures sometimes in change, sometimes in
total non-change. Either way Aristotle's earlier starting point
loses any claim to absolute status. But the alternating theory
ascribed to Empedocles is only one example of a class of speculations
threatening this claim. The threat is the same on any supposition
that change is not continually present, whether the theory be that
it alternates with non-change, or that non-change once and for all
preceded or will supersede it.
(17) I shall not dwell on the question of the accuracy of Aristotle's
account of Empedocles in VIII 1, nor on the question of whether he was
fair in including the views of Anaxagoras and Plato among those which
he has to combat. Nor shall I attempt a detailed account of his
arguments that there never was nor will be a time without change. For
the present purpose it is enough to say that by the end of VIII 1 he
takes himself to have established this conclusion, thus answering the
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initial question of Book VIII. His answer, moreover, makes no overt
appeal to the original conception of natural substance. He does not
formally assume this and then draw the conclusion as follows: 'Nat¬
ural substance is by definition that which is possessed of an inner
principle of change; there can be no natural world without natural
substance; therefore change is an inherent feature of the natural
world throughout its history.' It seems in short that in VIII 1-2
Aristotle proceeds as if the original conception were not available
for building upon. This is the only indication that he intended the
arguments of VIII 1 - 2 to support it. However, whether or not this
was his intention, support is what they logically provide: not by
entailing the concept's validity, but by contradicting a group of
theories whose truth would undermine it.^
9. In fact, the position argued for in VIII 1 comprises two logically
distinct theses which Aristotle does not separate: (i) At no time
is the natural universe devoid of change; (ii) Time is infinite
in both directions. If we assume that the natural universe exists
only in and through time, then the II 1 doctrine of natural sub¬
stance depends on the truth of (i) but not on that of (ii) . For
the doctrine requires that the existence of change as such should
not have a beginning or end within the history of the natural uni¬
verse, ■i.e. a beginning or end in time. But this does not entail
that there might not be a sense in which time itself, and the hist¬
ory of the natural world, has a beginning and/or end. And if there
were the possibility of a changeless state of things "before" or
"after" time, this would not conflict with the view that natural
substance is essentially characterised by change, since by the
initial assumption what exists "beyond" time would not be a natural
substance. (Thus Aristotle's doctrine of natural substance does
not require him to argue, as he does in VIII 1, against the Timaeus
view (taking it literally) that time was created. This is fortun¬
ate, since the argument rests on a fallacious inference from the
truism that time cannot have a beginning or end in time, to the
conclusion that it cannot in any sense be said to begin or end.
Cf. G.E.M. Anscombe, 'Aristotle', in Three Philosophers, G.E.M.
Anscombe and P.T. Geach, pp. 60-61.) However in the rest of this
chapter I have followed Aristotle in his amalgamation of theses
(i) and (ii): thus, e.g., I use 'eternal change' to imply, as he
does, a change that has no beginning or end in time and which is
infinite because time is infinite.
10. However, VIII 3, 253b5 - 6 'uitd$eabs yap on n cpuaus apxh xris
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(18) In Chapter 2 Aristotle puts forward and answers what he takes
to be the main objections to the doctrine that there always was and
will be change. These all start from the same point, namely the
undeniable fact of changes that begin and cease. The first objection
states temporal finitude to be a necessary characteristic of all
change; for all change, says the imaginary opponent, is from contrary
to contrary, one of which marks the beginning, the other the end of
the change, so that no change can continue indefinitely (252bl0 - 12).
Secondly, if, as Aristotle has argued, change never comes into being
not having been before, how is it that there are beings, e.g. the
inanimate substances, that begin to change, not having changed before?
(12-16). And when we consider living things, such as ourselves, it
is even more obvious that change can simply start, without the subject
of change being already in a state of change. But if this can happen
with the finite organised substances within nature, why should it not
also be the case with the natural world as a whole, assuming this to
be an organised entity logically analogous to those familiar organ¬
ised substances which we call living things? The latter put themselves
into motion from a state of rest, so that their self-change has a
beginning in time: what reason then do we have for supposing that the
universe as a whole did not begin to change, having been previously
at rest? (17-28). This last objection seems irrelevant at this stage
of the argument, for it assumes that Aristotle's position entails (a)
that there is a change that belongs to the universe as a whole
HLvnaeiDs' is not the remark of someone who sees any current need
to defend the II 1 conception of nature. The tone of the pre¬
ceding passage echoes that of II 1, 193a3 - 6 (quoted in paragraph
(15)). But does 253b5 - 6 express the original unquestioned
attitude of II 1; or does it rather reflect confidence newly
gained through successfully defending the II 1 starting point?
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considered as a single subject, and (b) that this change is everlast¬
ing. But neither Aristotle's arguments nor his conclusion in Chapter 1
logically commits him to either of these propositions. The logical
truth-conditions of the conclusion that there never was nor will be a
time without change may be presented in the form of an inclusive dis¬
junction: Either (A) there never was nor will be a time when it is
not the case that some change or other is occurring, or (B) there is
some change such that there never was nor will be a time when it is
not occurring. And the second disjunct, if it is true, may be true
either because (B^) there is an everlasting change of which the world
as a whole is the subject, or because (B2) there is an everlasting
change whose subject is some being within the world. But the actual
arguments of Chapter 1 make no reference to the disjunct (B), nor to
(B^) or (B2) . Starting (like his opponent in Chapter 2) from the
fact of temporally finite change, Aristotle has argued in 1 that the
conditions under which finite changes begin and cease involve prior
and posterior changes. Obviously this argument does not depend on
the assumption that any particular change is of other than finite
duration. He also argued that the concept of a "time without change"
is incoherent, on the ground that time has already (IV 11) been shown
to be 'a sort of qualification of change' (251b27 - 28). But there is
no suggestion in VIII 1 that there must be some single everlasting
change of which time is the qualification.
(19) However, the last of the objections in VIII 2 is not as incon¬
sequential as it may seem. The connection becomes apparent in Chapter
6, where Aristotle sets forth the presuppositions of the thesis that
there is always change. One of the presuppositions is that there
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should be at least one change that is individually everlasting. A
temporally infinite succession of finite changes is possible only if
some one change in the universe is of infinite duration and absolutely
continuous. In other words, although the proposition that there is a
change without beginning and end does not follow by logical necessity
from the proposition that there never was nor will be a time without
some change or other, the truth of the former proposition is for
Aristotle a metaphysical necessity, given the truth of the latter.
His reason for this we shall consider presently. Meanwhile, however,
he is not yet ready to assert the former proposition, since to do so
would be pointless in the context of replies to objections to the
doctrine that there is never a time without change. The assertion
could not function as an effective premiss in an argument supporting
this doctrine against the objections, for the objector would simply
refuse to accept it. Experience shows that there are changes that
begin and cease; but experience does not and could not tell us that
any single change goes on for ever. So in Chapter 2 Aristotle contents
himself with pointing out that the possibility of an individually
everlasting change is not ruled out. He answers the first objection
by agreeing that change between contraries begins and ceases, but
says that this is no reason why there should not also be a change (not
between contraries) that is everlasting and eternally unbroken
(252b29 - 253al). He also (253a2) states that changes that have a
beginning depend on prior changes in the environment; which implies
that if there is some being (as for instance the universe as a whole,
mentioned by the objector at 252b25 - 28) that has no environment, since
nothing is outside it, its change, if it has one, must necessarily
never have begun.
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(20) However, in the context this implication is not stressed, and
the main burden of Aristotle's reply in 2 consists in an expanded
version of the point he has already propounded in Chapter 1: namely
that when a finitely changing object begins to change, not having
been in process of change before, the beginning of its change is not
an absolute beginning of change in the sense that there never was,
or need have been, any preceding change. A beginning of change in
a particular substance necessarily implies that there has been some
shift in the external conditions, which explains why the change that
begins begins just when it does. And this, Aristotle makes clear
(253al5 - 17), is as true for the self-changes of animate creatures
as it is for the changes of lifeless matter. If it is assumed that
a particular beginning of change in a particular substance is a
beginning of change as such, and not merely of change in that
particular substance, then of course it would be correct to argue,
as the objector does at one point (252bl2-16), that the existence
of substances that begin and cease to change disproves the doctrine
that there is never not change. But the assumption is false. With
this it would seem that Aristotle has adequately defended his doc¬
trine. Yet in his view there still remains a serious difficulty
concerning the possibility of temporally finite changes, and, there¬
fore, of the existence of substances whose nature is expressed in such
changes. What this difficulty is, is not immediately clear, but the
context shows that he sees it as springing from the view that change
as such never begins nor ceases. The objector of Chapter 2, he implies,
was right to regard the fact of finite change as a challenge to that
view, and the challenge has not been fully met by Aristotle's answers
in that chapter. Thus he begins 3 with these words:
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'The starting point of our inquiry is a question
that also relates to the problem already mentioned:
What is that on account of which some things sometimes
change and sometimes revert to a state of rest?' (3,
253a22 - 24)
(21) The sequence of thought between Chapters 2 and 3 is as
obscure as that between 1 and parts of 2. Given the proof that
temporally finite changes are necessarily preceded (and succeeded)
by other changes, what more is needed to reconcile the fact of tempor¬
ally finite particular changes with the doctrine that change as such
is not temporally finite? How is it that Aristotle's answers in 2
fail to effect this reconciliation to everyone's satisfaction? The
problem is not one of logical consistency but of metaphysical compossi-
bility. It is not enough, he says, to explain the beginning of a finite
change by reference to prior changes in the environment, for the
alteration in the environment equally stands in need of explanation.
'It is not in the least absurd that something
should change that has not been previously changing,
given that the external cause of change is sometimes
present, sometimes not. However, we have to consider
how this is possible: I mean, how it is that one and
the same potential agent of change should sometimes give
rise to a change and sometimes not, in the same subject.'
(2, 253a2 - 5)
This passage shows that what Aristotle finds puzzling is not just the
fact of changes that begin and cease, but variation in general. The
variation of a natural substance between change and non-change is one
instance of this, while another is the variation in the substance's
spatial relations to those external factors whose presence converts
them from potential into actual causes of its change.
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(22) But why should Aristotle find variation problematic? To
him, apparently, the difficulty was so obviously a difficulty that
he does not even pause to state what it is before proceeding straight
to the task of solving it. This task takes him from the beginning of
3 to the end of 6, and it is only in 6, where the problem is presented
as finally solved, that the modern reader can begin to see the nature
of the puzzle. What emerges from 6 is that it is not so much the
doctrine of everlasting change that casts doubt on the possibility of
substances whose nature it is to vary between change and rest, but
rather a certain postulate required to make sense of the truth of that
doctrine. The postulate is that there exists at least one eternal and
absolutely changeless cause on which the fact of everlasting change
depends: and the difficulty is to see how such a cause could give
rise to effects that are in any way variable. Let us consider these
points in turn, first the postulate, then the resulting difficulty.
Aristotle takes himself to have established not merely that there al¬
ways was and will be change, but that this is necessarily so. The
question now is how this necessary and everlasting fact of change is
possible. To answer the question we must start from what we know
beyond any doubt, and what we know is that there are temporally finite
changes preceded and succeeded by other temporally finite changes. We
do not at the outset know, prior to argument, that there is any single
particular change that is individually everlasting. Hence to explain
the everlastingness of change as such, we begin by assuming that what
makes change as such everlasting is simply the fact that there is an
everlasting succession of finite changes. We must, moreover, regard
this succession as necessarily unbroken and everlasting, since other¬
wise we have no reason to accept that change as such is necessarily
everlasting. But what can account for the necessary everlastingness
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of the succession? Not, Aristotle implies, a succession of causes,
each responsible for one of a succession of changes, for the succes¬
sion of causes must be necessarily everlasting, if this is to be
true of the succession of their effects; and the former succession
will stand as much in need of explanation as the latter. Nor can the
cause of the succession of changes be identified with any single sub¬
stance that expresses its nature in temporally finite change, for
just as change in such a substance gives way to rest, so every such
substance passes away, one generation replacing another. Nor, finally,
can the totality of such substances account for the infinite series,
for this "totality" is an infinite multitude which does not all exist
at once, so that it cannot be a cause even for a limited time, let
alone throughout all time.
'The eternity and continuity of the succession
cannot be accounted for by any one of them, nor by
all together. For it is eternal and necessary,
while the totality of them is infinite and they do
not all exist at one time.' (258a29 - 32)
The cause must be some single being, not a succession of beings, and
it must be eternally present throughout the series. Thus, Aristotle
concludes, even if the immediate reason why change as such is ever¬
lasting is that there is an infinite succession of finitely changing
and transiently existing substances, each giving rise to changes in
itself and in other things, still
'it is nonetheless true that there is something
that comprehends (u£ptexet) them, being other than
any of them, and that this is the cause of some
things existing while others cease to exist, and
of the continuity of change (xhs ouveyoi'S yexagoAhs) . '
(259a3 - 5)
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(23) Everlasting change then depends on an eternal cause, or
causes:"'""'" for Aristotle's argument does not exclude the possibility
of a plurality as such, but only of a successive plurality. In addi¬
tion to being eternal, the cause or causes must, he assumes, be absol¬
utely changeless. Aristotle does not make explicit the reason for
this assumption. In VIII 5 he argues for the point which we have
already considered (V.s. Chapter IV, paragraphs (22) ff.), viz. that
causing change is not itself a kind of change of which the cause is
subject. But the fact that the eternal cause, insofar as it functions
as cause, neither changes nor needs to be able to change, does not
entail that it is in all respects changeless, any more than the fact
that building is neither a change nor a potentiality for change in the
builder entails that the man who builds is in every respect changeless.
However, the vital difference between the two cases, although Aristotle
does not spell it out, is that the changes effected by building are
of limited duration and interruptible, so that there is no contradic¬
tion in supposing that the individual who builds might change in ways
that would terminate the building activity; whereas the eternal cause
is postulated as the cause of an eternal effect, which rules out its
liability to any change that could suspend its activity as a cause.
And since all that we know of this postulated cause is the function
for which it was postulated, viz. to be the cause of everlasting change,
its absolute unchangeability in the actual fulfilment of this function
implies that for our knowledge it must figure as absolutely unchange¬
able simplicite?. Now it is this that creates the problem for varying
substances and their varying conditions. For how can variation result
11. Nothing in this discussion hangs on whether the references in
VIII 6 to a possible plurality of eternal changeless causes are
late insertions.
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from the eternally unvarying causation of such a cause? If such a
cause can be supposed to produce change at all, the change must be a
process whose properties mirror its own as far as it is possible for
change to mirror the changeless. The change, then will be an eternal
process which is no more made up of successive finite processes than
its cause is made up of successive transient substances. Thus it
would seem that the effect of the eternal cause or causes can only
be one or more than one individually eternal changes. Now unless
there is some escape from this reasoning, Aristotle's argument up to
this point could legitimately be converted into a proof that the suc¬
cession of finite changes, and of substances whose nature is expressed
in finite change, is not infinite. For if the succession can be sup¬
posed infinite only on the assumption of an eternally unchanging cause,
and if such a cause can cause only change that is individually unbroken,
then the concept of infinite succession is self-invalidating; for the
infinity of the succession must be explained by an assumption that
rules out the possibility of succession. So that if there is succes¬
sion of changes, which no one can deny, the succession itself must be
of finite duration, which is as much as to say that there has been or
will be a time when there is no finite change, and therefore no beings
such as those which for Aristotle are par excellence examples of
natural substance. But if the existence of such beings is localised
to certain temporal pockets of the world's history, it is sheer
parochialism to imagine that philosophical inquiry into the structure
of their characteristic changes can lead to universal conclusions
about natural substance or nature as such.
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(24) Aristotle's answer is skilful. He postulates a tevtium quid
causally intermediate between the eternal changeless cause and the
varying transient effects, which participates sufficiently in the
characteristics of each to be rationally conceivable as the effect of
the former and cause of the latter. This connecting link is a process
of change which resembles the changeless cause in being absolutely
unvarying in its form and unbroken in its duration, while at the same
time resembling variegated change in that it too is a change. Since
there can be no change without a changing subject, and since a single
unbroken change presupposes a single individual subject persisting
throughout, it follows that there must be at least one eternally
existing entity other than the changeless cause, viz. the subject of
the change that this cause brings about. Thus at 6, 259b32 - 260a5,
Aristotle writes:
'If there exists something such as we have said,
a cause of change which is itself changeless and
eternal, that which is primarily changed by it must
also be eternal. This [sc. the conclusion that the
primary patient cannot be any transiently existing
and transiently changing substance] is also clear
from the fact that otherwise there would be no coming
into being and passing away and variation (yexagoAri)
of other things, unless there is a cause of change
which is itself a subject of change. For the change¬
less will always cause change in the same way, the
change being [sc. numerically] one, since it does not
itself vary in its relations to what it changes.
Whereas a changing entity, even if its change is single and eternal,
may be supposed to stand in different relations at different times to
other beings, and so to be able to affect them variously. Aristotle's
next sentence, according to the generally accepted text, shows that he
does not regard variation as the immediate effect of eternal change
due immediately to the changeless; instead he separates variation
from the changeless by a series of several intermediate eternal changes.
(260a5 - 10) The details of the implied cosmology are not made clear in
279
the Physics, and nor need they be for Aristotle's present purpose,
which is to work out the bare metaphysical basis of an eternal sequence
of finitely changing substances. Logically, this reasoning does not
commit Aristotle to identifying the eternal change whose existence has
been proved a priori with any process or processes known to us through
observation. However, both he and his audience were already disposed
to regard the motions of the heavens as eternal, so that heavenly
bodies are the natural candidates for him to assign to the role which
he has shown must, as a matter of metaphysical necessity, be filled by
something or other. That assignment once made, questions concerning
the number and causal order of distinct eternal (celestial) motions
and moving bodies become problems for science, to be settled by what-
12
ever hypotheses best explain the astronomical data.
12. Paragraphs (22) - (24) are an exposition of VIII 6, 258b26 - 259a6
and 259b32 - 260al9. These two passages together yield the fol¬
lowing argument (let us call it A): (i) Given that the sequence
of finite changes is eternal, there must be an eternal change¬
less cause; (ii) given that there is an eternal changeless
cause, there must be an eternal change (and an eternal subject
of this change) by the mediation of which the changeless cause
operates and which connects it with finite change. However,
Aristotle also argues (B): (i) Given that change as such is
eternal, there must be some single unbroken eternal change; (ii)
given that there is a single unbroken eternal change, there must
be an eternal subject for this change and an eternal cause, since
otherwise it would not be unbroken (VIII 6, 259al3 - 20; step B
(ii) is elaborated in VIII 10, 267a21 - 267b6). In B the pattern
of thought neatly matches the relations between the objects, the
unbroken eternal change acting as middle term in the argument
just as it is causally intermediate in reality. In A, the change¬
less cause is the logical middle term. I have preferred to ex¬
pound A rather than B, partly because Aristotle gives rather more
space to the two parts of A, but mainly because B is an inferior
argument, offering no plausible account of the inference in B (i)
from the eternity of change as such to a single eternal change.
Noting this non sequitur, Ross and Solmsen hold that Aristotle's
'certainty that [some single unbroken eternal] change exists
arises from a reason which has never been mentioned in the argu¬
ment' (RosSj Aristotle's Physics, pp. 91-92). According to Ross,
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(25) To establish the metaphysical position outlined above, Aris¬
totle needs to have reasoned his way past a serious difficulty, and
it is here that his argument relies crucially on the concept of self-
change. But before considering this, I want to examine what seems to
me a spurious problem raised in connection with the position itself by
Professor Solmsen. Solmsen claims to find an inconsistency between
the doctrine of an eternal ultimate cause of change in the universe
and the II 1 conception of natural substances as containing each within
itself a principle of change. Describing the inference to the eternal
ultimate cause as 'a Platonic line of thought', Solmsen writes:
'Aristotle has so faithfully preserved the
Platonic line of thought - and how could be help
it if he wished to find the first mover? - that
he does grave harm to one of his own new doctrines.
As we know, Book II defines nature as "a source of
movement" and natural objects as "having a source
of movement in themselves". What in Plato was re¬
served for soul has in Aristotle become the property
of all nature. Yet that which has the source of
movement in itself should certainly be able to
initiate its own movement and not be in need of
receiving the impulse from a remote principle.
Evidently in Book VIII Aristotle is developing a
legacy of the Platonic world soul which conflicts
with his own doctrine that all natural entities have
^
their source and principle of movement in themselves.'
We have no wish to dispute Professor Solmsen's learned account of the
historical development of Aristotle's position in Physios VIII from
certain Platonic doctrines, but only to consider whether, as Solmsen
holds, the development conflicts with Aristotle's own concept of the
the 'unmentioned reason' is 'observation \sio] of the never-
ceasing rotation of the heavens' {ibid.), while in Solmsen's view
{Aristotle's System3 pp. 225 - 228) it is the influence of Platonic
cosmology. No doubt observation and inherited outlooks play a
part, but the text of VIII 6 also provides an explicit argument,
namely A, for the alleged non sequitur. Both commentators over¬
look this, perhaps because B is more prominent than A in Meta¬
physics A.
13. Aristotle's System3 p. 232. See also pp. 233 - 234, 100 - 102, and
'Platonic Influences' {loo. oit.) pp. 228 - 229.
nature of a natural substance. The seriousness of this conflict
(supposing Solmsen to be right) depends partly on the general light
in which we regard Book VIII. From any point of view, the most im¬
portant conclusions of VIII are by Solmsen's account inconsistent
with all those earlier writings that take the II 1 concept of nature
as an essential starting point. On the other hand, Book VIII itself
could be regarded as broadly speaking self-coherent, if we were to
interpret it as a free-standing inquiry which neither questions nor
seeks to justify that earlier concept. But if, as I have suggested,
VIII can be read as an attempt to defend the latter, (a) by showing
that the existence of natural substance as defined in II 1 is indeed
an eternal feature of the universe (thus justifying the title of
'substance' for objects falling under the definition), and (b) by
explaining how this is possible, then if Solmsen's criticism is sound,
Book VIII is not only rampantly at odds with itself but provides all
the materials for a veduct'io ad absurdum of Aristotle's original con¬
cept of nature.
(26) It is because of the gravity of these implications that
Solmsen's criticism mainly merits attention, rather than through any
great plausibility of its own. It arises partly from its author's
apparent inability to see how something could coherently be said both
to change by its own nature and to depend on something else for the
realisation of this change; and partly on his belief that in certain
passages of VIII Aristotle actually does what to Solmsen is the only
consistent thing for him to do, namely sets aside his earlier theory
of nature. Certainly, if at any point Aristotle did this, his doing
so would be evidence that at moments anyway he sensed some inconsistency
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between that theory and the newly established position of VIII. But
in fact there is nothing in VIII to suggest that he is troubled in the
way in which Solmsen undoubtedly thinks he ought to be. Solmsen is
presumably leaning on his own assumption that at 4, 254bl4 - 15 Arist¬
otle makes 'self-change' synonymous with 'natural change' (p.s. para¬
graph (2), footnote 1). If this were so it would entail that Aristotle
is no longer prepared to ascribe nature to inanimate substances. But
there is nothing to support the assumption of synonymy, as we saw
(ibid.). Solmsen also seems to regard Aristotle's insistence on a
distinction between changer and changed in the self-changer as entail¬
ing that nothing can be properly described as 'changed by itself':
which on the synonymy assumption would imply that nothing can be said
to 'change by its own nature'. Finally (although this is not made
clear), Solmsen also seems to draw support from those passages in
Chapters 2 and 6 where Aristotle argues that all sublunary changes,
even those of living creatures, are causally dependent on prior changes
in the environment. It is true that Aristotle paid virtually no at¬
tention to this aspect of change when first expounding the doctrine
of nature in Book II, and brings it now into focus only when he needs
it to help support the thesis that there can never have been a time
without some change or other. But there is no need to interpret this
shift of interest as a withdrawal from the earlier doctrine, which, as
we have stressed from the first, is entirely consistent with the view
(which no sane person could deny) that natural substances are not
absolutely self-sufficient sources of their natural changes. A cursory
glance at 6, 260al - 10, where Aristotle speaks of an eternally chang¬
ing body as the proximate changer of sublunary substances, being
responsible by its activity for their coming to be and passing away
and their variation of behaviour, might cause us to fear for the earlier
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doctrine of nature: but only as long as we fail to note that Aris¬
totle has already in 4 committed himself to using the active and
passive of the transitive verb 'xtveCv' in a blanket sense to cover
a number of types of causal dependence, some of which have nothing to
do with immediate determination of the form of the dependent change.
If a releaser from hindrance can be called a 'changer', then why not
also a heavenly body such as the sun whose eternal rotation through
positions at differing distances from the earth ensures the continual
rotation of seasons that condition the varying activity of sublunary
substances? (See De Gen. et Corr., II 10.) And why should the sun,
any more than the releaser, be thought to usurp the change-forming
function earlier assigned to the natures of these substances, or
rather, to the substances themselves considered as being of the kinds
they are? But if natural changes are compatible with dependence on a
proximate eternal cause such as the sun, there is no reason why they
should not also be compatible with dependence on the ultimate change¬
less cause which sustains, via however many causal stages, the sun's
. . 14
eternal motion and the eternal sequence of its finite effects.
14. Solmsen describes Aristotle in Physios VIII as maintaining 'the
causal dependence, by way of chain transmission [my italics],
of all other movements and changes in the world on [the] primum
mobile1, Platonic Influences, p. 216; of. Aristotle's System,
p. 248. This suggests a universal mechanistic determination
which indeed would rule out 'change from a thing's own nature'
as explained in II 1. But while Aristotle in VIII maintains
universal dependence of all changes on the ultimate eternal
rotation, he is aware that dependence takes other forms than
the reception of transmitted motion. (The generator and liber¬
ator are agents of natural inanimate movement, but by making
possible, not by transmitting.) Since 'transmission' literally
implies that the self-same change is passed on to the patient,
the theory of VIII not only does not entail but actually rules
out dependence-by-transmission of all changes on the motion of
the primum mobile, since if this eternal motion were passed on,
what is passed on would be eternal, and there could result no
finite changes. It is true that in VIII 5 Aristotle examines
causal series in which the dependent changes might not unreason¬
ably be described as 'transmitted': the man pushes the stick
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Solmsen, it seems clear, has failed to take full account of Aris¬
totle's view that the ultimate changeless cause works only via an
eternally unvarying change. Perhaps it is Solmsen's preoccupation
with the Platonic antecedents of this latter concept that causes him
to overlook the protection that it gives to the Aristotelian doctrine
of nature. If, as Aristotle insists, the ultimate cause must manifest
itself in an eternal change, this is because it cannot manifest itself
in finite sublunary changes,"'""' but (at most, at their level) in the
fact that the series of such changes is endless. But this means that
the concept of the ultimate cause cannot be regarded as competing for
the position occupied by the concept of 'nature* in Book II. For the
nature of a sublunary natural substance (as defined in II 1) does
what the ultimate cause (as demonstrated in VIII 6) could not conceiv¬
ably do, according to Aristotle's theory: namely manifest itself in
transitory events; while the ultimate cause does what sublunary
natures individually and collectively could not conceivably do, namely
ensure the necessary eternal continuity of the series of substances in
which pushes the stone, etc. Here the dependent changes are
counter-natural to their subjects. Aristotle's point is that
every such series starts with a 'self-change', of which a human
voluntary movement would be an example. Thus, e.g. , if a partic¬
ular eternal rotation is simply the mechanical effect of the rot¬
ation of an ulterior body, still the series must originate with a
"self-rotation" (involving an unchanging agent and rotating
patient). (For Aristotle's application of the 'avayxri axnvaL'
principle to such a series of eternal motions, see VIII 10, 267a
21 - 267bl.) But there is no evidence that Aristotle thinks that
all changes stand to the eternal self-motion in the same type of
dependence relation; i.e. that all changes, eternal and finite,
are to this self-motion as its mechanically determined dependents.
If he did think this, how could he take the man's voluntary move¬
ment as an example of self-change? This sublunary instance dif¬
fers from the eternal self-change in being subject to possible
hindrance from without, but resembles it in not being a 'trans¬
mitted' change.
15. Cf. Zeller., Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics_, vol. I,
p. 421.
which the natures are realised
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(27) The real conceptual difficulty besetting Aristotle's position
is this. He has argued (a) that the eternity of the series presupposes
an eternal changeless cause, and (b) that its variegation presupposes
a cause in process of change. He has then (c) related these two pre¬
supposed entities by causally subordinating the second to the first,
and this move has led him to postulate (d) that the change in the
second is such as to reflect, as far as possible, the properties of
the first, -i.e. is an eternally unvarying change. Thus, as he says
at 3, 253a28 - 32, the sequence of beings that are sometimes changing
and sometimes at rest can be explained only on the assumption that
not everything is of this kind, but that something is always changing
and something always unchanging. But now why should we suppose that
the always unchanging and the always changing are different beings?
Why, in other words, should we not accept the arguments (a) and (b)
above, but put them together so as to draw a different conclusion from
Aristotle's, viz. that the ultimate cause is a unitary being comprising
within itself both eternal change and eternal changelessness, in that
it everlastingly changes with a changeless change? This is in fact
the true description of the entity which for Aristotle stands to the
ultimate cause as its immediate patient; and our question now is why
this entity needs to be regarded as a patient at all, rather than as
16. For further discussion see Appendix to Chapter V. The position
argued in paragraph (26) seems to bear out the contention of W.
Wieland {Die aristotelische Physik, ch. 16, translated as 'The
Problem of Teleology' in Articles on Aristotle, vol. I, edd.
Barnes, Schofield and Sorabji), that Aristotle does not subscribe
to a 'universal cosmic teleology'. However, Wieland does not
explain this phrase sufficiently to permit an exact assessment of
the relation between his thesis and the position here maintained.
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the ultimate cause itself. For Aristotle, by his own reasoning, is
anyway forced to endow it with eternal change and unchangingness
{i.e. continuity and uniformity of change); and eternal change and
unchangingness are the two properties needed to account for the eternal
succession of transitory changes. It seems as if in postulating dist¬
inct beings as bearers of the two properties, Aristotle is pointlessly
reifying the properties themselves. But if we refuse to allow him
this move, he cannot get beyond the eternally changing entity itself;
and since (i) its demonstrable properties account for the sequence of
finite changes, and (ii) reasoning from these premisses can go no
further, this entity may reasonably be termed the ultimate source of
all change."^ And since, as Aristotle will argue extensively in VIII
7-9, locomotion is the one type of change that could continue etern¬
ally, it would follow that the ultimate cause is some kind of corporeal
object moving through space.
(28) If an opponent put this point to Aristotle no doubt he would
reply that even if an eternal body in eternal circular motion is
adequate to account for the effects which it is postulated to explain,
still it is not adequate to account for its own motion: this change
like any other must depend on an agent, and this agent must be in some
sense distinct from the moving body itself, so that it is the agent,
not the moving body that is the true ultimate cause. But the opponent
17. Philoponus ad 259b32, Vitelli 893, 6 ff., writes as if someone
had suggested that an eternally moving body is a sufficient
cause of the unbroken succession of generated things: '...
eneu6q xqs ac6tws xwv yevqxuiv 6ta6oxhS dvayxn etvau ev tl Mat
au6uov auxbov, xouxo 6e o yev "awg av sbicob xbvodyevov eCvat o
6e axuvqxov, 6ua xoOxo 6euxvuauv oxi euxe Kbvouyevov e"q xouxo
xo au6uov, avayxq wai anuvqxov eSvau xt ctbSbov dtp'o5 xo xtvouyevov
cttduajs KLVeuxat ...'
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could justly complain that so far nothing has been said to block the
following move: Why should we not conceive of the eternal body as
analogous to earth and fire? Just as the natures of these substances
are natures for tracing out certain characteristic paths through space,
so, let us say, it is the nature of the former to trace out (for its
parts, not for its total bulk, since it rotates always about the same
centre) a circular path. This in fact is precisely the position for
which Aristotle himself argues in De Caelo 12-3, and he also says
in that book that there is nothing superior ('hpcuttov') to the eternal
18
body that could act as agent of its change (I 9, 279a33 - 34). We
may spell out the position as follows: if it is the nature of the
eternal body to rotate, then the rotation does not require an agent
19
distinct from the subject of motion itself. For firstly, if the
18. This common interpretation of the passage is disputed by H.
Cherniss, Aristotle's Criticism of Plato3 etc., pp. 587 - 588.
Solmsen's rebuttal of Cherniss (Aristotle's System, p. 308,
note 30) is in my view unanswerable. But even if Cherniss were
right about Aristotle's meaning, this would not affect the
logical point that a distinct agent is redundant if the eternal
body is of a nature to rotate. See Appendix to Chapter V.
19. A full treatment of the De Caelo I position would highlight the
way in which two contrary tendencies contribute to the same
conclusion, viz. that there is no distinct mover of the rotat¬
ing body (although, notoriously, this is not a conclusion to
which Aristotle consistently seems to keep in De Caelo as a
whole). Firstly, the comparison with the sublunary simple
bodies, and especially the attribution of a nature specifiable
like theirs in purely locomotory terms, makes of the heavenly
rotation a thoroughly natural fact, representable by physical
concepts and no more dependent than ordinary sublunary motions
on a mysterious transnatural agency (cf. Solmsen, 'Platonic
Influences', loc. cit. pp. 226 - 227). But secondly, the etern¬
ity, uniformity and perfect circularity of the heavenly motion
manifest the divinity of the moving subject, and now it is this
divinity that excludes dependence on an agent (cf. below, para¬
graphs (47) - (49)). The contrast between these two lines of
thought is extreme if the De Caelo I 2 comparison with the sub¬
lunary simple bodies is taken as logically committing Aristotle
to the view that the "first body" is like them inanimate. How¬
ever this would follow only on the assumption that being animate
involves a distinct internal agent of natural change. This is
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relation of this body to its own rotation is comparable to that of
fire to motion upward, then the eternal body's nature cannot be re¬
garded as an agent of its change. The nature of fire, as Aristotle
makes clear in Physics VIII 4, is not the agent of fire's rising:
this follows from his refusing to class fire etc. as self-changers,
and from his statement that the inner principle in such substances
is a principle not of causing the natural change, but of suffering
it. The only agents of fire's natural motion that he recognises are
external substances that have made the motion possible. This brings
us to the second point, which is that the eternally rotating body
cannot be supposed to stand to any other substances in the relations in
which fire stands to the external agents (so called) of its natural
action. For the body must be eternal, hence ungenerated, and since
its motion is not only continuous but necessarily so (for it could
not otherwise account for the necessarily continuing succession of
finite changes), it is immune to any possibility of hindrance, hence
owes nothing to a liberator. In short, if fire were an ungenerated
substance and so powerful that nothing could hinder its natural motion,
then fire too would be without an agent: which does not entail that
fire would lack motion, but rather the opposite, i.e. that its nature
to move would have absolutely free play. And so, for all that has
been shown to the contrary, it may be with the eternally rotating
body, or bodies. Solmsen after all was right to suspect possible
the position of Physics VIII, being a necessary premiss for
proving the eternal changeless cause (see paragraph (29)).
But in De Caelo Aristotle does not set out to prove such a
cause (although sometimes seeming to assert its existence),
and therefore 'soul' there for him need not imply a distinct
agent of change. Thus the De Caeto "first body", even if
ensouled (as he says it is at II 2, 285a30), could still
resemble the sublunary inanimate ones in being dynamically
simple.
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inconsistency between Aristotle's doctrine of nature as a principle
of change, and the position of Physics Book VIII, although wrong in
locating the trouble. The VIII 6 theory of the changeless first cause
of change does not, as Solmsen thought, contradict the earlier picture
of sublunary substances as endowed with natures; but it does make
problematic any extension of the concepts of nature and natural change
20
to cover the eternal body and its characteristic motion.
(29) In Physics VIII, however, Aristotle does not hesitate to claim
a distinct agent for the primary eternal motion. Indeed he proceeds
as if unaware of the possibility of an account such as that suggested
in the last paragraph, or as if it needed no refutation. Thus he is
viewing the topic from a conceptual basis which keeps this problem
out of sight altogether, or else solves it without ado. Either way,
that basis is provided by the notion of self-change, which comes
to the fore in 4 and 5, i.e. between the first and last stages of
the inquiry that opens in 3 with the question of how an eternity of
finite change is possible, and ends in 6 by stating that it is possible
only on the assumption of an eternal motion and a changeless source of
that motion. To reach the latter position by rational steps, Aris¬
totle needs a concept that meets the following three requirements:
(a) it comprises within itself the notion of something changing, and
of something distinct although not physically distinct that is the
cause of change; (b) it can be illustrated and therefore proved
meaningful by instances in the sublunary world; (c) it can be shown
to be necessarily instantiated on the level of the primary eternal
20. See Appendix to Chapter V.
motion. The notion of "self-change" in Physi.cs VIII meets all these
requirements, and indeed could have been constructed purely with this
end in view, since it has virtually no content beyond what is neces¬
sary to fulfil them. Of the three, we have already given some con¬
sideration to (a) and (b). Let us therefore turn to Aristotle's
efforts to meet (c). To do this, we must follow his manoeuvres with
"self-change" in some detail.
(30) When he first introduces the concept in Chapter 4, it is in
order to help sustain that chapter's conclusion, that whatever changes
is changed by something (if not by something other, then by itself).
From this Aristotle doubtless hopes to be able to deduce that even
what eternally moves is moved by something. But his ground is weak,
for the range of cases on which he bases the universal proposition
includes only sublunary substances, and by what right do we extrapolate
from these to the eternal case? Moreover, two of the three classes of
sublunary change taken as evidence for the proposition that every
change has an agent are of no evidential value whatever as regards the
eternal change. We have seen that the eternal motion, unlike the
natural motions of fire and earth etc. , cannot depend upon a generator
or a liberator of the moving substance (f.s. paragraph (28)). Nor
can the eternal motion be attributed to an enforcing agent. The
enforcement would be eternal, and to Aristotle there could hardly be
an idea more absurd than that of eternal enforcement or the eternal
repression of a nature. Thus the only sublunary fact about agency
that provides any ground for inferring to an agent for the eternal
change, is the fact that there is a third class of agent-dependent
sublunary changes: namely those changes which are "by" the substance
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itself, or self-changes. But many sublunary changes are not self-
changes; so that the whole range of sublunary cases provides dubious
support for Aristotle's conclusion concerning the eternal case. He
may be justified in asserting that if the eternal change is "by
something" then it is more akin to sublunary change "by self" than to
either of the other types. But he does not succeed in making a cogent
argument for the antecedent of this hypothetical.
(31) Aristotle next (Chapter 5) tries to show that in every case
where a thing is changed by something other than itself, the source of
the change can be traced back through one or many causal stages to a
self-changing agent. Every causal series in which one thing changes
another starts from self-change. He puts this forward as a general
thesis, but its main effect is to establish that if in particular
there is such a thing as an eternal change, this too either is or
depends ultimately upon self-change. And the self-changer concerned
(which must itself be eternal, since otherwise its effects could not
be) can then be analysed into a changer (the Prime Mover) and a
distinct changed (the primum mobile). In this way Aristotle blocks
off in advance any attempt to merge the two entities metaphysically
demonstrated in 6, the cause of eternal change, and the body that
eternally changes. He rests his case in 5 on the proposition, there
taken as axiomatic, that there is a causally first changer in every
21
causal series of changes. His examples show that by 'changer' here,
he means 'agent that currently determines the form of change', and not
'condition that makes possible the change', nor 'agent that brought
21. For an attempt to prove this, see Physios VII 1,
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about a condition making possible the change'. Thus when a man
moves a stick which moves something else, and when the wind pushes a
stone which in turn knocks something over, the first changer is the
man or the wind. The proposition that there must in this sense always
be a causally first changer follows directly from the II 1 doctrine
of nature, for if everything owed its behaviour to an external
determining cause, there would be no natural change. Thus within
the terms of Aristotle's system, the proposition is indisputable and
legitimately functions as an axiom. But what is questionable is his
identification in 5 of the causally first changer with a self-changer.
The human agent does of course qualify for this title according to
the division made in Chapter 4, but not the wind, which for Aristotle
is only air in motion, a simple inanimate body. Thus, as regards the
eternal case, he may reasonably hold that there cannot be an infinite
causal series of eternal motions; but this does not automatically
entitle him to conclude that at the head of the series there stands
an entity that changes itself in some sense analogous to that in which
sublunary living things are supposed to. For it would be just as
reasonable to conclude that the series starts with a naturally-changing
eternal entity similar to the wind, -i.e. a simple, through and through
physical, substance.
(32) However, Aristotle now brings into play the earlier conclusion
that whatever changes is changed by something, either itself or some¬
thing else. In the examples given, the first changer causes change
only by itself changing (intransitive) , and since ex hypothesi, this
change is not due to anything other, it must be due to itself (5,
256al9 - 21). By this reasoning even the wind must count as a self-
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changer: an unwelcome consequence, not only because it contradicts
the division of substances in A, but because it so devalues the con¬
cept of self-change as to make it hardly worth arguing for an eternal
self-changer as the source of all change. For on this extension of
the concept, even if the eternal source can now be shown to be a
self-changer, this would give no ground for supposing that its change
is not on the same logical level as those of the sublunary simple
bodies, being dictated only by the sheer corporeal nature of the
changing body, and not by any principle remotely comparable with life,
soul, spirit or mind. And even if Aristotle might be willing under
pressure to waive (surely to the detriment of scientific investigation)
his sublunary division into animate and inanimate, treating fire and
earth etc. in animistic terms, this would not much strengthen his
position in VIII: at least not if his motive is to uphold the dignity
of the supreme cause. The souls of earth and fire would rank pretty
low on any scale of psychic levels, lower perhaps even than those
of plants. Thus there would not be much to choose between a theory
by which the ultimate cause might be an inanimate body inanimately
22. However, at 256a22 ff. Aristotle may be deliberately treating
the wind as a self-changer for the sake of his current argument.
The question turns on the meaning of the conveniently ambiguous
'autqa' in 'h yap autffi xuveu to xlvouv h aAAcp'. Here 'aurip xtveC'
stands for the relation between the first changer in the series
and its proximate changed. Now on the one hand he glosses the
above sentence with 'o£ov av-Spuros h auxog h xfj Baxxripua, mi o
aveyog xaxe'BaAev auxog q o Aubog ov etoaev'. On this explanation,
'auxeji xuvel' seems only to deny an intermediate or instrumental
link, hence can in this sense apply to any causally first
changer whether or not this has the logical complexity that
would justify calling it 'self-changer'. But on the other hand,
the contrast 'q auxS) xuvet ... f| aAAw' suggests that the changer
can be its own instrument or intermediate link, which implies
logical complexity, a distinction between the changer's body
with which it causes change in something else, and an internal
agent-element whose instrument this is.
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rotating, and one by which it might be something whose closest
23
sublunary analogues are souls of the most rudimentary kind.
(33) When in Physics VIII Aristotle takes the natural changes of
organic creatures as his model for the ultimate eternal change, he
does so for the purely negative reason that the only alternative sub¬
lunary models would be even less suitable, and not because he sees
more than the vaguest resemblance between the eternal case and that
of an organism. Indeed the list of criteria in 4 by which he dist¬
inguishes sublunary self-changers from sublunary non-self-changers
makes it doubtful whether there could be any resemblance. The body
of the eternal self-changer is a physical sphere without internal
physical diversification: this simplicity is a condition of its
being absolutely indestructible. Since the eternal motion is single
and simple and takes place in it as a whole, the body has no need of
variegated parts with which to function. Nor can it stop and start
24
or change in different ways. Nor can it be regarded as alive or
23. The Academic audience (and possibly Aristotle himself) may have
been deceived into accepting the proposition that every causal
series of changes starts from a self-changer by its verbal
similarity to Plato's position in Phaedvus 245 Cff. and Laws X
894 Bff. Since for Plato a self-changer is not a complex of
distinct agent and patient, but an entity that changes of
itself, the axiom forbidding an infinite causal regress of
changes is on its own sufficient to prove the existence of a
self-changer in Plato's sense - but not in Aristotle's. Whereas
for Plato, self-change is the defining property of soul, in
Aristotle's system the beings that most closely approximate to
Platonic self-changers are, paradoxically, the simple inanimate
bodies, because they (a) change of themselves, and (b) are not
internally differentiable into agent and patient.
24. Aquinas {Comm. on Phys. VIII, Lectio VII, 7) sees the inapplic¬
ability of this criterion to the eternal case, but is comforted
by noting that Aristotle does not say in VIII 4 that a self-
changer must be capable of different externally undetermined
changes, but only that it is unreasonable (aXoyov) that it
should not be (255alO - 11).
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ensouled in the sense in which this characteristic is displayed in
25
one or more levels of biological functioning. It may be for this
reason that Aristotle makes possession of soul in 4 a criterion of
sublunary self-change, but stops short of laying it down as a defining
characteristic, and also of explicitly identifying the soul with the
internal agent. A definite commitment on either of these points
might call into question his right to extend the concept of self-
change to the eternal case. And in general, the less he commits him¬
self regarding the import of 'self-change' as applied to sublunary
substances, the better for his main argument. Even doubts as to the
concept's coherence are better ignored, for two reasons. In the first
place, Aristotle cannot afford to furnish critics with grounds for
rejecting 'self-change' as a predicate of sublunary substances, for
if it is meaningless in this connection, what reason have we to sup¬
pose it meaningful in any other? And how could we understand its
meaning if there is nothing in the sublunary world of our experience
to illustrate it? Secondly, even if the problems raised earlier con¬
cerning sublunary self-change can be solved, this is worse than use¬
less for Aristotle's main argument, if, as seems likely, the solutions
rest on features present only in the sublunary cases, not in the
eternal one.
(34) For in fact there are several ways in which a case could be
made for distinguishing an agent- and a patient-element in organisms
25. Of course it may be suggested, and has been, that the mover of
the eternal body is a type of soul not exemplified by any sub¬
lunary creature, and this may have been Aristotle's position at
a certain stage. But there is no sign of this in Physios VIII,
and in 9, 265b32 - 33 he speaks of those who 'make soul the cause
of change' {i.e. the Platonists) as one who does not count him¬
self among them. Cf. Solmsen, Aristotle's System, pp. 242 - 245.
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along lines consistent with the unity of the organic substance. We
might for instance take a cue from Aristotle's remark in Chapter 6
that the only type of change that organisms originate of themselves
is locomotion. This entails that changes of quality, such as temper¬
ature, and growth insofar as it depends on qualitative change, are
determined as to their character by external conditions. Such changes,
then, are only indirectly due to the organism itself, arising when its
externally undetermined locomotion, whether of whole or parts, brings
it into contact with the external determinants of qualitative change.
Thus at the moment when the actual heating, for instance, takes place,
the organism or some part of it is the passive subject of this change,
as much so as if it were an inanimate substance. In taking this point
of view, we are identifying "the change" with the actual emergence of
the new property (of. Chapter III, paragraph (4)). But alternatively
we might include under "the change" (the becoming hot) the process
leading up to the emergence. Since this process consists in an
externally undetermined locomotion, the creature is not passive with
respect to "the change" in this sense, any more than the physician who
applies a poultice to his own body. Thus the organism could be
described as bringing about for itself the situation in which it or
some part of it is passive with respect to the immediate cause of
heat, and so it may be said to change itself. Obviously no such
analysis could be applied to the eternal self-change, consisting as
it does in a single uniform motion.
(35) Again, the natural changes of organisms, unlike those of
Aristotle's simple bodies, involve two different aspects which it is
not unreasonable to regard as active and passive. When fire flies
29 7
upwards and earth falls, the unforced motion is what it is the nature
of each to realise, and a description of the motion gives a complete
specification of the nature: it is the nature of the substance to
move like this whenever there is no hindrance. But when a living
thing displays unenforced change of a given description, this descrip¬
tion does not exhaust the account that might be given of the nature of
the substance, since there are many forms of unenforced behaviour
which the same individual realises on different occasions, and the
mere fact that a given behaviour-sequence would meet with no external
impediment is not sufficient for its actually coming about. Different
situations trigger different types of behaviour, as does the same
situation at different stages of the creature's development. It might
seem that a description of the whole range of these unenforced changes
might be adequate to characterise the nature of the individual, so
that this case differs from that of lifeless substances only in com¬
plexity. But even assuming it possible to arrive at a complete descrip¬
tion of everything that the organism would unenforcedly do under dif¬
ferent circumstances, it would be wrong to say that all this is what
it is the organism's nature to do, leaving the matter at that; for
this statement does not exclude what for Aristotle is the metaphysical
impossibility of a substance endowed with a plurality of natures each
coming into play under different circumstances. It is not enough to
say that the substance is of a sort to do (if unhindered) A under
conditions X, B under conditions Y, etc., for to say that it is of
a sort at all already implies some underlying or overall unity of
nature, which can be expressed only in a corresponding unity of behav¬
iour, and this is not brought out by such a list of hypothetical
behavings. In short, Aristotle's theory of nature presupposes that
there is some single description true of each item on such a list.
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And if we ask what this one description could be which the individual
satisfies in and through all its various unenforced changes, the
answer, it seems, can only refer to the maintenance of the life-form
of which this individual is an instance. This is what it is the
nature of this creature to do, being an activity that takes (as we
should expect) quite different shapes under different conditions.
(36) Thus for organisms, by contrast with inorganic substances,
there is a conceptual gap between the description of the activity that
defines their nature, and the descriptions of the specific, immed¬
iately identifiable, unenforced changes in which they engage. We
may say that the former activity stands to these changes as form to
matter, since it is realised through them. The activity can also be
said to be the cause of any particular specific unenforced change that
occurs. The claim that causal dependence runs in this direction
rather than the opposite one may be supported by the consideration
(which empirical evidence confirms) that if the creature were not
living, it would not have displayed that particular specific behav¬
iours, whereas if that behaviour had been prevented, it does not
necessarily follow that the creature would have ceased to live, since
it might have continued to realise the activity of living out its
characteristic life-pattern in some different type of change adapted
to the circumstances. In view of this distinction between the two
aspects of any concrete stretch of unenforced behaviour, and of the
causal relation between them, it is perhaps not unreasonable to apply
the terms 'agent' and 'patient' to the same organic individual.
According to this analysis, it is not the physical matter of the
organism {e.g. the earth of which it is composed) that is the patient
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of self-change, but the organism itself regarded as the subject of
those unenforced changes that stand to the life-activity as behav¬
ioural matter to behavioural form. The agent, correspondingly, is
the organism itself regarded as subject of the life-activity typical
of its kind. This agent, moreover, logically resembles such concep¬
tually obvious external agents as the craftsman at work on his mater¬
ials, in that it too, qua agent, is not a subject of change (HLVnoug) .
For the activity of living out a certain life-pattern is not a KtvpatSj
any more than the activity of building. It is true that for organic
substances living has an inbuilt terminus (since death in Aristotle's
view is a natural event, not necessarily due to externally enforced
interruption: of. Physios V 6, 230a25 - 28). But whereas a genuine
Kuvnous is defined in terms of the subject's present lack of the prop¬
erty in which the Kuvnous naturally terminates, it would be absurd to
regard even a necessarily finite life as the privation of the
"condition" of non-existence in which it naturally ends. Where a
Kbvnotg defines the nature of a substance, this nature can also be
defined by reference to the non-kinetic end-state of the xtvnoog:
thus it is the nature of fire to move upwards because it is its nature
to b£ in the upper region. If the enactment of a certain type of
life-pattern were a xdvriaos of its subject, we should similarly have
to say that it is the nature of this subject to live out its life
because it is its nature to not-exist or "be" dead.
(37) The analysis just suggested of 'self-change' relies only on
Aristotelian concepts and distinctions, and employs them so straight¬
forwardly that it is hardly credible that such an account would not
have occurred to Aristotle himself, had he been aiming to give one.
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But even if he was inexplicably blind to the suitability of his own
conceptual apparatus to clarify 'self-change' along such lines as I
have sketched, this was hardly to his disadvantage in the present
context. For it does not help his main argument to have attention
drawn to the unity-in-variety of the natural behaviour of those sub¬
lunary beings denominated 'self-changers'; and the possibility of
making this unity-in-variety the basis of a coherent explication could
only be a source of embarrassment. The more cogent such an explic¬
ation might strike us as being, the less we should be inclined to
accept any other account of the concept: but if we were to settle for
this type of account, we could not consistently accept Aristotle's
invitation to view the ultimate eternal motion as a self-change. This
motion is of necessity absolutely homogeneous, and like those of the
sublunary simple bodies offers no purchase for a distinction between
the single overall form of behaviour, and the varying behavioural
"matter" in which it is realised. If 'self-change' is to apply to
the eternal case (and if not Aristotle has lost his argument for an
eternal Prime Mover distinct from the pvimim mobiZe itself) analyses
such as the one just given must be firmly ignored. In general I would
maintain that Aristotle's vagueness in Physios VIII on 'self-change'
as applied to organisms is to be blamed on his need to make the same
concept cover a case which differs from these in virtually every known
feature. The same need also explains his view that an organism
changes itself not only when the change of the whole involves some
counter-natural change in the bodily material or a bodily part, but
even when the tendencies of all the subordinate natures concerned
fully harmonise with the natural change of the whole (f.s. paragraph
(13)). For the uniformity of the eternal motion entails that if the
motion is due to the operation of a changer at all, the operation too
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must be uniform and continuous; and since this motion is never
26
counter-natural (v.s. paragraph (30)), contrariety to nature cannot
be a necessary condition of its dependence on a changer. Thus as
regards sublunary self-changers, Aristotle is compelled to say that
the soul always functions as changer of the body (except when the
change is due to a physically external force). For even though the
changer in the eternal case is not a soul, and the changed nothing
like an organic body, still the relation between soul and organic
body must resemble the eternal relation, since otherwise what basis
is there for predicating 'self-change' in both cases?
(38) These remarks however assume that there is an eternal changer
distinct from the pvimim mobile, and so far we have not seen how this
distinction is to be explicated. We know only that an adequate
account must avoid any emphasis on features peculiar to the sublunary
soul-body relationship. Aristotle's own theory of the distinction is
presented in Chapter 5, and it is clear from the start that he is not
going to fall into the trap just mentioned, because he couches his
argument in terms of the most abstract and general of all concepts,
viz. those of potentiality, actuality, and the presence and absence
of a property.
'Let us make another start and consider the
following question: If something changes itself,
how does it cause change and in what way? Now the
object changed is necessarily infinitely divisible.
For this has already been shown in our treatise on
nature, that whatever is in motion in virtue of
itself is continuous. Thus it is impossible that
what changes itself should in entirety change
itself. For in that case the whole would be both
26. Which is not to say that it is natural, i.e. springs from an
independent nature. See Appendix to V, ad fin.
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the cause and the subject of the same locomotion,
if it were one and indivisible in nature: it
would be being altered and would be causing
alteration, so that it would both teach and
learn at the same time, and would be producing
and being restored to the same health. Moreover,
it has been laid down that what changes [or: is changed
('KLveuiau1)] is the changeable. But it is through ^
potentiality that this changes, not through actuality.
That which is potentially so and so passes into
actuality, and the change is the imperfect actuality
of the changeable. But the changer is already
actually so and so; e.g. the hot heats, and in
general what generates is that which possesses the
form. So the same thing will at the same time be
both hot and not hot in the same way. Similarly in
all other cases in which the changer must possess the
property in the same sense [sc. as that in which the
changed eventually possesses it]. So in that which
changes itself, there is something that causes change,
and something else that is changed.' (257a31-bl3)
(39) What more decisive difference could there be between two
things than that one has a certain property which the other has not?
Aristotle now needs no tool besides the Law of Non-Contradiction
itself for distinguishing agent from patient on grounds that do not
presuppose any grouping of diverse changes under a single principle.
Since the law holds good even (indeed primarily) of single properties,
it guarantees a difference even where the change is change in a single
simple respect. However the guarantee can take hold only if it is
certain that for every agent and patient there is a property possessed
27. 'xouxo 6 'eaxLv duvctyet xuvouyevov, oux evxeAex£tqi' . The obvious
translation 'This is potentially, not actually, changing',
(adopted by Hardie and Gaye (Oxford) and Wicksteed and Cornford
(Loeb)) is surely incorrect. This meaning contributes nothing to
the argument, which turns on the contrast between the changing
subject's potentiality to be in the terminal state, and the
actuality of that state, which is also the actual state of the
changer. Moreover on this interpretation 'xo de duvayet ets
evxeAexEtav BaduCeu' would refer to the subject's coming to
be actually changing, and although the transition from rest
to change is a sort of yexagoArj, Aristotle would hardly have
described it as a 'Babtats'. Themistius and Simplicius ad too.
support my rendering.
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by one and not the other. This Aristotle ensures by adopting the
model of giving and receiving. To change (intransitive) is to
acquire a new property, and to acquire is to be given. Hence there
must be a giver, and the giver must first possess what it gives.
That which acquires does not as yet have what it acquires. Hence
what gives is not at the same time acquiring what it gives, for it
gives only what it has. So what gives is not being given what it
gives, since to be given is to acquire. Thus at one stroke Aristotle
achieves the prized results (a) that the changer is distinct from the
changed, and (b) that the changer, while operating as such, is not
itself changing or being changed in the respect in which it causes
change. Moreover, since on this model the giving of the giver depends
only on the fact that the giver has a certain property and is in con¬
tact with a patient in a suitable condition to receive the latter,
it is irrelevant to the giving whether or not the giver is currently
changing in any other respect (being given some other property). Thus
the changer need not change, or even be changeable, in any respect
whatever.
(40) The changer must be supposed to have the property which it
then gives. For if the changed could get this property from something
not possessed of it, why should the changed not get it from itself -
in which case, it would not be a changed, but something which simply
of itself originates a change to the new state? On the other hand,
the giving/receiving model, if interpreted literally, implies that
where the change is in respect of a physical property (as in most of
Aristotle's examples) both agent and patient must be physical objects,
since each in turn has the physical property. This hardly assists an
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argument for an absolutely changeless (and therefore non-physical)
first cause which stands to the body whose motion it causes in a
relation not totally unlike that of a soul. Thus, as Aristotle hints
in the penultimate sentence of the passage last quoted, there must
be some sense in which something can be said to "have" (so that it
can give) a physical property without being physically characterised
2 8
by it. It might be objected that if there are different senses or
ways of "having", so that the same property can physically qualify
the changed whereas it non-physically qualified the changer, then the
reasoning of the passage breaks down. For the Law of Non-Contradiction
does not prevent the subject which has the property in the non-
physical sense from being numerically identical with the subject that
does not have it in the physical sense. However, this does not hinder
the general drift of Aristotle's argument, for he needs only to show
that agent and patient are in some way distinct, even if only distinct
aspects of the same individual. And he is assured of at least this
conclusion, for if a being is capable of the non-physical possession
of properties of whose physical possession it is also capable, then
it must be regarded as having two dimensions or aspects, a corporeal
and (however related to this) a non-corporeal.
28. The condition of desiring some as yet unachieved physical con¬
dition would be a way of non-physically "having" a physical
property. '... the thought (or image) that one has in one's
mind when one knows x is for Aristotle as fully actual an
instance of the form of x as an external object exemplifying
this form', J. Hintikka, 'Conceivability and Realizability in
Aristotle', Time and Necessity, p. 126. If Aristotle is
identifying the subject's "non-physical possession" of P with
P's being an object of perception and/or desire for that subject,
this would explain his tendency to confine self-change to
animals and to equate it with the distinctively animal change
of locomotion.
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(44) This stage of the first cause argument bears heavy respons¬
ibility for the aura of pseudo-metaphysics which for many still hangs
about the whole notion of "inner principles of change". The concept
of nature in Physios II is not unempirical in the sense that no
observation is relevant to its application in a particular case. To
say that it is the nature of fire to move upwards implies that regul¬
arly fire does so move, and that the motion is not shaped by the
external environment. The first of these claims can be verified
without difficulty, and the second with no more difficulty than many
causal propositions in modern science. Nor does the II 1 identific¬
ation of nature with form in organised substances put 'nature' beyond
the scope of empirical application. Minimally, this identification
entails that the regular and externally undetermined changes of the
substance cannot be reduced to products of the changes natural to its
elemental components. Although false, the doctrine of the natural
motions of the elements is to some extent supported by ordinary
observation, and if the doctrine is accepted, ordinary observation
leads to the conclusion that many substances behave in structured
ways not derivable from elemental behaviour. Thus to uphold the
notion of form as the source of change there is no need whatever to
postulate "within" the substance some kind of incorporeal counterpart
of the change or of the result thereby achieved, and in Book II Aris¬
totle showed no sign of being drawn in this direction. We have also
seen that the concept of self-changer as applied to organisms can be
analysed in terms of externally undetermined behaviour together with
the observable fact that this behaviour has the common property of
tending to development, survival and reproduction. These facts give
sufficient ground for conceptually isolating changer from changed, and
on this level it is gratuitous to assume an incorporeal counterpart,
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or to identify the agent factor with such an assumed entity. I say
'on this level', because at a logically posterior stage of inquiry it
may, in the case of some behaviour of some organisms, seem necessary
or reasonable to postulate a state of consciousness, desire and/or
perception, as a link in the explanatory chain, and this state may
be thought of as being or involving an incorporeal counterpart
(mental presentation) of the object desired or perceived. However,
we make this move only when the behaviour and physical characteristics
are such as to suggest that it would not be absurd to attribute con¬
sciousness to the creature in question. For some cultures and out¬
looks the threshold of absurdity may be lower than for others; thus
there have been people for whom, apparently, any directional behaviour,
even the fall of stones, indicates a spirit present. But Aristotle
like ourselves sets the threshold at a level to exclude not only these
cases but many far more complex organic ones; which means that he,
like ourselves, is bound to base the attribution of consciousness on
characteristics not universally present in all natural objects. And
it is fairly certain that any attempt to specify these characteristics,
even roughly and open-endedly, will point to features which the
eternally moving body lacks, and indeed necessarily must lack if its
motion is to be suitable to the metaphysical role for which it was
cast. In the absence of empirical criteria, Aristotle's only ground
for assuming a non-physical dimension to be operative in the eternal
case is supplied by the empty verbal logic that pictures change
(intransitive) as a receiving, and so as requiring a giver, and there¬
fore a prior possessor, and therefore, if there is no observable prior
possessor, one that is unobservable and possesses only incorporeally
what it gives, since it must possess it somehow because it could not
otherwise give, and nothing could receive from it. But although it is
30 7
perhaps only in the eternal case that Aristotle needs this reasoning
to assure him of the existence of a cause distinct from the subject
of the change, the reasoning itself is presented as general, being
29
allegedly derived from the concept of change as such. Thus it
logically extends to all areas previously covered by the original
30
concept of nature, imposing on the latter an otherwise groundless
interpretation in terms of ghostly inner "blueprints" striving for
physical embodiment through change.
(42) Such are the twists and turns by which Aristotle seeks to
establish an eternal source of change which itself stands outside any
actual or possible change, including even the eternal motion which is
its immediate effect. I want to end by considering why this position
is so necessary for Aristotle. The answer may seem obvious: for
theological and perhaps also religious reasons he could not accept
that the source of all change is a corporeal object: but this is what
it would have to be if the source were itself a subject of eternal
change (since the only eternal change is a species of locomotion).
The being on which all change depends is the being on which depend all
natural substances, since their nature is to change; and the being on
29. Cf. M. de Corte, 'La Causalite du Premier Moteur dans la philo¬
sophic aristotelicienne', Revue de t'Histoive de la Philosophise,
vol. V, 1931, p. 105: '... on ne peut pas ne pas etre frappe
par 1'insistence que met Aristote a ramener toute 1'essence de
sa preuve a l'unique analyse du mouvement ...'. See also p. 107.
30. See A. Gotthelf, 'Aristotle's Conception of Final Causality',
Review of Metaphysics XXX, 1976, pp. 226 ff., for an excellent
"demythologising" analysis of Aristotle's treatment of sublunary
nature. Gotthelf does not however note that Aristotle is
himself (by his theory of the eternal changeless cause) in a
measure responsible for the "immaterial agency" interpretation
against which Gotthelf argues (especially pp. 251 - 252).
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which all natural substances depend is God; and God must be changeless
and incorporeal. The theological assumptions expressed by the last two
clauses are matters for metaphysics rather than philosophy of nature,
but it would be absurd to make this a reason for denying their influence
on the central argument of Physics VIII. On the other hand, this consid¬
eration must be balanced against the fact that this argument is not on
the face of it an argument for God. Nor is it simply an attempt to
find a First Cause. It does of course result in this, but Aristotle's
avowed aim in Physics VIII 3-6 is to show how there can be individually
transitory changes even though change as such is an eternal feature of
the universe. And we have seen that although his solution invokes (a)
an eternal source of change, and (b) a being that eternally changes, it
does not by itself rule out the possibility that what satisfies these
two postulates might be one and the same thing. Thus it seems that the
assumption of a source distinct from the subject answers to some demand
extrinsic to the problem raised in 3 and solved in 6; and if that demand
is purely theological, then it is extrinsic too to the general domain
of "physics". But now without meaning to discount the theological
aspect, concerning which I shall say no more, I wish to draw attention to
another pressure operative here, and one whose source lies nearer home.
(43) Instead of debating whether a body in eternal motion is fit to be
assigned the position of ultimate source of all change, let us rather
consider whether this motion could by the standards implicit in the def¬
inition of III 1 be properly described as a Huvriaus or motion at all.
31. Philoponus refuses to take it for granted that the III 1 defin¬
ition of change is equally applicable to finite and to eternal
change: see ap. Simplic. Ad Phys. VIII 1, Diels 1129 ff., and
Simplicius' virulent reply.
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The problem is to find a sense in which it could be classed as an
incomplete actuality, or alternatively as an actuality of what is
potential insofar as it is only potential. The changes that fall
neatly under the original definition all naturally terminate in a
state of non-change, and the change itself is the actuality that
belongs to the subject insofar as it can be but as yet is not in that
state. But where there is no future terminal state to be actualised,
there can be no present potentiality to be in that state. Thus al¬
though the eternally moving body is ex hypothesi now moving, it is
not now potentially in some later-attained condition of non-movement;
and this too is ex hypothesi. The conclusion could be avoided if we
suppose the eternal motion to be a series of discrete movements to
successive static conditions, but Aristotle cannot accept any such
hypothesis: for him, it is essential that the motion be as absolutely
32
continuous as it is necessarily everlasting. It is true of course
that the eternal body is never, during any sub-period of its rotation,
actually doing all that it can do. Thus if A, B and C are points on
the circular path of some chosen section S of the eternal body, it
is true that while the body rotates so that S passes from A to B, it
is not as yet actually rotating so that S passes from B to C, yet it
33
possesses the potentiality to be doing so. But this fact hardly
serves to bring the motion into line with the earlier definition.
32. For a brilliant summary of the problems of fitting the eternal
circular motion to the III 1 definition of change, see Cherniss,
Aristotle's Criticism of Plato etc. , pp. 582 - 583. Cf. also
Robin, Aristote, p. 132: 'Ainsi, avec ce mouvement [sc. le
mouvement circulaire], qui est le mouvement par excellence,
s'effondre la definition physique du mouvement'. However I
argue (paragraphs (44) - (50)) that the position of Physics
VIII keeps to the definition's spirit if not its letter.
33. Cf. Simplicius ad VIII 1 contra Philoponum, Diels 1131, 9-22,
and Alexander apud Simplic. , Diels 1218, 20 - 27.
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That definition avoided circularity only by analysing change in
terms of a potentiality for some form of non-change, whereas the
eternal rotation, if it can be analysed at all without prejudice to
its absolute continuity, can only be analysed by reference to a
series of potentialities to be in motion.
(44) Sublunary changes are incomplete actualities by contrast with
the states of complete actuality in which they naturally terminate.
But no such contrast can justify the term 'incomplete actuality' as
applied to the eternal case. The consequence seems clear: either
the eternal motion counts as a complete actuality, or its incomplete¬
ness derives from an entirely different type of contrast. As a nat¬
ural phenomenon, the eternal circular motion is as complete as any-
34
thing in nature could be. Since it never started, it follows that
at every moment every part of the rotating body has just completed a
circle; and since it will never end, there is never any falling
short of a complete number of circles. Thus any actuality by compar¬
ison with which it would make sense to describe the eternal motion as
incomplete would necessarily lie beyond nature and change, and would
be of a perfection inconceivable in natural terms. Nor could such an
actuality be brought into existence by any process of change. Hence
it must necessarily exist for eternity, making true Aristotle's state¬
ment in Physics VIII 3 that besides substances that begin and cease to
change, there is something in eternal change, and something eternally
34. On the energeic (as opposed to kinetic) character of the eternal
rotation, of. W.K.C. Guthrie, 'The Development of Aristotle's
Theology I', Classical Quarterly vol. XXVII, 1933, p. 167, note 2;
J.B. Skemp, The Theory of Motion in Plato's Later Dialogues,
p. xi, note 3; L.A. Kosman, 'Aristotle's Definition of Motion',
Phronesis XIV, 1969, pp. 59-60.
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changeless. The point which we stress is that without the eternally
changeless, the eternal change could not be classed as a change, so
long as this term is supposed to retain some semblance of the meaning
earlier assigned it in Physics III.
(45) Perhaps when Aristotle framed the definition of III 1 he had
no thought for the eternal motion. The celestial spheres and their
rotations lay outside the scope of his current concern, this being
directed towards the substances and changes whose histories and devel¬
opments we can follow out from start to finish by our own observa-
35 . .
tions. By comparison with these experienced objects, eternal body
and eternal change are theoretical entities, whose eternity cannot be
observed but only argued for as a necessary factor in the explanation
of what we do observe. In the earlier books the need for such explan¬
ation did not arise: Aristotle was intent on developing concepts for
describing finite change as and when it occurs. We might compare his
account of 'the voluntary' in Nicomachean Ethics III 1-5: here too
his object is to delineate the concept and its criteria, but never at
any point to ask how voluntary action is possible. It would have been
no surprise, then, if in broaching the new level of discussion in Book
VIII Aristotle had quietly left his old definition of change behind
35. Compare II 1, where (a) the examples given of a natural substance
are all sublunary, and (b) nature is said to be a principle of
change and stasis. However, II 7, 198a29 - 31 shows that Book II
does not totally ignore the eternal world. But this passage
says that eternal moving things fall under a different branch of
knowledge from destructible changing things: i.e. the former do
not come within the scope of "physics" as conceived in II. (For
a list of the numerous comments, ancient and modern, on the
inapplicability of the II 1 definition of nature as a principle
of change and stasis to eternal bodies, see P. Moraux, Av%stote,
Du Ciel, p. xlv, note 1.)
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as a tool unsuitable for such a different type of venture, and it
would be niggling on our part to have criticised him for doing so,
especially since twentieth century philosophy of science provides
striking illustrations of the way in which concepts of space, time
and motion viable on the level of ordinary experience collapse when
applied beyond it. But Aristotle himself disallows any such concession
by reverting explicitly to the old definition in VIII 1 (251a8 - 10),
and again in VIII 5.
(46) In the course of considering in what sense something can be
said to change itself, he writes:
'It has been laid down that what changes
(intransitive) is the changeable. But it is ^
through potentiality, not actuality, that it changes.
That which is potentially so and so passes to being
so in actuality, and change is the incomplete
actuality of the changeable. But the changer
already has the property in actuality: e.g. what
is hot heats, and in general the generator possesses
the form. So [sc. unless even in the self-changing
there is a distinction between changer and changed]
the same thing is hot and not hot at the same time
in the same respect.' (257b6 - 11)
Here Aristotle firmly anchors himself to the account of change given
in III. According to III 1 the complete actuality by contrast with
which the change is an incomplete one, is the terminal state achieved
through unimpeded change. Moreover (of. Ill 2, 202a9 - 12), the com¬
plete actuality (or another instance of it) belongs also to the agent
of change, being what constitutes it a possible agent of this type of
change. This suggests that one formal feature of complete as opposed
to incomplete actuality is the power to reproduce itself (or produce
a replica of itself) in some other subject. The change in the patient
36. Cf. footnote 27 above.
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is the acquiring of this replica-actuality, but the acquiring itself
is not a replica of anything currently present in the agent. If it
were, then the agent too, at the moment of acting, would be acquiring
the complete actuality which it must already possess (hence not now
be acquiring) in order to be an agent of this kind. Now the question
is how eternal locomotion, or indeed locomotion in general, fits
into this conceptual scheme. It is to be noted that the scheme as
presented by Aristotle in the passage just quoted is intended to cover
all cases of agency and patiency, those where the action is between
mutually external substances, as well as the peculiar case of self-
change. (Indeed the whole bent of Aristotle's analysis in VIII 5 of
the difference between changer and changed in the self-changer is in
the direction of logically assimilating their relationship to the
37 .
external type of case.) But one body in locomotion can transmit
locomotion to another: can carry another along in its own direction.
Thus according to the model, locomotion functions logically as a com¬
plete, because self-reproducing, actuality. When a moving body A
causes motion in B, the only change that occurs in B, according to
3 8
Aristotle's conception of "change", is B's acquisition of locomotion,
but not the locomotion acquired. If the locomotion acquired by B were
a change in Aristotle's sense, it would be an incomplete actuality.
The same then would be true of the locomotion in the agent A. But it
37. Cf. Solmsen, Aristotle's System, pp. 248 - 249: 'As long as
it is at all possible, Aristotle continues to think in physical
terms; even of the self-mover he speaks as though it were a
body [better: a conjunction of bodies (my insertion)] and had
extension and parts.'
38. It may seem odd to speak of the acquisition of locomotion as
a change (xLvqarg) , since it must be instantaneous. But Aris¬
totle's own example of becoming hot (257b9) is also for him
instantaneous.
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is because A is in locomotion that it is able to cause locomotion in
B. Thus A qua agent would be in a condition of incomplete actuality:
which flatly contradicts the system of concepts with which we are
dealing.
(47) But Aristotle is so mesmerised by this system and at the same
time so certain that locomotion is of course to be counted a change
or xcvqatg (at 9, 266al - 2 he mentions that the word 'xovqats' is
strictly applied only to locomotion) that he altogether overlooks
the problem. At 5, 256b31 - 257a3 he writes as if the same absurdity
attached to the proposition that a subject is both in locomotion (in
a given direction etc.) and causes such locomotion in something else,
as to the proposition that a subject is both learning and teaching
39
the same lesson to another. Certainly, if being in locomotion
is an incomplete actuality (like learning), then locomotion (like
learning) could only be caused by an agent not itself in locomotion
39. Assuming that particular attributes (including changes) are indiv¬
iduated by reference to particular subjects, X cannot be both
subject and cause of L in another subject, where 'L' refers to
the same particular locomotion. (But it is arguable that Aris¬
totle does not share the assumption; a.f. G.E.L. Owen, 'Inherence',
Phvonesis X, 1965, pp. 97 ff.) However this cannot help Aris¬
totle here: if locomotion is to count as xuvqats in his scheme,
it must be impossible for the agent to be in and to cause
specifically the same locomotion. For it is in this sense of
'same' that an agent's supposed possession of complete actuality
entails its not undergoing the same process as it causes. This
is clear in the case of 'teaching'. Still, it might be said that
on a narrow definition of 'specifically same locomotion' in terms
of points traversed, different spatial objects cannot undergo
specifically the same locomotion at the same time; so that Aris¬
totle is justified in holding that with locomotion as with other
types of MLvriots an agent cannot undergo what it causes. But the
fact that (in some cases) the agent is as such in locomotion at
all still shakes Aristotle's scheme; for this requires not
merely that the agent not be undergoing the change which it
causes, but that qua agent it be in a state of non-change, com¬
plete actuality.
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(learning) but in some sense already in possession of the place
40
arrived at through locomotion (already in possession of knowledge).
Aristotle simply asserts the antecedent of this hypothetical, and there¬
fore the consequent, without stopping to consider whether experience
does not present grounds for denying the consequent and therefore
the antecedent. If he had, he would have been faced with the neces¬
sity of abandoning either the assumption that locomotion is in all
cases a xtvnots or the proposition that xuvqats is in all cases
incomplete actuality. Now what shields Aristotle from realising
this is, I suggest, his certainty that locomotion, and in particular
eternal rotation, depends on an agent distinct from its subject.
(48) To explain this, let us recall the assumption behind Aris¬
totle's argument in VIII 4 that the natural movements of the sublunary
simple bodies are agent-dependent. The only agents to be found were
the generator and/or liberator. Now to call these 'agents' presup¬
poses that the simple bodies are, in their natural motions, patients.
And Aristotle's only reason for regarding them as patients of their
liberators, etc. was the fact that it is a change or xtvriaug that
these alleged "agents" make possible. If the upward motion of fire
were (per impossibile) a non-kinetic activity or evepyeta in the narrow
sense of Metaphysics 0 6, then the liberator, although he might still
be necessary, would not count as an agent. For the evepyeua is not
a passivity, hence its subject not a patient. It would be absurd,
for instance, to think of a living thing as passively receiving the
40. Cf. Philoponus in VIII 5, 257b9, Vitelli 835, 1 - 3: ' a.\\ ' ou6e
ent xwv xaxa xoitov xtvouvxwv aAqbqs o Vdyos* ouxe yap au qyuovou
at xtvouaau xrjv aya£av evepyeta elolv ev xw xdiuo evba 6et
topeuShvat•'
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evepyeta that is its own life-activity. The assumption, then, in
41
VIII 4 was that only HLvqats requires an agent. Now the natural
motions of the sublunary simple bodies are clearly incomplete actual¬
ities, so they fit the definition of xuvqats in III 1. The criterion
of their incompleteness, hence of their kinetic status, is that they
proceed to a termination-point. And in VIII 4 their status as passi¬
vities was assumed to follow from this already established kinetic
status. But to turn now to the case of the eternal rotation: here
Aristotle lacks the criteria upon which he has so far been relying to
divide kinetic from non-kinetic, incomplete from complete. If he
takes the criterion to be 'proceeding to a termination point', then
the eternal rotation is not incomplete. If he takes the criterion
for complete actuality to be the power of self-replication, then loco¬
motion of all kinds must often count as complete. There remains one
path of escape from the obvious conclusion, and Aristotle in my view
follows it. This is to convert agent-dependence from a necessary
consequence of kinetic status into a criterion for the same, where
all other criteria fail. Thus it is because (as he never in Physios
VIII doubts) the eternal rotation has a distinct agent that we can
continue to class it as a HLvqaus. Conversely, if we supposed it to
stand in no need of an agent, with the eternal body functioning as
the self-sufficient subject and source of its own motion, we would
automatically put it outside the class of xuvnoecs, in the absence of
any other reason for calling it 'incomplete'.
41. V.s. Chapter IV, paragraphs (12) and (13).
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(49) Earlier (paragraphs (27) -(28)) it seemed that Aristotle's
postulate of an unchanging agent for the primary eternal motion was
logically superfluous in his account of the infinite succession of
finite changes: that the eternal motion by itself would have been
enough. But it is plain now that the changeless agent is an essential
element in the conceptual structure set up in VIII 6, and for reasons
unrelated to theology. One local effect of questioning the existence
of the changeless agent, let alone of denying it, would be to spoil
the smooth move by which Aristotle argues for an eternal motion in
the first place. Variation in the sublunary world cannot, he holds,
immediately stem from the absolutely changeless; hence there must be
eternal change to supply the intermediate link (u.s. paragraphs (23) -
(24)). But if the change is conceivably independent of an agent,
then since dependence on an agent is the one characteristic that sets
this process in the category of HuvqaLS as opposed to evepyeua, it
follows that the presumed intermediary might not be a xuvqaus. But
how, if it were not, could it fulfil the mediating function for which
it was postulated, i.e. to connect the changeless with the variable?
If eternal rotation is evepyeoa, then what does it have in common with
sublunary transient xovnoets that fits it to bridge the causal gap
between them and the ultimate cause?
(50) But this problem is minor compared with the main difficulty
that comes to light once we scrutinise the conceptual role of the
changeless eternal agent. What begins to emerge is the fundamental
weakness of Aristotle's basic equation of change with incomplete
actuality. Suppose that it were allowed that the primary eternal
rotation is agentless. Then it would have to be classed as complete
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actuality, and it would not figure as xcvnacg. (Here again we find
that the cause of a possible xuvqaus has to be established before it
can be assumed that the phenomenon in question one; V.s. Chapter
III, paragraph (38).) But no amount of juggling with classifications
can obliterate the palpable difference between this sort of complete
actuality, which involves passage through space, and a static one such
as being at a place. And the philosopher cannot argue away the fact
that for ordinary thought at least, this is the difference between
change and staying put, between motion and rest, between process and
the static. But this difference is not captured by the distinction
of complete versus incomplete actuality which inspires Aristotle's
III 1 definition of xiivqaus. On the contrary, the common-sense dist¬
inction between e.g. locomotion of whatever kind (whatever its cause)
and rest, cuts across the class of possible complete actualities,
bracketing at least one member (the eternal rotation, supposing this
possibly agentless) with sublunary motions classed as incomplete.
(51) Yet for Aristotle, even in Physios VIII, the dichotomy 'complete/
incomplete' continues to express the essential difference between non-
process and process (although passages in Physios VI may represent an
abortive effort in another direction). The reason, I suggest, is that
in the Physios he never recognises as possible the case that would drive
a wedge between the two distinctions; this is the case of agentless
eternal rotation. He can rest assured that the distinctions are
synonymous as long as he is assured that they coincide, and he can be
certain of their coincidence because he is certain that all processes
(that common sense would recognise as such, including all locomotions)
are incomplete, whether because self-terminating, or because agent-
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dependent, or on both counts. Once faced with the possibility that
even one process (let alone that on which all others depend) has
neither of these characteristics, Aristotle would have had to
recognise that III 1 has failed to define process or (since the
concepts are there equated) change. Recognition is kept at bay only
if the eternal rotation is assumed without question to be due to an
agent. In short, Aristotle's definition of xuvqaus in Physi.cs III 1
stands or falls with the Physios VIII doctrine of the distinct eternal
agent. But in that case his dubious manoeuvres in VIII 4-5 with
'self-change' cannot properly be described as an argument for the
existence of that agent, seeing that the "argument"'s conclusion has
already been begged by his assumption that eternal rotation is a
xtvqaos, together with his continued adherence to the notion of
Htvriaus as incomplete actuality. Suppose, on the other hand, that
we allowed the argument for the agent to pass as a genuine piece
of reasoning to a conclusion not presupposed: in that case, this
reasoning must also be regarded as Aristotle's defence (conscious or
not) of the idea of xuvnats as incomplete actuality. We earlier saw
(u.s. paragraphs (15) - (17)) how his initial concept of natural
substance is buttressed in Physios VIII by the doctrine that change
is an eternal feature of the universe. Just so, we now see too how
Book VIII's theory of the eternal changeless agent is required to
sustain his original definition of change.
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APPENDIX TO CHAPTER V
In the main text I argued as follows that the concept of self-
change plays an essential part in establishing the position reached
by Aristotle in Physics VIII 6: (1) He is not logically entitled to
postulate an eternal cause distinct from any eternally moving body
merely on the ground that otherwise there could be no infinite
sequence of finite changes, since this sequence could be adequately
accounted for by eternal motion alone. (2) His ground then must be
that eternal motion in turn requires to be explained, and this is
possible only on the assumption of a distinct and changeless ultimate
cause. (3) But such an explanation would be unnecessary on the view
that an eternally moving body is like fire or earth, -i.e. simply of
a nature to move as it does, because then there would be nothing for
a distinct mover to do. (4) Therefore (since there must surely be
some sublunary analogue to assist our understanding of the ultimate
eternal motion) Aristotle compares the motion to the natural loco¬
motion of a living thing. (5) A living thing involves a cause of
motion (the soul) which is in some sense distinct from that which
moves (the body), and which is not itself a body, and which (qua
source of change) is not itself changing. (6) If, then, the ultimate
eternal motion is analogous to soul-directed movements in an organism,
this motion too must have an in some sense distinct although not
physically external cause. (7) Thus provided that Aristotle can show
that the ultimate eternal motion is the manifestation of a mover-moved
complex analogous to the complex of soul and body (i.e. that the
motion is the manifestation of a self-mover), he has the proof he
needs, but not otherwise (given his starting position in Physios
VIII). Now, he tries to meet the proviso by arguing that every
series of changes starts with a self-changer, and this is where his
proof breaks down, since the proposition is groundless in his system
according to the Aristotelian meaning of 'self-change', although not,
as we saw, according to the Platonic.
However, proposition (3) above needs fuller discussion than
there was space for in the text. As against H. von Arnim (Die Ent-
stehung der Gotteslehre des Aristoteles) who maintained (3), W.K.C.
Guthrie, followed by H. Cherniss, holds that the distinct changeless
cause is not redundant even if the subject of eternal rotation is
endowed with a nature to rotate (Guthrie, 'The Development of Aris¬
totle's Theology' (I), Classical Quarterly vol. XXVII, 1933, and
introduction to Loeb De Caelo\ Cherniss, Aristotle's Criticism of
Plato and the Academy, App. X, pp. 584 ff.) Guthrie in fact claims
not merely that the doctrine of eternal body as natured to rotate
is consistent with that of the changeless agent, but that the former
doctrine is incomplete without the latter.
The scholars just mentioned were especially concerned with the
De Caelo, but their views have implications for the argument of
Physics VIII, and especially for any assessment of the function of
"self-change" in that argument. If Guthrie and Cherniss are right,
"self-change" is an unnecessary complication. If it is possible to
argue for the changeless eternal agent even on the assumption that
the primum mobile is, as in De Caelo I, of a nature analogous to
that of fire etc. then Aristotle had no need to introduce a special
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category of natural changes (self-changes) from which those of fire
etc. were carefully excluded. Nor need he have insisted on the dis¬
tinction between internal agent and patient within the so-called self-
changers. His purpose of arriving at the position of VIII 6 would
have been equally well served if he had adhered to the II 1 concep¬
tion of nature as an inner principle without subdividing natural sub¬
stances into self-changers and non-self-changers. (This is not to say
that he would have regarded them as all alike ensouled or not en¬
souled, but that this difference would not have mattered for the
argument.) Or if, when treating of eternal things, his sense of con¬
tinuity with Platonic tradition inclined him to use the Platonic term
'self-changer' in this context, he could have used it without adding
the un-Platonic assumption that it implies a distinction between
changer-self and changed-self. In that case, the term would have
functioned as an equivalent to 'originator of change', and have applied
as well to fire etc. as to organic creatures: in short, it would have
been a Platonically-tinged synonym for 'natural substance' as explained
in II 1.
It is Aristotle's refusal to use 'self-change' in this simple
sense, and his insistence on the internal distinction, that generates
the serious doubts and obscurities which we surveyed near the begin¬
ning of Chapter V above. Thus if Guthrie and Cherniss are right,
these doubts and obscurities are not (as to me it seems they are) the
necessary price for an otherwise coherent argument culminating in
VIII 6; for the concept which generates them, the concept of "self-
change", turns out to be an unhelpful intruder. It is not incredible
that Aristotle should have failed to realise this; indeed Guthrie
seems to suggest that it is not until Metaphysics A (where 'self-
change' does not appear) that he reaches a coherent position concern¬
ing the Unmoved Mover.
To support his claim of compatibility between the doctrine of
eternal body as having a nature like that of fire, and the postulate
of a distinct cause of its motion, Guthrie maintains that the concept
of nature undergoes development in the Physics, its original meaning
being supplemented by a new metaphysical refinement.
'[According to] the principles of the first books
of the Physics ... change and motion is to be regarded
as the actualization of a potency. This actualization
takes place because the cpuats of things is something
dynamic, an inward urge towards the realization of
form. But by the time the investigations of the Physics
were completed by the theories of books VII and VIII, A.
had logical proof of what he had always believed to be
true, but would not allow himself to state until the
proof was ready to hand, namely that this inward urge
would remain dormant unless there were actually existent
some external perfection to awaken it, by instilling
the desire of imitation, in so far as that was possible
for each thing in its own particular mode of being.'
(Classical Quarterly, 1933, p. 171)
(Since Cherniss does not question these remarks, presumably he would
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not reject them.) I shall not consider whether Aristotle had 'always'
held the belief attributed to him in the last few lines, but only
whether he holds it in the last book of the Physios. For, clearly,
if he does, then he holds there that a thing moves because of its
nature and because of the eternal Unmoved Mover (the latter being
what Guthrie means by 'some external perfection'). Now if in partic¬
ular this is Aristotle's view concerning the primum mobile of Physios
VIII, then the latter's dependence on the eternal Unmoved Mover is no
reason against his retaining the Be Caelo I analogy between the primum
mobile and fire, earth, etc. Thus the Physios VIII comparison of
primum mobile with a self-moving organism, and the implied contrast
with inanimate substances, contributes nothing to the main argument of
that book.
In the passage quoted Guthrie starts with the concept of a
nature as an active principle (that on account of which a substance
changes in a certain way unless prevented), and then distinguishes
within this two metaphysical factors: one is the ground of there
being any change at all, which he identifies with the urge or desire
to imitate the absolute perfection of the eternal Unmoved Mover, while
the other is that which determines the particular way in which the
imitation of absolute perfection will be realised in the particular
case. It is the second factor that Guthrie identifies with nature in
the "developed" account. Clearly, 'nature' in the latter sense (in
which it refers not to an active or dynamic principle but to a
metaphysically distinguishable component of a dynamic principle) is
consistent with and indeed entails (final) causation by the Unmoved
Mover. But it is doubtful whether in Physics VIII (whatever may be
the case in the Metaphysics) Aristotle ever uses 'nature' in this
sense. For in this sense of 'nature' the Unmoved Mover is present
(as final cause or object of imitation) with equal immediacy to the
natures of all natural substances - or perhaps we should say, with
equal remoteness. There is nothing "between" the absolutely perfect
being and the substances that try through change to imitate it,
except the metaphysical gap between finite physical perfection and
absolute changeless perfection; and this gap is the same for all
changing substances. But in Physios VIII the eternal Unmoved Mover
is in a special sense separated from sublunary substances, because
they depend on it only at physical removes, via the mediation of the
eternal spheres and in particular the outermost. This fits with the
analogy Body: Soul : : Eternally rotating outermost sphere: Eternal
changeless cause, because a soul is intimately related to one body,
and to other physical substances only via this body. (For a penetrat¬
ing discussion of this question see M. de Corte, Revue de I'histoive
de la Philosophie V, 1931.)
It is therefore a reasonable conclusion that in Physios VIII
Aristotle is not using 'nature' in Guthrie's narrow and metaphysically
analytical sense. If he is not, then presumably 'nature' continues
in VIII as in II to signify the dynamic principle, or that about a
substance on account of which it does change in a certain way unless
prevented. But a substance endowed with nature in this sense cannot
depend for its change on anything other than its natural self except
insofar as the change can be hindered. That is, it depends on favour¬
able conditions and on whatever is responsible for those conditions.
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Thus the statement that a sublunary substance changes by its own
nature does not exclude the ultimate dependence of this change
on some external unmoved mover; for the eternal motion caused by
the latter may be supposed to keep going (by however many causal
stages) the seasonal conditions and developments that make possible
the sublunary natural change. However, in such cases, the natural
change depends on the eternal agent only because it depends more
immediately on physically external conditions. Where there are no
external conditions or possible hindrances, as in the case of the
primary eternal change, there cannot be an agent whose responsibility
for the change consists entirely in its ensuring the continuance of
favourable conditions. Either there is no agent or the agent does
more than create the possibility of change. So if the primary eternal
motion has a distinct eternal agent, this can only be because the agent
determines the motion, not because (as with sublunary substances) it
makes possible the motion already determined by the substance's nature.
If then the primwn mobile were by nature determined to move as it
does, there would be no function for a distinct agent. Nature (in
the sense of dynamic principle) is not in general incompatible with
dependence on the eternal Unmoved Mover, but it is so in the case of
the first eternal body because of this body's unique independence of
physically external conditions.
In Physics VIII Aristotle goes to great lengths to prove that
there is at least one eternal change and that it is circular loco¬
motion. Yet (by contrast with De Caelo I) he never says that this
change stems from its subject's nature. The eternally moving body
is never said to have a nature at all. This is evidence that (pace
Guthrie) Aristotle in VIII uses 'nature' as meaning 'dynamic prin¬
ciple' , and that he is now aware of inconsistency in attributing
nature in this sense to an object immediately kept in necessary
motion by the ultimate cause.
It might be argued as follows that even on the scheme of Physics
VIII the object could be said to have a nature: this object is to its
changeless cause as body to soul in sublunary organic self-movers, and
the bodily matter of an organism even considered in abstraction from
the soul is said in VIII 4 to have a natural tendency which may or may
not coincide with the natural tendency of the body-soul concrete as a
whole. But would we be entitled to attribute to the bodily matter its
own nature were it not the case that sometimes the natural change of
the organism as a whole goes against this by a kind of constraint? If
the tendency of the bodily matter were always and completely in harmony
with that of the whole, then the former could be said to have its own
nature only on the grounds that when it decomposes it will yield
simple stuffs whose actual natural motions differ from those of the
living organism (of. Chapter II, paragraph (35)). Since an eternal
body cannot decompose, the primwv mobile has no nature of its own in
this sense, nor in the sense of requiring to be constrained to move
as it does. The point could be discussed more fully, but enough has
been said to show that Aristotle had good reason to refrain from
endowing the primum mobile with any kind of a nature, given that he
makes its motion depend upon a cause distinct from itself.
It may seem unduly paradoxical that this body, which is after
all a physical object, should not possess a nature (in the sense of
II 1) and hence fail to qualify for the category of natural substance.
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Yet Physics VIII entails this, just as Physics IV entails the paradox,
which Aristotle openly accepts, that the primum mobile has no place
(IV 5, 212b8 - 10). We may recall too the De Philosophia (see Cicero,
De Natura Deorum, ii, 16, 44), according to which the motion of the
heavens is voluntary, and voluntary change is neither natural nor
enforced, but forms a third category. A being whose only motion is
voluntary must be presumed not to possess a nature in the sense of
principle of natural change; thus the concept of a nature-less
physical substance was not at every stage alien to Aristotle. This
is not to say that the position of Physics VIII requires him to hold
that the primum mobile's motion is voluntary; the triple division of
De Philosophia is of interest here not on account of its positive
characterisation of the third type of change, but because it recog¬
nises that 'natural' and 'enforced' do not exhaust the possibilities,
and are equally unsuitable to describe the primary motion.
It may be disturbing to have to admit the existence of a moving
physical object that stands in causal relation to other physical (and
natural) substances, yet is natureless itself; but this is the lesser
of two conceptual evils. For in denying a nature to the primum mobile,
we are safe at least from being compelled at the same time to assert
one; whereas in asserting one, we should also have to deny it. If
the primum mobile is of a nature to rotate, then (given that this
excludes a distinct agent) the rotation is not a change or xtvqaus in
Aristotle's sense of 'incomplete actuality' (so we argued in the text);
but then since 'nature is an inner principle of change or xuvqats',
the "nature" that thus manifests itself is not after all a nature.
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